Attachment 0017 - SELF-PROPELLED HOWITZER (SPH) FAMILY OF VEHICLES (FoV) SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE (SCG)_17APR2023.pdf

Self-Propelled Howitzer (SPH) Family of Vehicles (FoV) Security Classification Guide

ISSUED BY: Project Management Office PM Self-Propelled Howitzer Systems (SPHS)

APPROVED BY:

GLENN A DEAN

Major General, USA Program Executive Officer, Ground Combat Systems

EFFECTIVE DATE:

SUPERSEDES: M109 Family of Vehicles Security Classification Guide, dated 4 October 2019

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to the Department of Defense and U.S. DoD contractors; Specific Authority: DoDM 5200.01 and DoDM 5200.45, date of determination is: 1 May 2018. Other requests for this document shall be referred to the attention of the PM SPHS Security Manager at: Program Executive Office Ground Combat Systems (PEO GCS), ATTN: SFAE-GCS-H, 6501 East Eleven Mile Road, Warren, MI 48397-5000.

This document contains information that may be EXEMPT FROM MANDATORY DISCLOSURE under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

Classification Authority: PEO-GCS Controlled By: PM SPHS CUI Category: OPSEC Distribution/Dissemination Controls: Distro D; FEDCON POC: Thomas Striebich, 586‐282‐0330

Controlled Unclassified Information

CUI

Self-Propelled Howitzer FoV Security Classification Guide

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................................... i

GENERAL INFORMATION

1. Purpose

2. System Description

3. Authority

4. Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR)

5. Classification Challenges

6. Compilation of Information

7. Threat/Intelligence Information

8. Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) Caveat

9. Distribution Statements

10. Export Controlled Marking

11. Reproduction, Extraction, and Dissemination

12. Public Release

13. Release of Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)

14. Release of Classified Information

15. Foreign Disclosure

16. Loss, Compromise, or Suspected Compromise

17. Marking Requirements

18. Foreign Government Information (FGI)

19. Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

20. Operations Security (OPSEC)

21. Security Classification Guides for Program Components

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE TABLE

NOTES

ACRONYMS

DEFINITIONS

REFERENCES

DISTRIBUTION LIST

ATTACHMENT 1

Self-Propelled Howitzer Family of Vehicles Security Classification Guide

GENERAL INFORMATION

1. Purpose

This Security Classification Guide (SCG) provides instructions and guidance on the classification and declassification of information and material pertaining to all variants of the Self-Propelled Howitzer (SPH) Family of Vehicles (FoV).This guide refers only to information owned by the Program Executive Office for Ground Combat Systems (PEO GCS) under the PEO’s Original Classification Authority (OCA). Complementary program SCGs and Department of Defense (DoD) technical SCGs that will be used on the SPH FoV retain their original classification when integrated into the SPH FoV. The OCA for these external programs retains OCA. Classification elements will be added to address technical and design details as these areas mature. Contact the Office of Primary Responsibility to determine the appropriate course of action for elements that are missing or do not fit into the categories defined in this guide.

2. System Description

The M109A6 Paladin and the M992A2 Field Artillery Ammunition Support Vehicle (FAASV) and its replacement, the M109A7 Self-Propelled Howitzer and the M992A3 Carrier Ammunition serve as the currently fielded organic indirect fire platforms within the Armored Brigade Combat Teams. The Extended Range Canon Artillery (ERCA) effort which includes the XM1299 and XM1299A1 closes current cannon artillery capability gaps. Building on the M109A7’s mobility and survivability upgrades, ERCA will increase the lethality, range, and reliability of self-propelled howitzers to eliminate gaps in the portfolio. This next-generation howitzer armament system provides the Army with an entirely new capability for self-propelled howitzers, while also providing the architecture and growth margins for future propellant and projectile advancements. Together the legacy, current production and future acquisition systems comprise the SPH FoV which this SCG covers.

a. M109A7 Self-Propelled Howitzer – The M109A7 Howitzer is a self-propelled, fully tracked, diesel powered, aluminum armored, turreted, and air transportable 155mm weapon which possesses excellent ground mobility, all weather operational capability and nuclear, biological crew protection. The Self-Propelled Howitzer (SPH) carries 39 complete conventional rounds on-board. It has a nominal crew of four, including the driver. The main armament consists of the M284 cannon assembly and M182A1 gun mount.

The fire control system is fully automated, providing accurate position location and azimuth reference, on-board ballistic solutions of the fire mission (with Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) at platoon Fire Direction Centers (FDC) as backup), and computer controlled gun drive through electric motor drives with manual backup. These improvements permit flexibility in employment and enhance responsiveness and firing rate.

Digital and voice communications utilizing the Single Channel Ground/Air Radio System (SINCGARS) through an on-board communications processor, enable dispersed operations/missions from one firing unit to multiple Howitzers. Tactical and technical fire control and direction are maintained primarily through an interface with the AFATDS, on both voice and digital data, through KY-57 speech security devices (COMSEC). A Blue Force Tracking system consisting of a BFT2 Transceiver, KGV-72 encryption device and MFoCs computer is implemented providing GPS location information of friendly forces.

The system will also support future next gen tactical radios and future next gen GPS systems.

