Atttachment 0012 - AMCOM Regulation 702-7 19 June 2017.pdf

AMCOM Regulation 702-7

Aviation Engineering

Aviation Critical Safety Items, Critical Application Items, and New Source Testing Program Management

Headquarters U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command Redstone Arsenal, AL 35898-5000 19 June 2017

UNCLASSIFIED

Headquarter U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command Redstone Arsenal, Alabama 35898-5000

AMCOM Regulation 702-07

19 June2017

Aviation Engineering

Aviation Critical Safety ltems, CriticalApplication ltems, and New Source Testing Program Management

FOR TH ER:

PRICKETÏ

COL, AV

Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL

llsll

STEVE FISHER

Secretary of the General Staff

HISTORY. This publication is a major re-write of this AMCOM regulation.

SUMMARY. This regulation prescribes policy, procedures, and assigns responsibilities for enforcing the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM) Flight Safety Parts/New Source Testing Program.

APPLICABILITY. This regulation applies to all elements of AMCOM, its subordinate organizations, and Program Executive Offices (PEO), and their organizations. ïhis FSP/NST Program applies to all army aviation systems. This regulation applies to all Flight Safety Parts (FSP) to include those delivered as part of end item aircraft and those bought as spare parts from the Prime or alternate source vendors. The requirements of this regulation also apply to assemblies containing FSP.

PROPONENT AND EXCEPTION AUTHORITY. The proponent of this publication is the AMCOM Research, Development, and Engineering Center. Only the proponent has the authority to approve exceptions to this regulation.

Army lnternal Control System. This regulation does not contain internal control provisions as outlined in the Management Control Evaluation Process.

SUPPLEMENTATION. lssue of supplements to this regulation by subordinate commanders is prohibited unless specifically approved by AED.

Suggested lmprovements. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications) to AMRDEC, ATTN: RDMR-AEM, Redstone Arsenal, AL 35898-5000

Distribution. This publication is approved for public release, distribution unlimited z AMCOM Reg702-7. 19 June 2017

AMCOM Reg 702-7 • 19 June 2017

SUMMARY of CHANGE

AMCOM Regulation 702-7 Aviation Critical Safety Items, Critical Application Items, and New Source Testing Program Management

This complete rewrite dated 19 June 2017-o Incorporates the requirements of The Department of the Army Pamphlet 95-9 (DA Pam 95-9) dated 25 January 2006 and the Joint Aeronautical Commander’s Group (JACG) Aviation Critical Safety Item Management Handbook dated 16 March 2011.

o Changes the title of the AMCOM Regulation to more accurately reflect the content of the regulation (cover).

o Makes administrative changes (throughout).

o Added Appendix F, G, H, and I.

Headquarters AMCOM Regulation 702-7 U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command Redstone Arsenal, AL 35898-5000 19 June 2017 Effective 19 June 2017

Aviation Engineering

Aviation Critical Safety Items, Critical Application Items, and New Source Testing Program Management

History. This publication is a major rewrite.

Summary. This regulation prescribes Army specific requirements to enforce Department of Defense (DoD) policy, prescribes procedures, and assigns responsibilities for enforcing the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM) and the Aviation and Missile Research, Development, and Engineering Center (AMRDEC) Critical Safety Items (CSI), Critical Application Items (CAI), and New Source Testing (NST) program.

Applicability. This regulation applies to all elements of AMCOM, its subordinate organizations, AMRDEC, Program Executive Offices (PEO), and their organizations. This CSI/CAI/NST Program applies to all Army aviation systems. This regulation describes the controls that these organizations shall apply to all CSIs to include those delivered as part of end item aircraft and those bought as spare parts from the Prime Contractor or alternate source vendors or overhauled by commercial or organic sources. The requirements of this regulation also describe controls for assemblies containing CSI(s).

Proponent and exception authority.

The proponent of this publication is the AMRDEC Aviation Engineering Directorate (AED). Only the proponent has the authority to approve exceptions to this regulation.

Army internal control process. This regulation does not contain internal control provisions as outlined in the Management Control Evaluation Process.

Supplementation. Issue of supplements to this regulation by subordinate commanders is prohibited unless specifically approved by AED.

Suggested improvements. Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications) to AMRDEC, ATTN: RDMR-AEM, Redstone Arsenal. AL 35898-5000.

Distribution. This publication is approved for public release, distribution unlimited.

Contents (Listed by paragraph and page number)

Chapter 1 Introduction, page 7 Purpose • 1–1, page 7 References • 1–2, page 7 Explanation of abbreviations and terms • 1–3, page 7

Chapter 2 Army aviation requirements, page 7 Management requirements • 2-1, page 7 Acquisition requirements • 2-2, page 7 Supply requirements • 2-3, page 7 Higher tier documents • 2-4, page 8

*This regulation supersedes AMCOM Regulation 702-7, dated 23 October 2000.

