Attachment 3 - Revisded SRPS RFP_A0003_Track Changes.pdf

Issuance Date: December 1, 2022

Questions Due Date: December 12, 2022

Closing Date: January 20, 2023

Closing Time: 1400 hours GMT/UTC

Subject: Request for Proposals (RFP) Number: 72062422R00018, Strengthening Regional

Peace and Stability (SRPS) in West Africa Program

Dear Potential Offerors:

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is seeking proposals to provide technical assistance and implement USAID/West Africa’s Regional Peace and Governance Office

Strengthening Regional Peace and Stability (SRPS) in West Africa program as described in the attached Request for Proposals (RFP).

This is a full and open competition, under which all types of organizations are eligible to compete.

In support of USAID’s interest in expanding the number and sustainability of development partners, USAID/West Africa encourages proposals from U.S. small businesses and potential new and local partners as prime or subcontractors.

USAID/West Africa anticipates awarding one Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) completion type contract for an anticipated five-year period with a total estimated cost of $45 - $49.5 million, subject to the availability of funds. Offerors should not strive to meet the maximum amount; rather, Offerors should propose costs that are appropriate, realistic, and reasonable, and in accordance with the proposed approach for achieving results. The principal geographic code for this contract is 935 and North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code is 541611.

The procedures for "contracting by negotiation, trade-off process,” as described in the Federal

Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 15 will apply in this procurement.

This RFP can be viewed and downloaded from the SAM.gov website. USAID reserves the right to amend or rescind this solicitation at any time. If substantive questions are received that affect the response to the solicitation, or if changes are made to the closing date and time as well as other aspects of the RFP, this solicitation will be revised, and amendments will be issued and posted on the SAM.gov website. USAID advises Offerors to regularly check the above website for amendments.

Offerors are responsible for ensuring proposals are submitted in accordance with Section L of this

RFP and received at USAID/West Africa by the due date and time as specified above. USAID requires that offers remain valid for a minimum of 180 calendar days from the date of proposal submission.

U.S. Agency for International Development West Africa Regional Program No. 24 Fourth Circular Rd. CT P.O. Box 1630, Accra - Ghana

Tel: (233) (302) 741-200 Fax (233) (302) 741-365 www.usaid.gov/missions/warp http://www.usaid.gov/missions/warp

Request for Proposals No. 72062422R00018

Strengthening Regional Peace and Stability in West Africa Program

Questions and Proposals must be submitted only electronically via email on or before the due dates stipulated above to Yves Kore at ykore@usaid.gov and Samuel Nwanokwu at snwanokwu@usaid.gov and copy Robert Ago-Josiah at ragojosiah@usaid.gov, Osei Asamoa-

Bonsu at asamoabonsu@usaid.gov, and Alex Larbie at alarbie@usaid.gov. Responses to questions received prior to the deadline will be furnished to all potential offerors through an amendment to this RFP posted to www.sam.gov. Late proposals will be handled in accordance with FAR 15.208.

This solicitation in no way obligates USAID to award a contract nor does it commit USAID to pay any cost incurred in the preparation and submission of the proposal. USAID appreciates the time and effort put in preparing proposals in response to this solicitation.

Sincerely, Yves Kore

Director, Regional Acquisition and Assistance Office

USAID/West Africa mailto:tbaldwinowusu@usaid.gov mailto:snwanokwu@usaid.gov mailto:ragojosiah@usaid.gov mailto:asamoabonsu@usaid.gov mailto:alarbie@usaid.gov mailto:alarbie@usaid.gov http://www.sam.gov/ http://www.sam.gov/

Offeror must download the most recent version of the SF 33 on www.gsa.gov to prepare its offer.

Table of Contents

PART I - THE SCHEDULE 9

SECTION B – SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICE/COSTS 9

B.1 PURPOSE 9

B.2 CONTRACT TYPE 9

B.3 ESTIMATED COST, FIXED FEE, AND OBLIGATED AMOUNT 9

B.4 COST REIMBURSABLE 11

B.5 PAYMENT OF FIXED FEE 11

B.6 INDIRECT COSTS 11

SECTION C – DESCRIPTION/SPECIFICATIONS 13

C.1 PURPOSE 13

C.2 U.S. GOVERNMENT STRATEGIC PRIORITIES AND OBJECTIVES 13

C.3 DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 14

C.4 DETAILED STATEMENT OF WORK 17

C.5 THEORY OF CHANGE 19

C.6 LOGICAL FRAMEWORK 19

C.7 DETAILED TASKS AND ACTIVITIES 20

C.8 DETAILED SECTION FOR GRANTS UNDER CONTRACT (GUC) 32

SECTION D – PACKAGING AND MARKING 35

D.1 AIDAR 752.7009 MARKING (JAN 1993) 35

D.2 BRANDING AND MARKING POLICY 35

D.3 BRANDING STRATEGY 36

D.4 ANTICIPATED ELEMENTS OF A MARKING PLAN 36

D.5 APPROVAL OF CONTRACTOR BRANDING IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

AND MARKING PLAN 37

D.6 SOCIAL MEDIA AND ONLINE OUTREACH 38

SECTION E – INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE 39

E.1 NOTICE LISTING CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE 39

E.2 INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE 39

E.3 RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL 39

E.4 CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 39

SECTION F - DELIVERIES OR PERFORMANCE 41

F.1 NOTICE LISTING CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE 41

F.2 PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE 41

F.3 PLACE OF PERFORMANCE 41

F.4 REPORTS AND DELIVERABLES 41

F.5 DELIVERY SCHEDULE FOR REPORTS/PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES 48

F.6 PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 49

F.7 AUTHORIZED WORKDAY/WEEK 49

F.8 KEY PERSONNEL 50

F.9 SUBMISSION REQUIREMENTS FOR DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE

DOCUMENTS (AIDAR 752.7005) 51

SECTION G - CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION DATA 53

G.1 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING OFFICER 53

G.2 CONTRACTING OFFICER’S AUTHORITY 53

G.3 CONTRACTING OFFICER’S REPRESENTATIVE 53

G.4 ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL 53

G.5 TECHNICAL APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS 53

G.6 PAYING OFFICE AND INVOICING INSTRUCTIONS 54

G.7 AIDAR 752.7003 DOCUMENTATION OF PAYMENT (NOV 1998) 54

G.8 ACCOUNTING AND APPROPRIATION DATA 55

G.9 CONTRACTOR’S PRIMARY POINT OF CONTACT 56

G.10 AIDAR 752.228-9 CARGO INSURANCE (DEC 1998) 56

SECTION H – SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS 57

H.1 REQUESTS FOR CONSENT TO SUBCONTRACT 57

H.2 AUTHORIZED GEOGRAPHIC CODE 57

H.3 ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PERSONNEL COMPENSATION 57

H.4 ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PERSONNEL 58

H.5 LOGISTICAL SUPPORT 59

H.6 ELECTRONIC AND INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION

TECHNOLOGY ACCESSIBILITY (APRIL 2018) 59

H.7 MEDIA AND INFORMATION HANDLING AND PROTECTION (APRIL 2018) 60

H.8 PRIVACY AND SECURITY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS 61

INCIDENT REPORTING (APRIL 2018) 61

H.9 SKILLS AND CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIVACY AND 65

SECURITY STAFF (APRIL 2018) 65

H.10 CLOUD COMPUTING (APRIL 2018) 65

H.11 LIMITATION ON ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 71

H.12 EXECUTIVE ORDER ON TERRORISM FINANCING 73

H.13 ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS SYSTEM 73

H.14 SUBMISSION OF DATASETS TO THE DEVELOPMENT DATA

LIBRARY (DDL) (OCTOBER 2014) 74

H.15 GRANTS UNDER CONTRACTS 75

H.16 ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE 75

H.17 FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DELEGATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL 76

CONFERENCES (JAN 2002) 76

H.18 CONFLICT OF INTEREST 77

H.19 DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION 78

H.20 PROHIBITION AND ASSISTANCE TO DRUG TRAFFICKING 79

H.21 NONEXPENDABLE PROPERTY AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 79

RESOURCES 79

H.22 GENDER CONSIDERATION 79

PART II – CONTRACT CLAUSES 80

SECTION I - CONTRACT CLAUSES 80

I.1 NOTICE LISTING CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY

REFERENCE 80

I.2 AIDAR 752.252-2 AIDAR CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

(MAR 2015) 85

I.3 FAR 52.204-1 APPROVAL OF CONTRACT (DEC 1989) 87

I.4 FAR 52.217-8 OPTION TO EXTEND SERVICES (Nov 1999) 87

I.5 FAR 52.222-35 EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR VETERANS (JUN 2020) 88

I.6 FAR 52.222-36 EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR WORKERS WITH 88

DISABILITIES (JUN 2020) 88

I.7 FAR 52.222-50 – COMBATING TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS (NOV 2021) 89

I.8 FAR 52.244-2 SUBCONTRACTS (Jun 2020) 95

I.9 AIDAR 752.7007 PERSONNEL COMPENSATION (JULY 2007) 98

I.10 AIDAR 731.205-43 TRADE, BUSINESS, TECHNICAL AND

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITY COSTS—USAID CONFERENCE

APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS 98

I.11 AIDAR 752.7036 USAID IMPLEMENTING PARTNER NOTICES (IPN)

PORTAL FOR ACQUISITION (JULY 2014) 99

I.12 AIDAR 752.222-71 NONDISCRIMINATION (JUNE 2012) 100

I.13 AIDAR 752.222-70 USAID DISABILITY POLICY (DECEMBER 2004) 100

I.14 AIDAR 752.231-72 CONFERENCE PLANNING AND REQUIRED

APPROVAL (APRIL 2022) 101

I.15 AIDAR 752.7032 – INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL APPROVAL AND

NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS (APR 2014) 102

I.16 FAR 52.223-17 AFFIRMATIVE PROCUREMENT OF EPA-DESIGNATED ITEMS IN

SERVICE AND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS (AUG 2018) 103

I.17 FAR 52.223-22 PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 103

AND REDUCTION GOALS-REPRESENTATION (DEC 2016) 103

I.18 AIDAR 752.204-2 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS (FEB 1999) 104

I.19 AIDAR 752.225-70 SOURCE AND NATIONALITY REQUIREMENTS 104

(FEB 2012) 104

I.20 AIDAR 752.228-70 MEDICAL EVACUATION (MEDEVAC) SERVICES 105

(JULY 2007) 105

I.21 AIDAR 752.229-71 REPORTING OF FOREIGN TAXES (JUL 2007) 105

I.22 AIDAR 752.231-71 SALARY SUPPLEMENTS FOR HOST

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (MAR 2015) 107

I.23 AIDAR 752.245-70 GOVERNMENT PROPERTY USAID REPORTING

REQUIREMENTS (OCT 2017) 107

I.24 AIDAR 752.247-70 PREFERENCE FOR PRIVATELY OWNED U.S.-FLAG

COMMERCIAL VESSELS. (OCT 1996) 108

I.25 AIDAR 752.7012 PROTECTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AS A RESEARCH

SUBJECT (AUG 1995) 109

I.26 AIDAR 722.170 EMPLOYMENT OF THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS (TCN'S) 110

