AppendixE.pdf

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AFLCMC/WNY Program Protection Plan - Version 2.0

01 July 2019

Appendix E – AN/ALQ-172(V)

1.0. Introduction

The AN/ALQ-172(V) Electronic Countermeasures System Program Protection Plan (PPP) serves as the single source document to coordinate, integrate and execute all protection efforts to deny access to Critical Program Information (CPI) by persons not authorized or without a need-to-know, and to prevent inadvertent disclosure and exploitation of CPI by foreign intelligence services. This

PPP applies to all Government and industry agencies and personnel associated with the AN/ALQ-

172(V) Electronic Countermeasures System (CMS). This PPP is tailored to cover the Unites States

Air Force (USAF) specific security requirements for the legacy and Maintainability and Reliability

System (MARS) AN/ALQ-172(V) configurations. The MARS project is a Consolidated

Sustainment Activity Group (CSAG)-funded multiple Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) redesign effort to support B-52 until its planned end of service life of 2060+.

This PPP will be updated every three years or as changes in the environment dictate. Each update will specifically address any changes in the CPI and Critical Components (CC), their value to an adversary, collection threat, and associated protection actions required to counter new or different threats.

Table 1.0-1 PPP Annex Update Record (mandated)

Technology/System Description The AN/ALQ-172(V) is an electronic countermeasures (ECM) system that provides countermeasures against airborne and ground-based fire control systems and associated missiles.

The system provides self-protection by decreasing the effectiveness of weapons associated with radar emitters. Such weapons are directed away from the target aircraft by providing the threat radar with erroneous target information and/or preventing or delaying utilization of target aircraft data.

The platforms on which the AN/ALQ-172(V) is integrated are as follows:

• ALQ-172(V)1: Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) AC-130U and MC-

130H

• ALQ-172(V)2: Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) B-52

Revision Number Date Changes Approved By

001 20190701 AFLCMC/WNY

Table 1.1-2: Program Information

Program Name ACAT Level

Mission Assurance

Category (MAC)

Last Milestone

AN/ALQ-172(V) Sustainment N/A C

Program Protection Points of Contact (POCs)

The Program Manager for the AN/ALQ-172(V) is Alan Arnold, AFLCMC/WNY, 235 Byron

Street, Suite 19A, Robins AFB, GA, 31098-1670. The Logistics Manager reports to the Internal

Electronic Attack Integrated Product Team (IPT) Lead. The Internal Electronic Attack IPT reports to the Chief, AFLCMC/WNY, Electronic Warfare and Avionics System Program office. The Chief reports to the Program Executive Officer (PEO) Agile Combat Support (ACS), AFLCMC/WN.

Table 1.2-3: Program Protection POCs

Title/Role Name Location Contact Info

Internal Electronic Attack

IPT Lead Rhonda Durham

235 Byron St., Ste 19A

Robins AFB, GA 31098

DSN 468-3635

Rhonda.Durham.1@us.af.mil

Logistics Manager Alan Arnold 235 Byron St., Ste 19A

Robins AFB, GA 31098

DSN 468-4960

Alan.Arnold@us.af.mil

Engineer Dae Lee 235 Byron St., Ste 19A

Robins AFB, GA 31098

DSN 497-8250

Dae.Lee@us.af.mil

Chief Engineer Matthew Bryant 235 Byron St., Ste 19A

Robins AFB, GA 31098

DSN 472-4210

Matthew.Bryant@us.af.mil

Program Protection Lead Alan Arnold 235 Byron St., Ste 19A

Robins AFB, GA 31098

DSN 468-4960

Alan.Arnold@us.af.mil

Anti-Tamper Lead Matthew Bryant 235 Byron St., Ste 19A

Robins AFB, GA 31098

DSN 472-4210

Matthew.Bryant@us.af.mil

Information Assurance

Lead Richard King

235 Byron St., Ste 19A

Robins AFB, GA 31098

DSN: 497-4924

Richard.King.19@us.af.mil

Security Specialist Wendy Myers 235 Byron St., Ste 19A

Robins AFB, GA 31098

DSN: 468-5101

Wendy.Myers.1@us.af.mil

Government Sites that Handle, Store, and Analyze ALQ-172(V) Material AFLCMC/WNY, Robins AFB, GA, 31098 as well as various operational Air Force units around the world.

Government ALQ-172(V) Test and Evaluation Centers Electronic Warfare Avionics Integrated Support Facility (EWAISF) ALQ-172

Engineering Facility, Robins Air Force Base, AFLCMC/WNY, 280 Byron Street, Bldg.