Chapter 3 General, page 8 Prime contractors • 3-1, page 8 Contractors (to include prime contractors) • 3-2, page 8 Nonconforming characteristics • 3-3, page 9 Field Level Maintenance • 3-4, page 9 Organic and commercial M&O operations • 3-5, page 9 Procurement of critical safety items • 3-6, page 9 Reports of Nonconformances • 3-7, page 10 Designation of critical safety items and critical application items • 3-8, page 10 Critical safety item criteria • 3-9, page 10 Critical application item criteria • 3-10, page 12 Critical and major characteristics • 3-11, page 12 Aviation weapon system qualification, upgrades, or modifications • 3-12, page 12 Changes in CSI/CAI/NST status • 3-13, page 13 Critical safety item/critical application item contract requirements • 3-14, page 14 Joint service critical safety item requirements • 3-15, page 14 Critical safety item data repositories • 3-16, page 14 Reverse engineering of critical safety items • 3-17, page 14 Mutilation of critical safety items • 3-18, page 15 Local manufacturing approval of critical safety items • 3-19, page 15 Qualification of new spares sources • 3-20, page 15 Performance based logistics contracts • 3-21, page 15 Software used in critical applications • 3-22, page 15

Chapter 4 Control and oversight of CSIs/CAIs/NSTs, page 16 Source control requirements • 4-1, page 16 First article test/production verification audit • 4-2, page 16 Quality assurance letters of instruction • 4-3, page 16 New source testing • 4-4, page 16 Critical application item M&O sources • 4-5, page 16 Production lot testing • 4-6, page 16 Audits • 4-7, page 17 Maintenance processes affecting critical or major characteristics • 4-8, page 17 Identification of approved maintenance critical application item sources • 4-9, page 17 Revalidation of technical data • 4-10, page 17 Frozen planning • 4-11, page 17

Chapter 5 Responsibilities, page 17 Director of Aviation Engineering Directorate, AMRDEC • 5–1, page 17 Program Executive Officer, Program Managers, Project Managers, Product Managers, Weapon System Managers • 5-2, page 19 Director, Army Contracting Command - Redstone • 5-3, page 19 Director of Engineering Directorate, AMRDEC • 5-4, page 19 Director, AMCOM Logistics Center (ALC) • 5-5, page 20 Chief, AMCOM Safety Office • 5-6, page 21 Competition Advocate, Competition Management Office • 5-7, page 21 AMCOM Legal Office • 5-8, page 21

Appendixes A. References, page 22

B. Critical Safety Item Program Documentation Control Statement of Work, page 252

C. QE-STD-1, page 31

D. QE-STD-2, page 41

E. TEST-STD-1, page 51

F. CSI Subvendor Qualification Requirements for Prime Contractors, page 53

G. Critical Safety Item/Critical Application Item Contract Requirements, page 54

H. Continuous Airworthiness Requirements for Oversight of New Manufacture and Overhaul of CSIs and CAIs, page 56

I. Revalidation of Technical Data, page 59

Glossary

Chapter 1 Introduction

1–1. Purpose This regulation prescribes Army specific requirements to enforce Department of Defense (DoD) policy, prescribes procedures, and assigns responsibilities for defining and uniformly enforcing the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM) and the Aviation and Missile Research, Development, and Engineering Center (AMRDEC) Critical Safety Items, Critical Application Items, and New Source Testing (CSI/CAI/NST) Programs. The CSI, CAI, and NST Programs are intended to provide enhanced life cycle management and control of parts critical to the safe operation, mission capability, and mission readiness of the aircraft. This document applies to aviation CSIs used in fixed and rotary wing aircraft, unmanned air vehicles, Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment (ALRE), aviation weapons and equipment, aviation software, and associated aviation support equipment. Additionally, this regulation applies to Foreign Military Sales (FMS) aircraft supported through a FMS case when they are still in active use in the Department of Defense (DoD) inventory or if the U.S. military is providing engineering expertise via a FMS case and CSI support is included in the FMS case. This regulation also defines when CSI requirements must be applied to Commercial and Commercial Derivative Aircraft (CDA), and to what extent those requirements must be applied. For the purposes of this document, procurement refers to prime item development and modification; low-rate initial production (LRIP) and full-rate production (FRP) of major systems;

procurement of maintenance and overhaul (M&O) services; and procurement of spare replacement parts.

1–2. References Required publications are listed in Appendix A.

1–3. Explanation of abbreviations and terms Abbreviations and special terms used in this regulation are defined in the glossary.

Chapter 2 Army aviation requirements

2-1. Management requirements Per Public Law 108-136, the organization responsible for ensuring airworthiness is considered the Design Control Activity and is also responsible for CSI processes. The Commanding General of AMCOM or their designated authority is responsible for airworthiness, per Army Regulation (AR) 70-62. The Aviation Engineering Directorate (AED), AMRDEC has been designated by the Commanding General as the airworthiness authority for standard Army aircraft. Throughout this regulation, Engineering Support Activity (ESA) is considered synonymous with Design Control Activity. The Engineering Directorate (ED) functions as Program Administrator for programs related to oversight of the CSIs, CAIs, and NST items established by the ESA as defined in Chapter 5.

