JBADS_Post-JCTD_CONOPS_4PoR_6Jun2016.pdf

JOINT BIOLOGICAL AGENT DECONTAMINATION

SYSTEM (JBADS)

PROGRAM of RECORD (POR)

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS)

6 June 2016

The 2013 congressionally approved JBADS JCTD completed its Operational Utility Assessment (OUA) in January 2015. The Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense Joint Product Manager for Protection (JPEO-CBD JPM P) is the Program Office for the JBADS Program of Record (POR). This document establishes the Air Mobility Command (AMC) Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the JBADS PoR. This document is a critical step toward supporting the transition of the JBADS program to Initial Operational Capability (IOC) and Full Operational Capability (FOC). The JBADS meets Combatant Commanders’ (CCDR) need to decontaminate biologically contaminated large frame aircraft (LFA) and to return those assets to full unrestricted use. Updates for this CONOPS are welcomed and should be sent to HQ AMC/A3NP, 402 Scott Drive, Unit 3A1, Scott AFB IL, 62225-5302 or emailed to: larry.magnuson.1@us.af.mil.

Credits and attributes are extended to various sources: previous JBADS JCTD CONOPS (24 Oct 14 and 29 May 15), Integrated Assessment Final Report (August 2015), draft Capability Development Document (May 2016), K2M Solaria Design (Aircraft Enclosure Engineering Analysis and Design Modifications, December 2015), the JBADS Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) Drill Report (February 2016), and other lines of evidence.

Prepared by: Dr. Jimmie Jacobs (METSS Corporation), HQ AMC/A3NP, Treaties and C-CBRN Branch.

Document Version Control:

Version Date Status Initial 24 October 2014 Archived Post-JCTD 29 May 2015 Archived Program of Record 6 June 2016 Current

OPR: HQ AMC, Nuclear Operations Division, Treaties and Counter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (C-CBRN) Branch, AMC/A3NP, Scott AFB, IL 62225-5302

APPROVAL

The undersigned, representing HQ AMC as the lead major command user, has approved this CONOPS for the JBADS transition and Program of Record efforts.

mailto:larry.magnuson.1@us.af.mil

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This CONOPS describes the JBADS capabilities and overviews its expeditionary employment supporting decontamination operations of a large frame aircraft (LFA).

The JBADS effort supports US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and AMC Commanders’ requirement to return aircraft to full operational use following a CBRN/WMD event. Recent requirement updates include: USTRANSCOM, Gen McDew, Commander, 2015 Comprehensive Joint Assessment Survey:

“USTRANSCOM recommends robust funding of a program of record, or portion thereof, to develop and field a large frame aircraft decontamination capability.” “Today’s decontamination technologies are not fully effective in returning biologically or chemically contaminated cargo aircraft to pre-exposure condition.” In addition, chemical decontamination was emphasized in the USTRANSCOM proposed FY18-22 Integrated Priority List (IPL) under: “Decontamination of Strategic Lift Assets.”

Secondly, the USSOCOM, FY17-21 IPL states: SOCOM lacks the capability to restore its air assets to unrestricted worldwide operations following exposure to chemical and biological (CB) environments.” Finally, HQ AMC Commander, Gen Everhart, noted in the 23 Mar 16 Rapid Global Mobility (RGM) Capability Gaps memo the requirement to decontaminate aircraft in a CBRN environment: “Detect, protect, identify, and decontaminate people and assets in a CBRN environment and provide movement of contaminated cargo, passengers, patients, and human remains.”

JBADS supports those three 4-star requirements through a two-phase system.

JBADS Phase I specifically addresses aircraft biological decontamination using an Aircraft Enclosure (AE) and Aircraft Decontamination Units (ADUs) that provide an environment of 170°F and 90% Relative Humidity to provide a minimum of 99.9999% reduction (6-log) of the most resistant biological agent, Anthrax, as well as the emergence of highly-transmissible diseases (i.e., Ebola, pandemic influenza).

JBADS Phase II, will build upon the lessons learned in Phase I and specifically addresses chemical decontamination. Based on initial research by AFRL, it is anticipated that Phase II will be able to provide a clearance level chemical reduction using the AE and ADUs of Phase I with an increased emphasis on sealing of the AE to prevent contaminated air from venting and a filtration system to capture the chemical agent as it is vaporized from the aircraft.

JBADS addresses a capability gap that may limit a contaminated aircraft’s mission capability. “A state may deny access to its national airspace or compel an aircraft entering its national airspace to land for inspection if suspected of violating its laws or if it poses an imminent security risk. A state may also deny access to its national airspace to aircraft contaminated by [weapons of mass destruction] WMD. No state aircraft may fly over or land on, the territory of a foreign nation without prior diplomatic clearance.” (Ref: JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, 31 Oct 14, Appendix B, page 8). Approval authority is through the Department of State and host nation. Hence, a contaminated aircraft may be restricted in its area of operations, disrupting deployment and sustainment support to Geographic Combatant Commanders by being denied overflight/landing clearances at enroute locations and thus be limited in its wartime missions. The JBADS as an effective decontamination process can significantly reduce contamination, minimize its impact, and facilitate the objective of acquiring appropriate clearance level decontamination to expedite the return of aircraft to service to increase lift and air refueling capacity of inter-/intra-theater aircraft and maintenance of sortie generation rates vice being abandoned in times of operational need.