229S, Robins AFB, GA, 31098

46th Test Squadron, Eglin AFB, 46TS/OGEE, 101 East Daytona Road, Suite 243, Eglin

AFB, FL 32542-5605, contact number: DSN 872-7772

16th Electronic Warfare Squadron, 1358 Wizard Way, Eglin AFB FL 32542

AFSOAWC Det 1, 280 Byron Street, Bldg. 229S, Robins AFB, GA, 31098

Electronic Warfare Software Support Activity, Code 4.5.4.300E, 575 I Avenue, Suite 1, Pt. Mugu, CA 93042-5049

Software Support Activity, 507E. Corsair St. MS 2012, Building 2000A, China Lake, CA 93555

Primary Contractor and Original Equipment Manufacturer L3Harris Corp., 77 River Road, Clifton, NJ 07014-2000

Support Contractors Mercer Engineering Research Center (MERC), 135 Osigian Boulevard, Warner Robins, GA

31088

2.0. Program Protection Summary

Schedule

CPI and Critical Functions and Components Protection The ALQ-172 IPT ensures that the listed countermeasures for the CPIs and critical functions and components identified in the table below are implemented and maintained over the lifecycle of the program and/or weapon system.

Table 2.2-4 CPI and Critical Functions Protection

C P

I

# Protected Item (Inherited and Organic)

Countermeasures

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

1-1 OFP – Identification (ID) and Acquisition Algorithm

X X X X X X X

1-2 OFP – Tracking Algorithms

X X X X X X X

1-3 OFP – Geo-Location X X X X X X X

2 EID/OFP Reprogramming Software Tool/Program:

AOR Database and Deployable Formatted- Data

X X X X X X X X X

3 MARS Commercial Off-the-shelf (COTS) Usage & Cross Reference Matrix

X X X X X

4 ALQ-172 Simulator & Support Equipment Software

X X X X X X

5 Raw Test Data X X X X X X

6 Classified Technical Data Package (TDP)

X X X X X X

General CMS Research and Technology Protection CMS

Trusted Systems Design CMS

Key X = Implemented

I = Denotes protection already implemented if CPI is inherited

1 Personnel Security 2 Physical Security 3 Operations Security 4 Industrial Security 5 Training 6 Information Security 7 Foreign Disclosure/Agreement

8 Transportation Mgmt.

9 Anti-Tamper 10 Dial-down Functionality

11 IA/Network Security 12 Communication Security 13 Software Assurance 14 Supply Chain Risk Management 15 System Security Engineering (SSE)

16 Other

3.0. Critical Program Information (CPI) and Critical Components CPI is any information, technology, or system that, if compromised, would significantly alter program direction, compromise the program or system capabilities, shorten the expected combat-effective life of the system, or require additional research, development, test and evaluation to encounter the impact of the compromise. By definition, CPI includes CSR.

CSR are any system resources that, if unavailable or compromised, will prevent or delay the successful completion of the system acquisition or the ability or warfighters to carry out their mission. Examples include sole source or one-of-a-kind items including manufacturers, components, end items, and key locations.

CPI and CSR are lists of information or resources that, if known to an adversary, could enable the adversary to counter, destroy, or clone the technology. The CPI and CSR lists are reassessed as required in response to changing requirements, the international collection threat environment, and/or inadvertent disclosure or loss of CPI or CSR data. If a new CPI or SCR element is identified, it will be added to the ALQ-172 CPI and/or CSR lists. If AFLCMC/WNY ALQ-172 Electronic

Warfare Program Office determine an item is no longer a CPI or CSR, the item will be removed from the applicable lists. To protect the ALQ-172 program, information pertaining to the following areas are reviewed:

Mobility and Operations Plans

Requirements showing possible operational intent or activity

Selected reasons for grounding aircraft if it affects limitations

Operational Flight Program (OFP)

System Reprogramming Tools

Information concerning real world military deployments

Details of logistics plans

Test reports and results

Existing Technical Data Package

As a result, information that, if revealed, could lead to the development and effective employment of countermeasures by our adversaries, has been identified as critical.

The detailed system architecture and OFP algorithms are used to identify, track, and provide ECM techniques against emitters in a dense Radio Frequency (RF) environment. Therefore, any EID and ECM information consists of a catalog of the specific signal parameters that the system utilizes are identified as CPI since the EID/ECM techniques are coupled to the specific signal identification to provide the most effective protection against the identified platform/weapon.

ALQ-172 CPI also includes System Reprogramming software tools that link the OFP, EID, and

ECM together and ensure that all of the software components are compatible. This combined software creates a composite load file tailored to the mission’s Area of Responsibility (AOR).

Inherited CPI and Critical Components The AN/ALQ-172(V) system does not contain any inherited CPI.

Organic CPI and Critical Components

Table 3.2-5: Organic CPI and Critical Components (mandated)

Assessment Date(s): 20190630

CPI/CC Consequence of

Compromise

Status/ Date &

Justification for Status Change

Tracea ble

CTEs, KPPs, etc.

Export Control Areas

Physical Location

System Location PPIP Exists?

