SECTION M (AMENDED) - Moab RAC RFP.pdf

MOAB RAC – FINAL RFP – PROJECT COMPLETION SECTION M

SOLICITATION NO. 89303320REM000066 – AMENDMENT 0001 (AMENDED)

M-ii

Section M

Table of Contents

M.1 DOE-M-2001 Proposal Evaluation – General – Alternate III (Feb 2019) ................................ M-1

M.2 Evaluation Factor – Key Personnel ............................................................................................ M-2

M.3 DOE-M-2008 Evaluation Factor – Past Performance (Oct 2015) (Revised) ............................ M-3

M.4 Evaluation Factor – Management Approach ............................................................................. M-5

M.5 Evaluation Factor – Cost and Fee/Profit .................................................................................... M-5

M.6 DOE-M-2011 Relative Importance of Evaluation Factors (Oct 2015) ..................................... M-6

M.7 DOE-M-2012 Basis for Award (Oct 2015) .................................................................................. M-6

M-1

M.1 DOE-M-2001 Proposal Evaluation – General – Alternate III (Feb 2019)

(a) Conduct of acquisition.

(1) This acquisition will be conducted pursuant to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Part 15 entitled, Contracting by Negotiation; Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation (DEAR), Part

915 entitled, Contracting by Negotiation; and the provisions of this solicitation.

(2) DOE has established a Source Evaluation Board (SEB) to evaluate the proposals submitted by

Offerors in response to this solicitation. Proposal evaluation is an assessment of the proposal and the Offeror’s ability to perform the prospective contract successfully. Proposals will be evaluated solely on the factors specified in the solicitation against the evaluation factors in this Section M to determine the Offeror’s ability to perform the contract.

(3) The designated source selection authority will select an Offeror for contract award whose proposal represents the best value to the Government. The source selection authority’s decision will be based on a comparative assessment of proposals against all evaluation factors in the solicitation. The source selection authority may reject all proposals received in response to this solicitation, if doing so is in the best interest of the Government.

(b) Deficiency in proposal.

(1) A deficiency, as defined at FAR Section 15.001 entitled, Definitions, is a material failure of a proposal to meet a Government requirement or a combination of significant weaknesses in a proposal that increases the risk of unsuccessful contract performance to an unacceptable level.

No award will be made to an Offeror whose proposal is determined to be deficient.

(2) A proposal will be eliminated from further consideration before completing the Government’s evaluation if the proposal is deficient as to be unacceptable on its face. Deficiencies may include any exceptions or deviations to the terms of the solicitation. A proposal will be deemed unacceptable if it does not represent a reasonable initial effort to address itself to the material requirements of the solicitation, or if it does not substantially and materially comply with the proposal preparation instructions of this solicitation. Cursory responses or responses which merely repeat or reformulate the Master Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ)

Performance Work Statement (PWS) and/or Task Order PWS will not be considered responsive to the requirements of the solicitation. In the event that a proposal is rejected, a notice will be sent to the Offeror stating the reason(s) that the proposal will not be considered for further evaluation under this solicitation.

(c) Responsibility. In accordance with FAR Subpart 9.1, Responsible Prospective Contractors, and

DEAR Subpart 909.1 entitled, Responsible Prospective Contractors, the Procuring Contracting

Officer (PCO) is required to make an affirmative determination of whether a prospective contractor is responsible. The PCO may, if necessary, conduct a preaward survey of the prospective contractor as part of the considerations in determining responsibility. In the absence of information clearly indicating that the otherwise successful Offeror is responsible, the PCO will make a determination of nonresponsibility and no award will be made to that Offeror; unless, the apparent successful Offeror is a small business and the Small Business Administration issues a Certificate of Competency in accordance with FAR Subpart 19.6 entitled, Certificates of Competency and Determinations of

Responsibility. The responsibility determination includes a finding that award of the contract to the

Offeror will not pose an undue risk to the common defense and security as a result of its access to classified information or special nuclear material in the performance of the contract, as prescribed in

Section L provision, DEAR 952.204-73, Facility Clearance, which requires submission of specific information by the Offeror related to foreign interests.

M-2

(d) Award without discussions. In accordance with paragraph (f)(4) of Section L provision FAR 52.215-

1, Instructions to Offerors – Competitive Acquisition, the Government intends to evaluate proposals and award a contract without conducting discussions with Offerors. Therefore, the Offeror’s initial proposal shall contain the Offeror’s best terms from a cost or price and technical standpoint. The

Government, however, reserves the right to conduct discussions if the PCO later determines them to be necessary and may limit the competitive range for purposes of efficiency.