Currently approved aircraft decontamination methods for both chemical and biological contamination include weathering (environmental decontamination), air washing (flying aircraft with flaps/gear down to accelerate weathering), and washing the aircraft with hot soapy water (HSW). These marginally effective methods do not have an interior decontamination capability. Current, effective chemical decontamination agents are all highly corrosive to critical aircraft parts and are not permitted. JBADS Phase I supports the development and acquisition of a thermal/humidity decontamination system to neutralize interior and exterior aircraft biological contamination. The hot, humid air approach was proven effective through Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) “proof of concept” tests (2008-09), plus three independent field demonstrations of interior decontamination on a DC-9 (2009), a C-130E (2011) and a C-130H (2014). During these tests, JBADS Phase I demonstrated the efficacy of using controlled temperature (1700-1800F) and high humidity levels (80%-90% relative humidity) to inactivate Anthrax (Bacillus anthracis/Bacillus thuringiensis kurstaki (Ba/Btk)).

During the 2014 Operational Utility Assessment (OUA), JBADS Phase I successfully demonstrated the use of hot (170-180°F) humid (80-90% RH) air, over a 4-day period, to achieve a 6-log and a 7-log (99.9999%/99.99999%) reduction (LR) of Anthrax for both exterior and interior aircraft areas. This new capability reduces hazard to aircrew, support personnel, passengers, and cargo and assists the return of aircraft to pre-exposure condition.

It further demonstrated that the aircraft enclosure (AE), using Structural Insulated Panels (SIP), could be readily constructed on-site with personnel in Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE), if required. The OUA concluded with a successful engine start on two engines following a 6-hour 314th AW, Little Rock, AFB, AR, maintenance personnel inspection/minor repairs. Further detailed information is available in the JBADS JCTD OUA CONOPS, 24 October 2014; the Analytical Test Report, April 2015;

and the AMC/TE JBADS JCTD Final Report, August 2015.

Although this CONOPS emphasizes JBADS Phase I, biological decontamination, the requirements, number of units required, and the concept of operations for Phase II, chemical decontamination, are projected to be very similar. Later CONOPS will reflect continuing research into variations of Phase I needed to provide Phase II, chemical agent decontamination.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION Page

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.0 Overview

1.1 Goal

1.2 Purpose

1.3 Sustainment

1.4 The Threat Environment and Operational Problem

1.5 The Operational View

1.6 JBADS Description and System Characteristics

2.0 Solution Strategies

2.1 Background

2.2 JBADS Operational Use Cases

2.2.1 Top-Level Operational Use Case and Preparation for JBADS

2.3 JBADS Forward Deployed

2.4 The JBADS Site

2.5 JBADS Assembly

2.5.1 AE Construction and Erection

2.5.2 JBADS Execution/Decontamination Operations

3.0 Protection Actions

4.0 Maintenance

5.0 Safety and Risk Management

5.1 Safety

5.2 Personnel Protective Equipment

6.0 Environmental Concerns

7.0 JBADS Disassembly

8.0 Command and Control (C2) and Operational Reporting

9.0 Conclusion

10.0 Issues

APPENDIX A - List of Tables

APPENDIX B - List of Figures

APPENDIX C - JBADS Procedure Overview

APPENDIX D – JBADS Operational Use Cases

APPENDIX E – 17 May 16 CONOPS Brief to BG Bobeck J8

Acronym List

References

OPR: AMC/A3NP, C-CBRN Branch, Scott AFB, IL 62225

** Commercial vendor file photos and open source literature support illustrations contained herein.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1.0 Overview

According to JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management, 21 June 2012, “no single concept of operations exists that covers the entire range of DOD CBRN Consequence Management (CM) activities.”

The DOD now has the capability to decontaminate a large frame aircraft. The USAF is the lead service of JBADS with HQ AMC designated as the “Lead MAJCOM User.”

Under this role, the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD) will continue as the JBADS Program Office until JBADS is fielded to AMC. This will occur upon JBADS Phase I FOC in FY20. As part of that transition JPEO-CBD will provide sustainment for each item for two years after fielding. The sustainment function will transition to Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) Agile Combat Support (ACS). Funding for storage is currently managed by HQ Installation Management Support Command (IMSC) and accounted for in the FY18-22 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) via Program Element Code (PEC) 27593 CBRN O&M.

IMSC leadership will sustain JBADS through 27593 as AF CBRN Defense capability.

USTRANSCOM and AMC missions cross international boundaries and require a capability for aircraft decontamination against Biological Warfare Agents (BWA) to include highly transmissible diseases, viruses, or toxins. The current phase of JBADS addresses BWA. Aircraft cleanliness clearance is determined by the user and is independent from the JBADS Program of Record. This CONOPS supports a C-130J-30 Stretch or smaller aircraft and materiel. Once a biologically contaminated aircraft has been successfully decontaminated by a 6-log reduction, the technology and process will equal or surpass a “Biological Clearance Criteria” as soon as it is developed. The practical objective is to provide a clearance level decontamination IAW the “Draft Biological Clearance Guidelines for Platforms and Materiel, 11 May 16. IAW that document, “Clearance is achieved when residual biological hazard is at or below a health based exposure level protective of public health” (ref para 5). “Characterization of the biological hazard must be conducted so that a health based clearance level can be determined. The CCDR requests a [Health Risk Assessment] HRA from appropriate SMEs.” “Through a preliminary HRA, SMEs will make recommendations to the [Combatant Commander] CCDR on health based exposure risks. As recommended in the HRA, acceptable levels of residual agent for clearance decontamination may be a quantifiable level or no detection of the specific viable or biologically active biological agent. This information forms the basis of the overall HRA conducted to guide decontamination activities and final clearance approval.” (ref para 7a(4)). JBADS only performs a 6-

LR of a BWA. Verification resides with the aircraft owner or decision authority (e.g., a Geographic Combatant Commander/GCC).