C P

I

System

OFP

Algorithms

Compromise of this information would allow a foreign intelligence service or competitors to degrade neutralize the AN/ALQ-172(V) System performance

N/A N/A N/A N/A a) AFLCMC/WNY,

b) L3Harris Corp

a) AFLCMC/WNY,

b) L3Harris Corp,

c) AFSOC 492

SOW/DET1,

d) ACC 16 EWS

EID/OFP

Reprogram ming Data & Programs

Compromise of this information would allow a foreign intelligence service or competitors to degrade neutralize the AN/ALQ-172(V) System performance

N/A N/A N/A N/A a) AFLCMC/WNY,

b) L3Harris Corp,

c) ACC 16 EWS,

d) AFSOC 492

SOW/DET1

a) AFLCMC/WNY,

b) L3Harris Corp,

c) ACC 16 EWS,

d) AFSOC 492

SOW/DET1

MARS

COTS

Usage and Cross Reference Matrix

Compromise of this information would allow a foreign intelligence service or competitors to gain knowledge on System performance

N/A N/A N/A N/A a) AFLCMC/WNY,

b) AFSC 408

SCMS,

c) L3Harris Corp

b) AFSC 408

SCMS,

c) L3Harris Corp

Simulator & Support Equipment Software

Compromise of this information would allow a foreign intelligence service or competitors to gain knowledge on System performance

N/A N/A N/A N/A a) AFLCMC/WNY,

b) ACC 29 TSS

c) 402 EMXG

d) L3Harris Corp

a) AFLCMC/WNY,

b) ACC 29 TSS

c) 402 EMXG

d) L3Harris Corp

Raw Test Data

Compromise of this information would allow a foreign intelligence service or competitors to gain knowledge on System performance

N/A N/A N/A N/A a) AFLCMC/WNY,

b) L3Harris Corp,

c) ACC 16 EWS,

d) ACC 28 TES,

e) AFMC 46 TS,

f) AFSOC 492

SOW/DET1,

g) AFGSC A3T

c) ACC 16 EWS,

d) ACC 28 TES,

e) AFMC 46 TS,

f) AFSOC 492

SOW/DET1,

g) AFGSC A3T

TDP

(Classified)

Compilation of this information would allow a foreign intelligence service or competitors to gain knowledge on System performance

N/A N/A N/A N/A a) AFLCMC/WNY,

b) L3Harris Corp,

c) ACC 16 EWS,

d) ACC 28 TES,

e) AFMC 46 TS,

f) AFSOC 492

SOW/DET1

g) 402 EMXG

c) ACC 16 EWS, d)

ACC 28 TES,

e) AFMC 46 TS,

f) AFSOC 492

SOW/DET1

g) 402 EMXG

C ri ti c a l C o m p o n e n ts

Digital Receiver, Digital Radio Frequency Memory

(DRFM),

Digital Direct Synthesizer

(DDS),

Processor

Compilation of this information would allow a foreign intelligence service or competitors to gain knowledge on System performance

N/A N/A N/A N/A a) AFLCMC/WNY,

b) L3Harris Corp,

c) ACC 16 EWS,

d) Hurlburt Field,

e) Barksdale AFB,

f) Minot AFB,

g) Deployed Locations

a) AFLCMC/WNY,

b) L3Harris Corp,

c) ACC 16 EWS,

d) Hurlburt Field,

e) Barksdale AFB,

f) Minot AFB,

g) Deployed Locations

4.0. Horizontal Protection

The identified CPIs are unique to ALQ-172 and not shared by other systems. The ALQ-172

Program Manager (PM) is responsible for applying common security measures for protecting similar CPI for any program or technology to ensure horizontal protection. The PM ensures horizontal protection through the distribution of the approved, signed PPP to any related or affected program or subsystem for incorporation into their PPP.

5.0. Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Countermeasures

Table 5.0-7: Summary of CPI Threat, Vulnerabilities, and Countermeasures (mandated) (sample)

CPI/CC (and CC supplier) Section 2.0

Threats Section 5.1

Vulnerabilities Section 5.2

Countermeasures Section 5.3

C P

I

System OFP Algorithms 3,6,9,11,12,13,15 Classified Classified

EID/OFP Reprogramming Data & Programs 3,6,9,11,12,13,15 Classified Classified

MARS COTS Cross Reference 3,6,9,11,12,13,15 Classified Classified

Simulator & Support Equipment Software 3,6,9,11,12,13,15 Classified Classified

Raw Test Data 3,6,9,11,12,13,15 Classified Classified

TDP (Classified) 3,6,9,11,12,13,15 Classified Classified

C ri ti c a l o m p o n e n ts

Digital Receiver, Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM), and Digital Direct Synthesizer (DDS)

3,6,9,11,12,13,15 Classified Classified

Threats Applicable Threats to the ALQ-172 system are contained in the Air Force Office of Special

Investigations (AFOSI) Department of Defense Threat Assessment. The ALQ-172 threat assessment elements include:

Key intelligence judgement and significant changes in the threat environment, highlighting the most likely and most stressing threats to the US weapon system

Operational threat environment, target attributes, the system-specific threat, and emergent technologies; these will form central body of the assessment.

