Attachment_J.1_-_ILRG_RFTOP.pdf

Solicitation No.: SOL-OAA-17-00012 Integrated Land and Resource Governance (ILRG) Task Order

ATTACHMENT J.1: INTEGRATED LAND AND RESOURCE GOVERNANCE (ILRG)

REQUEST FOR TASK ORDER PROPOSAL (RFTOP)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION B – SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICE/COSTS

B.1 PURPOSE

B.2 CONTRACT TYPE

B.3 ESTIMATED COST, FIXED FEE AND OBLIGATED AMOUNT

B.4 BUDGET

B.4.1 COST PLUS FIXED FEE TERM BUDGET

B.4.2 COST PLUS FIXED FEE COMPLETION BUDGET

B.5 COSTS REIMBURSABLE

B.6 PAYMENT OF FIXED FEE

B.7 CONTRACT LINE ITEMS (CLINS)

B.8 GRANTS UNDER CONTRACT (GUC)

B.9 BUY-IN/FIELD SUPPORT

B.10 MULTI-YEAR CONTRACT

SECTION C – DESCRIPTION/SPECIFICATION/STATEMENT OF WORK

C.1 PURPOSE

C.2 IMPORTANCE TO USAID AND FOREIGN POLICY GOALS

C.3 BACKGROUND

C.4 OBJECTIVES

C.5 STATEMENT OF WORK

C.6 GENDER ANALYSIS

C.7 RESULTS

C.8 GRANTS MANAGEMENT

SECTION D – PACKAGING AND MARKING

D.1 NOTICE LISTING CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

D.2 AIDAR 752.7009 MARKING (JAN 1993)

D.3 BRANDING AND MARKING POLICY

SECTION E - INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE

E.1 NOTICE LISTING CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

E.2 INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE

E.3 RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL

SECTION F – DELIVERIES OR PERFORMANCE

F.1 NOTICE LISTING CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

F.2 PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE

F.3 PLACE OF PERFORMANCE

F.4 REPORTING AND DELIVERABLES

SECTION G - CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION DATA

G.1 NOTICE LISTING CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

G.2 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING OFFICER

G.2.1 CONTRACTING OFFICER’S AUTHORITY

G.3 CONTRACTING OFFICER’S REPRESENTATIVE (COR)

G.4 TECHNICAL DIRECTIONS/RELATIONSHIP WITH USAID

G.5 PAYING OFFICE

G.6 ACCOUNTING AND APPROPRIATION DATA

SECTION H- SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS

H.1 NOTICE LISTING CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

H.2 LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS

H.3 AUTHORIZED GEOGRAPHIC CODE

H4 LOGISTIC SUPPORT

H.5 ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE

SECTION I – APPLICABLE CLAUSES

I.1 NOTICE LISTING CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

SECTION J—LIST OF DOCUMENTS, EXHIBITIS, AND OTHER ATTACHMENTS

J.1 INITIAL ENVIRONMENTAL EXAMINATION (IEE)

SECTION B – SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICE/COSTS

B.1 PURPOSE

The purpose of this task order is to provide services that fall within the Scope of Work (SOW) specified in Section C of this Integrated Land and Resource Governance (ILRG) Task Order (TO).

B.2 CONTRACT TYPE

This is a Cost Plus Fixed Fee Term and Completion Task Order.

Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Term Task Order applies to:

• Technical services implemented in Mexico, Mozambique and Zambia

Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Completion Task Orders applies to:

• Field Support Services implemented in Africa, Asia, Latin American and/or the Middle East and Grants under Contract (GUCs)

For the consideration set forth in the Task Order, the Contractor must provide the deliverables or outputs described in Section C and comply with all task order requirements.

B.3 ESTIMATED COST, FIXED FEE AND OBLIGATED AMOUNT

a. The estimated cost for the performance of the work required for the three-year base period hereunder, exclusive of any fixed fee is $ TBD. The fixed fee is $ TBD. The estimated cost plus fixed fee is $TBD.

b. The estimated cost for the performance of the work required for Option Year 1 hereunder, exclusive of any fixed fee is $ TBD. The fixed fee is $ TBD. The estimated cost plus fixed fee is

$TBD.

c. The estimated cost for the performance of the work required for Option Year 2 hereunder, exclusive of any fixed fee is $ TBD. The fixed fee is $ TBD. The estimated cost plus fixed fee is

$TBD.

d. Within the estimated cost plus fixed fee specified in paragraph (a) above, the amount currently obligated and available for reimbursement of allowable costs incurred by the Contractor (and payment of fee, if any) for performance hereunder is TBD. The Contractor must not exceed the aforesaid obligated amount.

e. Funds obligated hereunder are anticipated to be sufficient through TBD.

B.4 BUDGET

The inclusion of any costs in the budgets below do not obviate the requirement for prior approval by the contracting officer of cost items designated as requiring prior approval by any of the terms and conditions of this task order, including the applicable cost principles (see FAR § 52.216-07, “Allowable Cost and Payment”); nor does it constitute a determination of allowability by the contracting officer of any item of cost, unless specifically stated elsewhere in this task order. The contractor will not bill any amounts against this task order in excess of the amounts specified for each line item.

B.4.1 Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Term Budget

B.4.2 Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Completion Budget

B.5 COSTS REIMBURSABLE

The U.S. dollar costs allowable will be limited to reasonable, allocable, and necessary costs determined in accordance with FAR § 52.216-7, “Allowable Cost and Payment,” FAR § 52.216-8, “Fixed Fee,” FAR § 52.232-20, “Limitation of Cost,” and FAR § 52-232-22, “Limitation of Funds,” if applicable, and AIDAR 752.7003, “Documentation for Payment.”

