ATTACHMENT_J.14_4__OTIs_Innovative_Approaches_to_CVE_programming.pdf

1 | USAID.GOVINNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO CVE PROGRAMMING

INNOVATIVE

APPROACHES

TO CVE

PROGRAMMING

INSIGHTS AND LESSONS FROM THE

USAID OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES

LEBANON COMMUNITY RESILIENCE INITIATIVE

(2014-2017)

DISCLAIMER This report is made possible by the support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the sole responsibility of the Management Systems International and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.

TITLE

2 | USAID.GOVINNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO CVE PROGRAMMING

CONTENTS

ACRONYMS 5

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

THE MERITS OF “TANGIBLES”

LESSONS ON YOUTH PROGRAMMING

LESSONS ON GRANTEES 8

MAGNIFYING PROGRAM IMPACT AND ENSURING LONGER-TERM RESULTS

9OPERATIONAL LESSONS

LESSONS ON STRATEGY

THE RESILIENCE AND SOCIAL COHESION (R&C) PROGRAMMING QUANDARY

10LESSONS ON MONITORING AND EVALUATION

CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION

METHODOLOGY 12

THE USAID/OTI PROGRAMMING MODEL 12

LRCI: AN OVERVIEW 14

SECTION I:

THE MERITS OF

“TANGIBLES”

LESSON 1 TANGIBLES MAY BE REQUIRED TO GAIN ACCESS TO TARGETED COMMUNITIES AND EARN THEIR TRUST 16

LESSON 2

WHEN RELYING ON TANGIBLES, PROVIDE THE GRANTEE AND PARTICIPANTS WITH SIGNIFICANT

AUTONOMY TO DETERMINE PRIORITIES AND SUPPORT THE COMMUNITY TANGIBLE BEGINNING WITH

SELECTION, WORKING THROUGH DESIGN AND EXECUTION, AND ENDING WITH CELEBRATION 17

LESSON 3

TANGIBLES CAN HELP ENHANCE SOCIAL COHESION AND REDUCE INDIVIDUAL ISOLATION, THUS

LESSENING VULNERABILITY TO VE AS WELL

LESSON 4

THE RECLAIMING OF COMMON SPACES FOR INTERACTION MAY BE A PARTICULARLY VALUABLE

TANGIBLE IN CONTESTED ENVIRONMENTS. 18

LESSON 5

TANGIBLES CAN HELP ENSURE THAT ASSISTANCE IS BOTH PERCEIVED TO BE AND IS BALANCED AMONG

RIVAL GROUPS OR COMMUNITIES 19

LESSON 6 ENSURE THAT TANGIBLES ARE ACCOMPANIED BY ADEQUATE MEDIA OUTREACH AND PUBLIC EVENTS

LESSON 7

WHEN RELYING ON TANGIBLES, PROGRAMMING SHOULD BE SENSITIVE TO THE LIMITATIONS INHERENT

IN SUCH EFFORTS 20

SECTION II:

LESSONS

ON YOUTH

PROGRAMMING

LESSON 1

PROVIDING SEPARATE PHYSICAL SPACE FOR POSITIVE INTERACTION AMONG AT-RISK YOUTH MAY BE

IMPORTANT TO CVE GAINS, BUT MUST BE APPROACHED CAREFULLY. 21

LESSON 2

LINCLUDE PROGRAMMING SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO ADDRESS THE PSYCHO-SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF

VE.

LESSON 3

TANGIBLES CAN PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN BRINGING YOUTH INTO PROJECT ACTIVITIES, AND THEN

IN BOOSTING THEIR PSYCHO-SOCIAL RESILIENCE TO VE NARRATIVES.

LESSON 4

MAKE USE OF THE ARTS TO ATTRACT YOUTH, MAINTAIN THEIR ENGAGEMENT, AND ADDRESS SOME KEY

PSYCHO-SOCIAL DRIVERS OF VE.

LESSON 5

BROADEN THE FRAME OF REFERENCE OF AT-RISK YOUTH THROUGH TARGETED EXPERIENCES OUTSIDE

THEIR IMMEDIATE COMMUNITY.

LESSON 6

SELECTION OF PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE DONE CAREFULLY, WITH A NECESSARY FOCUS ON

INCLUDING AT-RISK YOUTH AND CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF WHAT IMPLICATIONS AN ACTIVITY’S MAKE-UP WILL HAVE ON ACHIEVING INTENDED RESULTS. OVERSIGHT OF GRANTEE TARGETING SHOULD

BE PARTICULARLY CLOSE.

LESSON 7

ENGAGE YOUTH OF DIFFERENT COMMUNITIES WITH EACH OTHER TO REDUCE MISPERCEPTIONS AND

STIGMA.

27LESSON 8

USE YOUTH PARTICIPANTS TO RECRUIT MORE YOUTH AND EXPAND REACH INTO VULNERABLE

COMMUNITIES.

LESSON 9

DESIGN TRAINING TO REFLECT TARGET GROUP AGE AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AND MAKE IT

ENTERTAINING BY USING MIXED MEDIA AND DRAMA.

LESSON 10

EXPECT AND PLAN FOR INITIAL ADULT SKEPTICISM OF, AND SOMETIMES OPEN HOSTILITY TO, YOUTH

COMMUNITY-BASED ACTIVITIES.

LESSON 11 CONSIDER STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF SCHOOLS IN THE LIVES OF YOUTH.

INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO CVE PROGRAMMING 3 | USAID.GOV

CONTENTS

SECTION III:

LESSONS ON

GRANTEES

LESSON 1

IN NON-COMPETITIVE SELECTION PROCESSES, THE VETTING PROCESS FOR GRANTEES SHOULD

BALANCE THE NEED FOR RIGOR WITH THE IMPERATIVE OF QUICK-RESPONSE. 29

LESSON 2

THREE KEY VARIABLES SHAPE A GRANTEE’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO PROGRAM OBJECTIVES: THE LEAD PERSON(S) IN THE ORGANIZATION; THE EXTENT TO WHICH THAT ORGANIZATION IS EMBEDDED AND

ENJOYS BROAD CREDIBILITY IN THE COMMUNITY; AND ITS ADDED CVE VALUE. 30

LESSON 3 CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE RESPECTIVE MERITS, RISKS AND TRADE-OFFS

LESSON 4

THE IP SHOULD ENSURE THAT INDIVIDUAL GRANTEES UNDERSTAND THE PROGRAM’S OVERALL

STRATEGY, THE LOGIC BEHIND IT, AND THEIR OWN CONTRIBUTIONS TO IT. 31

LESSON 5

ENSURE GRANTEES HAVE ROBUST OUTREACH STRATEGIES AT START UP, DURING ACTIVITIES, AND AFTER

COMPLETION. 32

LESSON 6 KEEP CHECKING THAT GRANTEES ARE ENGAGING THE RIGHT POPULATIONS.

LESSON 7

RELY ON A BROAD RANGE OF PARTNERS AND ENCOURAGE COLLABORATION AND NETWORKING

AMONG THEM.

LESSON 8 TRUST, BUT VERIFY. VERIFY, BUT TRUST.

LESSON 9

KEEP REASSESSING PARTNER CHOICES, AS WELL AS TARGETED AREAS AND POPULATIONS, AND

FORMALIZE THE PROCESS THAT WILL ENSURE THAT THIS REVIEW TAKES PLACE AT REGULAR INTERVALS.

SECTION IV:

MAGNIFYING

IMPACT AND

ENSURING

LONGER-TERM

RESULTS

LESSON 1 THINK CAREFULLY ABOUT SEQUENCING, LAYERING, AND “REELING OPPORTUNITIES.” 35

LESSON 2

LHELPING NASCENT OR “PROTO-GROUPS” GET ORGANIZED AND SOMETIMES EVEN REGISTERED CAN

MAKE A LASTING DIFFERENCE. 37

LESSON 3 SUSTAINABILITY OBJECTIVES CAN BE INTEGRATED INTO QUICK-IMPACT INTERVENTIONS. 38

SECTION V:

OPERATIONAL

LESSONS

LESSON 1

COUNTRY-SPECIFIC AND GENERIC CVE TRAINING SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO IP AND USAID STAFF

IN THE FIELD.

LESSON 2 CONSIDER APPROACHES WHICH COULD INCREASE FEMALE PARTICIPATION IN PROGRAMS.

LESSON 3

REMAIN ALERT TO BOTH OPPORTUNITIES FOR, AND DANGERS IN, GRANTEE-LOCAL GOVERNMENT

ENGAGEMENT ON CVE ISSUES. 40

LESSON 4 FILMS, PLAYS, AND PRESS BRIEFINGS CAN BE USED TO SHIFT NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS OF AN AREA. 41

LESSON 5

ANTICIPATE AND PLAN FOR THE PERCEPTION OF ASSISTANCE-RELATED INEQUITIES WHEN WORKING

WITH RIVAL OR NEIGHBORING COMMUNITIES.

LESSON 6 SOCIAL MEDIA TRAINING SHOULD BE INCLUDED FOR GRANTEES WHO LACK THIS SKILL SET.

SECTION VI:

LESSONS ON

STRATEGY

LESSON 1

BE DELIBERATE AND SELF-AWARE ABOUT THE DEGREE OF EMPHASIS BE PLACED ON STRATEGY IN

PROGRAM DESIGN.

LESSON 2

EVEN ACTION-LEARNING PROGRAMS IN VOLATILE ENVIRONMENTS SHOULD BE UNDERPINNED BY

ROBUST ANALYTICS AND A DEGREE OF STRATEGIC THINKING THAT RESPONDS TO THE ANALYSIS.

LESSON 3 ENSURE THAT PROGRAM DESIGN CAREFULLY APPROACHES THE COMMISSIONING OF VE RESEARCH. 44

LESSON 4

WHEN A FULL-FLEDGED STRATEGY IS DEEMED NECESSARY, ITS FORMULATION SHOULD PAY PARTICULAR

ATTENTION TO FIVE KEY AREAS. 45

LESSON 5

ALWAYS BE CLEAR ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE WORK BEING CONDUCTED. DOES THAT WORK TARGET

PREVENTION OR MITIGATION AND HOW DOES IT DO SO? 48

SECTION VII:

THE RESILIENCE

AND SOCIAL

COHESION

PROGRAMMING

QUANDARY

DEFINING RESILIENCE AND COHESION 49

THE COMPELLING LOGIC OF R&C PROGRAMMING 50

RESILIENCY’S TRADE-OFFS 52

INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO CVE PROGRAMMING 4 | USAID.GOV

SECTION VIII:

LESSONS ON

MONITORING

AND

EVALUATION

LESSON 1

M&E-RELATED FACTORS MUST BE CONSIDERED EARLY ON AND BE INTEGRATED INTO STAFFING,

STRATEGY AND ACTIVITY DESIGN.

LESSON 2 ENGAGE M&E STAFF IN STRATEGY DESIGN AND PERIODIC REVISIONS AS WELL AS IN CVE TRAINING.

