70RSAT19RB00000001_-_5_CISA_S&T_EC3_Brief_5-16-2019.pdf
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CISA/EC3 Briefing
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DHS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Emergency Communications Cybersecurity Center (EC3)
Sridhar Kowdley
Program Manager First Responders & Detection Science and Technology Directorate
May 16, 2019
C I S A | C Y B E R S E C U R I T Y A N D I N F R A S T R U C T U R E S E C U R I T Y A G E N C Y
EMERGENCY
COMMUNICATIONS
CYBERSECURITY CENTER
(EC3)
Improving Next Generation 911 (NG911) cybersecurity posture
TLP:WHITE
EC3 Concept & Refinement Strategy May 16, 2019
Originating Service Provider
Selective Router
Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP)
Legacy 911:
Security through control and isolation
Circuit-switched, voice
NG911:
No defined end-to-end security strategy…yet
IP-based, multimedia
Ongoing transition to IP-based architectures is increasing exposure to cyber threats and vulnerabilities that did not exist in the legacy environments
May 16, 2019
NG911 Core Services and Emergency Services IP Networks (ESInets) are operational and experiencing an increasing rate of adoption nationwide
ESInet
• Provides the foundation for NG911 services*
• Based on NENA i3 or ATIS IMS-based standards
• Enables increasing interconnection
Number of ESInet-connected PSAPs by state
2017 National 9-1-1 Progress Report
*End state NG9-1-1 will not be available until there are IP call handling capabilities at the
ECC/PSAPs and end-to-end IP call delivery available from the originating service provider(s) to the
ECC/PSAPs 2017 National 9-1-1 Progress Report
May 16, 2019
Though ESInet adoption continues, a comprehensive end-to-end NG911 security architecture is absent, and the threats are perilous
Typical Cyber Attacks Against PSAPs
Ransomware
Use of software to block computer systems for the purpose of extorting a ransom
• Maine, Arkansas, Tennessee law enforcement agencies
• California Health Care
• Licking County, OH PSAP
• Washington, DC CCTV
Telephony Denial of Service (TDoS)
Use of Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) systems to overwhelm the answering point’s phone system, rendering the center incapable of placing or receiving calls
• 300+ TDoS vs Public Safety (911, Law Enforcement, Fire, EMS, Emergency Management)
• 12 State TDoS event
Swatting Manipulation of IP-based 911 calls to indicate the call is originating from a location at which a most serious criminal act has taken or is taking place (e.g., armed and violent hostage takers) or similar situations so significant that the local PSAP dispatches a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team to the address
• Known incidents Nationwide
• Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) products
• Impact expanding
May 16, 2019
FCC’s Task Force on Optimal Public Safety Answering Point Architecture (TFOPA) recommended Emergency Communication Cybersecurity Centers (EC3s)
The EC3 layer represents the opportunity to create a manageable core infrastructure to support cybersecurity for distributed emergency communications network elements.
Source: TFOPA Adopted Final Report, 29 Jan 2016
May 16, 2019
TFOPA also recommended a near-term “funded pilot for the development and deployment of an EC3”. CISA is in the process of refining the EC3 concept for pilot efforts
Need for Pilot:
• Necessary to improve the cybersecurity of the Nation’s 9-1-1 system
• Agreed to by government, industry, and academia
• Requires federal leadership
CISA – ECC/PSAP coordination, subject matter expertise, outcome management S&T – Vendor coordination, pilot funding, and test plans
Objectives:
• Proof-of-concept
• Defined implementation challenges for the community
Desired Outcomes:
• Mission-based system designed for user (PSAP/system administrator) experience and value at the forefront
• Documented system requirements and capability limitations
• Cybersecurity outputs that can be correlated into actionable data and integrated into mitigations
May 16, 2019
Next steps include continued refinement of the concept with stakeholders throughout the ecosystem
Federal leadership
• Ensure the cohesive and collective planning, designing, and piloting of
EC3s into the emergency communications landscape
Industry and academia
• Demonstrations of existing cybersecurity solutions
• Innovation in emerging cybersecurity solutions
• Collection of service provider and vendor insights on current cybersecurity capabilities, demarcation points, and best practices
Public safety stakeholders
• Define current way of operating from a user’s perspective
• Contrast to future methods (considering new threats/conditions)
• Document mission capability gaps
May 16, 2019 9
For more information:
cisa.gov
| Slide Number 1 |
| Emergency Communications Cybersecurity Center (EC3) |
| Ongoing transition to IP-based architectures is increasing exposure to cyber threats and vulnerabilities that did not exist in the legacy environments |
| NG911 Core Services and Emergency Services IP Networks (ESInets) are operational and experiencing an increasing rate of adoption nationwide |
| Though ESInet adoption continues, a comprehensive end-to-end NG911 security architecture is absent, and the threats are perilous |
| FCC’s Task Force on Optimal Public Safety Answering Point Architecture (TFOPA) recommended Emergency Communication Cybersecurity Centers (EC3s) |
| TFOPA also recommended a near-term “funded pilot for the development and deployment of an EC3”. CISA is in the process of refining the EC3 concept for pilot efforts |
| Next steps include continued refinement of the concept with stakeholders throughout the ecosystem |
| Slide Number 9 |
| Slide Number 10 |
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