AND COOPERATING COUNTRY NATIONALS (CCN'S) 110

I.27 AIDAR 752.228-3 WORKER'S COMPENSATION INSURANCE (DEFENSE BASE

ACT) [DEVIATION JUN 2022] 109

PART III - LIST OF DOCUMENTS, EXHIBITS, AND OTHER ATTACHMENTS 112

SECTION J - LIST OF ATTACHMENTS 112

PART IV - REPRESENTATION AND INSTRUCTIONS 113

SECTION K - REPRESENTATIONS, CERTIFICATIONS AND OTHER 113

STATEMENTS OF THE OFFERORS 113

K.1 NOTICE LISTING SOLICITATION PROVISIONS INCORPORATED BY

REFERENCE 113

K.2 FAR 52.204-8 ANNUAL REPRESENTATIONS AND CERTIFICATIONS

(MAY 2022) 113

K.3 FAR 52.204-20 PREDECESSOR OF OFFEROR (AUG 2020) 117

K.4 FAR 52.204-24 REPRESENTATION REGARDING CERTAIN 118

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND VIDEO SURVEILLANCE SERVICES OR 118

EQUIPMENT (NOV 2021) 118

K.5 FAR 52.204-26 COVERED TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT OR 120

SERVICES-REPRESENTATION (OCT 2020) 120

K.6 FAR 52.209-5 CERTIFICATION REGARDING RESPONSIBILITY MATTERS 121

(AUG 2020) 121

K.7 FAR 52.209-7 INFORMATION REGARDING RESPONSIBILITY MATTERS 123

(OCT 2018) 123

K.8 FAR 52.209-11 REPRESENTATION BY CORPORATIONS REGARDING 124

DELINQUENT TAX LIABILITY OR A FELONY CONVICTION UNDER

ANY FEDERAL LAW (FEB 2016) 124

K.9 FAR 52.209-13 VIOLATION OF ARMS CONTROL TREATIES OR 124

AGREEMENTS- CERTIFICATION (Nov 2021) 124

K.10 FAR 52.222-18 CERTIFICATION REGARDING KNOWLEDGE OF 126

CHILD LABOR FOR LISTED END PRODUCTS (FEB 2001) 126

K.11 FAR 52.219-1 SMALL BUSINESS PROGRAM REPRESENTATIONS (SEP 2021) 127

K.12 FAR 52.222-22 PREVIOUS CONTRACTS AND COMPLIANCE REPORTS 130

(FEB 1999) 130

K.13 FAR 52.222-25 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION COMPLIANCE (APR 1984) 130

K.14 FAR 52.225-2 BUY AMERICAN CERTIFICATE (FEB 2021) 131

K.15 FAR 52.225-20 PROHIBITION ON CONDUCTING RESTRICTED 131

BUSINESS OPERATIONS IN SUDAN-CERTIFICATION (AUG 2009) 131

K.16 FAR 52.227-15 REPRESENTATION OF LIMITED RIGHTS DATA AND 132

RESTRICTED COMPUTER SOFTWARE (DEC 2007) 132

K.17 FAR 52.230-1 COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NOTICES AND 133

CERTIFICATION (JUN 2020) 133

K.18 FAR 52.230-7 PROPOSAL DISCLOSURE-COST ACCOUNTING 135

PRACTICE CHANGES (APR 2005) 135

K.19 AGREEMENT ON, OR EXCEPTIONS TO, TERMS AND CONDITIONS 135

K.20 SIGNATURE 136

SECTION L - INSTRUCTIONS, CONDITIONS, AND NOTICES TO OFFERORS 137

L.1 NOTICE LISTING SOLICITATION PROVISIONS INCORPORATED BY 137

REFERENCE 137

L.2 FAR 52.216-1 TYPE OF CONTRACT (APR 1984) 137

L.3 FAR 52.233-2 SERVICE OF PROTEST (SEP 2006) 137

L.4 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS TO OFFERORS 138

L.5 PROPOSAL SUBMISSION PROCEDURES 139

L.6 TECHNICAL PROPOSAL ORGANIZATION 140

L.7 INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARING THE TECHNICAL PROPOSAL 141

L.8 INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARING THE COST PROPOSAL 145

L.9 EVIDENCE OF RESPONSIBILITY 153154

L.10 REPRESENTATIONS, CERTIFICATIONS, AND OTHER STATEMENTS

OF OFFEROR 153154

L.11 CONSENT TO SUBCONTRACT 154155

L.12 LEGISLATIVE REPORTING INFORMATION 154155

L.13 SUBCONTRACTING: SMALL BUSINESS GOAL PLAN AND 154155

SUBCONTRACTING PLAN 154155

L.14 WAIVERS UNDER FAR PART 4.2101 PROHIBITION ON COVERED

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND VIDEO SURVEILLANCE SERVICES AND 154155

EQUIPMENT (DECEMBER 2021) 154155

SECTION M – EVALUATION FACTORS FOR AWARD 157158

M.1 GENERAL INFORMATION 157158

M.2 TECHNICAL EVALUATION CRITERIA 157158

M.3 DETERMINATION OF COMPETITIVE RANGE 161162

M.4 COST EVALUATION 161162

M.5 SOURCE SELECTION 162163

M.6 CONTRACTING WITH SMALL BUSINESS CONCERNS 162163

PART I - THE SCHEDULE

SECTION B – SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICE/COSTS

B.1 PURPOSE

The purpose of this contract is to provide services and technical assistance as described in the

Statement of Work found in Section C for the implementation of USAID/West Africa’s

“Strengthening Regional Peace and Stability (SRPS) in West Africa Program” to enhance the ability and efforts of West Africans to prevent and counter violent extremism, address conflict and fragility drivers and improve stability across the region.

B.2 CONTRACT TYPE

This is a Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee completion type contract. For consideration set forth below, the

Contractor shall provide the deliverables or outputs described in Section F in accordance with the performance standards specified in Section E.

B.3 ESTIMATED COST, FIXED FEE, AND OBLIGATED AMOUNT

In accordance with FAR Part 52.232-22 - Limitation of Funds:

(a) The estimated cost for the performance of the work required hereunder, exclusive of fixed fee is $TBD. The fixed fee is $TBD. The total estimated cost-plus-fixed fee is not to exceed $45 -

$49.5 million.

(b) Budget

The Contractor will not be paid any sum in excess of the Total Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee amount.