LESSON 3 NUMERICAL INDICATORS ARE RARELY A SATISFACTORY WAY OF GAUGING IMPACT. 55

LESSON 4

FORMAL MECHANISMS AND PROCESSES NEED TO BE ESTABLISHED TO ENSURE THAT THE INFORMATION

PROVIDED BY GRANT FERS FEEDS INTO ON-GOING PROGRAMMIING 56

CONCLUSION 57

ANNEX 1:

LCRI BUILDS

BRIDGES AND

MITIGATES

CONFLICT

AND VE RISK

IN TRIPOLI

REPAIRING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN YOUTH AND SECURITY FORCES 59

CONSIDERING COMMUNITY TENSIONS THROUGH ALL STAGES OF PROGRAMMING

RECRUITING TRULY AT-RISK YOUTH

EMPOWERING YOUTH THROUGH GRANT ACTIVITIES 61

FINAL THOUGHTS 62

ANNEX 2:

INTERVIEW

GUIDE FOR

KIIS AND FGDS

OBJECTIVE OF THE GUIDE AND HOW TO APPROACH IT

ORGANIZATION

I. QUESTIONS FOR PARTICIPANTS 64

II. QUESTIONS FOR CLOSE PERSONAL CONNECTIONS 66

III. QUESTIONS FOR POTENTIAL INDIRECT BENEFICIARIES IN THE COMMUNITY 67

CONTENTS

5 | USAID.GOVINNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO CVE PROGRAMMING

ACRONYMS

AAB ABDULLAH AZZAM BRIGADES

AQ AL-QAEDA

BA BASMAT AMAL

BET BAB EL-TEBBANEH

CAVT COALITION AGAINST VIOLENCE IN TRIPOLI

CBO(s) COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANIZATION(S)

CVE COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

FER(s) FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

FGD(s) FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION(S)

FO(s) FIELD OFFICER(S)

GOL GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON

INGO(s) INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL

ORGANIZATION(S)

IP IMPLEMENTING PARTNER

IS ISLAMIC STATE

ISF INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

JAN JABHAT AL-NUSRA

JM JABAL MOHSEN

KII(s) KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW(S)

LAF LEBANESE ARMED FORCES

LARD LEBANESE ASSOCIATION FOR RURAL

DEVELOPMENT

LCRI LEBANON COMMUNITY RESILIENCE INITIATIVE

LCI LEBANON CIVIC INITIATIVE

LCSI LEBANON CIVIC SUPPORT INITIATIVE

M&E MONITORING AND EVALUATION

MEL MONITORING, EVALUATION, AND LEARNING

MEPI MIDDLE EAST PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE

MSI MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL

MVE MITIGATE VIOLENT EXTREMISM

NGO(s) NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION(S)

OTI OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES

PDO(s) PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT OFFICER(S)

PI PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR

PO(s) PROGRAM OBJECTIVE(S)

PPR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REVIEW

PVE PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM

ROT(s) RULE(S) OF THUMB

SO(s) SUB-OBJECTIVE(S)

TOC(s) THEORY(IES) OF CHANGE

TYC TEBBANEH YOUTH COUNCIL

UN UNITED NATIONS

UNDP UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

UNESCWA UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL

COMMISSION FOR WEST ASIA

USAID UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL

DEVELOPMENT

VE VIOLENT EXTREMISM OR VIOLENT EXTREMIST

VEO(s) VIOLENT EXTREMIST ORGANIZATION(S)

6 | USAID.GOVINNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO CVE PROGRAMMING

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As the Syrian crisis has deepened and diverse actors have been drawn into the conflict, instability across the region has intensified.

Neighboring Lebanon has been affected heavily by the war, heightening its own long-running political and sectarian tensions. On the Fragile States Index, Lebanon shows extremely weak social cohesion rankings with high levels of group grievance and elite factionalization.

Space for entrepreneurs peddling sectarian narratives, including Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) has expanded, as has external intervention in the country’s politics. These factors have weakened the state further and generated internal violence. Lebanese actors have engaged in activities supporting different sides in the Syrian war and many communities have been affected by the spillover of the conflict. The country now hosts a huge refugee burden, often imposing substantial costs on the communities least able to bear them.

Certain regions and communities feel marginalized and abandoned by the state. Poor services, inequitable economic development, inadequate infrastructure, lack of opportunity, unemployment, and poverty have deepened feelings of alienation. Distrust of the security forces, political elites, and the state is pervasive in these parts of the country.

From 2014 to 2017, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) and Management Systems International implemented the Lebanon Community Resilience Initiative (LCRI). LCRI explored how to design, implement, and monitor approaches and activities in the nascent field of countering violent extremism (CVE), working through roughly 270 small civil society grants executed over a three-year period.

Programming followed the Action Research Model typical of OTI projects, an approach based on learning while implementing. LCRI worked in areas of the country most affected by the Syrian crisis to strengthen the resilience of Lebanese communities to violent extremism (VE) while alleviating some of the pressure created by drivers of conflict. Specifically, it was designed to mitigate sectarian and host community-refugee tensions and the risk of radicalization and recruitment by VEOs. It was built around two program objectives (POs): “Mitigate Rising Sectarian and Host Community-Refugee Tensions” (PO1) and “Counter the Influence of Violent Extremist Groups” (PO2). Each of these POs contained three separate sub-objectives (SOs):

PO1: Mitigate rising sectarian tensions and host community-refugee tensions.

• SO1: Promote peaceful alternatives to violence.

• SO2: Reduce the marginalization and isolation of community groups.

• SO3: Strengthen moderate actors.

PO2: Counter the influence of VEOs.