The Howitzer incorporates state-of-the-art materials and technologies to achieve enhanced availability and maintainability through the use of Diagnostic System Health (DASH), Built- In Test (BIT), Built-In Test Equipment (BITE), and Plug-In Test Equipment (PITE) both diagnostic and prognostic, modularity, redundancy, reduced operating stress levels through use of a Microclimatic Cooling System (MCS), and application of vulnerability reductions measures for the crew and critical (i.e., mission essential) equipment.

The integrated DASH system is a key element for real time diagnostic and system health assessment activities of the PIM vehicle. Normal Mode presents overall status and current active LRU fault information, and Maintenance Mode exhibits detailed LRU status information and ability to run Interactive Built-In Test (IBIT) on Ethernet supported LRUs which include; Paladin Digital Fire Control System - Replacement (PDFCS-R), Gun Drive and Rammer (GDR), Vetronics Control and Distribution Module (VCDM), Common Module Power System (CMPS), Engine Control Module (ECM), Driver Display, Micro-Climate Conditioning System (MCS) and Automatic Fire Extinguishing System (AFES). Information is available to driver and maintainer personnel. The DASH application will be able to run on the Smart Display Unit (SDU) and also have the data displayed on the Chief of Section (CoS) display.

b. M992A3 CAT Ammunition Re-Supply Vehicle – The M992A3 Tracked Ammunition

Supply Carrier is a full tracked, self-propelled, aluminum armored vehicle which transports ammunition components for the 155mm Howitzers. In terms of driving capabilities and limitations, the M992A3 is comparable to the M109A7 howitzer. The speed, mobility, maneuverability, and survivability of the M992A3 equals that of the M109A7, making the M992A3 well suited for efficient re-supply of ammunition to M109A7 howitzers. The M992A3 CAT maintains a common chassis with the M109A7 permitting the vehicle to operate in the same environment as the M109A7. The operation and maintenance features are common to the M109A7.

c. Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) – The requirement for ERCA capability is directly linked to the Extended Range Gap (Range Efficiency Gap #550072 identified in the US Army Fire Center of Excellence (FCoE) Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) from New Generation Warfare (NGW) Study Special Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA), Draft highlights ranges greater than 70 km.)

Near peer threats currently out-range Army indirect tube artillery and potential opponents have developed new systems, techniques, and tactics designed to exploit this gap. The combined arms team is vulnerable to indirect fire in the contemporary and emerging operating environment. Peer adversaries employ a recon-strike fires complex to defeat combined arms maneuver and integrated air defense systems (IADS) to deny US and allied forces air superiority. The ERCA SPH system employs several capabilities required by Army Fires forces to defeat threat artillery and air defenses, ensuring combined arms freedom of maneuver in the future operating environment.

3. Authority

This guide is issued under the authority of Executive Order (EO) 13526 Classified National Security Information, DoD Manual 5200.01 Volume 1-4, DoD Information Security Program;

and Army Regulation (AR) 380-5 Department of the Army Information Security Program.

According to Executive Order 13526 there are three classification levels. All three apply to this guide:

1) CONFIDENTIAL (C), the unauthorized disclosure could cause damage to national security.

2) SECRET (S), the unauthorized disclosure could cause serious damage to national security.

3) TOP SECRET (TS), the unauthorized disclosure could cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.

This guide constitutes classification authority and is to be cited as the basis for derivative classification, regrading, or declassification of information involved in the program.

Changes in classification required by application of this guide shall be effective immediately. Information identified as classified in this guide is classified by the PEO GCS.

When citing this guide, the appropriate entry is:

Classified by: List name and position title of the Derivative classifier and office of origin Derived from: SPH FOV SCG, 20211104 Declassify on: YYYYMMDD (Refer to declassification column to determine the date)

Information or material classified using this guide and other security classification guidance shall cite “Multiple Sources” on the “Derived from” line and the list of multiple sources shall be included with or annotated on the derivative document. If the document has a bibliography or reference list, this may be used as the list of sources.

4. Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR)

All inquiries concerning content and interpretation, as well as any recommendations for changes, deletions, and additions, should be addressed to:

Project Manager, Self-Propelled Howitzer Systems Security Manager Program Executive Office Ground Combat Systems

ATTN: SFAE-GCS-H

6501 East Eleven Mile Road Warren, MI 48397-5000

5. Classification Challenges

If at any time, any of the security classification guidance contained herein is challenged, the items of information involved shall continue to be protected at the level prescribed by this guide until such time as a final decision is made on the challenge by appropriate authority.

Classification challenges should be addressed to the OPR.

All users of this guide are encouraged to assist in improving its currency and adequacy.

Over classification or incorrect classification should be brought to the attention of the OPR.

Changes to this guide will be made by the issuance of a numbered change letter with corrected page.

6. Compilation of Information

In some circumstances, classification may be required when unclassified elements of information are combined to reveal classified information, or when classified elements combine to reveal information at a higher classification level than the individual elements.

An explanation for the classification as a result of compilation shall be provided on the “Derived from” line or within the document. The explanation must clearly describe the circumstances under which the individual portions constitute a classified compilation, and when they do not. The classification and marking process is as follows:

a. When a document that comprises individually unclassified items of information is classified by compilation, the overall classification shall be marked conspicuously at the top and bottom of each page and the outside front and back covers (if applicable). An explanation of the basis for classification by compilation shall be placed on the “Derived from:” line or within the document. The explanation must clearly describe the circumstances under which the individual portions constitute a classified compilation, and when they do not. The explanation shall be portion marked as needed, at a minimum as “CUI.” If portions, standing alone, are unclassified, but the document is classified by compilation or association, those portions shall be marked “U,” and the document and pages shall be marked with the classification of the compilation.

b. If individual portions are classified at one level and the compilation is a higher classification, each portion shall be marked with its own classification, and the document and pages shall be marked with the classification of the compilation. An explanation of the classification by compilation is required.