Critical Intelligence Parameters (CIPs). CIPs are specific thresholds at which the performance of a foreign system/capability will likely compromise the effectiveness of the

US system. Production Requirements/Requests for Information (PRs/RFIs) supporting these CIPs shall be developed and shall be referenced in the applicable documents.

A threat assessment in response to the system’s CPI was accomplished by the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) on 12 Jan 2016. This product gives insight into the human intelligence threat posed on these systems. The threat assessment along with an established

Counter-Intelligence Support Plan (CISP) serves as a guide and tool for management and security professionals in developing and implementing effective policy and methodologies to reduce, delay, or prepare for identified threats. Below is general threat information that can be used as a guide for security operations for electronic warfare systems.

Table 5.1-1: Threat Product References

Title of Program-Specific or Other Threat Products

Used for PPP Threat

Analysis

Classification

Document

Date

Organization(s) Producing the Product

Reference/Link to

Product

Formal Threat

Reports Integrated Threat

Assessment (ITA) U-S 12 Jan 2016

Air Force Office of

Special Investigations

(AFOSI)

Contact

AFLCMC/WNY

Table 5.1-2: Identified Threats

T#

Threat

Description

Consequence of threat realization

HUMINT

Collection

A category of intelligence derived from information collected and/or provided by human sources.

Information

Assurance

Signals Intelligence

(SIGINT)

A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted.

Security

Classification

Personnel

Security

Clearance

Imagery Intelligence

(IMINT)

Intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar wherein

Facility

Security

Clearance images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media. This category also includes imagery gathered via satellites.

Industrial Security Controls

Measurement and

Signature

Intelligence

(MASINT)

Scientific and technical intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydro magnetic). This data is derived from specific technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the source, emitter, or sender. This facilitates subsequent identification and or measurement of the same.

Security Training

Open-Source

Intelligence

(OSINT)

Information of potential intelligence value that is available to the general public.

Operational

Security (OPSEC)

Vulnerabilities The ALQ-172 PM is responsible for identification, review, and update of ALQ-172 threats, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures during the annual review of the PPP. The PM shall vary and apply adequate mitigation methods as applicable.

The program will do a vulnerability check before every software release. The program will also complete a vulnerability check after any hardware modifications are completed. If any vulnerability is found, a mitigation strategy will be formulated. After a determinate amount of time, defined by the mitigation plan, the vulnerability will be re-assessed. The following are potential vulnerabilities that may apply to all the system CPI and CC.

Table 5.2-8: Potential CPI and Critical Component Vulnerabilities (mandated)

V# CPI/Critical Components Identified Vulnerabilities

1 System OFP Algorithms

Data Transfer

Industry Activity

Unsecured Communications

OPSEC Indicators

Electronic Media

Lack of Security Awareness

Personnel Security Vulnerabilities

EID/OFP Reprogramming Data and Programs

Data Transfer

Unsecured Communications

OPSEC Indicators

Electronic Media

Lack of Security Awareness

Personnel Security Vulnerabilities

3 MARS COTS Cross Reference

Industry Activity

Unsecured Communications

OPSEC Indicators

Personnel Security Vulnerabilities

Simulator & Support Equipment Software

Data Transfer

Unsecured Communications

OPSEC Indicators

Electronic Media

Lack of Security Awareness

Personnel Security Vulnerabilities

5 Raw Test Data

Data Transfer

Unsecured Communications

OPSEC Indicators

Electronic Media

Lack of Security Awareness

Personnel Security Vulnerabilities

6 TDP (Classified)

Data Transfer

Unsecured Communications

OPSEC Indicators

Electronic Media

Lack of Security Awareness

Personnel Security Vulnerabilities

Digital Receiver, Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM), and Digital Direct Synthesizer (DDS)

OPSEC Indicators

Lack of Security Awareness

Personnel Security Vulnerabilities

Countermeasures High Value CPI must be protected against the threats discussed in Section 4 throughout the lifecycle of the ALQ-172 program. The countermeasures selected for the ALQ-172 CPIs and CSR are based on their priority, the probability of collection, and the impact to the program, if compromised. In all cases, security countermeasures that are already required by DoD and USAF requirements were determined to provide adequate protection without addition additional program costs. The degree of protection required for a particular CPI will depend on its vulnerability to various collection modes and other conditions (i.e., activity, time, process, operational test, etc.).

The ideal level of protection is one that is required to effectively counter all potential threats.

However, the degree of risk, practicality, and available resources will limit the implementation of countermeasures. The selection of specific countermeasures to mitigate specific vulnerabilities and protect specific CPI is contained in following table.