• SO4: Strengthen youth empowerment and civic participation.

• SO5: Increase moderate space and strengthen moderate actors.

• SO6: Counter extremist messaging.

PO1 received the most emphasis at program outset, but, a year into LCRI, the focus shifted to PO2. Both SOs 4 and 5 received heavy investment. However, LCRI understood from its inception that the two POs were closely linked, particularly since sectarian tensions and VE can feed into and exacerbate each other. Consequently, it was understood that an activity categorized as falling under one PO could in fact have an effect on the other.

This case study explores the insights and lessons gained under LCRI. While the case study notes areas in which programming fell short, the majority of lessons reflect on the program’s accomplishments, which look all the more remarkable when we consider : a) the intricacies of the Lebanese political environment in general, the complexity of its VE landscape in particular, and the massive challenges associated with trying to program against it; and b) how few CVE programs can point to credible evidence that they had a substantive positive impact. For a program that had limited resources and a short life-span, LCRI can claim accomplishments worthy of CVE practitioner study. It is hoped that others tasked with CVE programming can benefit from those lessons.

Lessons and insights are presented in eight separate sections. Some relate primarily to programming and design, while others focus more on effective implementation and management. Several sections discuss themes that have both programmatic and operational dimensions. Some of the most pertinent insights are discussed briefly in this Executive Summary. The full report need not be read sequentially from start to finish; rather readers can use the table of contents to search for those topics of most immediate relevance to their concerns.

INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO CVE PROGRAMMING 7 | USAID.GOV

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

THE MERITS OF “TANGIBLES”

An effective tool for gaining and solidifying trust in communities is the provision of community goods or small-scale infrastructure projects, known in LCRI as “tangibles”. LCRI’s target communities were among those that felt abandoned by the state and the political class; promises to make improvements were often made and seldom kept. This deepening perception of marginalization made it difficult to solidify trust between the community and those hoping to work with it to mitigate conflict and VE. LCRI found that small-scale tangibles were an effective tool for entry into resistant and suspicious communities. Through quick-impact, high-visibility activities, communities were able to see the value of the work being done by the grantee. Tangibles strengthened grantee standing in and relationship with the community and gave them the ability to expand their efforts and draw more community members into softer CVE programming.

A key element in successfully providing tangibles in LCRI was ensuring that community members participated in needs assessment and in deciding which tangible project should be undertaken. By obtaining the input of the community, LCRI grantees demonstrated that the community’s sense of its own needs was paramount, while also strengthening the community’s ownership of the resulting improvement.

These community projects were not an end in themselves; they helped strengthen relationships within the community, between participants and the community, and between the grantee and the community. The process was important for building resilience and a platform from which future programming could draw in more members of the community and realize greater CVE gains.

Youth found working on tangibles particularly attractive because of the visibility of both the improvements and their role in actualizing them. Successful provision of a tangible increased the status of participating youth in the community and improved their sense of efficacy and self-esteem, in part through the community recognition they received for their efforts. Tangibles became a vehicle to draw youth together within their own community and sometimes between antagonistic ones. The initial positive effects helped draw other youth into future activities and enhance the community’s confidence in local grantees. Impact was further enhanced through media outreach and public events, which included grantee branding, community events, festivals, and opening ceremonies to commemorate an activity’s completion. Target communities were accustomed to negative media portrayal and resented prejudicial labeling. Redirecting media as a tool to reshape the image of a community and the image it had of itself was powerful in amplifying the impact of an activity.

LESSONS ON YOUTH PROGRAMMING

As is typical of CVE programming, youth were an important target group for LCRI. In LCRI’s troubled, conflict-affected areas, many youth dropped out of school early, engaged in drug use and petty crime, and held out little hope for the future. Many were seen in their communities as irresponsible troublemakers rather than forces for positive change. Social exclusion, perception of marginalization, idleness, boredom, isolation, and a lack of social mobility fed youth vulnerability to VEO recruitment.

Grantees often struggled to determine which youth were most at-risk of VE. This is a common problem in CVE programming where resources are slight and the potentially affected population large. There is no set formula for determining who is the most at-risk, especially since this often depends on the context of the individual community. Examining the kinds of youth targeted by VEOs, recruitment channels, and mechanisms used by VEOs to gain youth and community support can prove helpful in determining guidelines for recruiting truly at-risk youth for programming. Some grantees were able to pinpoint particular street locations or institutions within target towns or neighborhoods and solicit the engagement of youth in close proximity to those sites. Sometimes the youth most interested in participating in the initial community development or youth-oriented activities were not the most vulnerable; however, their sense of purpose and enthusiasm often proved infectious and enabled the grantee to draw in additional participants in later programs. Adults were often not keen on their children participating when they were unsure of the grantee or the value of the work, but the tangibles discussed above were important in winning over parental support. Grantee provision of safe spaces for activities, often outside the community, also proved important both to parental approval and youth participation. Youth were often grateful for activities held in settings that were not only secure but also provided an escape from the emotional burden of their grim everyday reality.

The LCRI experience recommends that explicit conversations about the recruitment process be held with grantees so that they understand how to determine vulnerability and what the expectations are for recruitment. Grantees who reached out to parents and community leaders early on had far more success in attracting youth to their activities. Once the activities were successfully completed, it was easier to draw in additional youth and to reach those who had initially been more skeptical or uninterested.

INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO CVE PROGRAMMING 8 | USAID.GOV

Successfully engaging youth in activities that cross sectarian divides, particularly when violence has occurred, can be difficult. LCRI found that it was often necessary to engage youth within their own community and sect first, to develop their capacity to engage with “the other,” and then bring the two sets of youth together. The preparatory work was critical to the success of the cross-sect activities. The initial activities gave youth the confidence they needed to be open in engaging youth from a rival community. LCRI also learned that care needs to be taken in grouping together youth of very different economic and educational backgrounds. Sometimes, this caused the less well-off youth to withdraw and reinforced their sense of isolation; sometimes it worked very well and each group had its perspective broadened. Elements critical to success appeared to be: 1) the capacity of the grantee, and 2) embedding opportunities to build up the capacity and voices of the less advantaged and ensure “equal time” in the program’s design.

While engaging youth in producing tangibles was both popular and successful, community improvement projects generally could not address the emotional or psychosocial drivers that contributed to youth vulnerability to VE. It is important to provide youth the opportunity for self-expression as an avenue for addressing these drivers; this is an area where the arts proved especially helpful.

Photography, film, story-telling, dance, singing, and drama all served as activities to help youth escape from the negative feelings fostered by violence and marginalization while giving them a vehicle through which to “tell their stories”, release their frustration and anger through creative means, draw attention to their needs, and help the community understand the difficulties they faced and hopes they had. These activities had therapeutic benefits for participating Lebanese youth, while also attracting youth because of how rare opportunities for self-expression were in the target communities. Collaborative art activities, like theater and the production of documentaries, were effective in bringing together youth from different communities, as they realized how truly similar they were and then gave voice to those sentiments through their performances.

LESSONS ON GRANTEES

In environments where CVE programming is necessary, the potential for negative consequences is considerable. As a result, selection of the face of programming, the grantee, is critical to achieving the program’s objectives. Some grantees had the capability but lacked the leverage to get into a suspicious community. Sometimes LCRI helped community groups to form so that they would have a knowledgeable and acceptable local partner with which to work. Capacity levels occasionally affected the extent to which a grantee could manage the CVE focus of the program. Most did not have a CVE mandate and they generally lacked an understanding of VE, a problem that sometimes surfaced in participant targeting. Substantial support and training, as well as oversight, from the Implementing Partner (IP) or donor is required for grantees expected to play a new and more complex role.

Creating new community groups to implement grants was often an effective method of accomplishing CVE goals by engaging members of the community and empowering moderate actors, despite the risks. Small in-kind grants helped minimize the perils associated with these new community groups, but simultaneously offered the incentive of future grants if the group implemented its first grant effectively. If a group was truly successful after implementing a number of grants, helping them officially register as an NGO helped cement their status as a moderate leader in the community, providing a trustworthy mechanism for community problem solving where few existed before. When the risks associated with forming a new community group outweigh the benefits, programmers may need to rely on a proven entity based in a different community, as long as it has a clear ability to engage key actors within the targeted neighborhood or town.

MAGNIFYING PROGRAM IMPACT AND ENSURING LONGER-TERM

RESULTS

The action research model used by LCRI is composed of many small, quick-impact grants meant to provide programmers with an opportunity to adjust the strategy throughout the life of the program as the context changes and new lessons are learned. The potential downside of this kind of programming is that even accumulated small grants may not produce a community resilient enough to withstand powerful “shocks”. These “shocks” can send communities backwards, unraveling at least some of the progress made towards CVE goals. One way to counteract this downside is through deliberate and thoughtful layering and sequencing of grants; another is through using one set of grant participants to reel in additional participants in an ever-widening circle. If programmers are deft enough to spot opportunities and conscious of the effects their grants and the processes by which they work are producing, they can layer or sequence grants so that they build on early successes and create a multiplier effect. The technique of first engaging youth within a community in one activity and then taking those youth, now more confident in their abilities, and combining them with youth from a rival community in the following activity to successfully bridge sectarian divides is an example of appropriate sequencing. The mingling of parents at their child’s performance or commemoration of an event is an example of a potential “reeling in” opportunity. While it can be difficult to capitalize on these opportunities because the IP cannot necessarily predict what successes a grant will have, it is important to plan grants in a way that makes this kind of sequencing, layering, and “reeling in” possible. As a result, communities may become more resilient to the pull of escalating tensions created by “shocks” and may recover faster after a “shock” has occurred.

INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO CVE PROGRAMMING 9 | USAID.GOV

OPERATIONAL LESSONS

All program-related staff and grantees need an adequate understanding of VE dynamics and drivers, VE analytics, and CVE programming, as this is a new domain and experienced staff and grantees may be hard to identify. Significant training and follow-on refresher training should be provided and simple program guides applicable to the country setting developed.

Programmers should assume that others will try to claim credit for the work of grantees and participants. This happened repeatedly in LCRI’s work. Municipal leaders, political elites, and others tried to claim credit, especially for tangibles. LCRI was attentive to this issue and ensured that grantee branding, media outreach, training for grantees in the use of social media, and public celebrations were extensive to ensure that credit went where credit was due. Nearly every grant had some kind of public relations component that was a critical part of the activity. OTI itself did not seek credit for USAID but preferred that the grantee, as a moderate actor in the community, obtained the praise that would favorably position it as a moderate resource in the community.

LESSONS ON STRATEGY

When developing a strategy prior to implementing a program that learns by doing in a domain where not much is known, a delicate balance must be struck between a program that can quickly adapt to changes in context and lessons learned and a strategy founded on a strong analytic foundation. The dangers of going too far in either direction are either a strategy that is far too lean (in LCRI’s case reduced to broad and abstract theories of change) and therefore likely to be misinterpreted and poorly implemented or a strategy that is so well developed that it takes on a life of its own, regardless of reality or learning, and cannot adapt to a changing context or increased understanding. This is especially true in CVE environments, where it is difficult to form an ironclad strategy because of the fluid and unstable context, as well as the variation in drivers and dynamics across target localities.