7. Threat/Intelligence Information

Data or information relating to the threat systems or other intelligence derived from material must show the security markings of that threat/intelligence material. The release of threat / intelligence may require the consent of the originator. The servicing Foreign Intelligence Office (FIO) controls all dissemination of threat/intelligence information. Threat/intelligence information will not be reproduced, released to contractors, or disseminated unless approved by the FIO and Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) that supports the program in the G2, U.S. TACOM Life Cycle Management Command (LCMC), Attn: AMSTA-CSS-F, 6501 East 11 Mile Road, Warren, MI 48397-5000, commercial 586-282-5891.

8. Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) Caveat

Unclassified Information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls pursuant to and consistent with applicable law, regulations, and government-wide or “LRGWP” policies but is not classified under EO 13526, (Classified National Security Information).

All documents containing CUI shall carry the CUI markings in accordance with DoDI

5200.48. Discontinue all use of legacy “FOUO” or other markings not permitted or included in either the DOD CUI Registry or DoDI 5200.48. DoD’s legacy “FOUO” marking was authorized to protect UNCLASSIFIED information that “may be exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).” The new CUI marking does not automatically protect information that is identified as CUI under the FOIA. An independent determination has to be made in response, to each and every FOIA request, to whether a specific FOIA exemption applies.

Marking of Technical Information will include the statement provided in the Security Classification Guide. If the contents of the technical document require more than one Distribution Statement, apply the most restrictive statement. This does not preclude additional mandated markings as may be required by the contract.

To determine if information in your document is CUI, check the information against the DOD CUI Registry. Examples of some common categories would be CTI, OPSEC, EXPT and BUDG.

At a minimum, CUI markings for unclassified documents will include the acronym “CUI” at the top and bottom of each page and the CUI designation indicator. The CUI designation indicator must be annotated on the first page or cover page of all documents and contain:

Line 1: the name of the DoD Component (not required if identified in the letterhead) Line 2: identification of the office creating the document Line 3: identification of the categories contained in the document Line 4: applicable distribution statement or limited dissemination control (LDC) Line 5: name and phone number or email of POC Do not add “UNCLASSIFIED” before “CUI”.

Do not add the CUI category to the top and bottom of the page. The category is listed in the CUI designation indicator block with certain exceptions as list in DODI 5200.48.

9. Distribution Statements

Distribution Statements are required to be placed on all technical information documents whether they are classified or unclassified. These notices will be placed on the front cover or first page of the document.

Technical information is defined as containing information (experimental, developmental, engineering works) that can be used to define an engineering or

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to the Department of Defense and U.S. DoD contractors only; Administrative or Operational Use, date of determination is 4 October 2019. Other requests for this document shall be referred to the attention of the PM SPHS Security Manager at: Program Executive Office Ground Combat Systems (PEO GCS), ATTN: SFAE-GCS-H, 6501 East Eleven Mile Road, Warren, MI 48397-5000.

manufacturing process or to design, procure, produce, support, maintain, operate, repair or overhaul material. The information may be in text, graphic or pictorial form.

The following statement will be applied to technical information. Exceptions for the use of another distribution statement shall be submitted to the OPR, in writing, with justification.

Refer to DoDI 5230.24 for a complete list of Distribution Statements.

a. The standard distribution statement for technical information is Distribution Statement D. This shall be applied to classified or unclassified technical information. The reason is “Administrative or Operational Use”.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT E: Distribution authorized to the Department of Defense Components only; Proprietary Information (DFARS Limited/Restricted Rights), date of determination is 4 October 2019. Other requests for this document shall be referred to the attention of the PM SPHS Security Manager at: Program Executive Office Ground Combat Systems (PEO GCS), ATTN: SFAE-GCS-H, 6501 East Eleven Mile Road, Warren, MI 48397-5000.

WARNING - This document contains technical data whose export is restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22, U.S.C., Sec 2751, et, seq.) or the Export Administration Act of 1979, (Title 50, U.S.C., App. 2401 et seq.) as amended.

Violations of these export laws are subject to severe criminal penalties. Disseminate IAW provisions of DoD Directive 5230.25.

b. For those documents that contain the government data rights such as “limited rights” or “restricted rights”, the standard distribution statement for technical information shall be Distribution Statement E. The reason is “Proprietary Information (DFARS Limited/Restricted Rights)”.

10. Export Controlled Marking

Information contained in this SCG may be restricted from export to foreign nationals. For documents containing export controlled information, the following warning shall be placed on the document immediately below the distribution statement and the reason “Export Controlled” will be added to the distribution statement.

(See Definitions for Export and Deemed Export)

11. Reproduction, Extraction, and Dissemination

Authority for reproduction, extraction, and dissemination of this guide is granted to DoD and U.S. DoD contractors. Other requests shall be referred to the OPR.

