SSP-50715_RevA.docx
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This document outlines a solicitation for the Human Space Flight Technical Integration Contract (HSFTIC). The solicitation will be issued by November 1, 2019, with offers due by December 11, 2019. The NAICS code is 541715 with a size standard of 1,250 employees. The procurement is a total small business set-aside to be conducted by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Johnson Space Center. Interested parties should monitor the listed websites for the release of the solicitation and any amendments. The solicitation will seek technical integration services to support human space flight programs.
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International Space Station Crew Reduction, De-crewing and Re-crewing Plan
International Space Station Program
Revision A
September 2011
National Aeronautics and Space Administration International Space Station Program Johnson Space Center Houston, Texas Contract Number: NNJ10GA20B
SSP 50715
Revision A
REVISION AND HISTORY PAGE
| REV. |
| DESCRIPTION |
| PUB. DATE |
| - |
| Initial Release (Reference per SSCD 008586, EFF. 05-28-06) |
| Early Release |
| 06-12-06 |
| Program Release |
| 09-04-07 |
DCN 001 (Reference per SSCD 010218, EFF. 01-12-07)
| Early Release |
| 02-05-07 |
| Program Release |
| 01-08-09 |
| A |
| Revision A (Reference per SSCD 011236, EFF. 03-05-12) |
The signature pages reflect signatures from 2008, 2009 and 2011. Additional coordination efforts to reach a document concurrence on consumable criteria were worked between 2009 to November, 2011. Dates on the document signature pages reflect the timeframe during which all coordination efforts took place. During a face to face between Kathy Leary/NASA and Konstantin Grigoriev/RSC-E on 09/14/11, RSC-E concurred with the Consumable/GGR&C change and Mr. Grigoriev would obtain required signatures. During the Team 0 meeting on 11/17/11 it was agreed that all signatures received in 2008 and 2009 would be accepted and that the additional signatures required would be added to that page as well.
| Early Release |
| 03-18-12 |
| Program Release |
| 06-20-12 |
PREFACE
International Space Station crew reduction, De-crewing and Re-crewing Plan The purpose of this document is to define the International Space Station (ISS) Program process requirements and milestones should it become necessary to (1) reduce the crew size when there are two Soyuz vehicles on the ISS (2) de-crew the ISS and (3) re‑crew and return to normal operations. Actual Station configurations for de-crew and re-crew are developed in the Flight Rules.
The contents of this document are intended to be consistent with the tasks and products to be prepared by the ISS Program participants as defined in SSP 50200-01, Station Program Implementation Plan, Volume 1: Station Program Management Plan. This document is under the control of the Space Station Control Board (SSCB).
iii
INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION PROGRAM
international space station crew reduction, de-crewing and re-crewing plan September 2011
INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION PROGRAM
international space station crew reduction, de-crewing and re-crewing plan
CONCURRENCE
September 2011
INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION PROGRAM
international space station crew reduction, de-crewing and re-crewing plan
CONCURRENCE
September 2011
INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION PROGRAM
international space station crew reduction, de-crewing and re-crewing plan
CONCURRENCE
September 2011
INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION PROGRAM
international space station crew reduction, de-crewing and re-crewing plan
CONCURRENCE
September 2011
INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION PROGRAM
international space station crew reduction, de-crewing and re-crewing plan
CONCURRENCE
September 2011
| Developer Concurrence: |
| Alexander Zheleznyakov |
RSC-E
russian Space Corporation - Energia org
SIGNATURE
DATE
| Developer Concurrence: |
| Alexander Telegin |
RSC-E
russian Space Corporation - Energia
ORG
SIGNATURE
DATE
INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION PROGRAM
international space station crew reduction, de-crewing and re-crewing plan
LIST OF CHANGES
September 2011 All changes to paragraphs, tables, and figures in this document are shown below:
SSCB
Entry Date
Change
Paragraph(s)
June 2006
Baseline
All
January 2007
DCN 001
March 2012
Revision A
All
TABLE OF CONTENTS
| PARAGRAPH | PAGE | |
| 1.0 | introduction | 1-1 |
| 1.1 | PURPOSE | 1-1 |
| 1.2 | Scope | 1-1 |
| 1.3 | Precedence | 1-1 |
| 1.4 | Delegation of authority | 1-1 |
| 2.0 | documents | 2-1 |
| 2.1 | applicable documents | 2-1 |
| 2.2 | reference documents | 2-1 |
| 3.0 | crew reduction Decision Process | 3-1 |
| 3.1 | crew reduction definitions | 3-1 |
| 3.1.1 | unplanned crew reduction | 3-1 |
| 3.1.2 | off-nominal planned crew reduction | 3-1 |
| 3.2 | unplanned crew reduction decision process | 3-1 |
| 3.3 | off-nominal planned crew reduction decision process | 3-3 |
| 3.3.1 | consumables criteria | 3-4 |
| 3.3.2 | medical criteria | 3-5 |
| 3.3.3 | systems criteria | 3-5 |
| 4.0 | de-crewing decision process | 4-1 |
| 4.1 | de-crewing definitions | 4-1 |
| 4.1.1 | unplanned de-crewing | 4-1 |
| 4.1.2 | Planned de-crewing | 4-1 |
| 4.2 | unplAnned de-crewing decision process | 4-1 |
| 4.3 | planned de-crewing decision process | 4-2 |
| 4.3.1 | consumables criteria | 4-3 |
| 4.3.2 | medical criteria | 4-4 |
| 4.3.3 | systems criteria | 4-4 |
| 5.0 | System configuration and activities for De-crewing | 5-1 |
| 5.1 | ISS Systems configuration | 5-1 |
| 6.0 | Re-crewing Process | 6-1 |
| 6.1 | Decision process | 6-1 |
APPENDIX
| a | acronyms and abbreviations | a-1 |
| b | glossary of terms | b-1 |
| c | open work | c-1 |
TABLE
| C-1 | to be determined items | c-1 |
| C-2 | TO BE RESOLVED ISSUES | c-1 |
FIGURE
| 3.2-1 | unplanned crew reduction or unplanned de-crewing decision flow | 3-3 |
| 3.3-1 | generic process for an off-nominal planned crew reduction or a planned de-crewing | 3-4 |
| 6.1-1 | International space station Re-crewing Decision Process | 6-2 |
SSP 50715
Revision A introduction Reducing the crew size on the ISS and de-crewing of the ISS can occur as a result of several scenarios. Reducing the crew size will apply to the timeframe when there are two or more Soyuz vehicles docked to the ISS. For some scenarios, reducing the crew can be used to mitigate the possibility of de-crewing. The scenarios and decision processes for both are very similar. In the case of a crew reduction, this document does not cover any follow-on plan for augmenting the crew since this would be done through the standard procedures. In the case of de-crewing, this document does outline the decision process for re-crewing.
PURPOSE
This document describes the processes, decision criteria, responsible organizations/boards, and timelines associated with reducing the crew size, de-crewing, and re-crewing the ISS.
Scope This document addresses the anticipated program-level aspects of the crew reduction, de-crewing and re-crewing processes including the criteria and processes for decision making. The information contained herein is written at a level to allow operational team products (flight rules, procedures, etc.) to be adapted to the ISS configuration as it changes over time.
Real-time decision making authorities during standalone ISS operations, and while a visiting crew is present, are defined in NSTS 12820 Volume B, ISS Generic Operational Flight Rules. Several of these flight rules are reflected in this document in order to provide a complete understanding for how a decision to reduce the crew, de-crew, or re-crew the ISS may be made. However, that document should be referenced for detailed information on real-time operations decision making authority.
Additional actions will be invoked per SSP 50650, Program Management Operations Integration Procedures.
Precedence In case of conflicts between this document and SSP 50200-01, Station Program Implementation Plan, Volume 1: Station Program Management Plan, (SPIP Vol 1), SSP 50200-01 will take precedence.
Delegation of authority This document is approved by, and is subject to, the Space Station Control Board (SSCB) process. This document is developed and maintained by the ISS Mission Integration and Operations Office.
2-2 documents applicable documents The following documents include specifications, models, standards, guidelines, handbooks, and other special publications. The documents listed in this paragraph are applicable to the extent specified herein. Inclusion of applicable documents herein does not in any way supersede the order of precedence identified in Paragraph 1.3 of this document.