1. The contract budget found herein is based on the Contractor’s original proposal and/or final proposal revision, which was accepted by USAID through award of this contract. NOTE:

The contractor will be required to notify the USAID Contracting Officer’s Representative

(COR) of Budget variation of 10% and request concurrence.

Line Item Description Period of Performance Total All Years

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5

Salaries and Wages

Fringe Benefits

Consultants

Allowances

Travel, Transportation, and Per Diem

Equipment and Supplies

Subcontracts

Grants Under Contract $15,000,000

Program Activities

Other Direct Costs

Indirect Costs

Total Estimated Costs

Fixed Fee

Total Estimated Cost-

Plus-Fixed-Fee

Contract Line Item Number (CLIN) Budget

Item No. Supplies/

Services

(Description)

Qty Unit

Price Year 1

Total

Amount

Year 2

Total

Amount

Year 3

Total

Amount

Year 4

Total

Amount

Year 5

Total

Amount

All Years

Total Amount

CLIN 0001 Direct

Costs Lot

CLIN 0002 Program

Activities

CLIN 0003 GUCs Lot $15,000,000

CLIN 0004 Indirect Costs Lot

Total Estimated Cost

CLIN 0005 Fixed Fee %TBD

Total Estimated Cost-

Plus-Fixed-Fee

[*Offeror must set aside a minimum of $15 million of its total budget to provide Grants Under

Contract for the duration of the five-year program implementation. This amount does not include any relevant management or administrative expenses incurred by the Contractor.]

2. The inclusion of any costs in the above cost categories does not obviate the requirement for prior approval by the contracting officer of cost items, any of the terms and conditions of this contract, including the applicable cost principles (see FAR 52.216-07, “Allowable

Cost and Payment”); nor does it constitute a determination of allowability by the contracting officer of any item of cost, unless specifically stated elsewhere in this contract.

3. The Contractor may shift/move funds up to 10% between line items with COR concurrence. Any adjustments above 10% require written Contracting Officer (CO) approval.

4. The Contractor agrees to furnish data that the contracting officer may request on costs expended or accrued under this contract in support of the budget information provided herein.

(c) Within the estimated cost-plus-fixed-fee specified in paragraph (a) above, the amount currently obligated and available for reimbursement of allowable costs incurred by the Contractor

(and payment of fee, if any) for performance hereunder is $TBD. The Contractor will not exceed the aforesaid obligated amount.

(d) In accordance with FAR 52.232-19, Availability of Funds, funds obligated hereunder are anticipated to be sufficient through o/a TBD. Funding for this contract will be on an incremental basis, subject to the availability of funds.

B.4 COST REIMBURSABLE

(a) Allowable costs will be limited to reasonable, allocable and necessary costs determined in accordance with FAR 52.216-7, Allowable Cost and Payment (AUG 2018), FAR 52.216-8, Fixed

Fee (JUN 2011), if applicable, and AIDAR 752.7003, Documentation for Payment (NOV 1998).

(b) In addition, the requirement and conditions concerning estimated cost and funding apply as detailed in FAR 52.232-22, Limitation of Funds (APR 1984).

B.5 PAYMENT OF FIXED FEE

a. Pursuant to FAR 16.306(d), the fixed fee will be tied to the conditions and completion of the deliverables specified contained in Section F of this contract {USAID will incorporate the successful Offeror’s Fixed Fee into the award} and in accordance with the amounts in Sections

B.3 and B.4.

b. At the time of each payment of allowable costs to the Contractor, the USAID paying office will pay the Contractor a percentage of fixed fee that directly corresponds to the percentage of allowable costs being paid. Two exceptions to paying fixed fee in this manner apply:

(1) If the Contracting Officer (CO) determines that this method results in paying a disproportionately higher ratio of fixed fee than the percentage of work that the Contractor has completed, then the CO may suspend further payment of any fixed fee until the

Contractor has made sufficient progress to justify further payment, up to the agreed percentage.

(2) The clauses entitled "Allowable Cost and Payment" (FAR 52.216-7) and "Fixed Fee"

(FAR 52.216-8) are incorporated into this contract. The terms and conditions of these clauses apply after total payments of fixed fee reach eighty-five percent (85%) of the total fixed fee.

(3) In the event of discontinuance of the work in accordance with the clause of the contract entitled FAR 52.249-6 Termination (Cost Reimbursement), the fee must be re-determined by mutual agreement equitably to reflect the reduction in the work performed. The amount by which such fee is less than, or exceeds, payments previously made on account of the fee must be paid to, or repaid by the Contractor, as applicable.

B.6 INDIRECT COSTS

The Contractor is authorized to recover applicable indirect costs, if it is part of the Contractor's usual accounting procedures, consistent with FAR Part 31, and Negotiated Indirect Cost Rate

Agreement (NICRA).

Pending establishment of revised provisional or final indirect cost rates, allowable indirect costs will be reimbursed on the basis of the following negotiated provisional or predetermined rates and the appropriate bases as below:

[To be inserted at the time of Award]

Contractor Fringe

Rate %

Overhead

Rate %

G&A

Rate %

PRIME (insert)

Type of Rate (insert) TBD TBD TBD

Base of Application TBD TBD TBD

Source: TBD TBD TBD

Period: TBD TBD TBD

MAJOR

SUBCONTRACTOR(S)

Type of Rate TBD TBD TBD

● Contractors are allowed to recoup indirect costs (OH, G&A, etc.) as other direct costs if it is part of the Contractor’s usual accounting procedures, consistent with FAR 31 and the contractor's NICRA.

● Major subcontractors are those subcontractors whose proposed costs exceed 20% of the

Offeror’s proposed total cost or perform a key element of the RFP.

● The Contractor will make no change in its established method of classifying or allocating indirect costs without the prior written approval of the Contracting Officer.

Reimbursement for indirect costs shall be at final negotiated rates.

● This advance understanding must not change any monetary ceiling, obligation, or specific cost allowance or disallowance.