12. Public Release

The fact that this guide shows certain details of information to be unclassified, including controlled unclassified information, does not allow automatic public release of this information. The public release of Army information regarding the program will be IAW AR 360-1. Defense contractors shall follow DFARS 252.204-7000 (disclosure of information) and fully comply with National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM), DoD 5220.22M, the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and its supplements, and are responsible to ensure their subcontractors comply with these requirements. All requests for public release of official information pertaining to the program must undergo an Operational Security (OPSEC) review and be approved by the PEO GCS Public Affairs Officer (PAO) prior to any release in any form (media, e-mail, websites, video, photographs, etc.). Replies to queries from unofficial sources may be made only after written approval from the PEO GCS PAO is obtained. Information or visit requests received through any Public Affairs Office or public media representatives shall be coordinated with the OPR, prior to release of information or the visit.

Defense contractors and other organizations must ensure all information is unclassified and technically accurate prior to an OPSEC review submission. Copies of the material may not be released outside official channels until the OPSEC review process is complete and the final determination is the information is approved for public dissemination.

All requests will be submitted to the OPR. The OPR requires 45 working days to process the request and render a decision. Requests for public release shall be sent electronically via encrypted email using National Institute of Standards and Technology/National Information Assurance Partnership (NIST/NIAP) approved cryptographic or mail the Compact Disc/Digital Video Disc (CD/DVD) using first class mail.

Care must be taken to ensure all Army information that is entered on publicly accessible or unprotected Worldwide Web (WWW) sites has been processed, reviewed and approved for public release. The provisions of AR 25-2 Cybersecurity apply and AR 530-1 Operations Security are applicable.

13. Release of Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)

CUI includes technical information. Releasing CUI information to individuals or organizations that are not supporting the program requires Program Office approval.

Submit a request for dissemination outside of predetermined controls (identified previously in this SCG) and a justification to the OPR. A review shall be conducted within a minimum of 45 calendar days to adjudicate each request. Requests shall be sent electronically via encrypted email using NIST/NIAP approved cryptographic products/algorithms or mail the Compact Disc/Digital Video Disc (CD/DVD) using first class mail.

14. Release of Classified Information

Presentations containing information classified under this SCG intended to be released at classified symposiums, seminars, conferences, or similar forums will be submitted for approval. Such requests for release must be submitted through the OPR at least 45 calendar days prior to the proposed date of release. The request will include the name of the individual making the presentations, date of the presentation, title of the forum, and justification for the proposed release. The request will also identify whether the forum will include any foreign attendance or participation.

15. Foreign Disclosure

Disclosure of SPH FoV program information (classified or unclassified) under the cognizance of this guide to foreign governments or companies shall conform to the policy and procedures in the National Disclosure Policy-1, DoD Directive (DoDD) 5230.11, Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations, and AR 380-10, Foreign Disclosure and Contacts with Foreign Representatives. If a country with which the DoD has entered into a reciprocal procurement Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or offset arrangement expresses an interest in the SPHS, a foreign disclosure review will be conducted prior to issuance of a solicitation. All program contractors must comply with U.S. export laws and be contractually prohibited from executing any third party information releases, without PEO GCS approval. Any requests for information shall be processed as official requests through appropriate foreign disclosure organizations. The supporting TACOM LCMC Foreign Disclosure Officer is the primary point of contact for all foreign disclosure issues. Mailing Address: G2 TACOM LCMC, AMSTA-CSS-C, Mail Stop 105, 6501 E. 11 Mile Road, Warren, MI 48397-5000.

16. Loss, Compromise, or Suspected Compromise

Report the loss, compromise, or suspected compromise of classified information or material to the OPR within 24 hours of the incident or IAW the applicable Defense Department (DD) Form 254, Contract Security Classification Specification, DoD 5220.22-M and the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual, Section 3, reporting requirements, for contractors, and AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security Program, Chapter 10 for Government organizations.

17. Marking Requirements

Documents and other products, including information technology material and briefing slides containing classified material will be marked IAW DoD 5220.22-M, DoDM 5200.01, and the booklet labeled, “Marking Classified National Security Information,” as required by EO 13526, Classified National Security Information, 29 December 2009, and 32 C.F.R. Part 2001, Information Security Oversight Office Implementing Directive, effective 25 June 2010.

18. Foreign Government Information (FGI)

If a foreign country expresses an interest in sharing its information with the program, either with a DoD agency or to a defense contractor, the OPR shall be notified immediately. Use of or reference to foreign government data or information furnished under this program shall be classified not less than the classification assigned by the original foreign government. Safeguarding of FGI must be IAW DoDM 5220.22-M and DoDM 5200.01.

Third party (i.e., a party other than the intended recipient) disclosure and dissemination is prohibited.

19. Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

If a foreign country expresses an interest to enter into a FMS, the OPR shall be notified without delay. The provisions of AR 12-1, Security Assistance, Training and Export Policy apply.

20. Operations Security (OPSEC)

PM SPHS has an approved OPSEC Plan. This plan identifies the information deemed critical to the program and has documented various OPSEC measures to protect the critical information (classified or unclassified). Contact the OPR to request a copy of the OPSEC Plan.

21. Security Classification Guides for Program Components

The following SCGs also provide security classification guidance for program components.

The list is provided for reference purposes only and may not be all inclusive.