Protection measures for the ALQ-172 program have been developed to address key vulnerabilities of the CPI, in order to protect classified and sensitive unclassified information, and to comply with regulatory requirements. Protection measures will be evaluated against the evolving threat environment and reassessed as necessary during the entire acquisition life cycle. Protection of the program’s classified information is addressed in the AN/ALQ-172(V) Electronic Countermeasures

(ECM) System Security Classification Guide (SCG), 8 February 2018

Information Security: Applies to all aspects of safeguarding information, in whatever form it is recorded. It is an important point to note that information security is, inherently and necessarily, neither hermetic nor perfectible. It is virtually impossible to eradicate all risk of improper handling or capricious use of any information. As a result, the level of information security implemented in a particular situation is commensurate with the value of the information and the impact to the loss that might accrue from improper use – effective risk management. ALQ-172 information will be protected to the level its sensitivity warrants in accordance with DoD requirements and Air Force

(AF) instructions. Protection level will be determined, and the corresponding security measure selected. CPI is also protected using a variety of protection measures contained in public law, such as exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of 1964, as amended, and the Computer

Security Act of 1987. Additionally, the ALQ-172 effort complies with compulsory guidance contained in several other AF guidance concerning the protection of computer systems, foreign disclosure, public release, continuity of operations, and information assurance designed to protect information. Distribution of ALQ-172 CPI will be restricted to the DoD and US DoD contractors only.

Industrial Security: The industrial security posture is based on threat analysis and risk management. Industrial security creates a government and industry partnership empowering industry to directly manage its own administrative security controls. It prescribes requirements, restrictions, and other safeguards necessary to prevent unauthorized disclosure of classified information and control authorized disclosure of classified information released by the US. ALQ-

172 contractors protect all classified information in accordance with their DD441, Defense

Security Agreement and DD form 254, Contract Security Classification Specification.

OPSEC: OPSEC is a systematic, proven process by which the US Government and its contractors deny potential adversaries information about important capabilities and intentions.

This process identifies, controls, and protects generally unclassified evidence relating to planning and executing sensitive government activities. Estimates from the intelligence community indicate that about 95% of information desired by other countries is available through open sources.

Implementing OPSEC procedures renders it more difficult to gather this information and put together the “big picture.” The information comes from unclassified reports, memos, drawings, telephone numbers and lists, individual and organizational names, and other general information placed in trashcans, picked up in conversations with acquaintances and over telephones, and in dozens of other ways. Part of the ALQ-172 program’s overall strategy for combating an ever-changing intelligence threat includes an active and rigorous operations security program.

Automated Information System (AIS) Security: ALQ-172 computer and networking systems (collectively referred to as automated information systems or AIS) are used to capture, create, store, process, develop, and distribute classified and FOUO information. They are operated in a manner that ensures the information is protected against unauthorized disclosure, exploitation, or modification. Methods for ensuring such protection require administrative, operational, physical, procedural and personnel controls. Protection measures are selected based upon the sensitivity and category of the information, the threat, and operational requirements associated with the AIS environment.

Communications Security (COMSEC): COMSEC material includes any item that secures or authenticates telecommunications. ALQ-172 COMSEC includes keys, equipment, devices, documents, firmware and software that hold or describe cryptographic logic and other items for

COMSEC functions. ALQ-172 COMSEC operations include distributing, safeguarding, destroying and accounting for these COMSEC materials for AFLCMC/WNY administrative and operational COMSEC accounts.

Education and Awareness: ALQ-172 effort relies upon vigorous security education and awareness programs in both government and industry as its most cost-effective security countermeasures. Without this program, ALQ-172 IPT members would be unaware of those technologies in need of protection, the threats these measures may encounter, and the proper means to provide that protection. All member are provided with the ALQ-172 SCG and recurring training program.

Personnel Security: The primary security measure followed in the ALQ-172 program for safeguarding classified information is to ensure it is accessible only by persons having the appropriate clearance and access approval. Who possess a clearly identified need-to-know and have completed security indoctrination. Even when approved, personnel are directed to proactive a need-to-know discipline in acquiring or disseminating information about the program. Intrinsic to this discipline is acquiring or disseminating only that information essential to effectively carrying out the assignment. No person warrants a need-to-know solely by virtue of rank, title, or position. By requiring strict attention to ensuring:

o The need-to-know o Necessary investigations o Binding contractual obligations on those granted access o Security education and awareness o Individual responsibility

CPI

Vulnerability

M u lt id is ci p li n ar y ll ec ti

E le ct ro n ic

D at a

T ra n sf er

In d u st ry A ct iv it y

U se cu re m m u n ic at io n s

O P

S E

C I n d ic at rs

F re ig n V is it rs

P u b li c D is cl o su re

E le ct ro n ic

M ed ia

L ac k o f S ec u ri ty

A w ar en es s

P er so n n el

S ec u ri ty

V u ln er ab il it ie s

Vulnerability Priority

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

System OFP Algorithms

EID/OFP

Reprogramming Data and Programs

Simulator & Support Equipment Software

Raw Test Data

MARS COTS Cross Reference

TDP (Classified)

Digital Receiver, Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM), Digital Direct Synthesizer (DDS), Processor

Countermeasures

1 Facility Access Restrictions

2 Arms Export and Control Act Restrictions

3 COMSEC

4 Distribution Restrictions on Technical Information

5 Document Destruction Procedures

6 Designated Disclosure Letters

7 FOUO Provisions of the Freedom of Information Act

8 Foreign Disclosure Procedures and Restrictions

9 Information Assurance, Computer Security, and Unclassified Network Controlled Access

10 Security Education

11 OPSEC Protection Measures

12 Personnel Security Clearances and Access Controls

13 Public Release Restrictions

14 Security Classification

Anti-Tamper (AT)

The ALQ-172(V) program was initiated and developed prior to AT being a program design requirement. As new, relevant modifications are made to the system, AT will be considered as part of any updated designs.

