Attachment 2 CBTS Phase X BOA SOW.pdf

Attachment 2 DRAFT CBTS Statement of Work

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DRAFT Statement of Work

DHS Center of Excellence Basic Ordering Agreement Cross Border Threat Screening and Supply Chain Defense (CBTS)

I. Background

The Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002, as amended, mandated that DHS designate university-based centers for the purpose of establishing a coordinated, university-based system to enhance our nation's homeland security. DHS established its Centers of Excellence (COEs) program to fulfill this mission. The COEs conduct research, analysis, and educational programs to enhance homeland security capabilities. The HSA also identified that S&T could use grants, cooperative agreements, or contracts. The initial suite of COEs was funded as grants. Since then, S&T has utilized the cooperative agreement instrument (allows substantial federal involvement) for COE base funding. In addition, the DHS S&T Office of University Programs (OUP) established COE Basic Ordering Agreements (BOAs) in July 2010 to allow for contract funding to the COEs, where appropriate. These two mechanisms support the OUP mission to maximize DHS's return on investment in university-based research and education.

Traditionally, federal funding for basic and applied research and educational programs by universities is through the use of assistance instruments (grants/cooperative agreements), as the fundamental purpose of the work to be performed by the recipient is in the furtherance of the public good. OUP funds grants and cooperative agreements to the COEs to establish fundamental research and education programs in specific multidisciplinary subject matter areas. DHS S&T expects the universities that comprise the COEs to become self-sufficient over time and to obtain additional sources of funding beyond S&T OUP's investment in order to support more directed research. Interest in the work of the COEs has increased, particularly among other DHS components.

Other S&T Divisions and DHS components frequently need to access the capabilities created by the COEs at the lead or partner universities for directed research, analysis, and related technical services, both unclassified and classified. It should be noted, however, research that is more directed and research involving classified information cannot be performed under S&T's grants and cooperative agreements, as the appropriate funding instrument would be a contract. Also, our customers have identified emerging needs that require a timely response (e.g., research on the effects on the U.S. of emerging threat groups and countering violent extremism) that could be more quickly addressed through issuance of a task order under a Basic Ordering Agreement

(BOA).

II. Scope of Work

Based on the success of the current BOA vehicles, DHS S&T, OUP intends to issue a BOA for Cross Border Threat Screening and Supply Chain Defense (CBTS). The CBTS COE will research and develop solutions, protocols, and capabilities to support

DHS operations that detect, assess, and respond to known and unknown biological threats and other hazards that could adversely impact the Nation’s people, agriculture, and economy. DHS seeks research that explores the nature of countering terrorism operations from multiple perspectives including the adversaries’ (threat) and that of Homeland security stakeholders.

The new five-year BOA will accommodate additional DHS requirements for COE research, analysis, and technical services in the research areas for CBTS. The BOA will be issued for a five-year period, ending in 2031. OUP estimates the value of the task orders issued under this BOA to range from $0.25

- $5 million, and $1-$2 million annually depending on the task orders awarded. We based this estimate on the following:

1. The historical funding of projects as assistance supplements.

2. As the COEs mature and build up their capabilities/tools, the DHS S&T's customers will seek to use those capabilities and tools more.

3. Use of a procurement action in lieu of obtaining assistance authority will allow more DHS

S&T customers to utilize the capacity developed at the COEs.

Statement of Work Cross Border Threat Screening and Supply Chain Defense (CBTS)

1. Independently, and not as an agent of DHS, the Contractor shall furnish services, qualified personnel, materials, equipment and facilities as needed to conduct research, analysis, or services in the focus thrust area of the Center of Excellence.

1.1 Cross Border Threat Screening and Supply Chain Defense (CBTS) will research and develop solutions, protocols, and capabilities to support DHS operations that detect, assess, and respond to known and unknown biological threats and other hazards that could adversely impact the Nation’s people, agriculture, and economy. CBTS will aid DHS in reducing risks posed by biological threats and other hazards encountered at borders, ports of entry, and within the global supply chain. By researching the countering biological threats in supply chains, CBTS will assist DHS operations that protect and mitigate threats to the global supply chain and reduce the risk of exposing people and infrastructures to new and evolving biological threats.

1.2 To meet the diverse needs of DHS in keeping the homeland safe at and beyond the border, the CBTS is integrating programs that address the following research and workforce development objectives:

1.2.1 Enhance current capabilities to detect biological threats;

1.2.2 Advance novel analytics for timely decision making through meaningful data integration and representation from disparate sources;

1.2.3 Reduce risk of biological threats by developing new operational methods to assess the national supply chain network as an integral part of a global system and allow varied stakeholders to integrate emerging tools, data streams, and analytics;

1.2.4 Use academic initiatives, industry partnerships, and enhanced workforce development to educate and train current and future personnel throughout the HSE;

1.2.5 Provide unique capabilities and capacities to support time critical response for DHS through implementation of next-generation threat identification and characterization approaches;

1.2.6 Analyze the feasibility of using blockchain and/or other IoT technologies to capture and securely transmit information throughout the supply chain, in a land border crossing and trade scenario, utilizing a fresh product supply chain study.