(e) Organizational conflicts of interest. The Offeror is required by the Section K provision entitled, Organizational Conflicts of Interest Disclosure, to provide a statement of any past, present, or currently planned interests related to the performance of the work and a statement that an actual or potential conflict of interest or unfair competitive advantage does or does not exist in connection with the contract resulting from the solicitation.

M.2 Evaluation Factor – Key Personnel

(a) Key Personnel. DOE will evaluate the proposed Program Manager, Moab Operations/Site Manager

(individual primarily responsible for technical implementation of its Closure Strategy), and Crescent

Junction Operations/Site Manager; and other proposed key personnel along with the Offeror’s rationale for selecting the proposed non-required key personnel positions and why the positions are essential to the successful performance of the entire IDIQ PWS. DOE will evaluate the key personnel team make-up that demonstrates the elements in paragraph (c) below. DOE’s evaluation of the

Program Manager will be the most important aspect of the evaluation of key personnel.

Failure of the Offeror to propose the required key personnel position(s), or to confirm the availability of all key personnel as being assigned to the contract full-time and that their permanent duty station is located in the required areas will adversely affect the Government’s evaluation of the proposal and may make the proposal ineligible for award. Additionally, failure of the Offeror to provide a letter of commitment for each key personnel will adversely affect the Government’s evaluation of the proposal.

Note: DOE will evaluate all proposed key personnel. However, a higher number of proposed key persons will not be inherently evaluated more favorably than a lesser number of proposed key persons, as the proposed key personnel and the key personnel team will be evaluated based on the evaluation criteria in this factor.

(b) Resume. The individuals proposed as key personnel will be evaluated on the degree to which they are qualified and suitable for the proposed position in relation to the work for which they are proposed to perform and areas of responsibility. The qualifications and suitability of the individual key personnel will be evaluated on the following:

(1) Experience. The key personnel individually will be evaluated on their relevant DOE, commercial, and/or other Government experience in performing work similar to the work to be performed in their proposed position, including leadership and other accomplishments, with emphasis on closure project and completion-type work.

(2) Education. The key personnel will be evaluated on their education, specialized training, certifications, and licenses that support the suitability for the proposed position.

(3) DOE may contact any or all of the references, and other sources of information not provided by the Offeror, to verify the accuracy of the information contained in the resume and to further assess the qualifications and suitability of proposed key personnel.

(c) Key Personnel Team. The evaluation will include an assessment of the following elements for the key personnel team: (i) Experience in promoting and enabling change within an organization; (ii) Recent

M-3 and relevant management experience in direct project execution in the field; (iii) Experience at partnering and good-faith negotiations with client(s) that achieved measurable performance improvements; and (iv) Experience in developing innovative technical approaches to implement a strategy for site closure. More recent experience in these elements may be given greater consideration. While it is not expected that each key person will possess all of these elements, individual key persons may be evaluated more favorably to the extent they demonstrate each of these elements, and the key personnel team collectively should demonstrate each of them.

(d) Oral Interviews of Key Personnel. The Offeror’s Program Manager, Moab Operations/Site Manager, and Crescent Junction Operations/Site Manager will be evaluated for qualifications and suitability, including leadership capability, for their proposed positions as demonstrated during the oral interviews.

M.3 DOE-M-2008 Evaluation Factor – Past Performance (Oct 2015) (Revised)

(a) Offeror. The Offeror, to include all members of a teaming arrangement, as defined in FAR 9.601(1), will be evaluated on the Government’s assessment of relevant and recent past performance information obtained for the Offeror performing work similar in scope, size, and complexity to the portion of the Master IDIQ PWS that each entity is proposed to perform. The information will be evaluated in order to assess the Offeror’s potential success in performing the work required by the contract. Similar scope, size, and complexity are defined as follows based on the portion of work that each entity is proposed to perform: scope – type of work (e.g., work as identified in the Master IDIQ

PWS, including similar work of a non-nuclear nature and/or similar non-DOE work); size – dollar value (approximate average annual value in relation to the proposed work; annual contract value of approximately $20M for evaluation purposes); and complexity – performance challenges (e.g., overcoming barriers for completion/closure-type projects to safely accelerate work scope, prior innovations, work performance improvements, subcontractor management, management of large complex contracts in highly regulated industries, cost efficiencies, and successful partnerships with the Government, Client, and Regulators). The higher the degree of relevance of the work, the greater the consideration that may be given.

DOE will evaluate recent past performance information for contracts that are currently being performed or have a period of performance end date within the last five (5) years from the original solicitation issuance date. More recent past performance information may be given greater consideration.

The Government will not apportion the assessment of past performance differently amongst the members of a Contractor’s Teaming Arrangement, as defined in FAR 9.601(1), on a past performance contract, as each entity is considered to be responsible for overall performance of the ongoing or prior contract. All partner companies on past performance contracts will be equally credited (positively and negatively) for past performance information. However, relevancy determinations on a past performance contract may differ depending upon what scope each entity is proposed to perform.