| DOCUMENT NO. |
| TITLE |
| TYPE |
| SSP 50200-01 |
| Station Program Implementation Plan, Volume1: Station Program Management Plan |
| Multilateral |
| SSP 50200-02 |
| Station Program Implementation Plan, Volume 2: Program Planning and Manifesting |
| Multilateral |
| SSP 50261-01 |
| Generic Groundrules, Requirements, and Constraints Part 1: Strategic and Tactical Planning |
| Multilateral |
| SSP 50489 |
| ISS Mission Integration Template |
| Multilateral |
| SSP 50505 |
| Basic Provisions on Crew Actions in Case of Fire on the ISS |
| Multilateral |
| SSP 50506 |
| Basic Guidelines for Crew Activities During ISS Depressurization |
| Multilateral |
| SSP 50623 |
| Joint Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) Functionality Strategy (JEFS) |
| Multilateral |
| SSP 50650 |
| Program Management Operations Integration Procedures |
| Multilateral |
| SSP 50653-01 |
| Basic Provisions on Crew Actions in the Event of a Toxic Release on the ISS |
| Bilateral |
NSTS 12820
Volume B
| ISS Generic Operational Flight Rules |
| Multilateral |
reference documents The following documents contain supplemental information to guide the user in the application of this document. These reference documents may or may not be specifically cited within the text of this document.
| DOCUMENT NO. |
| TITLE |
| TYPE |
| SSP 50260 |
| International Space Station Medical Operations Requirements Documents |
(ISS MORD)
Multilateral
| SSP 50261-02 |
| ISS Generic Groundrules and Constraints Part 2: Execute Planning |
| Multilateral |
| SSP 50643 |
| Operations Interface Procedures Generic |
| Multilateral |
| ISS-MER-035 |
| ISS MER Notification and Call In Requirements |
| NASA Internal |
| MGT-OA-019 |
| On-Orbit Anomaly Resolution |
| NASA Internal |
| MGT-OC-012 |
| International Space Station Management Center Contingency Response Procedure Work Instruction |
| NASA Internal |
| MGT-OC-013 |
| Replan Working Group Work Instruction |
| NASA Internal |
| MGT-OC-014 |
| Event Sequence Working Group Work Instruction |
| NASA Internal |
crew reduction Decision Process Section 3.0 defines the crew reduction decision process and requirements for ISS when there are two Soyuz vehicles docked to the Station. The decision making authorities are specifically defined since timely decisions during this process may be critical prior to declaring a need to reduce the crew size. Reducing the crew size of the ISS could occur as a result of several scenarios including; major system failure (unrecoverable or resulting in emergency condition), medical emergency or related problem, insufficient consumables, or a Soyuz failure. Each of these scenarios initiates a decision making process where the need to reduce crew size will be classified as “unplanned” or “off‑nominal planned” for discussion purposes in this document. The approach to reducing the crew size is directly related to the scenario classification and additional definitions provided herein.
crew reduction definitions unplanned crew reduction The unplanned crew reduction may occur when there are two Soyuz vehicles docked to the Station. An unplanned crew reduction is defined as a scenario requiring immediate departure of a sub-set of the ISS crew (i.e. medical condition) or requiring a crew reduction that is warranted within 72 hours or less due to: a major ISS system failure (can only support 2 or 3 crew), a medical emergency or related problem, insufficient critical consumables (i.e. air, food, or water), or a Soyuz failure. For unplanned crew reduction, it is not anticipated that any system configurations will be required prior to crew departure due to having some crew remain on board. For special cases involving partial system failures, the requirement for system reconfiguration will be determined by the Mission Control Center-Houston (MCC-H) and Mission Control Center-Moscow (MCC-M).
off-nominal planned crew reduction An off-nominal planned crew reduction may occur when there are two Soyuz vehicles docked to the Station. This off-nominal planned crew reduction is defined as a scenario, due to off-nominal situation, offering greater than 72 hours before a sub-set of the nominal crew must depart the ISS, leaving only one Soyuz and the associated crew. As a result the crew can configure the station systems for optimal operation for 2 or 3 crewmembers during the crew reduction phase and/or coordinate optimal undocking opportunities. This period includes time for crew sleep and rest.
unplanned crew reduction decision process The decision process for unplanned crew reduction is initiated when an event occurs that warrants a departure of one Soyuz vehicle in order to return crewmembers in less than 72 hours. Figure 3.2-1, Unplanned Crew Reduction or Unplanned De-crewing Decision Flow, depicts the decision process for an unplanned crew reduction.
The ISS Commander (CDR), with support from MCC-H and MCC-M will be responsible for making the decision, following the relevant procedural guidance, to determine if any urgent crew return in one of the Soyuz vehicles is required. It is understood that time may not allow for an ISS Mission Management Team (IMMT) to be convened in time to support the ISS CDR and MCC team decisions to reduce crew size on the ISS for certain emergency situations. Although not depicted here, it is noted that emergency situation guidance for visiting crewmembers is provided in the appropriate flight rules and procedures. Finally, it is acknowledged that while an emergency situation may be controlled, the ISS capability may have degraded such that a crew reduction within 72 hours may still be required.