2-2. Acquisition requirements CSI spare parts and M&O services shall only be procured from ESA approved sources. Spare parts with NST requirements shall also only be procured from ESA approved sources. For CSIs with NST requirements, only sources that have been approved and tested can be awarded a contract. The Commanding General, AMCOM, may waive this requirement in order to meet critical mission requirements, with consideration of airworthiness impact. If a contractor has difficulty in maintaining process control as evident through such things as adverse internal management audits, customer audits, the receipt of quality deficiency reports or other findings and the contractor fails to take effective corrective action, the contractor shall be subject to removal from the approved supplier list. CSIs shall not be procured through full and open competition nor be assigned an Acquisition Method Reason Code (AMRC) of 1G or 2G (full and open competition).

2-3. Supply requirements Only fully qualified CSIs and source controlled CAIs (manufactured or overhauled by an ESA approved source, to include meeting any NST requirements) will be released for use on Army aircraft. An exception to allow the release of less than fully qualified CSIs may be authorized after assessing the exception for airworthiness impact per AR 70-62, and approval of any resulting Airworthiness Impact Statement (AWIS), hazard assessment, or equivalent. Any previously issued CSI not manufactured or overhauled by an approved source will be either tested, removed from service, or be authorized through the risk management process. For the case of unqualified source controlled CAIs, hazard assessments and any associated risk acceptance will be processed using the Program Management Office (PMO) system safety management process.

2-4. Higher tier documents In addition to this regulation, all logistical and other CSI requirements of the following documents shall be complied with, in the following order of precedence:

a. Public Law 108-136, Section 802: Quality Control in Procurement of Aviation Critical Safety Items and Related Services.

b. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS).

c. DOD Regulation 4140.01: Quality Management Systems - Requirements for Aviation, Space and Defense Organizations.

d. DA Pam 95-9: Management of Aviation Critical Safety Items.

Chapter 3 General

3-1. Prime contractors The procuring agency (e.g., Program Manager, ALC) will ensure that all aircraft, engine, component, and subsystem Prime Contractors establish and maintain a CSI Program approved by the ESA. The Statement of Work (SOW) contained in Appendix B is a model contract SOW that may be tailored to meet specific program requirements and describes a minimally acceptable CSI Program to be maintained by Prime Contractors. The Prime Contractor's CSI program will be applicable to all end items and/or spare parts manufacture or M&O contracts procured from the same corporate entity or Commercial and Government Entity (CAGE) Code.

3-2. Contractors (to include prime contractors)

a. Approved sources. All CSIs shall be procured from ESA approved sources except in those cases where the AMCOM Commanding General has waived the approved source requirement (see Approved Source in the Glossary). Approval requirements for a new contractor shall be in accordance with the source approval request (SAR) procedures set forth in the Competition Management Office website (http://amcomdmz.redstone.army.mil/casl_cmo/casldba.casl_cmo_samsar). The objective is to achieve competition among approved CSI suppliers and their products/services and to ensure that potential new CSI suppliers and their products are effectively evaluated prior to delivery of CSIs to the Services. Dealers and distributors must be ESA approved and must procure parts or services from ESA approved sources.

b. Contract requirement. All contracts for CSIs shall reference and require compliance to QE-STD-1 for spares manufacturers or QE-STD-2 for M&O, (see Appendix C & D). Contracts or SOWs may reference a contractor’s CSI program in lieu of QE-STD-1 or QE-STD-2 if that program has been approved as an equivalent program by the ESA. The exception to this requirement is contracts for CSIs where the only critical characteristics (CC) are installation CCs or are similar to “Buy from approved sources”. A CC of “Buy from approved sources” is met by procuring the part from the ESA approved source, and therefore is an Acquisition requirement instead of a contractor requirement (note: “Buy from approved sources” is no longer considered an acceptable CC for new CSIs and new systems). Manufacture and overhaul of CAIs and NST items that are not CSIs will not be controlled by QE-STD-1 and QE-STD-2.

c. Serialization. Contractors for CSI manufacture shall be required to assign serial numbers unless the ESA has determined that the item only requires lot traceability. CSIs that also have a Serial Number Reporting Requirement (SNRR) shall also meet the requirements of AMCOM Regulation 700-39. Spares Technical Data Packages (STDP) and/or contracts for CSIs shall include serialization requirements, if applicable. All CSIs that do not require serialization shall be assigned lot numbers by the manufacturer and shall have lot traceability. M&O contractors shall be required to maintain the original serial number or original lot number on each CSI throughout the M&O process and to maintain traceability to M&O processes performed on that serial or lot number. CSIs shall be Item Unique Identification (IUID) marked as defined by MIL-STD-130.

3-3. Nonconforming characteristics Nonconforming CCs shall not be accepted through a contractor Materiel Review Board (MRB) action. Requests for waivers/deviations of CCs shall be classified as critical and will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Action on such a request may result in a change to the technical data requirements, deletion of the CC in its entirety, or disapproval of the request. All Nonconformances classified as critical or major, as defined in Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 46.101 and DA Pam 95-9, shall be reviewed by the ESA. The ESA may delegate review of minor Nonconformances on a CSI to the Defense Contracts Management Agency (DCMA). The ESA may also withdraw this delegation.

3-4. Field level maintenance All CSI information relevant to authorized field maintenance, shipping, handling, preservation, and packaging shall be incorporated into the appropriate Technical Bulletins (TB), Technical Manuals (TM), or other instructions. These documents will identify the CSI, CCs, and provide technical information necessary to ensure the continued safe operation of the CSI.