1.3 Research Themes:

Topic Area One: Detecting Biological Threats and Disruption to People and Global Supply Chains – Technologies, Tools, and Methods

DHS maintains core capabilities at ports of entry, preclearance stations situated abroad, and other transportation nodes where CBP and TSA officials screen people and goods before entering the US.

Timely and accurate detection of biological threats, malicious activities, invasive species, and other hazardous materials at inspection points and prior to inspection points is critical to securing the legitimate flow of goods and people. (See NOFO pg. 34).

• Opportunities for mitigating risk posed by biological threats in critical nodes within a supply chain.

Where are the critical nodes? What techniques exist to accurately discriminate legitimate from fraudulent or deceptive entries in cargo and traveler ports of entry environments? What capabilities exist to rapidly determine if the biothreat landscape is changing? What are the current limitations and what leap ahead opportunities exist to identify changes across domains? (See NOFO pg. 34).

• Rapid inspection. How can biological screening and data fusion capabilities work across domains (human, animal, food, supply chain, and environmental) to quickly and accurately detect high-risk trade entities and people hidden behind legitimate trade and travel? What are the technologies that could support the accurate identification and determine true origin imports that may have biological contamination? What are the advances in molecular, cellular, and imaging technologies that can be used to support existing DHS screening approaches? (See NOFO pg. 35).

• Detection and interdiction of biological threats and hazards prior to entering the U.S. How can DHS work with international partners to coordinate resources and enhance detection before products enter our border? (See NOFO pg. 36).

• Detection and interdiction of contraband or illicit substances (e.g., counterfeit goods, synthetic opioids) prior to entering the U.S. What technologies, tools, processes and methods can be used at ports of entry to distinguish between legitimate trade versus movement of illicit substances? (See NOFO pg. 34).

Topic Area Two: Data Integration and Analytics – Essential Enabler

• Data availability, aggregation, integration, and analysis. How can the value of supply chain, environmental, health, social media, financial, and intelligence data sets be assessed quantitatively for inclusion in tools focused on providing insights into the health status of our Nation? How effective are current predictive analytics in identifying potential incidents or conditions that warrant further investigation? (See NOFO pg. 36).

• Artificial intelligence analytics. How can analytical capabilities in epidemiology be included into existing event- based biosurveillance systems capable of providing spatiotemporal patterns of spread of infectious biological agents across hosts and environmental conditions? Can these analytics accept data feeds on agriculture, wildlife trade, and international travel from CBP’s data warehouses to establish footprint and origin, and provide probabilistic spatiotemporal movement of the biothreat across the globe and into the US? What legal agreements would be necessary to share this data in real time? (See NOFO pg. 37).

Topic Area Three: Novel Operational Methods to Use Emerging Tools to Reduce Risk

• Screening processes and operationalization (linkage to methods, protocols, data). What biological screening approached will support the identification of counterfeit goods, are contaminated with biological threats, are not declared, are prohibited or could be otherwise compromised while in transit through the global supply chain? How can this data be securely accessed or shared to support actionable decision making that will affect DHS operations? How can screening processes for people and cargo be optimized to balance cost, performance, and sustainability? How can the government and commercial sector work together to integrate security and processes into supply chain operations to support the identification of threats as early as possible, while protecting confidential business information? (See NOFO pg. 38).

• Trade Intelligence - How can CBP officers and DHS analysts detect relevant patterns in biological and supply chain data? Are there existing computational techniques or big data algorithms that can visualize hidden illegitimate relationships from legitimate entries? What are the most promising incentives to encourage private and public entities to share data that is critical to making risk informed decisions necessary to prepare for, respond to, and recover from an intentional biological attack? What are the limitations of current biological agent dispersion models? How can this be improved? (See NOFO pg. 40).

• Assessing risk prior to goods and products entering the U.S. How can screening processes for people and cargo be optimized to balance cost, performance, and sustainability? How can CBP officers and DHS analysts detect relevant patterns in biological and supply chain data? Are industry’s current risk management principles sufficient in restoring the movement of food and animal products following catastrophic disruptions? How can applications of perceived R&D technologies (e.g., computational techniques, modeling and predictive analysis etc.) be operationalized at the field level? Are industry’s current risk management principles sufficient in restoring the movement of food and animal products following catastrophic disruptions? (See NOFO pg. 38-40).

• Environmental sampling. What are the performance characteristics of existing portable field biosensors to priority biological agents and toxins? What advantages and disadvantages exist in these systems when deployed in operational settings such as POEs or in other operational environments including sea ship inspections? (See NOFO pg. 39).

• Disease outbreaks. As diseases emerge and re-emerge, how do we digitally detect outbreaks? What quantitative techniques can be used to develop long-term capabilities to better detect outbreaks of concern? (See NOFO pg. 39).

Topic Area Four: Workforce Development

• Educational needs. What are the core competencies needed by DHS and supporting agencies to address next generation biothreats? What are the core competencies needed by industry to manage their products and services in this environment? (See NOFO pg. 40).

• Effectiveness of current training. How effective are current training programs for inspectors, agents, and officers that address procedures for responding to biological incidents? (See NOFO pg. 41).