Scenarios allowing up to 72 hours prior to crew reduction might include:
| A. | A crew medical condition of one or two crewmembers requiring near term medical support on the ground. |
| B. | A combination of ISS system failures that results in a need for a sub-set of the crew to return while engineering teams work recovery plans with remaining crew members. |
| C. | An emergency that, while controlled, may result in limited ISS capability and warrant a crew reduction. |
| D. | Insufficient resources or equipment to restore habitable environment following a fire or toxic release event. |
| E. | A failure or combination of failures on a Soyuz vehicle which requires rapid de-orbit in order to ensure safe crew return. |
For contingency situations, the International Space Station Management Center (IMC) will execute MGT‑OC‑012, International Space Station Management Center Contingency Response Procedure Work Instruction, to ensure the appropriate program parties are notified and support personnel report to the MCC. The ISS Mission Evaluations Room (MER), Houston Flight Control Team (FCT), IMC, MCC-M and other appropriate International Partners (IPs) support, as required, will conduct assessments/analyses and provide situation specific recommendations to the IMMT for mitigating the problem or reducing the crew size. The IMMT will decide whether or not crew reduction is warranted. The Flight Directors from MCC-H and MCC-M have the authority to direct the crew to begin configuring systems for departure while the situation assessments are being coordinated and an IMMT decision is pending.
figure 3.2-1 unplanned crew reduction or unplanned de-crewing decision flow off-nominal planned crew reduction decision process Off-nominal planned crew reduction decision processes are invoked if an ISS crew member’s need to leave the ISS is greater than 72 hours away. Candidate scenarios driving this may be:
| A. | Consumable assessments projecting less than required on-orbit reserve with no workarounds. |
| B. | Failure of Crew Health Care System (CHeCS) hardware resulting in the inability to maintain all crew members health, but can maintain a sub-set of crew member’s health. |
| C. | Crew medical condition requiring a sub-set of crew return. |
| D. | System failures that result in an unacceptable level of failure tolerance for critical functions or hazard controls for a crew of more than three. IMMT will decide on the number of crew members to stay on ISS. |
| E. | A failure or combination of failures on a Soyuz vehicle which requires rapid de-orbit in order to ensure safe crew return. |
Off-nominal planned crew reduction decision processes will target 15 days between decision date and undocking in order to optimize Soyuz undocking and landing conditions. This may be subject to change based on the situation on board and on the ground. This allows consideration of the following in the planning for the Soyuz undock:
| A. | Lighted landing opportunities (approximately 7-14 days every eight weeks) |
| B. | Adequate crew physical conditioning to support Soyuz descent and landing (if possible given the scenario) |
| C. | Adequate time for landing logistics preparations |
| D. | Adequate time to assess and plan for configuring the ISS vehicle for remaining operations. |
For off-nominal planned crew reduction scenarios, if time allows, the IMMT will give the final authorization to prepare for crew reduction. Prior to the actual decision on crew reductions, consideration is given to the timing of the next re-supply vehicle and its manifest supplies which may allow on board crew extension or ability to regain lost capability. Discussions on the sharing of the partner systems on orbit, which will maximize the crew time prior to crew reduction, will occur through the IMMT. Figure 3.3-1, Generic Process for an Off-Nominal Planned Crew Reduction or a Planned De-Crewing, depicts the generic process.
figure 3.3-1 generic process for an off-nominal planned crew reduction or a planned de-crewing consumables criteria Consumables and expendable hardware resupplies are tracked on a weekly basis by the FCT and MER and on a monthly basis by the IMC, MIOCB, IMPR and IMMT to monitor actual versus planned usage rate for critical items. Criteria to initiate an off‑nominal planned crew reduction decision process are met when it becomes evident that one or more critical consumables (Oxygen, Water, Food and/or Carbon Dioxide Removal) will reach the reserve limit; see SSP 50261-0,1 Generic Groundrules, Requirements, and Constraints Part 1: Strategic and Tactical Planning for consumables planned usage rates and established consumables reserve levels. See SSP 50623, Joint Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) Functionality Strategy (JEFS) for ECLS strategy to meet consumables reserve levels.
The Increment Manager will be responsible for evaluating when this criteria has been met and requesting an IMMT to be convened to evaluate the problem, identify potential solutions, and identify follow on actions/meetings required to address the situation.
medical criteria Medical criteria for the off-nominal planned crew reduction decision process might result from the monitoring of crew medical conditions or from equipment failures that result in the inability to maintain crew physiological needs, as documented in the current SSP 50260 International Space Station Medical Operations Requirements Document (ISS MORD) and the current NSTS-12820 ISS Generic Operational Flight Rules Volume B, sections 13 and 14. The Integrated Medical Group (IMG) will be responsible to identify when a crew medical condition or equipment failures may require a crew size reduction. The Crew Surgeon will submit a request for an IMMT to review the problem, identify potential solutions, and identify follow on actions/meetings required to address the situation.
