Draft-JBADS_Deployment_Scenarios(29Aug16).pdf

PDF 202 KB Posted

Attached to
Joint Biological Agent Decontamination System (JBADS)
Solicitation number
W911QY-17-R-0001
Issued by

About this file

JBADS- Draft deployment scenarios.

View the file

Other files

File Type Posted
NOTICE_for_INDUSTRY_DAY__JBADS.docx DOCX document
JBADS_RFP-Section_C-PWS_V2.0(31Aug16).docx DOCX document
NOTICE_for_INDUSTRY_DAY__JBADS.docx DOCX document
JBADS_Post-JCTD_CONOPS_4PoR_6Jun2016.pdf PDF
JBADS_Draft_PSPEC_Ver_4_-_29_Aug_16.docx DOCX document

On GovTribe

Work with this file

  • Download the original file
  • Contacts named in this file
  • Similar government files
  • Ask GovTribe AI about this file

Text version

DRAFT JBADS DEPLOYMENT/OPERATIONS SCENARIOS

29 AUGUST 2016

JBADS Deployment/Operations Scenarios (for vendor use in determining deployment and operations costs)

For both scenarios the following applies:

1) 30-days is given as the expected time frame from COCOM request and warning to the contractor to when JBADS is given over to USAF personnel for loading onto aircraft.

2) One (1) JBADS is the number of units which will be deployed for each scenario.

3) The contractor is responsible for the transportation of personnel to the decontamination location, local transport, quarters and meals

4) The storage location for each scenario will be Holloman AFB

5) The AF is responsible for the costs of transportation of the system from Holloman AFB to decontamination location

SCENARIO 1

Two (2) C-130J, and six (6) aircraft were on the ground in an area known to be transited by a hazardous cloud of anthracis bacillus (Anthrax) during a major conflict with an enemy nation state. All aircraft had at least one access door/ramp and/or canopy open when the agent passed over and through the airframes. Evaluations resulting in positive test reports from the surface and/or interior of the aircraft have not taken place. However, assessment of biological warfare agent collectors in the immediate area did produce positive results for Anthrax. The appropriate operational reports and CBRN Warning and Reporting System reports were submitted at the time of the attack and discovery of biological contamination.

The affected command structure directed clearance decontamination operations for the affected aircraft be established at Yokota AB, Japan as soon as possible. This coordinated command structure decision included the responsible Component Commander, United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) Commander, the affected Air Component Commander, the United States Forces Japan (USFJ) Commander, and the affected Major Command and Numbered Air Force Commander. At this stage of the conflict, Japan is considered to be a permissive environment, and authorities are securing the appropriate foreign clearance permissions in order to transport the aircraft to Yokota AB.

The JBADS crew will conduct the decontamination operation(s) in an identified low use area of the base.

The installation Mission Support Group Civil Engineer and Security Forces units will support and provide the appropriate level of force protection for the JBADS crew/operation. Aircrew, wearing the appropriate individual protective equipment, will fly the aircraft to Yokota AB one at a time from their present location once the JBADS is operational and ready to receive the first/next aircraft.

The length of the JBADS mission is directed to be for at least the time frame it takes to fully decontaminate the 2 affected aircraft. Mission length needs to take into account the time needed to verify success of aircraft decontamination and the possibility that decontamination may need to be repeated for at least one aircraft.

DRAFT JBADS DEPLOYMENT/OPERATIONS SCENARIOS

29 AUGUST 2016

SCENARIO 2

A C-130J was believed to be contaminated by an airborne release of Yersinia pestis (Plague) while the aircraft was deployed in support of a contingency operation. The aircraft was the midst of on-loading operations with passengers and cargo at the time of attack. The attack originated from a man-portable ground sprayer, in which the assailant was seen and apprehended by local security forces. Although the aircraft exterior and interior surfaces were not tested, the confiscated sprayer tank was evaluated and found to contain plague. Given the wind direction and alignment of the aircraft in relation to the assailant at the time of the attack, the aircraft, cargo, and personnel and were considered to be contaminated. Appropriate medical countermeasures for the personnel were initiated. The appropriate operational reports were submitted at the time of the discovery of biological contamination.

The affected command structure directed clearance decontamination operations for the affected aircraft be established at Ramstein AB, Germany as soon as possible. This coordinated command structure decision included the responsible Component Commander, United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) Commander, and the affected Major Command Commander. Germany is a permissive environment, and authorities are securing the appropriate foreign clearance permissions in order to transport the aircraft to Ramstein AB.

The JBADS crew will conduct the decontamination operation(s) in an identified low use area of the base.

The installation Mission Support Group Civil Engineer and Security Forces units will support and provide the appropriate level of force protection for the JBADS crew/operation. Aircrew, wearing the appropriate individual protective equipment, will fly the aircraft to Ramstein AB from their present location once the JBADS is operational and ready to receive the aircraft.

The length of the JBADS mission is expected to be the length of time it takes to fully decontaminate the aircraft, to include the palletized cargo within it. Mission length needs to take into account the time needed to verify success of aircraft decontamination and the possibility that decontamination may need to be repeated for at least one aircraft.

File details come from the government source that posted it. Updated .