● The Government will not be obligated to pay any additional amount should the final indirect cost rates exceed the negotiated ceiling rates. If the final indirect cost rates are less than the negotiated ceiling rates, the negotiated rates will be reduced to conform to the lower rates.

[END OF SECTION B]

SECTION C – DESCRIPTION/SPECIFICATIONS

C.1 PURPOSE

This statement of work outlines the requirements for the five-year, USAID Strengthening

Regional Peace and Stability (SRPS) in West Africa Program. The purpose of this Contract is to acquire technical services to assist USAID/West Africa Regional Peace and Governance Office

(RPGO) support the efforts of West Africans to address the risks of instability from democratic backsliding and from conflict, and prioritize targeted conflict and violence prevention, peacebuilding, and preventing and countering of violent extremism (P/CVE) interventions across the sub-region. The program will engage with regional partners and with governments that demonstrate commitment to power-sharing and resource redistribution, both of which are crucial for reducing exclusion, violence, and conflict. Program interventions will address causes of fragility, and focus on good governance approaches, conflict prevention and response, and P/CVE interventions across select target countries in the Sahel and coastal West Africa.

The SRPS program will employ a conflict sensitive approach and its implementation efforts must remain flexible, agile and adaptive throughout program implementation. The SRPS program will:

● Build the capacity and commitment of our regional and bilateral partners in government, civil society, youth and women organizations, and the private sector, to prevent conflict, counter violent extremism and contribute to a more stable region;

● Address governance weaknesses and other risks and vulnerabilities with the aim of reducing countries’ fragility and the risk of populations’ support for violent extremism;

and

● Mobilize political will to strengthen state-society relations, restore the social contract and address elements of state fragility and population’s grievances.

C.2 U.S. GOVERNMENT STRATEGIC PRIORITIES AND OBJECTIVES

The new Interim National Security Strategic Guidance issued in March 20211, states that “the U.S.

government will work alongside fellow democracies across the globe to deter and defend against aggression from hostile adversaries, stand with our allies and partners to combat new threats aimed at our democracies, ranging from cross-border aggression, cyberattacks, disinformation, and digital authoritarianism to infrastructure and energy coercion and take special aim at confronting corruption, which rots democracy from the inside and is increasingly weaponized by authoritarian states to undermine democratic institutions.“ The document further states the need to “defend and protect human rights and address discrimination, inequity, and marginalization in all its forms, and address illicit financing that contribute to income inequality, funding terrorism, and generate pernicious foreign influence.”

Further, in late 2020, the United States Congress adopted the Global Fragility Act (GFA)2 and developed a U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability3. The GFA and the Strategy to prevent Conflict and Promote Stability (SPCPS) are a multi-pronged, multi-sectoral approach 1 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/03/interim-national-security-strategic-guidance/ 2 https://www.state.gov/united-states-strategy-to-prevent-conflict-and-promote-stability/ 3 https://www.state.gov/stability-strategy/ http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/03/interim-national-security-strategic-guidance/ https://www.state.gov/united-states-strategy-to-prevent-conflict-and-promote-stability/ https://www.state.gov/united-states-strategy-to-prevent-conflict-and-promote-stability/ https://www.state.gov/united-states-strategy-to-prevent-conflict-and-promote-stability/ https://www.state.gov/stability-strategy/ to strengthen the resilience of partner nations, specifically in fragile countries that face an array of often compounding shocks and stresses that can include civil unrest, complex humanitarian emergencies, natural disasters, and economic volatility. Through the GFA, the US will align diplomacy (including public engagement), assistance, investment, defense engagement, and other tools to help partners end protracted or recurrent crises and absorb, adapt to, and recover from such shocks and stresses. USAID’s new SRPS program responds to these strategic priorities by incorporating peacebuilding approaches to address the drivers of conflict, violence, and instability.

In line with the GFA and the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability, the new program will incorporate peacebuilding approaches to address the drivers of conflict, violence, and instability, support partners to build durable mechanisms to resolve conflicts, enhance social cohesion, build the capacity of critical institutions, deliver crucial services, and stress the importance of mobilizing political will and domestic resources that can enable lasting peace, stability, and ultimately, prosperity. This support will include advancing women's leadership and participation in all aspects of conflict prevention, stabilization, and peacebuilding.

Proposed interventions are also informed by and directly respond to the priorities outlined in the new U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace and Security (WPS)4, and USAID WPS implementation plan5, USAID Policy for P/CVE through Development Assistance6, and the strategic approach under the State-USAID Joint Strategic Goal Framework7, and the new Interim National Security

Strategic Guidance. The strategic vision of the SRPS program will have a specific focus on transnational, transboundary, and multi-country issues that will support coordinated, demand-driven programs and services to client bilateral USAID missions, country offices, and U.S.

Embassies.

All SRPS efforts will continue to reaffirm the important role of women and youth in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peacebuilding, and in post-conflict reconstruction and stress the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.

C.3 DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

West Africa is among the regions of the world most affected by instability. This instability is manifested in different ways, including violent extremism, communal conflicts, poverty, unemployment, inequality, corruption, porous borders, weak or fragile states, and climate change, among others. In recent years, the violent-extremist landscape in West Africa has grown increasingly fractured and complex. Within this larger regional context there are three main hot spots of violent extremism: (1) the tri-border region of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger; (2) Nigeria;

and (3) the Lake Chad Basin. These areas have been experiencing the most serious security and humanitarian crisis in their recent histories. Violent extremism and conflicts continue to destabilize countries, destroy communities, impede productivity growth, exacerbate the effects of weak governance, and increase the likelihood of humanitarian assistance needs. Ongoing vicious conflict

4 https://www.state.gov/women-peace-and-security/ 5 https://www.usaid.gov/women-peace-and-security/2020-wps-implementation-plan 6 https://www.usaid.gov/countering-violent-extremism 7 https://www.state.gov/joint-strategic-plan/ https://www.state.gov/women-peace-and-security/ https://www.usaid.gov/women-peace-and-security/2020-wps-implementation-plan https://www.usaid.gov/countering-violent-extremism https://www.usaid.gov/countering-violent-extremism https://www.usaid.gov/countering-violent-extremism https://www.state.gov/joint-strategic-plan/ cycles exacerbate poverty, drive large population segments into refugee and internally displaced people (IDPs) status, further destabilize weak institutions, and lead to violent relapse and increased fragility. Analysis of the Fragile States Index8 data indicates that from 2009 to 2019, seven of the twenty-one West African countries registered worsening pressures related to state fragility. For example, security threats related to crime, terrorism, and coups were significantly high in Chad and Mali, while threats due to fragmentation of state institutions along ethnic, racial or religious lines were high in Cameroon, Chad, and Guinea-Bissau.