3-5. Organic and commercial M&O operations

a. Distribution of critical safety item information. All CSI information relevant to authorized depot maintenance, shipping, handling, preservation, and packaging shall be incorporated into the appropriate TBs, TMs, Depot Maintenance Work Requirements (DMWR), or other instructions.

b. Critical safety item program compliance. All sources for CSI M&O services shall be required to comply with QE-STD-2 (see Appendix D) or ESA approved equivalent. Commercial and organic activities performing depot operations shall have documented and effective quality management programs which complies with all CSI requirements, including managing production processes and identifying critical characteristics.

c. Critical safety item replacement parts. All CSIs procured or manufactured as replacement parts for use in M&O processes shall be procured from ESA approved sources and shall be manufactured in accordance with QE-STD-1 or ESA approved equivalent.

d. Manufacture of a critical safety item by a source performing repair or overhaul. All Government depot/contractor organizations performing M&O functions with a need to manufacture a CSI must obtain source approval from the ESA. Approval processes will be the same as source approval for new acquisition of the same part. Approval for a one-time manufacture does not require the full source approval process but must meet the requirements for one-time manufacture described in DA Pam 95-9.

e. Special repair activity. Special Repair Activity (SRA) will not be approved for any repair which could affect a CC of a CSI without ESA approval. The ESA will review the planning and other associated documents and may require a Product Verification Audit (PVA) or other methods of verification for critical processes. Any activity performing depot level tasks on a CSI or assembly containing CSI will be required to comply with QE-STD-2.

3-6. Procurement of critical safety items All CSIs shall be procured utilizing the ESA approved sources, the ESA approved CSI STDP requirements, if any, and all ESA required CSI contract clauses, regardless of the Agency procuring the CSI.

a. Local purchase. Local purchase of CSI is not authorized, unless waived by the ESA prior to purchase due to an urgent and compelling need.

b. Surplus. Procurement of recycled, recovered, remanufactured, used, or reconditioned CSIs is not authorized, unless waived by the ESA. Offerors of unused former Government surplus CSIs must provide documentation to the ESA showing traceability to the approved/qualified source of supply. The ESA may approve surplus offers for new/unused CSIs after considering traceability, part revisions/usability, shelf life, condition of the items, and CSI requirements for the item during original manufacture.

c. Pre-award survey and First Article Test/Production Verification Audit. In accordance with subpart 9.1 and 9.3 of the FAR, the Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) shall request a pre-award survey and require a First Article Test (FAT) or PVA for all CSIs. The requirement may be waived by the ESA if all of the following conditions are met:

(1) The contractor has previously completed a FAT/PVA and manufactured or overhauled the item or higher assembly within the last 3 years for a DoD contract as an ESA approved source. Waiver of a production FAT only applies if the contractor has produced new spares in the last 3 years. Waiver of an overhaul PVA only applies if the contractor has overhauled the item in the last 3 years.

PVA or alternate FAT procedures may be authorized for spares contracts with ESA approval. The parts must have been produced or overhauled to the Army’s current CSI requirements.

(2) There is no adverse/unfavorable quality history against the part and/or contractor.

(3) There have been no changes in technical data, to the item, manufacturing/overhaul processes, manufacturing/overhaul location or changes to subcontractors used to manufacture/overhaul the item successfully in the past that would affect the contractor's capability to produce or overhaul a part to the current technical and quality requirements.

(4) There are no emerging airworthiness or quality issues with the item being procured or the procurement source. The ESA determines that items produced in the absence of a full or normal FAT/PVA will continue to meet the ongoing airworthiness requirements and will have 100 percent compliance with all CCs.

d. Purchase of kits containing critical safety items. Kits (i.e. ground support equipment, installation, aircraft modification kit, or any other kit of parts used for overhaul) containing CSIs are to be treated as CSIs, whether or not the kit itself is designated as a CSI. All CSI restrictions and requirements apply to the kit as an assembly.

e. Waivers/deviations to critical safety item requirements. CSI requirements for Army CSIs can only be waived with written approval from the ESA and are typically only done on a case-by-case basis. The ESA will approve/disapprove all requests for waiver for local purchase, special repair, reclamation of previously condemned, or offers of unused former Government surplus CSI in addition to evaluating waivers/deviations for CSI contract requirements, and will coordinate with the Engineering Directorate (ED), AMRDEC, as required, for FAT/PVA waivers.

3-7. Reports of nonconformances Product Quality Deficiency Reports (PQDR), Reports of Discrepancy (ROD), accident reports, or any other reports of Nonconformances or quality escapes against CSIs shall be given immediate attention to determine if alert actions are required due to safety considerations.

These reports will be screened against the established listing of identified CSIs, including analysis of prior part failure history. A PQDR relating to a CC of a CSI shall be classified as CAT I. CAT I PQDRs shall be processed in accordance with Army Regulation 702-7.