Program Components Proponent Date

Armor Materials and Technology Army Research Laboratory 22 March 2022

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Survivability

Asst Sec of Def for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological

8 Jun 2011

Dept of Defense Military Ground Based Counter Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare

PEO IEW&S

31 May 2021

Driver's Vision Enhancer PEO IEW&S 3 Jun 2019 Fire Cells Systems CECOM 11 Sep 2017 Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2)/Joint Battle Command - Platform (JBC-P)/Mounted Mission Command (MMC)

PEO C3T

29 Sep 2017

Global Positioning System Air Force Space Command 23 May 2018

Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD) JPEO-CBD 13 Jul 2009 Single Channel Ground and Airborne Systems (SINCGARS) PEO C3T 27 Nov 2018 Tactical Radio (TR) Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS) PEO C3T 15 Apr 2019

Assured Positioning, Navigation, Timing (APNT) Technologies PEO IEW&S 19 Feb 2020

Note: The SCGs listed above have been confirmed current as of the signing of this document.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE TABLE

REASON: Information is classified per section 1.4 a, e, g of EO 13526

ELEMENT CLASSI-

FICATION

DECLASSIFY

ON NOTES / REMARKS

1. Programmatic Information

1.a Administrative:

1.a.1 Program name as written SPH Family of Vehicles U

1.a.2 Identification of Program Executive Office (PEO) and Project / Product Management Offices

U

See Note 1.

1.a.3 Program mission U See Note 1.

1.a.4 Program purpose U See Note 1.

1.a.5 Model designation U See Note 1.

1.a.6 Nomenclature U

1.a.7 Federal or National Stock Number U

1.b Budget:

1.b.1 Planning, programming, and budgetary information U

See note 12.

Mark and handle as CUI. Category:

BUDG

1.b.2 Funding level for the program

See note 12.

CUI prior to White House/OMB release to Congress.

1.b.3 Overall budget for the year

CUI prior to White House/OMB release to Congress.

1.c Schedules:

1.c.1 Program schedule at summary level (does not list specific date, time or location of meeting or event)

1.c.2 Program schedule below summary level U See note 12.

Mark and handle as CUI. Category:

OPSEC

1.c.3 Test dates and test locations U See note 12.

Mark and handle as CUI. Category:

OPSEC

1.c.4 Test dates and test locations for classified tests See Remarks

Completion of test

CLASSIFY at the same level of the item being tested.

FICATION

DECLASSIFY

ON NOTES / REMARKS

1.c.5 Information about the program related to production details (e.g. capacity, volume, etc.)

Mark and handle as CUI. Category:

OPSEC/EXPT.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

1.c.6 Specific vehicle distribution (e.g. numbers, variants, destination, or delivery schedule) without unit allocation

See notes 10/12.

Mark and handle as CUI. Category:

OPSEC

1.d Contracting Information:

1.d.1 Contractor bid and proposal information.

Information prepared by or on behalf of an offeror and submitted to the Government

See Remarks

See Note 12.

Proprietary information received by the government is to be marked and handle as CUI.

Category: SSEL

1.e General Vehicle/System Characteristics:

1.e.1 Physical dimensions U See Note 1.

1.e.2 Vehicle weight (empty or full) U See Note 1.

1.e.3 Vehicle crew quantity and dismounted soldier quantity U

1.f Fleet Status:

1.f.1 Total numbers of vehicles in fleet U See Note 1.

1.f.2 Overall operational readiness of the vehicle fleet when specific locations or units are not identified

1.f.3 Total quantity of each mission role vehicle type U

1.f.4 Quantity of vehicles authorized to a unit U See Note 1.

1.f.5 Quantity of vehicles on hand in a unit U See Notes 10, 12.

Mark and handle as CUI. Category:

OPSEC

1.f.6 Vehicle fleet rate of delivery and numbers delivered U

See Notes 1 and 10.

1.f.7 Quantity of vehicles on hand in a unit (when specific locations or units are not identified)

See Notes 10, 12.

Mark and handle as CUI. Category:

OPSEC

1.f.8 Operational readiness of specific units U See Notes 10, 12.

1.f.9 Quantities of specific radios in theater

1.f.10 Quantities of specific vehicle kits in unit (when specific locations are not identified)

FICATION

DECLASSIFY

ON NOTES / REMARKS

1.g Program Protection:

1.g.1 Identification of organic Critical Program Information (CPI), organic Critical Components (CC) or Critical Function (CF). Inherited CPI or CC retain classification from owning program

See Note 12.

1.g.2 Identification of traditional security protection measures

Traditional security measures are Industrial Security, Information Security, Operations Security, Physical Security, etc.

1.h Transportation & Shipping:

1.h.1 Methods of shipping armor, armor kits, or vehicles with armor (e.g. rail, air, ship overland truck cargo, etc.)

1.h.2 Information on armor shipments or vehicles with armor upgrades which includes mode of shipment, quantities, and delivery dates, but does not include the unit receiving the shipment or the unit delivery location(s)

1.h.3 Information on armor shipments or vehicles with armor upgrades which includes all the following:

mode of shipment, quantities, delivery date, and unit of assignment and unit delivery location

See Notes 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 & 7 Mark and handle as CUI.

Category: OPSEC.