Politically related threats, such as challenges to state legitimacy and deficient and unequal provision of public services are present across the Sahel as well as in the coastal states, and are especially high in Cameroon, Mali, Mauritania, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Togo. From 2015 to

2019, Cameroon, Mali, Togo and Chad exhibited heightened fragility, ranking among the top fragile states globally under the Fragile States Index. As the situation in Mali continued to deteriorate, fragility has increased in neighboring countries as well, particularly in Burkina Faso9.

Furthermore, conflicts linked to the terrorist threat have started to affect coastal countries such as

Benin, Togo and Côte d'Ivoire. According to several recent research studies, and data from the

Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED)10, it is highly likely that insecurity in

Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger will continue to worsen and increasingly spread to other parts of

Coastal West Africa, especially neighboring coastal states including Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Togo and Ghana.

This growing insecurity is the result of an interrelated mix of vulnerabilities and threats that are not limited to violent extremism. Aside from violent extremist organizations (VEOs), insecurity has been fueled and aggravated by other violent entrepreneurs, including self-defense militias, criminal gangs, armed groups and other malign actors. The Sahel region also has been grappling with cyclical security challenges, such as the growing instability linked to the civil war in Libya;

clandestine migration flows; armed rebellions; competition and rivalries between tribes; and intracommunal and intercommunal conflicts. These cyclical challenges have had a negative impact on the coastal states, which are also affected by the proliferation of illicit trafficking, such as trafficking in arms, illicit drugs, gold, motorcycles or cattle theft; and the sale of counterfeit drugs.

Transnational organized criminals also use fragile environments to advance their operations, including illicit drug trading, environmental exploitation, and human and wildlife trafficking. VEO members are familiar with these realities and take advantage by embedding themselves in local communities, enabling greater operational resilience and capacity for recruitment.

Both the Sahelian and coastal countries are engaged in regional security cooperation mechanisms such as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

(MINUSMA), the G5 Sahel Task Force, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), the Accra

Initiative, etc. which helps to reinforce security sector strength and border protection. However, improved security cooperation has not yet resulted in increased stability. The porous nature of the borders, insufficient capacity, and human rights abuses that further incite population grievances

8 https://fragilestatesindex.org/

9 https://fragilestatesindex.org/ Chad ranks as 7th top country with an index of fragility of 105.8 (High Alert of Fragility); Guinea ranks as

14 with an index of 97.4; Cameroon ranks as 15 with an index of 97.2; Mali ranks as 19 with an index of 96.6; Niger ranks as 21 with an index of 96.0; Cote d’Ivoire ranks as number 28 with an index of 90.7; Mauritania as 33, with an index of 89.1; Burkina Faso ranks as 36 with an index of 87.1; Togo as 38 with 85.1; and Benin ranks as 78 with an index of 72.8.

10 https://acleddata.com/#/dashboard https://fragilestatesindex.org/ https://fragilestatesindex.org/ https://fragilestatesindex.org/ https://fragilestatesindex.org/ https://acleddata.com/%23/dashboard continue to leave these countries vulnerable to further exploitation and attacks by VEOs.

Furthermore, inadequate responses by poorly trained state security forces, often accused of atrocities and human rights abuses, have undermined the governments’ counterterrorism (CT) efforts, increasing distrust by their populations, propelling the creation of armed self-defense militias, and resulting in increased insecurity, radicalization, and VEOs operations.

The issue of radicalization has also been an important aspect of the violent extremism expansion in West Africa. Empirical research to date has highlighted a variety of social, economic, political, and security factors motivating engagement with and support for VEOs. Economic inequality is extremely high and is present across all of West Africa. Most empirical research shows that unemployment and poverty are among the determining factors that lead young people to join

VEOs. Further, research increasingly demonstrates that religion does not exclusively explain why individuals adopt the ideology of violent extremism or join terrorist cells in West Africa. Evidence suggests that VEOs rely on religious discourse, but they use it to instrumentalize the grievances of the population about the abuses of security services and the inability of states and governments to address the many problems that arise as a result.

Terrorist groups have exploited many political and security vulnerabilities with the intent to dismantle social life, and expand influence and territorial control. Multiple political risk factors pose serious vulnerabilities to coastal countries because, as it has been seen in the Sahel, VEOs have demonstrated an aptitude for filling legitimacy gaps when the state is absent or predatory.