IAW the guidelines, JBADS assumes a 3-D approach: “determine – decontaminate – determine” whereby a contaminated aircraft would be tested to confirm a quantifiable level of a biological agent, wait until the SMEs provide what an acceptable level of that specific residual agent is, decontaminate to that level, and seek, from the CCDR, final clearance approval.

The CONOPS assumes that following a biological event, airlift resources would be concentrated on providing personnel and material to assist in the recovery of the contaminated base (location). Thereafter, those resources would be used for specific recovery operations such as aircraft decontamination.

However, while the SME assessment is proceeding, there is no restriction within the guidance to prevent the CCDR to immediately proceed with any decontamination process, such as JBADS as outlined in this CONOPS (i.e. 170F, 90% RH, for 72 to 96 hours) if transportation resources are available.

The JPEO-CBD Business Case Analysis (BCA) considered three courses of action (COA): COA #1 Hybrid, CLS support with organic storage; COA #2 Contractor Logistics Support (CLS); and COA #3 Organic. The BCA developers recommended COA #1. Analysis results showed COA #1 as the most attractive, as described below. Rationale is:

– It has highest benefits, lowest risk, and second best cost

– Stakeholder priorities strongly favor benefits over cost and risk

To expedite the request for a BCA input of the cost of a storage location of the five programed JBAD systems, a single stateside storage location was conducted and is still being refined. While a single, stateside location was emphasized by HQ AMC in that this would allow for routine maintenance, as mandated within the draft CDD, to be readily accomplished, other stateside locations are being studied. A government facility at or near a C-17 capable runway is desired, as a cost limiting option, and is currently being researched.

Since the publication of the BCA, potential bases for storage include Holloman AFB, NM. The 49th Materiel Maintenance Group (49MMG) is responsible for the storage, inspection, repair, deployment and accountability of bare base assets (Base Expeditionary Airfield Resources [BEAR] of Air Combat Command) (ACC). This organic unit has 168 acres of storage at Holloman (primarily outside with option for development of storage pads with covers; 2 x wide-body aircraft (C-17) parking spots for loading/training; over 300 personnel; and 51 Unit Type codes (UTC); an array of Materiel Handling Equipment (MHE); HVAC/power/water capabilities.

On 1 October 2016, the 49MMG transfers to Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), Agile Combat Support (ACS).

Once the “benefit” of a fielded aircraft decontamination system to the warfighter is accomplished (Full Operational Capability/FOC, FY20), and following the selection of service personnel, training programs established, training manuals written, and with service approval, it is anticipated that the BCA of COA #3, Organic Only, should be considered. The rational of the Organic option is:

– It has lowest cost, though it has the highest risk

– Stakeholder priorities strongly favor benefits over cost and risk

Other favorable locations include: Pine Bluff Arsenal, AR; Sierra Army Depot, CA;

Warner –Robins AFB, GA; Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, NJ; and Travis AFB, CA.

1.1 Goal

As outlined in the Overview, the draft “Biological Clearance Guidelines for Platforms and Materiel,” “Clearance is achieved when residual biological hazard is at or below a health-based exposure level protective of public health….” However, until such a publication is realized, and the SMEs brought together following a biological event, the CCDR and/or SMEs have the option of using the JBADS to accomplish a significant reduction (6-log or higher) of commonly referenced BWAs. The goal of JBADS is to quickly achieve a clearance level decontamination to include or exceed that exposure level protective of public health and thus allow the CCDR to authorize the return of the once contaminated aircraft to a pre-event status. The document allows for use of “No Detect” and/or “No Growth” or as stated: “… no detection of the specific viable or biologically active biological agent….” The process foundation for that option lies in the EPA/CDC Clearance Strategy for Environments Contaminated with Bacillus anthracis, July 2012 that no detection of viable spores is the best practicable clearance goal. The AMC emphasis on decontamination has evolved from a decontamination of 6-log reduction to emphasize post-contamination levels. The criterion is that following decontamination attempts, personnel would provide samples (e.g., swabs, etc.) from the interior/exterior of the aircraft for laboratory analysis. With a suggested DOD cleanliness criteria of 100% clean samples (i.e., no colony forming units), the post-contamination results are sent to the “owner” such as the CCDR, or decision authority with a recommendation (plus verification from a Public Health Emergency Officer (PHEO), a key subject matter expert who helps guide commanders in consequence management or disease mitigation decision-making or Bioenvironmental Engineer (BEE) environmental health technical expertise) for personnel health risk mitigation. Based on PHEO/BEE recommendations, the Commander or owner of the aircraft would either restrict the aircraft (i.e., more decontamination needed) or authorize unrestricted use of the aircraft and informs the DOD.