Information Assurance (IA)

The ALQ-172 PM has overall responsibility for Information Assurance. The PM will enact measures that protect the availability, integrity, authentication, and confidentiality of information and information systems. The PM will ensure ALQ-172 personnel are trained and familiar with statutory and regulatory requirements governing IA.

ALQ-172 CPI directly related to the IA is the AN/ALQ-172(V) load files (OFP, EID, and ECM) released and controlled by reprogramming software utilities. The system reprogramming tools insure that the files included for load are compatible with each other and also creates a master configuration file that allows the system to verify the integrity of the load during self-test. The files are loaded using the AN/PYM-1 Common Aircraft Programming Equipment (CAPRE) and with the LRU-21 Control Display Unit (CDU). The data loaded is read back from memory and verified with the data in the load file. The files themselves have checksum values embedded in each file.

During system self-test, the OFP calculates the value of the checksum and compares it to the embedded value in each file to insure data integrity.

Software Assurance

ALQ-172 program software is designed, tested and delivered by prime contractor engineers. ALQ-

172 lead engineer monitors weekly software development status, monthly status and performance at the monthly program reviews. Software product testing is performed in the government furnished lab by contractor/organic engineers with witness of ALQ-172 lead engineer. Software lab tests ensure that the software products and associated documentation required by the contract have been documented, fulfill the requirements of the contract, and comply with processes and other product requirements. Test reports documenting the results of the analysis, software test, and software documentation provided from contractor engineers are approved by ALQ-172 lead engineer and captured in the AFLCMC/WNY ALQ-172 program data system.

The ALQ-172 lead engineer is responsible for software assurance, and evaluates software critical functions and CPI to be protected in the operational system. When the software development is completed, audits are conducted by contract quality personnel and ALQ-172 lead engineer to ensure software architectures, environments, design, and code is evaluated with respect to

Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and

Classification (CAPEC), and Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE). All delivered software is controlled by Computer Program Identification Number (CPIN) and stored security in a

Government-controlled infrastructure.

All test stations, software tools, and computer workstations to support system/software testing at the prime contractor’s facility are governed by rules and guidance of the DoD including Defense

Security Service (DSS), so the software development environment is protected. A list of all personnel that have access into software development laboratories is maintained by applicable

ALQ-172 security managers.

Table 5.3.3-9: Application of Software Assurance Countermeasures (sample)

Development Process Software (CPI, critical function components, other software)

Static Analysis p/a (%)

Design Inspect

Code Inspect p/a (%)

CVE

p/a (%)

CAPEC

p/a (%)

CWE

p/a

Pen Test

Test Coverage p/a (%)

Developmental CPI SW 100/80 Two

Levels 100/80 100/60 100/60

100/6

Yes 75/50

Developmental Critical Function SW

100/80 Two

Levels 100/80 100/70 100/70

100/7

Yes 75/50

Other Developmental SW none One level 100/65 10/0 10/0 10/0 No 50/25

COTS CPI and Critical Function SW

Vendor SwA Vendor

SwA Vendor

SwA 0 0 0 Yes UNK

COTS (other than CPI and Critical Function) and NDI SW

No No No 0 0 0 No UNK

Operational System

Failover Multiple Supplier

Redundancy

Fault Isolation

Least Privilege

System Element Isolation

Input checking / validation

SW load key

Developmental CPI SW 30 All all yes All All

Developmental Critical Function SW

50 All All yes All All

Other Developmental SW none Partial none None All All

COTS (CPI and CF) and NDI

SW

none Partial All None Wrappers/

All All

Development Environment

SW Product Source Release testing

Generated code inspection p/a (%)

C Compiler No Yes 50/20

Runtime libraries Yes Yes 70/none

Automated test system No Yes 50/none

Configuration management system

No Yes NA

Database No Yes 50/none

Development Environment Access

Controlled access; Cleared personnel only

Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM)

The government program management team, supply chain management team, and the contractor will assess SCRM requirements rigorously and will capture changing requirements through the engineering change process. The AN/ALQ-172 Program will apply the various applicable Key

Practices (KP) from the Key Practices and Implementation Guide for the DoD Comprehensive

National Cyber Security Initiative 11, Supply Chain Risk Management (25 February 2010), to ensure supply chain integrity. By utilizing the Key Practices and Implementation SCRM guidance, the program will be able to address the KPs as they apply to the AN/ALQ-172 Program. It is the responsibility of the prime contractor to ensure that program protection is in place for all subcontractors supporting the program’s supply chain.