Investing in adequate research in order to understand VE drivers and their interactions and helping staff understand the implications of that research for programming is critical. Key elements of that research might include: VE dynamics and drivers; at-risk populations and areas; main processes and venues through which individuals and communities are drawn to VE views or recruited into VE activity;

essential VE-related dynamics (for instance, those that relate to recruitment, strategic communications, VEO operations, and radicalization processes); and significant protective factors and resiliencies. Programming will not of course be able to address all of these factors, but only once the phenomenon is sufficiently understood can programmers identify which aspects of a problem can be tackled and which will likely be beyond its scope. Relevant in-depth analysis can also nurture a better grasp of what the strategy is and is not doing to address the VE problem.

THE RESILIENCE AND SOCIAL COHESION (R&C) PROGRAMMING

QUANDARY

R&C programming attempts to prevent the spread of VE by promoting higher levels of community resilience and social cohesion so communities can cope effectively with the destabilizing forces associated with VE activity and recruitment. Community resilience can be defined as the ability of a community and its members to deal with both internal and external sources of daily adversity and larger shocks without becoming vulnerable to the predatory narratives of VEOs. Social cohesion is the ability and desire of individuals or groups of a society, community, or set of communities to cooperate with each other to enhance overall well-being. Social cohesion itself can be a major source of community resilience.

Perhaps the most powerful case for R&C programming is that it is grounded in a realistic understanding of what CVE programming can achieve in many VE environments. It recognizes that many of the most salient drivers of VE consist of intractable, systemic problems and complex dynamics that operate at the national and even transnational levels that lie beyond the ability of most stakeholders to affect. Consequently, it focuses on how communities can best be sheltered, at least partially, from these forces and on what can be done to mitigate some of those drivers where the likelihood of meaningful impact is greater : at the community level. R&C programming recognizes that, while it provides partial remedies to the VE threats, it can reduce both the stressors in target communities and the number and/or influence of VE actors in those communities. At the same time, it can help ensure that target communities do not add fuel to the VE or conflict fire when negative externalities occur; those communities may instead, be able to stay out of the problem or serve as a force for peace. The strengthening of more moderate actors and their influence in those communities may also have long term effects that can, where enough coverage is acquired, begin to shift political dynamics in a more positive direction.

The case for such an approach lies partly in the intractable nature of several of the macro-level forces that sustain VE. In the case of Lebanon, the state is weak, lacks capacity with regard to policy-making and implementation, and is captured by societal interests. For

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all practical purposes, it is largely absent from many of the regions and towns that are most susceptible to VE. An attempt to confront head-on the higher-level drivers of VE would likely prove futile and could be destabilizing and counter-productive.

At the same time, programmers must recognize that building resilience and social cohesion in some number of communities may not make a major dent in the structural causes of VE. Questions to consider include: When is R&C programming the most practical and effective option to respond to pressing VE threats, particularly through quick-impact activities? Might core structural drivers become more powerful over time if not addressed directly by some entity or can R&C programming have some impact on them? Are others addressing these structural drivers? And if unaddressed drivers do indeed become harder to counter over time, is R&C programming buying the country time to heal itself or making some portion of the population less reactive to such drivers?

In the context of a broken political system, one could argue that the greater the level of community resilience and social cohesion, the more the country can circumvent dysfunctionality. In this scenario, the coping mechanisms provided by R&C can help individuals and communities alike to by-pass formal institutions and mechanisms of governance and develop their own survival strategies. However, in the long run, they might do so at the cost of allowing citizens to disengage from trying to reform their malfunctioning state. As citizens progressively give up on the state and formal politics, demands for accountability from public officials may decrease markedly. Before making strategic programming decisions, however, this line of reasoning should be contrasted with the argument that cohesion has the ability to enhance community strength and community resolve to put pressure on decision-makers to address governance-related problems that fuel VE. It can also make them more resistant to the ethno-sectarian appeals of politicians, appeals which raise the risks of conflict. There are no “right” answers to the many questions raised here, but R&C programming can be enriched by seriously considering them.

LESSONS ON MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Adequate M&E is especially important when using an action research model to achieve CVE goals, since without M&E it would just be the action model. Unfortunately, it is common for M&E staff to be somewhat isolated from program conceptualization and divorced from an in-depth understanding of a program’s strategy. M&E staff should be included in the design and implementation of a program so they better understand the strategy being deployed when designing an M&E approach and can contribute to the iterative process of adjusting that strategy as learning progresses.

It is common in development assistance programs related to conflict, stabilization, and governance to under-staff the M&E role and to treat it as more of a formal accountability function than an interactive learning one meant to support adaptation. LCRI started out with one M&E officer and eventually moved to three M&E staff. Still as grants accumulated, the M&E staff found it difficult to keep up. In the case of programs like LCRI, where the period of an activity is very short and multiple grants are being managed and issued, it can be difficult to manage M&E-program design/implementation coordination. New grants are always in design while implementation proceeds on existing grants; it can be challenging for M&E staff to stay caught up and make their voices heard. At the same time, LCRI did have an important review mechanism in its periodic rolling assessments and strategy reviews, which provided platforms for staff to consider changes in the context and incorporate programming lessons.

CONCLUSION

Remarkably, through some of the approaches summarized above and others found throughout this case study, LCRI was able to gain access to at-risk communities where other donors were not active – often because those donors were unable to find effective ways of entering them. It was no small achievement for a USG-funded implementer to establish a presence in, and credibility with, some of the difficult neighborhoods and towns in Tripoli and the Beqaa – let alone to build bridges and defuse the sectarian tensions across those towns and neighborhoods. Being able to operate in such communities and support effective grantees within them may look routine by May 2017, but it was a daunting task a short three years earlier.

