Attachment 1 - Draft Suggested System Capabilities.pdf

Attachment 1 – Suggested System Capabilities This table provides NASA desired FSP system capabilities. The partner is free to develop their FSP system as desired, however these items should be considered for NASA as a potential user. While developing a proposal, the suggested system capabilities should be utilized, or a rationale should be provided for not utilizing them.

ID Title Capability Rationale and Notes

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Automated Operation The FSP system should be capable of operating independently without commanded intervention.

Removes the FSP system’s dependency on continuous or real-time communications networks during operations. Partners will need to assess operational phases which should be dependent on real-time commands, such as initial deployment.

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Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery

The FSP system should provide the capability to automatically detect, isolate, and recover from faults identified during system development or mission operations.

The intent is for the system design to provide isolation and recovery from faults (e.g., redundant strings or part isolation). A fault is defined as a defect that when executed under the appropriate conditions may cause a failure. A failure is the inability of a system or component to perform its required functions within specified performance requirements.

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System Restarts The FSP system should be able to perform without external power.

Partners will need to assess the need for restarts that could potentially occur during extended periods of darkness.

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Wire and Cable Derating

The FSP electrical power system should meet or exceed the Wire and Cable Derating Criteria found in Appendix C of EHP- 10046 EHP Safety and Mission Assurance Technical Requirements.

Wire selected must be able to carry, for an indefinite period of time, the maximum continuous current of which the associated protective devise is capable and must carry this level of current without causing the insulation temperature to exceed the rating of that wire.

ID Title Capability Rationale and Notes

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Connector Ports. The user interface should provide a minimum of 10 user interface connector ports at 120VDC with a minimum power rating of 6kWe.

Provides connectors for multiple users at power levels per EHP-10069 Extravehicular Activity (EVA) and Human Surface Mobility Program (EHP) Power Specification.

User Load The FSP system should accommodate user loads from 0 to 100% electric power at the user interface.

The FSP system is expected to support varying user power demands.

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Hazard Protection The FSP system should ensure safety of equipment and personnel against credible hazards.

This includes nominal and off-nominal scenarios that could result in one or more hazards, e.g.

electrical, thermal, communications, pressurized systems, nuclear, mechanical, etc. Control of credible hazards to prevent critical or catastrophic events ensures proper handling of system failures.

Note: this is a shall statement in Attachment 6 for the user interface.

Critical Hazard: A hazard that may cause severe injury, occupational illness, or major property damage to facilities, systems, or flight hardware.

Catastrophic Hazard: (1) A hazard that could result in a mishap causing fatal injury to personnel and/or loss of one or more major elements of the flight vehicle or ground facility. (2) A condition that may cause death or permanently disabling injury, major system or facility destruction on the ground, or loss of crew, major systems, or vehicle during the mission.

Crew Access Keep Out Zones (KOZ) and No Touch Areas (NTA)

The FSP system should have obviously marked and clearly identified crew Keep Out Zone areas which, if entered, could be hazardous to the crew or vehicle, and No Touch Areas for surface features which are hazardous.

Every effort should be made to ensure provisions are in place to protect both the crewmember(s) and vehicle. EVA hazards that are not controlled on external hardware pose a significant risk to crewmembers. Areas around which crew can be expected to operate should be designed to tolerate crew loads and not present hazards to the crew.

Anything that presents a danger or safety hazard needs to be declared a Keep Out Zone or No Touch Area that is visually observable by crewmembers during an EVA.

This capability should be realized if crewed maintenance is planned on the FSP system. It is included as a requirement in Attachment 6 for the user interface.

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Payload Safety Process

The partner should adopt a safety process that is similar to the Payload Safety Process in NPR

8715.7 and NASA-STD-8719.24 Payload Safety or EHP-10038 EHP Safety Review Process Requirements.

The FSP system is expected to operate safely in all phases of development, test, and operations. This should include a robust safety review process to ensure safety is designed into the system.

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Flight reactor operation prior to deployment

The flight reactor should not be operated at power prior to deployment.

Launching a reactor that has not been operated minimizes pre-launch radiation hazards. This does not include a zero power critical test prior to launch.

Inadvertent reactor criticality

The FSP System should prevent inadvertent reactor criticality for both normal and accident conditions in accordance with the risk criteria identified in NSPM-20.

Per NSPM-20, the U.S. shall develop and use space nuclear systems when such systems safely enable or enhance space exploration or operational capabilities. Designing a reactor to prevent inadvertent criticality minimizes radiation hazards.

Potential launch accident scenarios should include, but are not limited to, dry land, wet sand, water (ocean).

Attachment 1 – Suggested System Capabilities