Trusted Suppliers

Air Force Sustainment Center (AFSC) 408th Supply Chain Mamanement Squadron (SCMS) and

Defense Logistcs Agency (DLA) are primarily responsible for trusted supplier identification and counterfeit prevention.

Counterfeit Prevention

AFSC 408 SCMS implemented the counterfeit prevention requirement in repair and supply contracts. All AFSC repair and supply contracts require contractors to develop and implement tailored counterfeit prevention plan.

System Security Engineering

AFLCMC/WNY is responsible for system security engineering. Any system security engineering issues shall be addressed and considered as part of the EW Product Line Systems Engineering

Plan (SEP).

General Countermeasures

ALQ-172 program established Security Measures and Activates specifically designed to protect the availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality of information and information systems provided by other instruction or guidance. The ALQ-172 PM will ensure that all program personnel are trained and familiar with statutory and regulatory requirements governing program security measures and activities.

Type Detail

COMSEC

(Development Environment)

Only approved secure voice and communication instruments will be used to conduct classified voice communications and data transmissions. Classified discussions will take place in approved cleared areas. Under no circumstances will classified information be discussed in unsecured locations or transmitted over unsecured channels. Questions should be directed to AFLCMC/WNY security manager.

OPSEC All personnel will protect critical information per OPSEC policy.

Foreign Visit Program Contact AFLCMC/WNY security manager.

Information Assurance (Development Environment)

All personnel will abide by applicable regulations including the AF instructions, National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM), NISPOM supplement, as well as the ALQ-172 SCG. All personnel are required to complete information Protection training and provide certificates of training to the Information Protection Awareness program manager.

Computer Security

(COMPUSEC)

All personnel will strictly control all classification information processed on Automated Information System (AISs). Under no circumstances will classified information ever be processed on unclassified ISs or networks.

Computer security training has been conducted and will continue throughout the programs life cycle. All questions regarding COMPUSEC or information Assurance will be directed to the AFLCMC/WNY security manager.

Personnel Security All personnel (civilian, military, and contract) assigned to the ALQ-172 program are required to have a validated clearance and need-to-know.

Industrial Security All contractor personnel will abide by the provisions of the Industrial Security Regulations, industrial security stipulations within their contract and applicability within this PPP.

6.0. Other System Security-Related Plans and Documents

Table 6.0-10: Other System Security-Related Plans and Documents

Plan Organization Link/POC

Counterintelligence Support Plan (CISP) Office of Special Investigation

(OSI)

OSI Det 105

EW Product Line SEP SEP Approval Authority

7.0. Program Protection Risks

Whenever the program is planning or managing risk, cost, schedule, and technical aspects are considered. This is done with a full team of support. The team consists of different backgrounds that have cost, schedule, and technical aspects in mind. In addition, the team attempts to identify risk before every block cycle and software release. This is done through technical planning and planning meetings. There have not been any unmitigated risks with this approach.

Table 7.0-11: Risk Cube

L ik e li h o

Very Low

Low

Moderate

High

Very High

Very Low

Low

Moderate

High

Very High

Very Low

Low

Moderate

Moderate

High

Very Low

Low

Low

Low

Moderate

Very Low

Very Low

Very Low

Low

Low

Impact

The program continually conducts risk assessments as part of programmatic reviews. The table above shows the aggregated results of a technical risk analysis. For each grouping of high and moderate risks shown, risk mitigation plans have been identified.

High risks:

Vulnerability of security violations (lack of security awareness and personnel security vulnerabilities).

Moderate risks:

Open source intelligence threat combined with security violation vulnerabilities.

As open source information could be problematic, the program is constantly vigilant with what information is considered open and publicly available. Ensuring that open source data is actually open and classification violations are prevented is always being considered.

Open source intelligence threats combined with vulnerabilities of data transfer, industry activity, OPSEC indicators, foreign visitors, and electronic media.

The threat of imagery intelligence coupled with data transfer, industry activity, OPSEC indicators, foreign visitors, and electronic media.

8.0. Foreign Involvement

No information regarding the AN/ALQ-172(V) program will be released without approval of

AFLCMC/WNY in accordance with a designated Foreign Disclosure Policy Officer (FDPO) review. To obtain an FDPO review, AFLCMC/WNY will contact the cognizant FDPO for a disclosure decision. AFLCMC/WNY will also ensure the FDPO review has been accomplished prior to any Foreign Military Sales (FMS) effort. The TA/CP attached to this PPP also guides the release of any technology associated with this system with relation to any foreign involvement.

There are no FMS customers for the AN/ALQ-172(V) system.

Table 8.0-12: Foreign Involvement Summary

This system is US ONLY (Yes, No, Unknown): Yes

This system is intended for CONUS deployment only (Yes, No, Unknown): No. It is intended for global deployment.