It is acknowledged here that privacy requirements for certain medical situations may limit information shared with the general IMMT membership. The IMG may limit the type of information released to the mission integration and operations community at large.
systems criteria Systems based criteria for the off-nominal planned crew reduction decision process might result from failures that reduce fault tolerance for critical functions, that reduce the ability to control a hazardous condition or that reduce the Station capability to maintain a habitable environment for all crewmembers. It is acknowledged here that equipment failures for some critical ISS functions result in a loss of redundancy for the overall function, however alternate methods may be available to achieve adequate redundancy to reduce risk and maintain safety. Likewise, situations limiting crew habitability capability will be assessed, including the repair of the restriction causing the limitation. These situations are assessed during real-time as they occur using the appropriate Flight Rules. In most cases, several equipment failures must occur to reduce system redundancy to the point which could initiate a crew reduction. However, it is emphasized that increased consumable utilization must be considered as a result of those failures and what effect the accelerated depletion of reserves might have on the ability to keep all the crew on‑board.
Members of the IMMT will be responsible to identify when system failures exist that may require a crew reduction. The member identifying the risk will request the IMMT to be convened to review the problem, identify potential solutions, and identify follow on actions/meetings required to address the situation.
de-crewing decision process Section 4.0 defines the de-crewing decision process and requirements. The decision making authorities are specifically defined since timely decisions during this process may be critical. De-crewing of the ISS could occur as a result of several scenarios including; major system failure or other onboard conditions (unrecoverable or resulting in emergency condition), medical emergency or related problem, or insufficient consumables. Each of these scenarios initiates a decision making process where the de-crewing event will be classified as “unplanned” or “planned” for discussion purposes in this document. The approach to de-crewing is directly related to the scenario classification and additional definitions provided herein.
de-crewing definitions unplanned de-crewing The unplanned de-crewing takes on 2 sub-classifications defined here as emergency and contingency:
| A. | An emergency de-crewing is defined as a scenario requiring immediate departure of the ISS crew. The preparation time could be as little as 30 minutes with little ability to configure the station systems or optimize undocking opportunities. Emergency de-crewing scenarios focus around fire, cabin pressure loss and toxic release events. Crew emergency response procedures and Flight Rules outline the anticipated responses for these cases. The crew response to an emergency de‑crewing is by the discretion of the ISS CDR. |
| B. | A contingency de-crewing is defined as a scenario allowing up to 72 hours before a crew’s departure. This scenario allows time to execute some or all of the system configurations outlined in the current NSTS 12820 Volume B ISS Generic Operational Flight Rules (Flight Rule: B2-152), based on the cause for de-crewing, but no time is available for special payload configuration needs, or other system configuration “optimization” activity. |
Planned de-crewing The planned de-crewing is defined as a scenario offering greater than 72 hours before the crew must depart the ISS. This potentially allows for other tasks to be accomplished beyond the system configurations outlined in the current NSTS 12820 Volume B (Flight Rule: B2-152). As a result the crew may attempt to configure the station systems for optimal operations during the de-crewed phase and coordinate optimal undocking opportunities. This period includes time for crew sleep and rest.
unplAnned de-crewing decision process The decision process for unplanned de-crewing is initiated when an event occurs that warrants crew departure in less than 72 hours. Figure 3.2-1, Unplanned Crew Reduction or De-crewing Decision Flow, depicts the decision process for an unplanned de-crewing.
ISS emergency response strategy for fire, cabin pressure loss, and toxic release events are defined in SSP 50505 Basic Provisions on Crew Actions in Case of Fire on the ISS, SSP 50506 Basic Guidelines for Crew Activities During ISS Depressurization, and SSP 50653-01 Basic Provisions on Crew Actions in the Event of a Toxic Release on the ISS.
For on-board emergencies the CDR, with support from MCC-H and MCC-M will be responsible for making the decisions and following the relevant procedural guidance to determine if de-crewing is necessary. It is understood that time may not allow for an IMMT to be convened in time to support the ISS CDR and MCC team decisions to de‑crew the ISS for certain emergency situations. Although not depicted here, it is noted that emergency situation guidance for visiting crewmembers is provided in the appropriate flight rules and procedures. Finally, it is acknowledged that while an emergency situation may be controlled, the ISS capability may have degraded such that de-crewing within 72 hours may still be required. For the purposes of this document, this case will be considered a “contingency,” and additional time is allowed to respond to the situation.