Several other components of LCRI’s approach might serve as inspiration for CVE programmers elsewhere. Among them, some of the following stood out: the importance of thinking systematically about how to sequence and layer CVE activities so as to maximize their impact; recognizing the centrality of parents to the success of interventions directed at at-risk youth, including females; the criticality of addressing the psycho-social needs of youth (in particular their quest for empowerment, self-esteem, and public recognition, as well as their desire for self-expression and for a sense that their frustrations and hopes were being heard and validated by the community); the importance of trying to broaden the frame of reference of at-risk youth by creating experiences for them outside of their immediate community; the merits of activities that deliberately seek to alter negative perceptions of “the other” through cross-community youth engagement; and the critical contributions that social media and relevant training can make to CVE goals, whether in terms of expanding the public visibility of grantees and magnifying the impact of their activities or with regard to shifting negative perceptions of the other in general and of certain at-risk communities in particular.

11 | USAID.GOVINNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO CVE PROGRAMMING

INTRODUCTION

This case study shares insights from the Lebanon Community Resilience Initiative (LCRI), a USAID/Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) program in operation from September 2014 to November 2017, on how to effectively design, implement, and monitor countering violent extremism (CVE) programming. These insights draw on the knowledge gained by the LCRI field team while implementing over 270 small grants. Both programming and operations recommendations are based on the significant achievements as well as the deficits of LCRI. They examine what to do, what not to do, and what to do differently in addition to identifying common challenges and potential solutions to those challenges in CVE programming.

We hope insights garnered from LCRI will be of use to those in the Agency tasked with CVE programming, whether they work for OTI, a Washington-based Bureau, or a Mission. The lessons below should also be helpful to USAID grantees, implementers, and those charged with overseeing their efforts. Only those lessons that show potential for use in other environments are included in this case study and most are applicable to any organization engaged in CVE (although a few are more relevant to OTI than to other entities, and vice versa). Similarly, while this case study pays particular attention to CVE programming that provides small-grants to civic organizations as a means of accomplishing its goals, many of the lessons it underscores apply to other approaches as well. This document assumes practitioners will value forewarning of a possible challenge or trade-off in programming more than the actual solution LCRI implemented or the side of the trade-off on which LCRI erred. It is useful to keep in mind that just because an approach produced useful results in Lebanon, there is no guarantee that it will do so in a different environment.

Lessons and insights are presented under eight separate sections. Some relate primarily to programming and design, while others focus more on effective implementation and management. Several sections discuss themes that have both programmatic and operational dimensions. Before findings are presented under each of these sections, the approach used by this study to investigate LCRI lessons is described briefly below.

Section I highlights the instrumental role that “tangibles” (grant-funded community improvement projects) can play in facilitating successful CVE programming. Drawing on LCRI’s experience, it discusses the forms these tangibles may take and how and why they can facilitate successful CVE programming. Section I also explains why relevant activities must be designed and implemented carefully while integrating appropriate safeguards.

Section II concentrates on lessons that relate to CVE-oriented youth programming. LCRI devoted considerable attention and resources to youth and its experience sheds light on the types of activities, approaches, and foci that may be effective in reducing vulnerability to VE activity for youth interventions.

Section III reflects on lessons and trade-offs that relate to the proper selection of grantees and partners, while also identifying some core principles that should guide engagement with and oversight of those grantees and partners.

Section IV zeroes in on methods of magnifying the impact of CVE interventions and ensuring that they generate longer-term results in the context of LCRI’s experience and OTI’s distinctive programming approach (i.e., its action research model).

Section V highlights other key operational lessons from LCRI’s experience (in addition to those already discussed in the previous sections).

Sections VI and VII are devoted to “big picture CVE programming questions” and to the difficult choices and predicaments that practitioners often confront in this area. In both instances, the focus is on what LCRI, broader characteristics of OTI programming, and Lebanon’s own experience reveal about those issues. Section VI concentrates on strategy-related lessons. It discusses the proper role of strategy in program design and implementation, recognizing that different units within USAID may weigh the merits and drawbacks of “strategy-heavy programming” differently. It points to the distinguishing characteristics of a strong CVE strategy and outlines a general framework for assessing VE environments prior to the onset of programming. Section VII engages in an even broader reflection on the merits of, but also the predicaments associated with, programming that works to strengthen community resilience and social cohesion in order to reduce vulnerability to VE. Finally, Section VIII summarizes lessons that relate to monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL).

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In addition, a brief introduction to OTI’s model of programming and some background on LCRI are offered to provide context for the observations made in this guide. Two additional resources are provided in the annex to further illuminate the findings and method of this report. Annex 1 is a brief case study examining the factors contributing to a particularly successful approach to CVE programming implemented by grantee Basmat Amal in Tripoli. This case study is included to illustrate more completely the kinds of work done by grantees under LCRI and also to highlight the combination of CVE programming approaches used to create demonstrable changes through youth engagement. In Annex 2 the interview guide used to collect a portion of the data for this report is provided.