According to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), CBRN science and technology specialists, DOD uses 6-log reduction (6LR) or the number of microbes on a surface is 1,000,000 smaller as the “standard for biological decontamination efficacy, which has been incorporated in a variety of hazard mitigation (decontamination) technology development programs.” Measuring microbial log reduction assists scientists and laboratory specialists in identifying processes that work best to achieve desired reductions. This approach enables the determination of appropriate levels of cleanliness for various surfaces and environments. Further, according to DTRA, “The confirmation of a 6-Log10 reduction (process efficacy) coupled with environmental sampling to confirm “no growth” or residual surface contamination less than a pre-defined health-based exposure guideline may be used to establish a clearance decontamination standard.” (DTRA Position Paper, “Bacillus anthracis Spore Decontamination – 6-Log10 Reduction Efficacy Testing Coupled with Environmental Sampling for Decontamination Standards,” 12 August 2014). Hence, the AMC philosophy, JBADS methodology, DTRA position, and

EPA/CDC strategies are similar, with the same desired endstate: clearance-level decontamination.

1.2 Purpose

JBADS operational procedures are designed to produce a desired level of decontamination and to provide potential operators, the Joint warfighter, or intergovernmental agency “on demand,” an opportunity to use the system with continuous monitoring of the equipment via computerized data loggers by the contractor in a real world operational environment.

1.3 Sustainment

HQ AMC has agreed to take on the role of “Lead MAJCOM User” for JBADS in that as AMC would be the lead office/organization responsible for requirements, operations/sustainment strategy, receiver of the materiel solution, and overall lead voice in the development of the program from the operational user's perspective, acting as approval authority as needed. The designation of AMC/A3NP as the OPR for AMC was briefed at the March 2016 AMC Acquisition Sustainment Review (ASR) for "leadership endorsement."

In addition, AFLCMC/WNU designated that JPEO-CBD (specifically JPM P) will continue to develop JBADS Phase I until it is fielded to AMC. Upon JBADS Phase I FOC, JPEO-CBD will provide sustainment support and funding for two years and then the program will be transitioned to the AF. While the final program office has yet to be determined, it will more than likely reside within PEO Agile Combat Support (ACS) and in particular, the Human Systems Division (AFLCMC/WNU).

Funding is projected to be programmed within CBRN O&M funds (PEC 27593).

Background: JBADS is currently a 2-phase program, and it may include other phases in the future, requirements pending. The first phase is JBADS Phase I and it is an extension of a JCTD that concluded in early 2015. JBADS Phase I will use bio-thermal decon (BTD) to decontaminate a C-130J Stretch per a USTRANSCOM identified requirement. JBADS Phase I is currently pre-MS C and will reach IOC in FY18 and FOC in FY19. JBADS Phase II will use chemical hot air decon (CHAD) and BTD technologies to address not only bio threats but also chemical threats. It is also expected to come in various sizes to accommodate multiple platforms or potentially even be user-scalable to the size of object being decontaminated.

1.4 The Threat Environment and Operational Problem

DOD requires a capability to effectively decontaminate multi-service aircraft following biological agent exposure, returning aircraft to service. Intelligence sources have identified numerous countries having an active or presumed biological warfare program. Some countries are signatories to various conventions banning chemical and biological warfare, some countries continue to develop, test, and evaluate BWAs and the means to disseminate them. The spread of these weapons to third world nations and transnational (terrorist) organizations coupled with the potential for U.S. involvement in these areas in an operational or support capacity, increase the probability that Joint Forces may encounter biological hazards anywhere in the world. Threat biological agents include pathogens and toxins. These agents can be delivered to target areas throughout theaters of operation by surface-to-surface missiles, aircraft bombs, and covertly. Spray devices and aerosol generators are available for disseminating some biological agents. While primarily an inhalation hazard, there is evidence that a number of countries may be developing biological agents that are percutaneous hazards. Threat to be countered is BWA covert disseminations and largescale BWA releases.

Service aircraft, Coalition Forces, and commercial carriers (i.e., Civil Reserve Air Fleet [CRAF] when activated and performing missions supporting DOD -- war/peace operations, homeland defense and civil support, foreign humanitarian assistance, etc.) are vulnerable to biological contamination during attack, ground operations, or when transiting an endemic area.

“Actors of concern pose a threat of developing, acquiring, proliferating, or employing WMD and related capabilities thereby exploiting U.S. power projection, sustainment, and force protection vulnerabilities;…deny Access to an area or region and limit the ability of the US to respond to urgent threats…undermine support for U.S. policies and actions by key regional partners…Emerging infectious disease outbreaks and dangerous pathogen collections…may also present a threat if they pose an operationally significant risk to military forces.” (DOD Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, June 2014)

The JBADS is not intended to operate in and survive in the CBRN threats as presented in the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) CBRN Warfare Capstone Threat Assessment, DIA-05-1305-154-A, August 2013.

Presently, DOD’s aircraft survivability family of systems lacks a qualified procedure to effectively decontaminate, for unrestricted operational capability, an entire aircraft to safe levels not requiring personnel protective equipment after having been exposed to either a deliberate biological warfare attack or a highly transmissible disease. (DOD Instruction 3150.09, The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Survivability Policy, August 17, 2009)

Overflight and landing challenges exist in international theater of operations with use of contaminated aircraft. Missions will likely be restricted due to denial of those clearances. The capability to clean biologically contaminated aircraft to pre-exposure condition is needed to sustain and reconstitute forces during a wartime scenario. This capability fits into Agile Combat Support planning where time definite delivery (from frontline to CONUS reachback, delivery when/where needed) could reduce the size of the projection force if not employed. Approval of aircraft decontamination may be required to obtain international diplomatic clearances for aircraft overflight and landing. (AMC BioThreat CONOPS, July 2009)

The biothreat environment poses unique challenges in the planning and execution of the air mobility mission. This environment can be caused by a naturally occurring agent or biowarfare event either regionally, nationally, or internationally.