Contingency scenarios allowing up to 72 hours prior to departure might include:
| A. | A crew medical condition of one or two crewmembers requiring near term medical support on the ground. |
| B. | A combination of system failure that threatens the need to return while engineering teams work recovery plans. |
| C. | An emergency that, while controlled, may result in limited ISS capability and warrant a crew return. |
For contingency situations, the International Space Station Management Center (IMC) will execute MGT-OC-012, International Space Station Management Center Contingency Response Procedure Work Instruction, to ensure the appropriate program parties are notified and support personnel report to the MCC. The ISS Mission Evaluations Room (MER), Houston Flight Control Team (FCT), IMC, MCC-M and other appropriate International Partners (IPs) support, as required, will conduct assessments/analyses and provide situation specific recommendations to the IMMT for mitigating the problem or de-crewing. The IMMT will decide whether or not de‑crewing is warranted. The Flight Directors from MCC-H and MCC-M have the authority to direct the crew to begin configuring systems for departure while the situation assessments are being coordinated and an IMMT decision is pending.
planned de-crewing decision process Planned de-crewing decision processes are invoked if a need to leave the ISS is greater than 72 hours away. Candidate scenarios driving this may be:
| A. | Consumable assessments projecting less than required on-orbit reserve with no workarounds. |
| B. | Failure of Crew Health Care System (CHeCS) hardware resulting in the inability to maintain crew health. |
| C. | Crew medical condition requiring early crew return. |
| D. | System failures that result in an unacceptable level of failure tolerance for critical functions or hazard controls based on safety requirement documents. |
| E. | A failure or combination of failures on a Soyuz vehicle which requires de-orbit in order to ensure safe crew return. |
Planned de-crewing decision processes will target 15 days between decision date and undocking in order to optimize Soyuz un-docking and landing conditions and to leave ISS in such a way to minimize risk to the returning crew. This also allows consideration of the following:
| A. | Lighted landing opportunities (approximately 7-14 days every eight weeks) |
| B. | Adequate crew physical conditioning to support Soyuz descent and landing (if possible given the scenario) |
| C. | Adequate time for landing logistics preparations |
| D. | Adequate time to assess and plan for configuring the ISS vehicle for unmanned operations given operations/payloads underway at that point in time and future re‑crewing. |
For planned de-crewing scenarios, if time allows, the IMMT will give the final authorization to prepare for de-crewing such that the final two‑week on‑orbit plan can be up‑linked to the crew and any required phasing burns can be implemented. Prior to the actual de-crewing of the ISS, consideration is given to the timing of the next re-supply vehicle and its manifest supplies which may allow mission extension or ability to regain lost capability. Discussions on the sharing of the partner systems on orbit which will maximize the crew time prior to de-crewing will occur through the IMMT. For the case with 6 (or 5) crew members on orbit, options for crew reduction to 3 (or 2) to extend the mission and delay any de-crewing of the Station will be reviewed by the IMMT. Figure 3.3-1, Generic Process for an Off-Nominal Planned Crew Reduction or a Planned De‑crewing, depicts the generic process.
consumables criteria Consumables and expendable hardware resupplies are tracked on a weekly basis by the FCT and MER and on a monthly basis by the IMC, MIOCB, IMPR and IMMT to monitor actual versus planned usage rate for critical items. Criteria to initiate the planned de-crewing decision process are met when it becomes evident that one or more critical consumables (Oxygen, Water, Food and/or Carbon Dioxide Removal) will reach the reserve limit; see SSP 50261-01 for consumables planned usage rates and established consumables reserve levels. See SSP 50623 for ECLS strategy to meet consumables reserve levels.
The Increment Manager will be responsible for evaluating when this criteria has been met and requesting an IMMT to be convened to evaluate the problem, identify potential solutions, and identify follow on actions/meetings required to address the situation.
medical criteria Medical criteria for the planned de-crewing decision process might result from the monitoring of crew medical conditions or from equipment failures that result in the inability to maintain crew physiological needs, as documented in the current SSP 50260, International Space Station Medical Operations Requirements Document (ISS MORD) and the current NSTS-12820 ISS Generic Operational Flight Rules Volume B, sections 13 and 14. The IMG will be responsible to identify when a crew medical condition or equipment failures may require de-crewing. The Crew Surgeon will submit a request for an IMMT to review the problem, identify potential solutions, and identify follow on actions/meetings required to address the situation.