3-8. Designation of critical safety items and critical application items The CSI and CAI designation is generally applied to repairable and consumable parts. Items that are produced and assembled once during the initial aircraft manufacture (e.g., non-repairable structures such as some bulkheads, spars, ribs, etc.) should not be designated as CSIs or CAIs unless the ESA determines a need or changes to acquisition planning require subsequent procurement or repair.

a. Airframes. Airframes (e.g., complete helicopters) shall not be designated as CSIs or CAIs. Unless otherwise directed by the ESA, critical items should be identified at the lowest level at which items will be procured or replenished by the Government or Contractor during subsequent maintenance or overhaul.

b. Assemblies. Assemblies containing CSI or CAI subcomponents shall also be designated at the same level. CSI assemblies should be assigned a CC of “Assembly contains CSI(s)”, in addition to any other CCs that may apply at the assembly level. This does not imply that every subcomponent of a critical assembly is CSI. Only those subcomponents individually assessed to be relevant to the safety-critical nature of the assembly should be designated CSI. CCs defined at a subcomponent level do not need to be replicated at the assembly level.

c. Kits. If a kit contains any CSIs, then the kit part number should also be designated as a CSI with a CC indicating that the kit contains a CSI or CSIs and listing which part numbers are CSIs. Depot assembled kits and kits otherwise assembled with DoD stock require CSI traceability.

3-9. Critical safety item criteria For the purpose of this instruction “Critical Safety Item,” “Flight Safety Critical Aircraft Part,” “Flight Safety Part,” “Safety of Flight Item,” and similar terms are synonymous. The term CSI shall be the encompassing term used throughout this instruction. Per Public Law 108-136, a CSI is a part, assembly, installation equipment, launch equipment, recovery equipment, or support equipment for an aircraft or aviation weapons system that contains a characteristic any failure, malfunction, or absence of which could cause a catastrophic or critical failure resulting in the loss or serious damage to the aircraft or weapons system, an unacceptable risk of personal injury or loss of life, or an uncommanded engine shutdown that jeopardizes safety. The following criteria shall be used to determine whether a part meets the CSI definition and must be classified as a CSI:

a. Critical safety item determination. The determining factor in CSIs is the consequence of failure. CSIs must contain a characteristic whose failure would lead to a failure of the item in a way that would lead to a catastrophic or critical failure resulting in the loss of or serious damage to the weapon system, an unacceptable risk of personal injury, or loss of life (as defined by MIL-STD-882), an uncommanded engine shutdown, and/or an uncontained engine failure that jeopardizes safety. The characteristics that would lead to a catastrophic or critical failure shall be classified as CCs. CCs should be based on a Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) or a similar analysis. Items with a CC shall be defined as CSIs. An item that does not have a CC, as demonstrated through a FMECA or similar analysis, does not meet the CSI definition; however, the ESA has the final authority on whether or not to include a part on the CSI list.

b. Dependent failure. A dependent failure is defined as a failure caused by the failure of an associated item. As applied to CSI determinations, if failure of one item causes failure of another item or items in an unstoppable chain of events (i.e., a domino effect) causing one of the consequences described within this section, then the first item shall be designated as a CSI, and subsequent items shall be evaluated individually. For example, an item shall be identified as a CSI when failure would result in a loss of power to the main and/or tail rotor systems or a loss of control to the aircraft. If the failure of the item could not cause a catastrophic chain of events, it is not a CSI.

c. Already designated by the prime contractor or original equipment manufacturer. An item shall be identified as CSI when the Prime Contractor or Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) has classified the part as a “flight safety part”, “flight critical part”, or similar terminology unless determined otherwise by the ESA.

d. Designated by another service. An item shall be identified as a CSI when any ESA signature authority to the JACG CSI Instruction considers the part to be a CSI unless determined otherwise by the ESA.

e. Assemblies containing critical safety items. Any assembly containing one or more CSI subcomponents shall also be a CSI, but this does not mean that every single subcomponent within the assembly is a CSI.

f. Excluding factors for critical safety item designation.

(1) Functional redundancy. Non-identical or functionally redundant items should not be classified as CSIs. Functionally redundant items are items where primary components are backed-up by components composed of different items or technologies (e.g., battery backup to a generator or dual independent flight controls) that allow continued and safe operation. Items are not considered functionally redundant if failure of one item could directly lead to a failure of the other system(s) as discussed in paragraph 3-9.b.

i. Items comprising identical or physically redundant systems should be classified as CSIs. In this case, a defect that affects one item could also simultaneously affect multiple redundant items. In a multiple engine aircraft, a part whose failure would result in the complete loss of power from one engine shall be considered a CSI. However, for physically redundant fasteners or other systems with multiple redundant items performing the same function, the items may be excluded based on an engineering analysis or test (e.g., frequency of inspection, type/effectiveness of inspection, detectability of a failure, fastener pattern, and existing quality controls required by the drawing or specification).

ii. If redundant items have a failure mode that interferes with continued operation of the remaining items (e.g., tandem actuators), then the redundancy would not be considered in the criticality determination. If a redundant system/item has a failure mode where control would not switch from a primary system/item to a secondary system/item, then the redundancy should not be considered.