According to Joint Publication (JP) 3-11, “If necessary, contaminated aircraft must be decontaminated to the level required by DOD and the host nation, and acceptable to the International Civil Aviation Organization, before returning to the air mobility flow.”

JBADS Documented Gaps and Requirements Multiple documents address the requirement for aircraft decontamination:

• USTRANSCOM Top 10, Integrated Priority List (IPL)

• USSTRATCOM Top 5, IPL

• USSOCOM, IPL

• AMC/CC Capability Gap, 19 June 2014 2014 Rapid Global Mobility (RGM)

Capability Gaps

• Legacy Aircraft CBRN Contamination Survivability (ACCS) Initial Capabilities

Document (ICD), JROCM 045-08, 26 Feb 08

• Contamination Mitigation ICD, JROCM 031-11, 1 Mar 11

• DRAFT Joint Biological Agent Decontamination System CDD, 15 Feb 16

• DODI 3150.09, The CBRN Survivability Policy, Aug 09

• Supports several Universal Joint Task Lists (UJTL)

• AFPD 10-26, C-CBRN Operations, 26 Sep 07

• Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Jan 12

• JP 3-40, “Countering WMD” 31 Oct 14, Appendix B Page 8

1.5 The Operational View

Scenario: OCONUS/CONUS natural disaster, biological agent disease outbreak, or contingency (covert attack) results in a biologically contaminated aircraft that needs to be decontaminated (interior and exterior decontamination in a permissive environment).

The following Operational View depicts a plausible, real world situation contributing to the development and anticipated acceptance of the JBADS technology and decontamination process.

Figure 1. Operational View

1.6 JBADS Description and System Characteristics

JBADS is comprised of mostly commercial-off-the-shelf products (COTS), configured for a unique application of generating environmental conditions that are consistent with BioThermal Decontamination (1600-1800F and 80%-90% RH) effective for neutralizing biological agents. The process is environmentally-friendly. The ADUs produce heat and humidity. The AE provides the enclosed space environment necessary to create the required heat/humidity levels.

The JBADS, based on the redesigned AE, may need four ADU sets: each set consists of a heater/humidifier (11,000 lbs), an air conditioning unit (10,000 lbs) and a storage/tPADS unit (9,000 lbs) all in 20 ft containers. Each heating/humidifying unit within the set interfaces with the AE with two 20ft ducts to supply air to the chamber and two ducts for return air. Each air conditioning unit within the set has one supply and one return. One additional heating/humidifier duct will be split off once inside the AE and positioned within the aircraft fuselage to circulate air within. As this is a closed-loop system, there is no requirement for a filter (i.e., High Efficiency Particulate Air [HEPA]).

The JBADS is compatible with ground and generator power. The JCTD ADU set can plug in to base power (subject to decontamination location) and requires ~800 amps (or 1600 amps for two sets needed for the JBADS JCTD or 3200 amps for an anticipated 4 ADU sets needed for the expanded AE, with 3-Phase 480VAC and water supply systems (clean; not necessarily potable). Water requirements: the two JCTD ADU sets used 120 gallons/hour. Assuming that four ADU sets may be needed for the larger AE, it is estimated that water requirements will be an average of 240 gallons per hour while the system is on. Specifically, for the two sets 1,800 gallons were required to fill all components (assuming the systems have been drained for transport, each pair of ADUs will require approximately 450 gallons to fill the chilled water buffer tanks, the chiller, and associated piping – 250 gallons per pair. Fill the boiler: 200 gallons per pair. For some implementations, electrical requirements may include use of an alternate portable generator, through Base Operations Support (BOS) or procured locally and shipped to the site.

For the decontamination cycle, the four sets require approximately 5,760 gallons of water total per day to maintain conditions. This is to replenish the boilers and maintain humidity only. The chilled water systems utilize the water as a medium to transfer heat. No water is “consumed” by the chillers. The length of the cycle in numbers of days (bringing to and maintaining condition) will determine the total water consumed during a full cycle. There are no requirements for water during the disassembly process (only draining of the 1,800 gallons that were used during set-up).

The JCTD ADUs were built inside of 20ft Conexes (6 total containers: 4/hardware, 2/storage and support equipment). Each container weighed between 9,000 – 12,000 pounds. The JBADS configured for future C-130 decontamination may require four ADUs (eight 20ft containers of hardware and four containers for storage/support materiel). Therefore, the future system may comprise 12/20ft Conexes per JBADS set as the final post-JCTD ADU design has yet to be determined.

Additional support materials and equipment may be loaded on standard 463L pallets (104in x 84in x 96in) aluminum-skinned board with rings along the sides, which allow cargo to be strapped to using top and side cargo nets or tie-down straps. Oversize cargo is classified as cargo exceeding the usable dimensions of a 463L pallet loaded to the design height of 96 inches but is equal to or less than 1,090 inches in length, 117 inches in width, and 105 inches in height. Any such cargo is transportable on a C-130, C-17, or other large frame aircraft.