METHODOLOGY

The core team consisted of a principal investigator, lead analyst, and primary author (Dr. Guilain Denoeux); a Washington-based analyst and contributing author (Dr. Lynn Carter); a Beirut-based contributing analyst and investigator (Dr. Bassel Salloukh); and the LCRI’s M&E officer (Mohammed Rouada), who was the main point of contact for all analysts, especially during fieldwork, and who supervised supplemental data collection.1

The approach entailed four steps. The first, beginning in April 2017, involved a thorough desk review of project documents (e.g., activities summaries, work plans, assessments, and evaluations), a portion of which were related to priority objectives and locations and coded using MaxQDA software. Background research also included an analysis of VE-related dynamics and broader political developments in Lebanon in the past five years. During the second phase (May 17-May 30), the principal investigator travelled to Lebanon to conduct an initial round of field interviews. He was joined by the Beirut-based contributing analyst and both benefited from the insights and logistical support provided by LCRI’s M&E officer. They conducted interviews with OTI and LCRI staff, as well as with grantees and community leaders in Tripoli, the Beqaa and Northern Lebanon. During this second phase, preparations were also made for ARK, a Beirut-based consultancy, to conduct key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs) with three categories of respondents: beneficiaries (individuals who took part in LCRI activities); individuals with a close personal relationship to beneficiaries (mostly parents, but in some instances siblings or friends); and members of the community who had been exposed to, or impacted by, an LCRI activity. During a meeting in Beirut on May 29, the principle investigator provided ARK with an interview guide (with questions for each category of respondents);2 discussed lines of inquiry to follow during FGDs and KIIs; and finalized a research plan for data collection. During the second half of June, ARK collected the data, which was submitted to the core research team on July 10. The fourth phase involved finalizing this study, which was completed in draft form in early August. Subsequent consultations with OTI and LCRI staff led to revisions and a final draft in early September. This case study, therefore, draws on a multiplicity of sources: the collective knowledge developed by the LCRI team; detailed project documentation review, analysis and coding; research into VE-related dynamics and developments in Lebanon; extensive field interviews with key stakeholders; and further data collection by a research firm.

THE USAID/OTI PROGRAMMING MODEL

OTI specializes in short-term political programming in countries emerging from democratic transitions and instability; that programming is intended to lay the foundation for longer-term development programming. The operating environment for OTI programs is generally unpredictable, requiring OTI and its implementing partners (IPs) to design and adapt their program strategy and activities with limited data. OTI has developed an action research model to accommodate volatile and uncertain environments, enabling its programs to adapt quickly to both the changing context and learning for implementation.

1. Chris Bathon and Gary Glass of MSI supported the coding of qualitative data.

2. The English-language version of the interview guide can be found in Annex 2.

INTRODUCTION

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ACTION RESEARCH MODEL

The OTI action research model encourages programs to learn by doing. Programs use small actions based on initial, imperfect information to test the environment and then assess what was learned through those actions to inform program strategy. This process is repeated again and again to find the most effective modus operandi in the given environment. Because OTI works through a series of small interventions or activities, each action presents a relatively small risk while offering significant opportunity to adapt approaches and design new activities based on observed outcomes. This approach can be simplified into three steps – Act, Assess, Adapt. Step one involves designing an initial strategy and implementing activities based on initial information and a preliminary theory of change. Through step two, programs evaluate the context, key drivers, and results of the initial activities. And finally, in step three, using the new information obtained on the implementing activities through step two, programs adjust their strategy, activities, and theory of change.

USING GRANT ACTIVITIES

The crux of OTI’s action research model relies on appropriate and effective grant activity design. OTI programs do not develop a long-term work plan with target numbers and benchmarks. Instead, programs utilize various activities to test partners, communities, and systems and enhance the understanding of the context. In short, OTI uses small grant activities to identify and address immediate needs to stabilize an environment, thereby fostering an atmosphere suitable for longer-term projects to address sustainability and development goals.

The makeup of an OTI program’s grant activity portfolio is eclectic, with each activity informing the program’s strategy and approach.

Activities typically fall into one or more of the following categories:

• Catalyst – Laying the foundation for a particular effort to be implemented by other partners.

• Experiment – Testing of strategy assumptions and partner abilities to implement large initiatives.

• Model – Provide proof of concept activities to show other development actors what type of programming is possible in target areas.

• Entry – Designed to gain a better understanding of the operating environment and build relationships with local actors.

• Research – Produce actionable analysis that can inform programming efforts.

• Resolution – Address a discreet problem set.

• Follow-on – Building on previous grant activities to amplify impact or expand to new areas.

DYNAMIC PROGRAM DESIGN

Due to the iterative programming approach, each of OTI’s program strategies and objectives evolve over the life of the program. At the onset of a program, OTI defines general programmatic objectives and identifies initial target areas. As staff and leadership gain a better understanding of the operating environment, the programs will adjust and refine the strategy and objectives accordingly. This process is conducted in real-time and also formalized through quarterly rolling assessments where all staff meet to discuss the direction of a program. Through this process, OTI ensures that programs are taking advantage of emerging windows of opportunity and address the most relevant issues impacting an environment.

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LCRI: AN OVERVIEW

The Lebanon Community Resilience Initiative (LCRI) was a three-year USAID OTI program. It was launched in September 2014, ended in November 2017, and was implemented by Management Systems International (MSI).3 The program’s goal was to strengthen resilience in Lebanese communities to help them cope with destabilizing factors related to the Syrian crisis. When LCRI began programming, nearly one million Syrian refugees had already fled to Lebanon. Two years later, Syrian refugees made up nearly a quarter of Lebanon’s population at 1.5 million (including refugees not registered with UN agencies).4 LCRI must be viewed in that context and against the backdrop of USAID/OTI’s longstanding mission in Lebanon, which has sought to promote stability, peace and prosperity by relying on agile programming, taking advantage of emerging windows of opportunity, and catalyzing local initiatives.

LCRI aimed to increase resilience and…