(2) Latent or hidden failures. A latent or hidden failure is defined as a failure that is inherently undetected when it occurs. If a latent and/or hidden failure of an item could cause a catastrophic or critical consequence, then it shall be designated as CSI. Mitigating actions such as inspections called out in technical publications should be considered as part of the analysis. Latent/hidden failures may occur and remain undetected because of any of the below:

i. The effects of the failure on the system are masked by other components.

ii. The existence of one failure mode masks the existence of a second failure mode.

iii. The system is not normally operating.

(3) Safety or relief devices. Safety or relief devices such as monitoring or alarm provisions which permit effective operation (e.g., through human intervention) or limit damage may be considered for exclusion from CSI designation. Failure of survival equipment and safety systems used in emergency situations where the item is placed in operation only when the platform has experienced a catastrophic failure is considered an independent failure. Those items should not be classified as CSIs unless they are subject to latent/hidden failures.

(4) Foreign object damage. Items should not be classified as CSIs if a Foreign Object Damage (FOD) induced failure is the sole basis for a CSI designation. An exception to this is the latent failure of FOD Prevention systems. Latent failure of a FOD Prevention system could lead to a situation where a pilot enters a FOD rich environment (such as a dust storm) expecting the system to work, leading to engine failure or failure of another CSI assembly. In cases where FOD will lead to a dependent failure as defined in this section, the item should be classified as a CSI.

(5) Installation critical. In cases where the only CC of an item relates to the part’s installation, then the item should not be deemed a CSI unless the item joins two items or joins an item to the aircraft. Instead, the installation feature of the part should be listed as a CC of the assembly or assemblies into which it is installed. CCs shall not be defined as “installation” by itself, without defining the actual operation. Instead, installation related CCs should define the aspect of the installation that is critical. For example, a torque range, orientation, etc. are acceptable CCs. In the case that a piece part has proper installation as its only CC, consideration should be given to designating the next higher assembly as CSI with the appropriate installation CC. In cases of functionally redundant features, an item may be deemed not to be installation critical. For example, a bolt that is torqued and then has safety wire or a cotter pin installed may not be considered installation critical.

3-10. Critical application item criteria CSIs are a subset of CAIs. All CSIs are CAIs but not all CAIs are CSIs. In this regulation, when referring to the category of part, the strictest label shall apply (i.e., CAIs that are non-CSIs will be referred to as CAIs. CAIs that are CSIs will be referred to as CSIs.). An item shall be designated as a CAI if the item is essential to weapon system performance or operation, or the preservation of life or safety of operating personnel, as determined by the ESA.

3-11. Critical and major characteristics

a. Critical characteristics (CC). A CC is any feature or material attribute throughout the life cycle of a CSI, such as dimension, finish, tensile strength, material or assembly, manufacturing or inspection process, installation, operation, field maintenance, or depot overhaul requirement which if nonconforming, missing or degraded could cause the failure or malfunction of the CSI. The preferred method of defining a CC is to define the actual characteristic as well as the verification/validation method or method of achieving the characteristic (e.g. tensile strength xx as verified through hardness test results of yy). CCs are further sub-divided into manufacturing critical characteristic (M), depot critical characteristic (D), or installation critical characteristic (I). CCs shall be defined for all CSIs.

b. Major characteristics (MC). A MC is any feature or material attribute that analysis indicates is not critical but is likely, if defective, to result in failure of the end item to perform a required mission. MCs may be defined for CSIs and CAIs when additional quality controls are deemed necessary by the ESA. MCs are only mandatory for NST items that are CAI, but not CSI and have a Fatigue, Endurance, or Interchangeability testing requirement.

3-12. Aviation weapon system qualification, upgrades, or modifications The following requirements shall be applied to new weapon systems during development or upgrades/modification to existing weapon systems, in addition to using the criteria listed in section 3-9 to determine CSI status:

a. Identification of critical safety items, critical application items, and parts requiring new source testing. Prime Contractors (or DoD engineering organizations for DoD developed systems) shall be required to develop a list of all CSIs and CAIs and their associated CCs and MCs, respectively. The initial lists shall be developed and delivered to the Government prior to the system entering its Critical Design Review (CDR). CSI drawings and other associated technical data shall state that the item is a CSI and list all CCs prior to exiting CDR. Any items requiring NST shall define the test requirements to qualify new contractors on the drawings and other associated technical data. The initial CSI list shall be approved by the ESA prior to exiting CDR. The list should continue to evolve as the design and supportability analyses reach final stages of maturity, culminating at the Physical Configuration Audit (PCA). Based on the PCA, a final CSI/CAI/NST list shall be documented and approved by the ESA prior to the Full Rate Production (FRP) Decision Review. The Prime Contractor list should be considered to be a recommendation. The ESA is the final authority for determining whether an item is a CSI or CAI.

b. Failure analysis. A FMECA or other similar failure analysis shall be used to define which components within the weapon system have failure modes that meet the CSI definition. The analysis shall also be used to identify CCs based on the failure modes. The results of the analysis shall be delivered to the Government. CCs will be re-evaluated as new modifications and repairs are developed.

c. Upgrades and Modifications. Upgrades and modifications that do not follow the full development cycle shall have CSIs and CAIs identified as otherwise required in paragraph 3-12.a. The ESA may determine that an upgrade or modification does not affect the CSI or CAI lists, in which case the prime contractor does not need to meet the requirements in paragraph 3-12.a. A FMECA should be used as justification if an upgrade or modification does not affect the CSI or CAI list.

d. CSI requirements for Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) type certificated commercial aircraft.