• Workforce protection. How effective are current training programs for inspectors or agents that address procedures for responding to biological incidents? (See NOFO pg. 41).

Topic Area Five: Time Critical Response Support

• Building resiliency into critical nodes and supply chain networks. How can research enhance operational protocols to address increased risks posed by high consequence biological, chemical, and other hazardous threats? What existing commercial off the shelf (COTS) technology exists that can help to address time critical tasks? What is the state of the art in the emergence of new technologies, what are the characteristics of, and links in the supply chains for these new technologies? (See NOFO page 42).

• Enhance operational protocols to address increased risk. What are the risks and uncertainties of new and emerging biological and other hazardous threats? What information can be integrated into decision support tools that will quickly instruct a non- technical individual to determine how to identify and respond to a high consequence biothreat? (See NOFO page 42).

• Decision support tools. What information can be integrated into decision support tools that will quickly instruct a non-technical individual to determine how to identify and respond to a high consequence biothreat? (See NOFO page 42).

• Dynamic re-routing following disruption. What is the state of the art in the emergence of new technologies, what are the characteristics of, and links in the supply chains for these new technologies?

What are the risks and uncertainties of new and emerging biological and other hazardous threats? (See NOFO page 42).

III. Other Contract Details

1. Period of Performance The sole-source BOA will be for a period of 5 years. BOA’s shorter duration would not provide the time that DHS would need to conduct the initial science, test, pilot, and potentially transition research. This 5-year period of performance is the historical POP for the issuance of the COE BOAs and allows for DHS components to issue multiple year task orders under the BOAs as a strategic sourcing vehicle. The purpose is to streamline ongoing access of the capabilities available from the COEs. Task Order Request for Proposals (TORPs) POPs will vary based on the requirement.

2. Travel Travel will be required in the performance of the duties listed.

3. DHS-Furnished Information and Property Not applicable.

4. Place(s) of Performance The place(s) of performance will be determined through the performance of duties required in the task order(s).

5. Program Status Report/Deliverables The Contracting Officer and COR responsible for establishing of the BOAs will manage the contractual and technical aspects of the BOAs themselves, whereas the ordering officers and assigned CORs within each ordering component will manage their respective task orders using a combination of monitoring techniques including the use of in-process review meetings, monthly status reports, and reviews of all draft and final deliverables to ensure accuracy, functionality, completeness, professional quality, and overall compliance with the terms and conditions of the respective task orders and BOAs.

6. Invoices No invoices will be issued against the BOAs because no funds will be issued on the BOAs. However, the TORP level COs and CORs will address as per current policy. Rate Agreement Pricing is updated annually by the universities.

7. Classified Information The BOA task orders do allow for sensitive and classified work.

8. Funding Requirements Obligations of funds shall be accomplished solely through Task Orders issued in accordance with the terms and conditions of the BOAs. It is the responsibility of the DHS component requiring offices to commit and obligate sufficient and appropriate funds in issuing their respective Task

Orders under the COE BOAs. The amount of funds obligated and made available for payment will be specified in each Task Order. Funding shall be obligated under each Task Order in accordance with federal appropriations laws, federal acquisition regulations specified in each BOA, and internal DHS component procedures and practices.

9. Foreign Participation Reporting Instructions The admittance of foreign detailees, scientists, and students into DHS sponsored/funded academic and other programs may result in continuous exposure of DHS information, personnel, IT systems, technologies, facilities, resources, and programs by non-U.S. citizens. In order to mitigate this potential security risk, DHS Management Policy 121-08 stipulates all foreign detailees, scientist, professors, principal investigators, and student nominees involved in long-term (greater than 30 days) DHS sponsored/funded academic or other DHS programs must submit a DHS Form 11055 to the Director of the Office of University Programs. The awardee is required to ensure all foreign investigators and students working on DHS sponsored/funded research or receiving tuition or travel support of any kind through this award, complete DHS Form11055, to report all foreign national students/teaching assistants. Within the Form, Section I (Foreign National Information), Section II (Foreign National Information -Passport/Visa), and Section III (Foreign National Information (Employer Information) must be completed. Sponsor information will be completed internally at S&T.

Please complete, save and return Form 11055 by email to: Rebecca.Medina@hq.dhs.gov. Do Not Use the “Submit” button on the form. For individual engagements with foreign nations, the Recipient will submit Form 11055 at least 30-days prior to the activity in which the foreign nationals participate.

Please indicate your Center of Excellence affiliation and position title in the email.

IV. Points of Contact DHS S&T Technical Representative:

Hilary Shackelford Department of Homeland Security Washington, DC Phone: 202-740-3960 Email: Hilary.Shackelford@hq.dhs.gov

DHS S&T Contracting Officer:

Danette Williams Department of Homeland Security Washington, DC 20528 Email: Danette.Williams@hq.dhs.gov

DHS S&T may change the individuals designated as POCs upon notice to the awardee.

mailto:Dana.Saft@hq.dhs.gov mailto:Danette.Williams@hq.dhs.gov

IV. Points of Contact