(b) Teaming Subcontractors. The Offeror’s proposed Teaming Subcontractors as defined in

Section L.11(a)(2) will be evaluated on the assessment of the past performance information obtained for the Teaming Subcontractor performing work similar in scope, size, and complexity to that proposed to be performed by that Teaming Subcontractor. DOE will evaluate past performance information for contracts that are currently being performed or have been completed within the last five (5) years from the original solicitation issuance date.

(c) Newly formed entity and predecessor companies. The evaluation of past performance for the Offeror and any Teaming Subcontractor(s) may be based on the past performance of its parent organization(s), member organizations in a joint venture, limited liability company, or other similar or

M-4 affiliated companies, provided the Offeror’s proposal demonstrates that the resources of the parent, member, or affiliated company will be provided or relied upon in contract performance such that the parent, member, or affiliate will have meaningful involvement in contract performance. Meaningful involvement means the parent, member, or affiliate will provide material supplies, equipment, personnel, or other tangible assets to contract performance; or that the common parent will utilize the expertise, best practices, lessons learned, or similar resources from the affiliate to affect the performance of the Offeror. Past performance information from predecessor companies that existed prior to any mergers or acquisitions may also be considered where the Offeror’s proposal demonstrates such performance reasonably can be predictive of the Offeror’s performance.

(d) Work to be performed. DOE will evaluate the Offeror and all members of a teaming arrangement, as defined in FAR 9.601(1) and any Teaming Subcontractors, in accordance with the work each entity is proposed to perform to cover the work scope described in the Master IDIQ PWS. The resulting rating will consider whether the Offeror’s team as a whole (including Teaming Subcontractors) has demonstrated relevancy to all PWS requirements.

(e) No record of past performance. If the Offeror or Teaming Subcontractor(s) do not have a record of relevant past performance or if information is not available, the Offeror or Teaming Subcontractor(s) will be evaluated neither favorably nor unfavorably.

(f) Performance information. The Government will only evaluate past performance information for work it considers relevant to the acquisition in terms of similar in scope, size, and complexity, as defined above in paragraph (a), and within the timeframe specified, as defined above in paragraph (a). The

Offeror may also be evaluated on safety statistics (OSHA Days Away, Restricted or Transferred

(DART) and Total Recordable Case (TRC)) and DOE enforcement actions and/or worker safety and health, nuclear safety, and/or classified information security incidents or notifications posted to the

DOE Office of Enterprise Assessments website (https://energy.gov/ea/information-center/enforcement-infocenter) and corrective actions taken to resolve those problems.

(g) Terminated contracts, cure notices, and conditional payment of fee/profit/other incentive actions. The

Government may consider contracts of the Offeror, to include all members of a teaming arrangement, as defined in FAR 9.601(1), and Teaming Subcontractors, that: (1) were terminated for default; (2) included a cure notice(s) in accordance with FAR 49 Termination of Contracts; and (3) included a conditional payment of fee/profit/other incentive action(s) as described in the DEAR over the preceding five (5) years from the original solicitation issuance date, including the reasoning for the aforementioned actions.

(h) Sources of past performance information. The Government may consider past performance information from sources other than those provided by the Offeror, such as commercial and government clients, government records, regulatory agencies, and government databases such as the

Government’s Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) and award fee determinations. The Government may contact any or all of the references provided by the Offeror and will consider such information obtained in its evaluation. Note: DOE contracts are not necessarily evaluated with more relevance than non-DOE contracts, based on the sole fact that it was work for

DOE. The evaluation of relevancy is based on the factors listed above. In addition, the Government may consider any other information determined to be reasonably predictive of the quality of the

Offeror’s performance under this proposed contract, such as information bearing on the Offeror’s integrity and business ethics. This other information is not limited to contracts found relevant to this procurement in terms of scope, size, and complexity.

(i) List of DOE contracts. The Government may consider the information provided per Section L, Attachment L-10, List of DOE Contracts, and evaluate past performance information on work determined to be relevant to the acquisition in terms of similar in scope, size, and complexity, as

M-5 defined above in paragraph (a).

M.4 Evaluation Factor – Management Approach

(a) DOE will evaluate the Offeror’s Closure Strategy that describes how it will effectively and efficiently manage Sections C.04 and C.05 of the Master IDIQ PWS and achieve Project completion. DOE will evaluate the Offeror’s Closure Strategy to coordinate and sequence the RRM (including debris), off-pile, and sub-pile excavation and placement while implementing all of PWS Sections C.01 through

C.05 to minimize costs and schedule and meet all Project completion requirements. DOE will evaluate how the Closure Strategy describes the details of the planned excavation methods, the excavation sequence based on optimizing placement of RRM/debris in the cell at Crescent Junction, mixing of slimes and sands, preparation and management of drying beds, size reduction or preparation of oversize debris, transportation and placement of RRM, and cell cover construction.