Metal-skinned structural insulated panels (SIP), the same as the JCTD, were selected for use for the aircraft enclosure given their characteristics of high thermal insulation, relative quick assembly, and lightweight components which lend themselves to air transportability, low maintenance, and low initial cost. The SIPs consist of a high-resistance (R) thermal barrier of 6-inch thick expanded polystyrene foam, encased in sheet metal with a compatible adhesive that binds materials together. The SIPs are complemented with the minimum structural elements required to deal with the spans and dimensions required to build the equivalent to a special purpose enclosure to accept a C-130H/J/J-30 Stretch aircraft. AE SIPs (39’ 4”) may be shipped in 40’ Conexes, however, hand stacked and net-covered on a 5-pallet or 6-pallet (i.e., 463L pallet) train is likely to maximize aircraft cargo loading space and minimize the total number of aircraft (C-5/C-17) to transport JBADS.

New AE design specifications, may include a shed roof to accommodate an aircraft to enter from the high end/rear of the building. A small front fuselage extension would allow the primary portion of the AE to be designed to accept the wing and tail sections of the aircraft while providing some lateral structural capacity for the AE.

A notional AE incorporates a 146’x24’ space frame truss to span the AE at the high end of the roof. This would be a custom configured aluminum space frame assembly that would bolt together in the field/at set up location. Custom adjustable columns would support the truss allowing the AE to be constructed level within tolerances expected at an improved airfield. The truss would combine with 8 modular steel trusses to reinforce the roof assembly. The trusses would be sustained by adjustable steel columns along the lower front wall of the building.

These trusses underpin aluminum purlins (i.e., the horizontal structural member in a roof) at 8’ on center that support the roof assembly.

The AE walls and roof may be built of 6-1/2”, 24 gauge steel-skinned SIP panels.

The walls are braced on either grade or a curb system constructed of concrete to provide a flat surface for the walls to rest. The structural frame exoskeleton system supports the roof and provides some of the lateral structural capacity required to meet the expected wind loading. “Tilt Walls” provide further support bracing. The rear wall lower section is constructed of a series of modular removable wall assemblies that allow the AE to be repeatedly loaded and unloaded. The removable wall assemblies are attached to removable columns that provide additional support to the large span truss by alleviating dead load deflection of the truss so the removable wall section fits properly. Removable columns also offer wind load support for the large upper truss allowing the large truss to be somewhat lighter in design. The AE design is produced with parts (except trusses) that meet the maximum shipping length requirement of 39’-4”.

Figure 2. JBADS JCTD Structural Insulated Panels

Figure 3. Notional C-130 Expanded Aircraft Enclosure

The total estimated weight of the new AE is 145,000 lbs. The JBADS’ commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components are designed to be quickly repairable in the event of failure, either by restart, repower, or replacement of modules or parts.

The JCTD command module served to control settings for heat/humidity for the system. Based on the JCTD, we estimate there will potentially be another control system that may require two people to operate the controls during a decontamination operation. Operators for the JCTD worked and collaborated 24/7 to ensure and maintain system functionality. Two independent hardware/software systems controlled and monitored JBADS for the JCTD, we estimate something similar for the final JBADS. Control for the JCTD was provided by a remote computer that used independent thermocouples and relative humidity sensors to adjust heating, cooling, and humidity generation to maintain precise environmental conditions inside the AE.

Monitoring was provided by a data logger capable of recording and logging input from a variety of thermocouples, relative humidity sensors, and other analog or digital input devices. Information was logged every 30 seconds and was viewable in real time via a remote computer.

2.0 Solution Strategies

2.1 Background

The JBADS includes and air, sea, land, non-hazardous transportable technology;

deployable capability to conduct LFA biological agent decontamination (interior and exterior) and vehicle platforms, then return these assets to service.

Figure 4. Notional View of C-130J-30 Stretch and Vehicle Platforms

2.2 JBADS Operational Use Cases

JBADS can deploy rapidly provided there are bases/locations available with enabling assets ready to support the team. OCONUS/CONUS operational use cases/scenarios represent key situations where AMC or Joint aircraft could encounter biological agent contamination in conducting air operations. One scenario is a top-level view of what could occur OCONUS, non-permissive environment and preparation for JBADS employment in a permissive area. For OCONUS events the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) determines the decontamination location. (JP 3-11) See Appendix D for illustrations of the natural disaster/disease outbreak and Ebola operational use cases.

2.2.1. Top-Level Operational Use Case and Preparation for JBADS

Enemy release of a biowarfare agent on an OCONUS base & C-130 becomes contaminated:

Offloading/uploading cargo and/or passengers, ramp and doors open, aircraft located downwind, interior/exterior exposed to release

A manportable empty cylinder is found outside the fence near the aircraft parking ramp

Base receives warning of a covert attack (biological attack confirmation is the trigger event)

Command Post directs actions to support the installation’s assigned mission;

serves as the focal point for installation-wide notification and warning operations; receives and sends task-relevant orders, information, and requests

First responders arrive, biodetectors test positive for Anthrax; C-130 mission critical aircraft is confirmed as contaminated via sampling test

Base Commander orders Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP)-4 for all base personnel

The GCC decides to fly the aircraft to theater-designated decontamination site

(a permissive environment, i.e., “no shooting”)

The GCC establishes the requirement and requests JBADS deployment

USTRANSCOM (DOD single-manager for transportation) and AMC air operations coordinate to obtain JBADS support (air transportability due to operational criticality; plan mission execution request for JBADS and coordination with the Contractor) and specially trained team, post-contingency.