It is acknowledged here that privacy requirements for certain medical situations may limit information shared with the general IMMT membership. The IMG may limit the type of information released to the mission integration and operations community at large.
systems criteria Systems based criteria for the planned de-crewing decision process might result from failures that reduce fault tolerance for critical functions or that reduce the ability to control a hazardous condition. In some cases, several equipment failures must occur to reduce system redundancy to the point which could initiate de-crewing. Nonetheless, situations could develop over time that place the crew at additional risk and result in a need to de-crew the ISS.
Members of the IMMT will be responsible to identify when system failures exist that may require de-crewing the ISS. The member identifying the risk will request the IMMT to be convened to review the problem, identify potential solutions, and identify follow on actions/meetings required to address the situation.
It is acknowledged here that equipment failures for some critical ISS functions result in a loss of redundancy for the overall function; however alternate methods may be available to achieve adequate redundancy to reduce risk and maintain safety. These situations are assessed during real-time as they occur. However, it is emphasized that increased consumable utilization must be considered as a result of those failures and what effect the accelerated depletion of reserves might have on the ability to keep the crew on‑board.
System configuration and activities for De-crewing Section 5.0 outlines the baseline system configuration desired for de-crewing which also supports the ability to successfully facilitate in re-crewing. Additional steps may also be required to regain fault tolerance for ISS habitation. Deviations from the baseline may be necessary due to the ISS configuration at the time, including the failure scenario dictating the de-crew, and will be appropriately analyzed for necessary changes and any required actions to be taken.
The ISS Program’s top priority is crew safety and survival (reference SSP 50261-01). As part of the nominal process to plan a safe and sustainable ISS configuration without a crew, the ISS and system configuration will be assessed. As time permits, depending on the scenario, a partial to full system configuration will be achieved. The risk and safety posture will be evaluated and appropriate actions taken by the ISS Program to maintain safety of the ISS and the returning crew.
ISS Systems configuration ISS systems will be configured beyond the emergency procedures as long as sufficient time/capability exists prior to crew departure. The configuration is documented in NSTS 12820 Volume B (Flight Rule: B2-152) to minimize risk to both the ISS during both ground control only operations and the returning crew. Deviations can be expected due to the current system status at the time that the plan is implemented based on the de‑crewing scenario. The planned de-crewing configuration will also be periodically re‑assessed as the ISS continues to evolve. As a part of the nominal process, each deviation will be properly assessed for acceptance.
Re-crewing Process Section 6.0 outlines the decision making process for re-crewing the ISS. This area is defined in general terms since the reasons for departure directly affect the decisions for return. The process does address the major elements of assuring crew safety upon return to the ISS and ability to restore system integrity. Ultimately the plans for return to ISS should mitigate the risk of de-crewing again but the processes must also recognize the potential risks associated with crew return to orbit.
Decision process The major factors involved in the decision making process for re-crewing ISS are expected to be directly related to the original reason for de-crewing. Considerations may include:
| A. | Assessment of ISS habitability |
| B. | Assessment of Cleanup requirements |
| C. | Assessment of required repairs and spares |
| D. | Assessment of systems readiness for re-crewing |
| E. | Assessment of consumables |
| F. | Launch date of a cargo vehicle which will deliver necessary reserves of consumables for ensuring crew life support as required |
The current configuration will be updated as configuration changes are required.
Ultimately the plans for return to ISS should mitigate the risk of de-crewing again but the processes must also recognize the potential risks associated with crew return to orbit. Figure 6.1-1, International Space Station Re-crewing Decision Process, depicts the decision process.
Figure 6.1-1 International space station Re-crewing Decision Process It is seen here that a variety of assessments may be required to support re‑crewing decisions. The ISS Program will determine the assessments that need to be conducted to fully evaluate the ability and requirements for re-crewing. Assessments may be conducted by multiple parties including the IPs, safety organizations, engineering organizations, Extravehicular Activity (EVA) organizations, training, operations teams, and the payloads community. Per Replan Working Group Work Instruction MGT-OC-013, the Replan Working Group (RWG) will ensure that assessments are properly coordinated with IPs of appropriate discipline and needs clearly identified for program management review.
Launches to the ISS may be required prior to re-crewing to boost ISS altitude while plans and equipment to support re-crewing are being prepared. Launches to station prior to re-crewing may also be necessary to repair equipment and/or pre-position equipment and consumables that the returning crew will need.