Approved Disclosures of CPI: None

Technology Assessment/Control Plan Exists (Y/N/Unknown): No

Type of Foreign Involvement

(IC/FMS/DCS)

Likelihood of Foreign

Involvement (H, M, L)

Status (Perceived/Established)

Agreements/Licenses in Place (if known)

Who is Involved?

N/A L Established None WNY

Defense Exportability Features Currently, the AN/ALQ-172(V) system is not commercially sold and has no foreign military users.

9.0. Processes for Management and Implementation of PPP

There are several methods of checking PPP implementation. Audits/inspections are used to ensure compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and policies. Engineering reviews are used to ensure that system security requirements are identified, traceable and met throughout the acquisition lifecycle.

Primary responsibility for implementation of the PPP during the AN/ALQ-172 life cycle remains with the PM. The PM is accountable for ensuring security is maintained throughout the program.

As a complement, the PM may appoint a Program Protection IPT (PPIPT) to assist. The PPIPT represents multiple Government functional disciplines and agencies charged with protecting the program from security threats. As required, the PPIPT retains the flexibility to engage the prime contractor to address program protection requirements.

CPI protection requirements are addressed and communicated through several means.

Requirements are developed by the program IPT and are incorporated into individual contracts and supporting requests for proposal. If CPI protection requirements change during the course of a contract, the IPT, through the Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO), will pursue a contract modification to update the new CPI protection requirements. Oversight and inspection of CPI protection measures will be conducted by the IPT with potential help from the DSS when possible.

The IPT and/or DSS will conduct periodic audits, reviews, and/or inspections of Defense

Contractor Facilities to ensure proper implementation of required countermeasures that fall within the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM). The IPT will also conduct inspection of protection countermeasures implemented which fall outside of normal NISPOM requirements. The IPT will work with the local DSS office to ensure gaps in protection are identified and review the contractor’s annual DSS report for trend analysis. Identified deficiencies that cannot be corrected will be presented to the PM and PCO for further resolution.

The IPT has instituted a tiered training program. Tier 1 training focuses on a general understanding of identified CPIs, the program protection process, and their importance to program support. Tier

II training is specifically designed for personnel who actually handle, store, develop and/or maintain CPI. This training is required for all personnel, both Government and industry, working the program. All Government organizations which handle, store, and manufacture items containing

CPI must accomplish the training annually. The prime contractor and its subcontractors are bound by this PPP, via a DD Form 254, and will implement required tier training.

Audits/Inspections Oversight and inspection of CPI protection measures will be conducted by the IPT with help from the Defense Security Service (DSS) when possible. The IPT and/or DSS will conduct periodic audits, reviews, and/or inspections of Defense Contractor Facilities to ensure proper implementation of required countermeasures as defined in the National Industrial Security

Program Operating Manual (NISPOM). The IPT will also conduct inspections of protection countermeasures implemented which fall outside of normal NISPOM requirements. The IPT will work with the local DSS office to ensure gaps in protection are identified and review the contractor’s annual DSS report for trend analysis

Engineering/Technical Reviews CPI protection requirements are relayed through several means. Security and protection requirements are identified and stated through the Request for Proposal (RFP) language and contracts. All RFPs and Statements of Work are reviewed to ensure they contain appropriate CPI protection requirements. If CPI protection requirements change during the course of a contract, the

IPT through the PCO will develop the appropriate change letter or contract modification to identify the new CPI protection requirements

Sustainment Electronic Warfare and Avionics System Program Office (AFLCMC/WNY) is the single manager responsible for the life-cycle sustainment and modernization of the ALQ-172 program. The

Sustainment strategy is captured in the ALQ-172 Product Support Strategy.

Sustainment software updates include Organizational-level test equipment software are managed by AFLCMC/WNY. Intermediate and depot-level test equipment software support for the ALQ-

172 is managed by AFSC 408 SCMS, Warner Robins Air Logistics Center (WR-ALC), Robins

AFB, GA. ALQ-172 Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) activity is performed at WR-ALC.

10.0. Processes for Monitoring and Reporting Compromises

Incidents of loss, compromise, unauthorized disclosure or theft of proprietary information or trade secrets involving Critical Research Technology (CRT) and CPI shall be immediately reported in accordance with E.O. 12958, DODM 5200.01 Volumes 1-4, DoD 5220.22M DoDI

5240.6, and AFI 16-1404 to the Security Representative. The Security Representative shall contact appropriate agencies for corrective actions and reporting (AIR 7.4, DSS, Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], AFOSI, and other law enforcement agencies).

11.0. Program Protection Costs

There are no specific program protection costs being budgeted for by the program office at this time

Security Costs There are no specific security costs being budgeted for by the program office at this time.

Table 11.1-13: Security Costs above NISPOM Requirements

Cost Type Activity Responsibility Cost

Nothing to report at this time

Total cost