The USAF, as JBADS owner, provides release authority to USTRANSCOM

Multi-modal transportation (i.e., highway, air) may be required. Priority is established for integration in the Time Phased Force Deployment (TPFD).

o CLS is envisioned for a majority of the system’s storage life. JBADS will remain in CONUS storage in “mission ready status” maintained and sustained by CLS until required by a GCC. CLS is envisioned for the first two years of sustainment o The JBADS storage location may be on a government site and/or co-located with an airfield

Overflight/landing clearances may not be required if aircraft remains in theater and does not transit/overfly foreign countries

An advance team (ADVON) such as a Contingency Response Element (CRE) should complete a pre-site survey of Base Operations Support (BOS) to will be pre-planned well before JBADS and aircraft arrival to ensure required space and equipment are available o CREs provide aerial port, logistics, maintenance, weather, medical, force protection, and Intelligence as necessary o The host location is planned to provide the necessary support equipment to supply JBADS with power (generator or land power), water, security, and other necessities required for operation. Some cases may require support contracts with local civilian organizations for necessary assets o AE laydown and staging area should be on flat, level concrete. Should the GCC-designated decontamination location be an austere site, an uneven pavement, depending on how the enclosure is leveled, could cause the aircraft to have “close” clearances (e.g., less than 12”) inside the AE thereby causing ground crews to have extra spotters to clear the aircraft of close zones o Pass off to the Contractor begins when JBADS is delivered to the site o BOS to provide direct support for contractors: food, lodging

Key equipment includes: cranes, forklifts, and construction-type tools other than those provided by the Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) team o Subject to location capabilities, diesel fuel may be required for generators. For the JBADS JCTD, a 1,500-k VA generator was used with each of the two JCTD ADU sets drawing 600-700 amps for a total of 1200-1400 amps. The fuel requirement was 800 diesel gallons per day.

If 4 ADU sets are required for the new AE, anticipate double the generators to 2 and double the fuel requirement to 1600 gallons per day, if needed.

Aircrew in protective ensemble, as a precautionary measure, will fly the aircraft to the decontamination site for decontamination preparation (removal of weapons, and other sensitive equipment/materiel)

Some “air washing” decontamination achieved during flight: gear down, flaps down, low altitude ~ 10,000ft above ground level (AGL)

On arrival, aircrew and aircraft undergo precautions of a combination of spot (immediate decontamination technique during aircraft recovery and operational decontamination (i.e., operationally decontaminate the aircraft around doors and hatches and operationally-essential equipment material, and/or working areas that are touched/handled in the course of routine operations to limit the spread and transfer of any residual surface contamination, etc.) (Air Mobility Command Counter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Concept of Operations (AMC C-CBRN CONOPS), HQ AMC Directorate of Air, Space, and Information Operations, HQ AMC/A3, 1 June 2007, page 63). Aircrew will adhere to standard procedures relating to aircrew extraction and assisted by Aircrew Flight Equipment (AFE) Specialists/Technicians and medics

Medical monitoring: BOS, AFE, and medics are responsible for military personnel; the Contractor is responsible for their own medical monitoring

Aircraft parked downwind from personnel centers and cordoned off in an isolated area of the decontamination site

Before decontamination, USAF aircraft maintenance personnel alongside the hazard response team, inspect and document the “as is” condition of the aircraft

The HAZMAT team also performs a detection sweep of the interior to determine the presence of any residual spores (negligible risk or significant contamination remaining) and the interior is spot decontaminated with an approved disinfectant (e.g., Calla 1452) before the JBADS crew places thermocouples and other decontamination equipment in the aircraft o This information is documented and recorded in the aircraft forms (AFTO781) and aircraft historical records. A red “X” is entered into the AFTO 781 to include the date and time of the contamination, agent type, and location, and decontamination process o In accordance with Air Force Technical Order (AFTO) 00-20-1. 6.1 Accessory Replacement and Reuse, 6.1.3, “Designation of parts removed from aerospace equipment contaminated with chemical, biological, or radiological agents will be labeled with the contamination date and type of agent on an AFTO Form 350 o Equipment markings will ensure that all handlers of the contaminated parts are aware of possible residual contamination hazards

Qualified Aircraft Maintenance/Ammo personnel will remove hazardous and sensitive equipment and line replaceable units (LRU) from the aircraft prior to entering the AE for decontamination o Removed parts not repaired and replaced must be disposed of per AFMAN 10-2602.” (AFTTP (1) 3-2.33, Multiservice Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense of Theater Fixed Sites, Ports, and Airfields.)