(1) CSI qualification requirements. When the Army procures or otherwise uses an unmodified Federal Aviation Administration

(FAA) type certificated aircraft, the ESA may determine that FAA design and production oversight meets all CSI requirements and no further oversight is required. The aircraft must maintain its FAA type certificate throughout its life if no further ESA CSI oversight is to be provided. The ESA shall establish CSI oversight requirements for any portion of a commercial aircraft’s life where it is not covered by a FAA type certificate. In order to maintain a FAA type certificate, an aircraft must be manufactured, operated, and maintained in accordance with FAA requirements and use FAA approved repair stations, unless the FAA agrees to provide additional oversight though a Memorandum of Agreement. A CSI list is still required for FAA type certificated aircraft that will also have an Army Airworthiness Release. “Verification of FAA certification and/or tags” shall be identified as the CC. In cases where a commercial aircraft will not be operated and/or maintained to FAA requirements, the ESA may determine that no additional CSI oversight is required for acceptance of new aircraft, but the aircraft would transition to an Army managed CSI program for M&O. Under these circumstances, “verification of FAA certification and/or tags” shall be identified as a manufacturing CC. Installation and depot CCs shall be identified as described in the paragraphs above.

(2) CSI quality requirements. When the Army procures a commercial aircraft, it acts as the “owner/operator” under FAA guidelines.

The Army (not the FAA) is responsible for providing quality oversight for the aircraft and any spare or overhauled parts. Whether or not the aircraft maintains its type certificate throughout its life, the ESA and Program Manager shall review the Prime Contractor’s quality program for the system and may add ESA defined quality requirements to the Prime Contractor’s development/production contract(s).

e. Critical safety item requirements for commercial derivative aircraft (CDA) and aircraft based on a commercial design.

(1) Federal Aviation Administration type certificate applicability. Aircraft operated and maintained outside of FAA oversight will not retain their FAA type certificates. Therefore, the Army CSI requirements outlined in this document shall apply. If the aircraft is delivered with an FAA type certificate, refer to the requirements for Commercial Aircraft.

(2) CSI requirements for commercial derivative aircraft. For the purposes of this section, CDA are any aircraft based on a commercial design and operated by the military without maintaining a commercial FAA certification or type certificate. This includes commercial aircraft modified for military use, military unique designs modified from a commercial design, and commercial aircraft with military unique equipment. The ESA shall review all modifications, including minor modifications, from a commercial design to determine if the modifications meet the CSI definition and are not covered by a FAA certification. Aircraft, assemblies, and/or components that are not operated within the FAA approved design and operational requirements must be identified and controlled to military CSI requirements. Other assemblies or components within the aircraft that are operated and maintained entirely within the FAA design and operational requirements may be treated as described in paragraph 3-12.d. for commercial aircraft as deemed acceptable by the ESA. Examples include the following: a commercial aircraft modified for a mid-air refueling mission, a commercial helicopter modified to fly and fire weapons in a war zone, or a commercial aircraft modified with a new transmission or engine.

(3) Federal Aviation Administration oversight of commercial derivative aircraft. When the Army acquires a CDA, compliance with Federal Aviation Regulations and FAA oversight cannot be assumed. Military aircraft and equipment, whether or not based on FAA certified designs, are considered “Public Aircraft” by statute and are exempt from Federal Aviation Regulations and FAA oversight.

FAA’s involvement with Public Aircraft is at FAA’s discretion. To address this, the Military Departments, US Coast Guard, and FAA established a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), FAA Order 8110.101, to provide reimbursable FAA support for commercial derivative aircraft. Under the MOA, FAA “Baseline Support Services” are centrally funded and apply when Army requirements are fundamentally the same as those in the civil sector. When FAA oversight will not be provided, then military CSI requirements shall apply.

(4) FAA “Program Support Services”. FAA “Program Support Services” apply when Army requirements are substantially different from the civil aircraft application. FAA “Program Support Services” are individually negotiated and funded by PMOs and can vary widely between programs. Therefore, the ESA needs to understand the degree to which FAA support to a commercial derivative aircraft program effectively satisfies military CSI objectives, how to take best advantage of FAA approaches when they are provided, and how to address the situation when FAA approaches are not sufficient or available.

3-13. Changes in CSI/CAI/NST status.

a. CSI/CAI/NST status downgrades. Parts downgraded from a CSI, CAI, or NST to a lower criticality shall have all records maintained that were generated under the previous designation. Maintainers of any affected technical documents shall be advised so that those documents can be revised to the new criticality requirements.

b. Legacy part requirements. Fielded parts that are designated as a CSI, CAI, or NST that previously were designated at a lower level or have had a change to their defined CCs or MCs shall be evaluated to determine what actions are necessary for already fielded items that were not manufactured under that criticality. Open contracts shall also be evaluated to determine whether modifications are necessary. When the fielded parts and open contracts are evaluated, the safety impact should be considered. If the criticality is changed due to changes in requirements, previously unknown failure modes, routine re-evaluation for criticality, or for any other reason where there is no known safety issue for fielded parts, the actions below should be considered, but are less likely to be required. After reviewing risk, existing parts and/or parts being manufactured under an open contract may be accepted as is with no modifications or any immediate action on those parts. If the criticality is changed because of a known or potential safety issue on fielded components, then the actions below should be considered.