1.h.4 Shipment of vehicles for demonstration, display or public view purposes that include model of shipment, quantity, delivery date and location

1.h.5 Total vehicle distribution (e.g. numbers, variants, destination, delivery schedule or unit allocation)

Mark and handle as CUI. Category:

OPSEC

2. Threats 2.a.1 A list of threat munitions likely to be used in an attack against the armor U

See Note 12.

Mark and handle as CUI. Categories:

CTI/EXPT.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

2.a.2 Generic threats (e.g. small arms, heavy machine gun, rocket propelled grenade (RPG), mine, top attack weapons or IED) against which the vehicles armor provides protection without the specific velocity of the round at impact, the angle of the round, the type of projectile, or net explosive material

See Notes 11, 12.

Mark and handle as CUI.

Categories: CTI/EXPT.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

2.a.3 Small arms, top attack and underbody threat(s) against which the vehicle provides protection when details of the specific threat are given (any one: velocity of the round at impact, the angle the round struck the target, range, explosive weight (underbelly) or specific projectile identification (top attack))

S

25 years from date of document

See Note 11.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

2.a.4 Medium and larger caliber (e.g., RPG, IED, tank fired KE and CE) threat(s) against which the vehicle provides protection when details of the specific threat are given (any one: velocity of the round at impact, the angle the round struck the target, range, explosive weight or specific projectile identification)

FICATION

DECLASSIFY

ON NOTES / REMARKS

2.a.5 Specific identification and characteristic of electromagnetic threats and their effects that threaten variants of the SPH FoV

25 years from date of document

See Note 11.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

2.a.6 Identification of any threat for which no countermeasures have been implemented from date of document

See Note 11.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

2.a.7 Information revealing performance against specific kinetic & chemical energy projectiles, explosive, directed energy, electromagnetic, chemical, biological, radiological/nuclear, etc. threats from date of

2.a.8 A system specific sample of vehicle armor with ballistic damage from specific munitions (direct or implied), that discloses the performance level or vehicle vulnerabilities

2.b Vulnerabilities and Limitations:

2.b.1 General information regarding limitations of the SPH FoV (non-survivability and non- lethality) subsystems or components (electrical, hydraulic, mechanical, etc.)

Categories: CTI/EXPT.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

2.b.2 Operational vulnerabilities of the system, subsystems or components from date of document

See Note 11.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

2.b.3 Vulnerability of crew members or vehicles to threat munitions, including kinetic and chemical energy projectiles, overhead threats, artillery, Anti- Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM)s, Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFP)s, RPGs, mines or IED weapons

2.b.4 Vehicle vulnerabilities and weaknesses to the electromagnetic spectrum which do not reveal specific frequencies, power levels, or associated E3 criteria

2.b.5 Capability, limitations, and vulnerabilities of the vehicle structure armor against conventional threats from date of document

See Note 11.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

2.b.6 Battle damage assessments that disclose a vehicle capability, vulnerability, or limitation. Battle damage assessment can include photographs, video, operational or maintenance reports, or modeling and simulation data results

See Note 8.

Apply Distribution Statement D

2.b.7 Ballistic data (velocity, ranges, actual round nomenclature) that identifies the threat, vehicle objective and threshold requirements, and/or vehicle performance associated with the SPH FoV

2.b.8 Vulnerability to non-ballistic threats, such as blast effects or incendiaries

2.b.9 Physical or structural properties when combined with detailed information of what will defeat this armor

FICATION

DECLASSIFY

ON NOTES / REMARKS

2.b.10 Non-ballistic threat known or postulated with known or suspect vulnerabilities to such threats from date of document

See Note 11.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

2.b.11 Identification of specific vulnerabilities related to particular SPH FoV threat which would aid being defeated by an adversary from date of document

2.b.12 Limitations of SPH FoV to negotiate all forms of terrain

Categories: CTI/EXPT.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

3. Requirements 3.a System Requirements/Specifications:

3.a.1 Specifications associated with the SPH FoV and components excluding survivability, sensor, and lethality threshold and objective levels

See Notes 11, 12.

Mark and handle as CUI.

Categories: CTI/EXPT.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

3.a.2 Identification of threshold and/or objective specifications for ballistic, IED, mine, or RPG threat criteria (velocity, ranges, explosive yield actual round nomenclature) that defeats installed armor component or shows sufficient detail to identify the threat, and/or vehicle performance associated with the SPH FoV, its subsystems or components

3.a.3 Identification of threshold and/or objective specifications for indirect drive and 360o Situational Awareness (360o SA) sensor range performance for the detection, recognition, or identification of objects of interest

Categories: CTI/EXPT.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

3.a.4 Identification of threshold and/or objective sensor range performance specifications for target detection, recognition, or identification when the sensor(s) performance defines the far limit or performance envelop of platform sensing capability, or is critical to the performance of the lethality capabilities

3.a.5 Identification of threshold and/or objective specifications for lethal weapon systems that show performance values plus range and environmental condition performance associated with the SPH FoV, its subsystems or components

3.b Operational Requirements:

3.b.1 General information regarding limitations of the SPH FoV (non-survivability and non- lethality) subsystems or components (electrical, hydraulic, mechanical, etc.)

Mark and handle as CUI.

Categories: CTI/EXPT.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

3.b.2 General information regarding operational capabilities or limitations (temperature, altitude, weather) of the SPH FoV subsystems, or components. Included in this element is information regarding changes in platform configuration after arrival in theater

Mark and handle as CUI.