Poor governance, specifically state absence and the inability to provide services throughout the countries’ respective territories are vulnerability factors for both the countries in the Sahel

(Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, Chad and Mauritania) and the coastal states, specifically Benin, Togo, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana. Increased levels of corruption, political polarization;

suppression of civil liberties; violence against civilians and political exclusion, threaten democratic institutions and are creating political discontent and grievances that VEOs exploit to gain recruits or tacit support. Distrust in government due to either inefficiency, absence or abuse, creates a tear in the social contract between citizens and their governments, resulting in political illegitimacy and increased state fragility. Country’s fragility is exacerbated by state institutions that are unable or unwilling to respond to periodic stresses or crises and protect their populations in a legitimate, inclusive, and effective manner. Over the long-run, fragile countries tend to see slower, uneven, and unsustainable development. They may become reliant on external actors to prop up governance systems, provide security, and deliver essential services to their population.11

West Africa’s coastal area also is home to a large number of illicit activities, including drugs and arms trafficking and money laundering, all of which attract the VEOs. Terrorist groups that exploit gold in Burkina Faso take advantage of the geographic proximity between Burkina Faso and the coastal countries of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, and Ghana where the gold is sold. Conflict and political violence has expanded over time in West Africa. In many cases, conflicts are a symptom of unresolved deep grievances. Not only is the number of conflict regions growing, but conflicts are also becoming more violent. In 2018, the number of violent events and fatalities were higher than the 20-year average in more than half of the conflictual regions.12 Likewise, conflicts between farmers and herders have spiked in recent years in the region, a

11 U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability, https://www.state.gov/stability-strategy/

12 OECD report “ The Geography of Conflict in North and West Africa” situation where the tensions between both groups have become even more deadly, recurrent and alarming given the cross-border nature of transhumance. Armed conflict, trafficking and terrorism have made vast areas off-limits. Desertification and climate-induced changes have wiped out grazing areas, forcing pastoralists to look elsewhere for fresh pasture and water. Crop farming has increased, and with it, a further loss of available rangeland. This has led to earlier cross-border transhumance, resulting in increasing pressure on croplands and the risk of conflicts in host countries. Many of these centuries-old transhumance corridors no longer exist, further impeding the movement of herders13 and aggravating the pastoralism related grievances.

Conflicts have forced population movements never seen in the recent history of the region. As of

November 30, 2020, 1,658,684 people were displaced in the Sahel, including 1,485,545 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 173,139 refugees. Sixty-five percent of the displaced population

(1,094,809) were in Burkina Faso, 19 percent in Mali (324,843), 12 percent in Niger (198,473), and 4 percent in Mauritania (63,860).14

These developments show how critical it is to put in place a variety of strong responses geared toward hindering VEOs from expanding presence and influence and affecting additional areas.

There is a need to explore integrated approaches to prevention of violent extremism and mitigation of conflict, that take into consideration the security, political, economic, and social elements, as well factors that push states towards becoming more fragile, and linking local, national, regional and international responses to ensure greater coordination, impact and policy implementation.

Regional cooperation, however, has not emerged easily. Some government actors have been committed to combating violent extremism at different levels. However, the resources mobilized and the initiatives undertaken so far have been far from sufficient to put an end to the terrorist groups operating in West Africa. Sahelian and coastal countries have weak capacities and lack financial resources. One of the main challenges is the inability or unwillingness of member countries to use budgets, albeit limited, and other resources to address conflict, improve social cohesion, provide services and address development needs at the local level. Sometimes this inability is linked to corruption and embezzlement. Political will, therefore, is essential, as it determines whether the mobilized resources are capable of generating state presence and operational skills needed to make a strategic difference on the ground. Political will is one consideration for getting partner governments to take action, however there are complex incentives and drivers at play. Utilizing a political economy analysis (PEA) lens can help partners and actors find a politically feasible and technically sound way forward, therefore incorporating a PEA approach into implementation can help unpack these elements for a more successful approach.

C.4 DETAILED STATEMENT OF WORK

The strategic vision of the SRPS Program will have a specific focus on transnational, transboundary, and multi-country issues that will support coordinated, demand-driven programs and services to client bilateral USAID missions, country offices, and U.S. Embassies. In line with the GFA and the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability15, the new program will

13 http://oecdinsights.org/2018/04/16/herders-vs-farmers-resolving-deadly-conflict-in-the-sahel-and-west-africa/

14 [1] International Migration Organization, “Liptako-Gourma Crisis Monthly Dashboard,” November 30, 2020, https://migration.iom.int/report-product-series/liptako-gourma-crisis-monthly-dashboard 15 https://www.state.gov/stability-strategy/ http://oecdinsights.org/2018/04/16/herders-vs-farmers-resolving-deadly-conflict-in-the-sahel-and-west-africa/ http://oecdinsights.org/2018/04/16/herders-vs-farmers-resolving-deadly-conflict-in-the-sahel-and-west-africa/ https://migration.iom.int/report-product-series/liptako-gourma-crisis-monthly-dashboard https://migration.iom.int/report-product-series/liptako-gourma-crisis-monthly-dashboard https://migration.iom.int/report-product-series/liptako-gourma-crisis-monthly-dashboard incorporate peacebuilding approaches to address the drivers of fragility, including conflict, violence, and instability; support partners to build durable mechanisms to resolve conflicts, enhance social cohesion, build the capacity of critical institutions, deliver crucial services, and stress the importance of mobilizing political will and domestic resources that can enable lasting peace, stability, and ultimately, prosperity. This support will include advancing women's leadership and participation in all aspects of conflict prevention, stabilization, and peacebuilding.

Programmatic priorities will directly support the Regional Peace and Governance Office (RPGO)

Regional Development Objective 1 (RDO1): Democracy, Peace, and Stability Enhanced of

USAID/West Africa’s Regional Development and Cooperation Strategy (RDCS)16. RDO 1 supports and strengthens regional and national capacity and commitment to open, accountable, inclusive, and democratic governance through strengthening participatory, representative, and inclusive political processes and government institutions; promotes greater accountability of institutional leaders to citizens and to the law; and supports partner countries’ pathways toward stability and peace. RDO 1 also addresses the risks of instability from violent conflict, and prioritizes targeted conflict and violence prevention, peacebuilding, and preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) interventions across the sub-region. At the bilateral level, priority programs will be implemented with governments that demonstrate commitment to power sharing and resource redistribution, both of which are crucial for reducing exclusion, violence, and conflict.

In accordance with the USAID Policy for Countering Violent Extremism through Development

Assistance, the SRPS interventions will tailor P/CVE and conflict prevention programming to local violent extremist contexts and threats in ways that take account of broader regional and transnational dynamics. The following principles will drive USAID/West Africa’s P/CVE programming:

● P/CVE interventions must be focused, tailored, and measurable. Contextual analyses of the dynamics that enable or mitigate violent extremism will underpin the program's interventions.