Aircrew extraction: AFE has procedures for aircrew decontamination

Aircraft Maintenance tow team will move the aircraft into the AE. Since the aircraft is contaminated, appropriate PPE is required to be worn. When inserting the aircraft into the AE, sample collection following decontamination operations, and until verification of decontamination is received, personnel should wear PPE for protection when in, near, or on the contaminated aircraft

USTRANSCOM arranges for pick up, transport, and delivery of JBADS to the designated decontamination site. Transportation Specialists and aircraft Loadmasters are the required skill sets to support system transport

The Contractor is required to meet JBADS availability requirements and gathers, sources, and prepares the necessary equipment and personnel for deployment to the aircraft’s location o Subject to final design and fielding, the ADUs may be shipped in their own 20’ Conexes with proper blocking, bracing, dunnage, tie downs to limit movement and ensure no damage to air conditioners and heaters o AE SIPs may be shipped in 40’ Conexes. See aircraft load plans and diagrams for additional information o Floor loading is anticipated for the trusses of the new AE o Subject to the final JBADS (AE and ADUs) all items would be loaded in accordance with Air Transportability Test Loading Activity (ATTLA) load plans

The Contractor determines employee fitness, ensures appropriate level of medical screening in accordance with DOD pre-deployment health assessments and other necessary requirements (e.g., having a current passport)

CLS team (two crews of six assemble the AE estimated to require three weeks.

This may require berm construction, estimated at one week to complete, then integration with the ADUs o The JBADS is designed to complete a 240-hour decontamination cycle without a mission failure o Decontamination time will be a minimum 96 hours at 1700plus/minus 5 degrees F and 90 percent RH plus/minus 5 percent o Contractors are planned to perform system maintenance o Whether OCONUS or CONUS, the Contractor will respond to a system failure with corrective maintenance 120 minutes or less o Contractor will source repair parts and other needs directly from commercial sources if necessary and may use USAF/theater Service supply system

Results documented

Laboratory analysis verification step will require a post-decontamination sample and analysis to ensure no residual hazard exists. A "representative" number of swabs, number to be determined, would be taken from inside/outside of the aircraft and analyzed. Qualified medical personnel confirm a successful decontamination (i.e., “no spore growth”), they recommend to aircraft owner or GCC with operational control over the aircraft to release the aircraft to Maintenance for return to unrestricted service

Decon information and sampling test results forwarded to the GCC/owner with recommendation on aircraft’s contamination level

Upon completion of decontamination, the aircraft is removed from the AE and released to maintenance for inspection/repairs as needed.

Aircraft Owner/Commander, e.g., CCDR, or other determining authority, decides (considerate of operational risks and confidence level from decon and sampling) on: aircraft restricted use > aircraft decontamination effort continues for added measures of decision confidence, or aircraft unrestricted use > aircraft released to service

The CLS team disassembles the AE (2-4 people and man lifts to remove lower wall; forklifts to lift/move wall panels/columns) and preps JBADS for shipment (materiel sort, inventory, pack components) and return to storage

USTRANSCOM arranges for transport of JBADS back to CONUS warehouse storage location o Return rates to storage can vary by type of aircraft movement or surface vessel (e.g., ship) o CLS team will place JBADS back into the storage site o Depending on cost, the AE (or portions thereof) could remain at the site and disposed. Replacements parts would be purchased and placed into storage.

Note: Commander Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3214-01E, 28 May 2015, page B-7, paragraph (13) states “[GCCs] Coordinate actions to decontaminate personnel, equipment, and/or remains that require inter-theater and intra-theater movement. Certify decontamination of personnel, equipment, and/or remains to established criteria… and coordinate with CDR [Commander], USTRANSCOM, and OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] for movement of formerly contaminated and subsequently decontaminated personnel, equipment, and/or remains. The Secretary of State coordinates international activities related to the prevention, preparation, response, recovery, and mitigation for domestic incidents and to protect United States citizens and United States interests overseas” (p.20). Also, “Commanders at foreign locations will follow Department of State (DOS), theater, and MAJCOM guidance when assisting local authorities. Commanders at US territories and US possessions will follow Department of the Interior (DOI), theater, and MAJCOM guidance when assisting local authorities. MAJCOMs will coordinate with the DOI to determine appropriate response protocols at US territory and US possession locations” (p.9). They also have the responsibility to designate an LFA decontamination location and coordinate approval with affected host nations.

2.3 JBADS Forward Deployed

Under the JBADS Forward Deployed option, JBADS equipment would be stored in the CONUS for worldwide application then employed in post-hostility conflict, post-natural disaster, post-biological attack or disease outbreak.

For JBADS redeployment, full AE disassembly would occur to package and ship it back to a storage area. Currently, a permanent structure is not allowed as per HAF/A4. A potential cost saving measure would be to scrap the used AE panels and order new ones than to air transport the panels back to CONUS for CLS storage. Another option is prestaging the SIPs in various theaters provided the US has access to the area.

2.4 The JBADS Site

The JBADS, when deployed, requires a prepared site to support a crane, forklift, and other material handling equipment (MHE) and Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE) movement in addition to the basic JBADS (e.g., ADU). Ancillary support items would be determined during deployment mission planning and possibly sourced in the local market, as capable, or deployed to the decontamination location as necessary. Setup and systemization of JBADS equipment should be completed within an estimated 30 days once materiel, equipment, and supplies are on site and ready for assembly. Work areas contain standard office and administrative equipment and supplies (e.g., radios, phones, computers, data loggers, printer, copier, shredder, and other media).

On site, the Contractor will assemble the AE and operate JBADS with support from BOS as needed. The Contractor may require support on securing construction equipment not on Base. Power, water, and other operational support needs will be met by BOS as well as lodging support and other miscellaneous needs.

The Contractor gathers, sources, and prepares the necessary equipment…