FICATION

DECLASSIFY

ON NOTES / REMARKS

3.b.3 Operational vulnerabilities of the SPH FoV, subsystems or components

4. STANAG References

4.a.1 STANAG protection levels associated with threshold or objective requirements for SPH FoV, including levels for IEDs, mines, EFPs, RPGs, NBC and KE threats document

See Note 8.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

STANAG definitions may have additional caveats or restrictions.

5. Hardware (HW) / Software (SW) Technologies

5.a.1 Description of technologies being considered or selected for use in the SPH FoV U

5.a.2 Self-Diagnostics/built in test (BIT)/built in test equipment (BITE)/platform maintenance/mission support software capabilities

Categories: CTI/EXPT Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.b Armor and Armor Components:

5.b.1 Design, description or configuration of armor, physical attachment and integration of armor into vehicle systems as well as A and B kits

Mark and handle as CUI.

5.b.2 Breached/exposed internal contents of armor

Mark and handle as CUI.

Categories: CTI/EXPT.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.b.3 Detailed design or description of physical attachment and integration of armor into vehicle systems

5.b.4 Armor and plate thickness with annotated dimensions U

5.b.5 Armor and spall liner installation methods U See Note 1.

5.b.6 Armor sub-assembly used as part of the armor system

Mark and handle as CUI.

5.b.7 Armor subcomponent used as part of the armor configuration with ballistic damage

Mark and handle as CUI.

Categories: CTI/EXPT.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.b.8 Specific information (e.g., installation timeline) associated with armor configuration changes

Mark and handle as CUI.

Categories: CTI/EXPT.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.b.9 A system specific sample of vehicle armor U See Note 1.

5.b.10 Operations of armor (installation instructions) as employed U

5.c Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN):

FICATION

DECLASSIFY

ON NOTES / REMARKS

5.c.1 General technical design details of SPH FoV system CBRN technologies and techniques, technical gaps in requirement compliance

See Notes 8,12.

Categories: CTI/EXPT.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.c.2 Technical design details or criteria of the SPH FoV CBRN technologies and techniques, or technical gaps in requirement compliance that identify capabilities, vulnerabilities or limitations document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

If Environmental Control System (ECS) design details support SIGMAN design, contact OPR

5.c.3 Specific identification and characteristic of CBRN threats and their effects that threaten the SPH FoV

5.c.4 Annotated technical drawings, sketches, or photos which do not reveal CBRN vulnerabilities of the vehicle

5.c.5 Specific test criteria for CBRN that discloses vehicle performance

S

25 years from

5.c.6 Agent detection thresholds or compilation of predictive models that will allow for NBC vulnerabilities or extrapolation of threat base

5.c.7 Details that reveal the performance of the system against specific CBRN agents or concentration of those agents, capacity or duration of filtration against specific agents

5.d Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) / Nuclear Weapons Effects Hardening:

5.d.1 General information (theory) and techniques for Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) /TEMPEST, Directed Energy Weapon (DEW) / Initial Nuclear Weapons Effects (INWE) hardening for the SPH FoV system

Mark and handle as CUI.

Categories: CTI/EXPT.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.d.2 Technical details and techniques for High altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) hardening/TEMPEST/Directed Energy Weapon (DEW)/Initial Nuclear Weapons (INR) event for the

5.d.3 Information, techniques and technical details for laser hardening/optical limiting treatments for the

5.d.4 Levels of EMP applied causing a system interruption of computer processor(s), computer resets, power interruption, etc. in open or closed hatch configurations

5.d.5 Performance of the SPH FoV against EMP/DEW/INR events/and under TEMPEST testing

FICATION

DECLASSIFY

ON NOTES / REMARKS

5.e Signature Management:

5.e.1 General descriptions of signature management techniques (acoustic, electromagnetic, infrared, visual and ultra violet)

Mark and handle as CUI.

Categories: CTI/EXPT.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.e.2 Electronic Countermeasures / Electromagnetic Interference (ECM/EMI) emission levels

5.e.3 Change in baseline signature level due to application of a signature reduction technique

5.f Lethality/Weapons Systems:

5.f.1 Primary and secondary weapon nomenclature and general capabilities being considered or selected for use in the SPH FoV system

Mark and handle as CUI.

Categories: CTI/EXPT.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.f.2 Rate of fire. U See Note 1 5.f.3 Number of ready/stowed rounds

U See Note 12.

Mark and handle as CUI.

Categories: CTI/EXPT.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.f.4 Weapon reliability, availability, and durability

U See Note 12.

Mark and handle as CUI.

Categories: CTI/EXPT.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.f.5 System accuracy (probability of hit, or target location error) or effective range or munitions performance document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

See weapon or ammunitions specific SCG for classification, if applicable

5.f.6 Effective range using specific ammunition document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

See weapon or ammunitions specific SCG for classification, if applicable

5.f.7 Performance and shot/hit/kill probabilities of the weapons when associated with service ammunition

S 25 years document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

Performance of training ammunition is UNCLASSIFIED

5.g System Software:

5.g.1 Technical details (i.e. including source code, libraries, object code, executable code, and configuration files) of software products, as code or expressed in firmware, used to manage and control traffic on the internal data busses as well as the operation of network switches, routers or red-black data bridges

Mark and handle as CUI, Categories: CTI / EXPT.