● P/CVE programming must be part of a larger, coordinated regional approach to prevent conflict. Activities will address political marginalization, weak governance, conflict, fragile social cohesion, threats to religious freedom, reduced economic and educational opportunities, and other structural conditions that lead to increased grievances, instability and fragility in target countries of the program.

● P/CVE efforts must support and enhance the commitment, capacity, and interaction of regional, national and local partners.

● Programming must ensure appropriate coordination and burden-sharing within the U.S.

Government and with other like-minded donors.

● Interventions must be conflict-sensitive and the overall program approach must be flexible, agile, and adaptive.

The program will also incorporate the U.S. Government Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) strategic priorities,17 and synchronize them with all program P/CVE and peacebuilding activities.

16 https://www.usaid.gov/west-africa-regional/rdcs

U.S. Government Women, Peace and Security Strategy https://www.state.gov/women-peace-and-security/ https://www.usaid.gov/west-africa-regional/rdcs https://www.usaid.gov/west-africa-regional/rdcs https://www.usaid.gov/west-africa-regional/rdcs https://www.state.gov/women-peace-and-security/

These lines of efforts will include: supporting the meaningful participation of women in decision-making processes related to conflict and fragility; promoting the protection of women and girls’ human rights and safety from violence; promoting equality and empowerment of women in peacebuilding processes; and strengthen partner governments capacity to adopt policies, and plans to improve the meaningful participation of women in processes connected to peace and security and decision-making institutions. The contractor will measure investments through complex-aware monitoring and evaluation, and strive to incorporate new learning as it emerges, and adapt the program accordingly per USAID’s guidance.

C.5 THEORY OF CHANGE

If, the capacity of regional institutions and of governments is strengthened to effectively address vulnerability factors and the risks of instability, including governance challenges and populations grievances that make communities more prone to violent extremism influence, If drivers of fragility are peacefully addressed through effective, peaceful and conflict sensitive approaches that strengthen the social contract between citizens and their governments, mobilize political will to strengthen state-society relations and restore the social contract and address elements of fragility, Then, West Africans’ ability and efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism, address conflict and fragility drivers, and improve stability, will be enhanced. (Program Purpose)

This Theory of Change will directly contribute to the USAID/West Africa’s RDCS Development

Hypothesis: “If the capacities of regional institutions and national actors to counteract the closing of political space, and commitment to democratic governance is strengthened, the ability of regional and national partners to counter violent extremism and prevent VEOs from spreading influence and presence is enhanced, and conflict drivers are peacefully addressed at the regional and national levels, then, with increased focus on gender equality, these efforts will together enhance democracy, peace, and stability in the region.”

C.6 LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Sub-purpose 1:

Strengthened capacity of regional institutions and of governments to effectively address vulnerability factors and the risks of instability, including governance challenges and populations grievances that make communities more prone to violent extremism influence

Sub-purpose 2:

Enhanced efforts that address drivers of fragility through effective, peaceful and conflict sensitive approaches that strengthen the social contract between citizens and their governments, mobilize political will to strengthen state-society relations and restore the social contract

Purpose: Enhanced ability and efforts of West Africans to prevent and counter violent extremism, address conflict and fragility drivers and improve stability

OUTPUT 1.1

Regional and bilateral partners in government, civil society, youth and women organizations, develop capacities to prevent conflict, counter violent extremism and contribute to a more stable region

OUTPUT 2.1

Regional and national P/CVE policies, strategies and frameworks are implemented in a collaborative and effective manner

OUTPUT 1.2

Program activities and partners efforts are well coordinated, communicated, disseminated

OUTPUT 2.2 Increased efforts of regional, national and local government and non-government partners to prevent conflict, prevent/counter violent extremism, address elements of fragility and contribute to a more stable region

OUTPUT 1.3 Target communities and institutions have the necessary support to more effectively prevent conflict and strengthen social cohesion

OUTPUT 2.3 Civil society organizations, women and youth groups, religious and traditional leaders collaborate on P/CVE and are effectively addressing drivers of fragility

C.7 DETAILED TASKS AND ACTIVITIES

Purpose: Enhanced ability and efforts of West Africans to prevent and counter violent extremism, address conflict and fragility drivers and improve stability

West Africa boasts a strong set of regional institutions empowered by their member states, including the G5 Sahel and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), among others. Through SRPS, USAID West Africa’s RPGO will continue to collaborate with these regional partners, and other stakeholders, to support efforts in building their commitment and capacity to advance implementation of aligned priorities. Modest but strategic investments in these institutions and increased coordination with USAID bilateral efforts can pay dividends at national and local levels, and increase return on USAID’s large bilateral investments, across all sectors and initiatives in the sub-region. SRPS must employ a conflict sensitive approach and its implementation efforts must be flexible, agile, and adaptive. The program must strive to:

● Build the capacity and commitment of our regional and bilateral partners in government, civil society, youth and women organizations, and the private sector, to prevent conflict, counter violent extremism and contribute to a more stable region;

● Address governance weaknesses with the aim of reducing countries’ fragility and the risk of populations’ support for violent extremism; and

● Mobilize political will to strengthen state-society relations, restore social contract and address elements of state fragility and population’s grievances.

Program interventions must ensure that assistance is sensitive to conflict dynamics and reinforces inclusive, participatory, and legitimate governance. SRPS must support USAID/West Africa’s efforts to build capable governance institutions, accountable practices, and reinforce meaningful participation, including addressing human rights concerns as directed by USAID.

USAID intends to align its priorities with the G5 Sahel Executive Secretariat and ECOWAS and support their efforts to mitigate conflict, prevent and counter violent extremism in the Sahel and in neighboring coastal states of Benin, Togo, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana among others.

Accordingly, SRPS must be able to implement programming under this contract…