(1) Removal and replacement of fielded components.

(2) Screening and/or freezing of depot stock on hand.

(3) Modifications to open contracts and M&O actions.

(4) Reduced intervals between maintenance actions.

(5) One time or continuous inspections of fielded components.

(6) Addition of serial numbers to stock brought to a safe and serviceable status. Serial numbers should only be added if the ESA determines the addition establishes value added traceability to the original source and material lot or through subsequent overhauls.

(7) Risk definition and acceptance.

(8) Testing of stock on hand and/or fielded components.

3-14. Critical safety item/critical application item contract requirements (as identified below or ESA approved equivalents)

Refer to Appendix G.

3-15. Joint service critical safety item requirements

a. Critical safety item common use items. A common use item that is determined to be a CSI in one application, is not necessarily

CSI for all applications. The same item may have safety implications when used in one or only a few applications, but have absolutely no safety impacts when used in many or most other applications. From a design, manufacturing, assembly, installation, repair, or maintenance perspective, the item is a CSI only in those applications where it has been determined to have safety critical implications.

However, for DoD item acquisition and supply management purposes, the part is coded CSI for all users of the item because there is no predetermined way to know which items with the same stock number in the same stock bin will be distributed to which aviation communities over time. Where it makes good business sense to differentiate identical items in the DoD supply system, separate Part Numbers and National Stock Numbers (NSN) may be created to distinguish the item when used in safety critical situations from all other applications. This may include items where CSI controls add cost and/or acquisition time for a Service that does not use the item in a CSI application. When identifying an item as a CSI and/or identifying CCs for a common use item, the ESA shall coordinate with Service counterparts for each affected DoD aviation system and shall ensure that records reflect the most stringent requirements. In cases where the Services disagree on the CSI status of an item, the Service that classifies the item as a CSI should consider assigning a new Part Number and NSN in order to separate the parts in the supply system. (Note: A common use item or standard part which has been designated CSI and assigned a new part number and NSN will subsequently be sourced, manufactured, and managed as a CSI.

Refer to the JACG Aviation Critical Safety Item Management Handbook for more information pertaining to Common Use Item Coordination.)

b. Contract requirements for critical safety item common use items. Contracts for CSIs shall reflect the most stringent requirements from each Service, i.e., if another Service defines a part as a CSI, Army contracts shall also require manufacture or M&O contractors to meet CSI requirements. Only contractors approved by all Services that use the item may be used in a contract.

3-16. Critical safety item data repositories CSI requirements, including NST requirements and approved sources, are listed in the Army Aviation Sustainment Gateway (ARISE) website, at https://aed-apps.amrdec.army.mil/ARISE/csiportal/. The ARISE website contains the Critical Item Management (CIM) database, which is the database of record for Army Aviation CSIs. The CIM database is intended for use by personnel involved with building, updating, or evaluating technical data related to CSIs and NSTs. Joint Service CSI data can also be found in the “Joint Service Critical Item DataViewer” at https://remote3.amrdec.army.mil/csiviewer/. The CSI DataViewer is intended for personnel involved in Joint Service CSI coordination, CSI procurement (AMCOM, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and the other Services), and the DCMA for oversight of CSI vendors.

3-17. Reverse engineering of critical safety items Army CSIs shall not be reverse engineered. This requirement may not be waived except under circumstances where the Army can no longer obtain sufficient quantities of an item to support the fleet. Refer to MIL-HDBK-115, US Army Reverse Engineering Handbook (Guidelines and Procedures) for further guidance in cases when the requirement is waived to allow reverse engineering of CSIs.

Waivers to allow reverse engineering of CSIs shall not be granted without the approval of the ESA, and all of the following criteria must be met:

a. There is an overwhelming readiness need and all other methods of support are unavailable or prohibitive. Other methods include working with current approved suppliers to increase production and attempting to procure the technical data required to qualify additional sources. Insufficient stock on hand is not sufficient justification.

b. The government must be in possession of sufficient data or be provided sufficient data to perform a risk assessment and assess the reverse engineered design.

3-18. Mutilation of critical safety items To prevent inadvertent use, CSIs that are defective, suspect, or beyond their specified life limits must be mutilated prior to disposal.

Likewise, CSIs for which there is no reliable documentation regarding manufacture, acquisition, use, modification, repair, or overhaul must be mutilated. CSIs delivered to the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS) for disposal shall be mutilated and rendered unusable. (Note: DLAM 4130.3 VOL II, PART 12, APPENDIX A-97 lists demilitarization (DEMIL) codes and addresses mutilation (e.g., code C= MLI - Demilitarize by mutilation (make unfit for intended purpose) by melting, cutting, tearing, scratching, crushing, breaking, punching, neutralizing, etc.). As an alternate, burial and deep-water dumping may be used when authorized.)

3-19. Local manufacturing approval of critical safety items CSIs manufactured, overhauled, or repaired under a local…