The assessment findings/results will be reviewed by the appropriate program boards/panels to formulate a formal plan for re-crewing which identifies key requirements. Final approval and direction to proceed with necessary procurements and activities will be provided by SSCB.
After the re-crewing plan is baselined, the program will utilize standard flight preparation processes for the ISS and relevant launch vehicle as defined in SSP 50489, ISS Mission Integration Template.
Appendix a- acronyms and abbreviations
| CDR |
| Commander |
| CHeCS |
| Crew Health Care System |
| CO2 |
| Carbon Dioxide |
| CSA |
| Canadian Space Agency |
| DCN |
| Document Change Notice |
| DQA |
| Document Quality Assurance |
| ECLS |
| Environmental Control and Life Support |
| ESA |
| European Space Agency |
| EVA |
| Extravehicular Activity |
| FCT |
| Flight Control Team |
| IMC |
| International Space Station Management Center |
| IMG |
| Integrated Medical Group |
| IMMT |
| ISS Mission Management Team |
| IMPR |
| ISS Monthly Program Review |
| IP |
| International Partner |
| ISS |
| International Space Station |
| JAXA |
| Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency |
| JEFS |
| Joint ECLS Functionality Strategy |
| MCC |
| Mission Control Center |
| MCC-H |
| Mission Control Center - Houston |
| MCC-M |
| Mission Control Center - Moscow |
| MER |
| Mission Evaluations Room |
| MIOCB |
| Mission Integration and Operations Control Board |
| MORD |
| Medical Operations Requirement Document |
| NASA |
| National Aeronautics and Space Administration |
| O2 |
| Oxygen |
| RSC-E |
| Rocket Space Corporation - Energia |
| RWG |
| Replan Working Group |
| SSCB |
| Space Station Control Board |
| TBD |
| To Be Determined |
| TBR |
| To Be Resolved |
| U.S. |
| United States |
| USOS |
| United States On-orbit Segment |
A-1
Appendix b- glossary of terms Contingency De-crewing This situation requires departure of the complete crew within 72 hours. Before de‑crewing the crew might be able to configure some of the Station systems.
Emergency De-crewing This situation requires immediate departure of the complete ISS crew. The preparation time could be as little as 30 minutes with little ability to configure the station systems.
Off-nominal planned crew reduction When there are two Soyuz vehicles docked to the ISS and there is a need for a sub-set of the crew to depart but allows over 72 hours before they must depart the ISS. This situation allows some crew to remain on board with the other Soyuz vehicle.
Planned De-crewing This situation provides over 72 hours before departure of the complete crew. Before de-crewing the crew has time to accomplish desired system configuration and prepare ISS for de-crewing.
Re-Crewing Re-crewing occurs after a de-crewing of the ISS. Re-crewing is complete once the ISS is capable of nominal operations and crew safety upon arrival of the long duration crew.
Unplanned Crew reduction When there are two Soyuz vehicles docked to the ISS and there is an urgent need for a sub-set of the crew to depart within 72 hours. This situation allows some crew to remain on board with the other Soyuz.
Unplanned De-crewing This situation would require departure of the complete ISS crew in less than 72 hours. Unplanned de-crewing falls into 2 sub-categories; emergency and contingency.
B-1
Appendix c - open work Table C-1 lists the specific TBD items in the document that are not yet known. The TBD is inserted as a placeholder wherever the required data is needed and is formatted in bold type within brackets. The TBD item is numbered based on the section where the first occurrence of the item is located as the first digit and a consecutive number as the second digit (i.e., <TBD 4-1> is the first undetermined item assigned in Section 4.0 of the document). As each TBD is solved, the updated text is inserted in each place that the TBD appears in the document and the item is removed from this table. As new TBD items are assigned, they will be added to this list in accordance with the above described numbering scheme. Original TBDs will not be renumbered.
Table C-1 to be determined items
| TBD |
| Section |
| Description |
Table C-2 lists the specific TBR issues in the document that are not yet known. The TBR is inserted as a placeholder wherever the required data is needed and is formatted in bold type within brackets. The TBR issue is numbered based on the section where the first occurrence of the issue is located as the first digit and a consecutive number as the second digit (i.e., <TBR 4-1> is the first unresolved issue assigned in Section 4.0 of the document). As each TBR is resolved, the updated text is inserted in each place that the TBR appears in the document and the issue is removed from this table. As new TBR issues are assigned, they will be added to this list in accordance with the above described numbering scheme. Original TBRs will not be renumbered.
table C-2 TO BE RESOLVED ISSUES
| TBR |
| Section |
| Description |
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