DOE will evaluate any proposed operational, technical, or administrative improvements and systems, including any graded approach to the PWS requirements, necessary to achieve the contract’s scope or its purposes described at PWS Section C.1.2. DOE will evaluate how the Offeror’s proposed Closure

Strategy is supported by its management approach, including, but not limited to, an organizational structure chart including the number of staff occupying each position, the basis for the number of daily and weekly work shifts, and the basis for any seasonal changes in site operations.

(b) DOE will evaluate the Offeror’s schedule that illustrates a portion of its Closure Strategy. DOE will evaluate how the schedule identifies the critical activities to complete the scope, the activity durations, the sequence and time-phasing of the work, and beginning and ending dates. DOE will evaluate how the schedule sequences the work scope described in the PWS Sections C.4.2 (except

C.4.2.3 and C.4.2.8), C.4.3, and C.05 paragraphs c through k.

(c) Contract Transition Approach. DOE will evaluate the Offeror’s approach to achieve the Contract

Transition Task Order requirements, including implementation of Contractor Human Resource

Management (CHRM) requirements, for the safe, effective, and efficient transfer of responsibility for execution of the Master IDIQ Contract with little or no disruption to ongoing operations.

M.5 Evaluation Factor – Cost and Fee/Profit

The Cost and Fee/Profit Proposal will not be adjectivally rated or point scored, but will be considered in the overall evaluation of proposals in determining the best value to the Government.

The Cost and Fee/Profit Proposal will be evaluated for price reasonableness in accordance with FAR

15.404-1 and FAR 15.402(a) and mathematical accuracy. Price reasonableness will be performed on the

Offeror’s proposed Contract Transition, proposed fully burdened labor rates (excluding fee) for FY 2022

(October 1, 2021 through September 30, 2022) applied to the DOE-provided Estimated Direct Productive

Labor Hours, and the proposed key personnel costs (FY 2022). Key personnel compensation is capped at

$525,000 for each designated key personnel employee, as established by Section 702 of the Bipartisan

Budget Act of 2013.

For purposes of determining the best value, the evaluated price will be the sum total of the following: 1) the Offeror’s proposed price for the Contract Transition Task Order, 2) proposed cost for Key Personnel

(FY 2022), not exceeding the ceiling stated in the previous paragraph, 3) proposed cost/pricing for the FY

2022 fully burdened labor rates (excluding fee/profit) applied to the DOE-provided Estimated Direct

Productive Labor Hours (DPLH), and 4) the total proposed fee/profit applied to the total estimated costs on cost-plus-incentive fee (CPIF) and firm-fixed price (FFP) task orders for a one year period (FY 2022), not exceeding the identified fee limitations. Mathematical errors will be adjusted.

M-6

M.6 DOE-M-2011 Relative Importance of Evaluation Factors (Oct 2015)

(a) The relative importance of the evaluation factors for the Management Proposal (Volume II) are below.

(1) Key Personnel;

(2) Past Performance; and

(3) Management Approach.

Key Personnel is more important than Past Performance. Past Performance is more important than

Management Approach.

(b) The evaluation factors for the Management Proposal (Volume II), when combined, are significantly more important than the total evaluated price (Volume III). Each evaluation factor applicable to this solicitation is identified and described in this and other provisions of this Section M. The descriptive elements of each evaluation factor will be considered collectively in arriving at the evaluated rating of the Offeror’s proposal for that evaluation factor. Areas within an evaluation factor are not sub-factors and will not be individually rated, but will be considered in the overall evaluation for that particular evaluation factor.

M.7 DOE-M-2012 Basis for Award (Oct 2015)

The Government intends to award one contract to the responsible Offeror whose proposal is determined to be the best value to the Government. Selection of the best value to the Government will be achieved through a process of evaluating each Offeror’s proposal against the evaluation factors described above.

The evaluation factors for the Management Proposal will be adjectivally rated. The Cost/Price evaluation factor will not be rated, however the evaluated price will be used in determining the “best value” to the

Government. The Government is more concerned with obtaining a superior Management Proposal than making an award at the lowest evaluated price. However, the Government will not make an award at a price premium it considers disproportionate to the benefits associated with the evaluated superiority of one Offeror’s Management Proposal over another. Thus, to the extent that Offerors’ Management

Proposals are evaluated as close or similar in merit, the evaluated price is more likely to be a determining factor in selection for award.