FICATION

DECLASSIFY

ON NOTES / REMARKS

5.g.2 COTS/GOTS software products (including firmware) that are configured as part of the SPH FoV system including source code, libraries, object code, executable code, and configuration files

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.g.3 Specific and technical design details regarding SPH FoV system to include data bus transfer of information where a classified capability, performance or vulnerability is not revealed

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.g.4 Specific and technical design details regarding SPH FoV system to include data bus transfer of information. If loss of the technical details would allow classified performance of the SPH FoV system to be derived or vulnerabilities associated with that classified performance to be derived

5.g.5 Survivability related functional diagrams or models (UML, etc.) of software at a sufficiently detailed level to provide significant and accurate understanding of the COTS or GOTS operational characteristics, algorithms, or data bases dealing with power, track suspension, electrical, hydraulic and computing systems

5.g.6 Functional diagrams or models (UML, etc.) of software at a sufficiently detailed level to provide significant and accurate understanding of the operational characteristics, algorithms or data bases that discloses an SPH FoV vulnerability or limitation or a capability that is classified by another element in this guide

See Note 2.

5.g.7 Software used to manage/control the operation/execution of countermeasure devices and systems, whether embedded in the control module or hosted in a separate Central Processing Unit (CPU) or Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) structure, if loss of the technical details would allow classified performance of the SPH FoV system to be derived, or vulnerabilities associated with that classified performance to be derived

5.g.8 Software products for peripherals such as servo motors, sensor interfaces, etc. or any COTS / GOTS survivability operating or source code.

Categories: CTI/EXPT.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

Unless classified by another SCG at a higher level.

5.g.9 Processor/data encryption capabilities or mechanisms in or associated with survivability or secure data storage on the SPH FoV including red/black data bridge structures, data loading mechanisms, when NSA developed or approved encryption is not used.

FICATION

DECLASSIFY

ON NOTES / REMARKS

5.g.10 Processor/data encryption capabilities or mechanisms in or associated with Survivability or secure data storage on the SPH FoV including red/black data bridge structures, data loading mechanisms, when NSA approved encryption is used

5.g.11 System software when loaded/downloaded into end item that reveals a vulnerability or limitation or a capability that is classified by another element in this guide

See software specific SCG for classification, if applicable.

5.h Cybersecurity:

5.h.1 Test methodologies and objectives used for cybersecurity vulnerability and penetration assessments when specific details of objectives indicate a specific vulnerability is suspected

5.h.2 Cybersecurity vulnerability and penetration assessments raw data (i.e. raw outputs of vulnerability scan tools, or code scanning tools with no analysis conducted) resulting from an SPH FoV weapon system

Categories: CTI/EXPT.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

"Weapon System" includes all subsystem components that as a whole creates the weapon system.

5.h.3 Analyzed results of the cybersecurity vulnerability or penetration assessments identifying the ability to exploit a vulnerability to an SPH FoV weapon system to defeat the system and cause mission degradation or mission failure document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

"Weapon System" includes all subsystem components that as a whole creates the weapon system.

5.h.4 Identification of cybersecurity mitigation or remediation after implementation and mitigation of the issue to a low residual risk level

Categories: CTI/EXPT.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.h.5 Timeline to fix cybersecurity vulnerability(ies) absent of vulnerability, mitigation and remediation

Categories: CTI/EXPT.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.h.6 State-of-the-art technologies, tactics, or techniques that do not require physical connections to an SPH FoV weapon system to defeat the system and cause mission degradation or mission failure

TS

document

Apply Distribution Statement D.

"Weapon System" includes all subsystem components that as a whole creates the weapon system.

5.h.7 Cryptographic Keys used for Public/Private Key mechanisms to hash and digitally sign final released software

Categories: CTI/EXPT.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

NOTE: FIPS 140-2 Level 2 compliant cryptographic keys not generated by NSA.

5.h.8 Open source vulnerability information on COTS products without association to an SPH FoV system

FICATION

DECLASSIFY

ON NOTES / REMARKS

5.h.9 Information or vulnerabilities for COTS systems or components for which the vulnerability information is not available within the public domain or for which there is value- added analysis by an Army

Categories: CTI/EXPT.

5.i Mobility:

5.i.1 Limitations of the SPH FoV vehicle to negotiate specific forms of terrain

Mark and handle as CUI.

Categories: CTI/EXPT.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.i.2 Actual automotive capabilities of the SPH FoV to negotiate slopes, terrains and obstacles, including fording (e.g., streams, rivers) to include mobility characteristics

Mark and handle as CUI.

Categories: CTI/EXPT.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.i.3 Actual propulsion system capabilities for the SPH FoV (including sustained speed, dash speed, emergency acceleration, fuel economy, available power, installed horsepower, propulsion power)

Mark and handle as CUI.

5.i.4 Specific fuel capacity, consumption, and rates

Mark and handle as CUI.

Categories: CTI/EXPT.

Apply Distribution Statement D.

5.i.5 Actual capabilities of the auxiliary power system (e.g. type, amount, duration, flexibility of use) of the

5.j COTS/GOTS:

5.j.1 Association of COTS/GOTS used on a particular system, subsystem, and component U

5.j.2 Technical modification to COTS/GOTS includes fit, form,…