B.6 PAYMENT OF FIXED FEE

USAID will pay a proportion of the contractor’s fixed fee pursuant to FAR § 52.216-8, “Fixed Fee,” upon the receipt of an invoice deemed proper by the Office of Chief Financial Officer (M/CFO/DC).

B.7 CONTRACT LINE ITEMS (CLINS)

CLIN 001 Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Term – Base Period

CLIN 002 Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Completion – Base Period

CLIN 003 Grants Under Contract

CLIN 101 Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Term – Option Year 1

CLIN 102 Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Completion – Option Year 1

CLIN 201 Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Term – Option Year 2

CLIN 202 Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Completion – Option Year 2

Total Year 1 Year 2 Base + Options

Total Estimated Costs $ $ $ $ Fixed Fee $ $ $ $ Total Estimated Cost Plus Fixed Fee $ $ $ $

Option Years3-Year Base Period

Option Year 1 Option Year 2 Cost Category -$ -$ -$ -$ Field Support 8,900,000.00$ 3,700,000.00$ 2,400,000.00$ 15,000,000.00$ Total Estimated Direct Cost -$ -$ -$ -$ Indirect Costs -$ Fixed-Fee -$ -$ -$ -$ Estimated Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee -$ -$ -$ -$ Grants Under Contract 2,000,000.00$ 400,000.00$ 100,000.00$ 2,500,000.00$ Total Estimated Cost Plus Fixed Fee + GUC

Option Periods Total - Base Period & Option

Years

3-Year Base Period

B.8 GRANTS UNDER CONTRACT (GUC)

Adjustments between the Estimated Cost–Plus-Fixed-Fee and Grants Under Contract budget line items are not authorized. The amounts for GUCs must only be used for grants. No indirect costs or fees are applied to GUCs.

B.9 BUY-IN/FIELD SUPPORT

Funding for mission buy-in and Field support in this task order must in accordance with the procedures set forth in F.9 of the IDIQ.

B.10 MULTI-YEAR CONTRACT

This is a multi-year contract as defined in FAR 17.103. Therefore, this contract is subject to the requirements of FAR 17.106. In the event that the Government cancels requirements for services in subsequent program years under this contract, the following conditions will apply: [Amount and dates to be filled in at time of award]

Cancellation Dates:

Contract Year 2: DATE TBD, [Award year + 1 year] Cancellation Ceiling: TBD

Contract Year 3: DATE TBD, [Award year + 2 years] Cancellation Ceiling: TBD

The cancellation dates and ceiling amounts will be established at the time of award. The amounts will be based on the nonrecurring costs to be incurred by the awardee, which would be applicable to, and which normally would be amortized over the life of the contract, and the items or services to be furnished under the multi-year requirement. This is a CPFF type contract, pursuant to which all costs for which the contractor seeks reimbursement must be allowable in accordance with FAR 52.216-7, “Allowable Costs and Payment.”

[END OF SECTION B]

SECTION C – DESCRIPTION/SPECIFICATION/STATEMENT OF WORK

C.1 PURPOSE

The purpose of the Integrated Land and Resource Governance (ILRG) Task Order is to provide support to the Land and Urban Office in the Bureau for Economic Growth, Education, and Environment (E3/LU) to develop and implement targeted, discrete interventions in select USAID presence and non-presence countries – pending Mission, Bureau, or operating unit concurrence – to remove the tenure-related barriers to achieving priority development objectives such as conflict prevention and mitigation, countering violent extremism, achieving women’s economic empowerment, promoting inclusive economic growth, increasing agricultural productivity and food security, and strengthening biodiversity conservation and sustainable natural resources management. This Task Order will provide technical assistance services to improve land and resource governance, strengthen property rights, and build resilient livelihoods as the foundation for strong economic growth, stability, and resilience1. Field support under this Task Order will be implemented in Mexico, Mozambique, and Zambia, as well as in Africa, Asia, Latin American and/or the Middle East.

As defined in ADS 302sad, “Global technical leadership… is a critical function of Pillar Bureaus and typically requires a marriage of a leadership agenda with field testing and implementation… Field support… provides Missions with an easy way to access state-of-the-art services and to take advantage of technical oversight and leadership that central programs offer. It can also serve as a mechanism to respond to urgent and rapidly evolving needs that are often associated with international assistance programs.”

To achieve the goals of improving land and resource governance, strengthening property rights, and building resilient livelihoods, this Task Order seeks to: (1) Support the development of inclusive land and property rights laws and policies; (2) Assist law and policy implementation, including clarifying, documenting, registering, and administering rights to land and resources; (3) Support the capacity of local institutions to administer and secure equitable land and resource governance; and (4) Facilitate responsible land-based investment that creates optimized outcomes for communities, investors, and the public.

C.2 IMPORTANCE TO USAID AND FOREIGN POLICY GOALS

Good land and resource governance (LRG) is a critical foundation for successful U.S. Foreign Assistance in all technical areas and regions, as highlighted in USAID’s Vision for Ending Extreme Poverty. This Task Order will strengthen LRG to contribute to the achievement of USAID’s goals by supporting the U.S. Government’s Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative; the Democracy, Human Rights; and Governance Strategy; the Biodiversity Policy; the Climate Change and Development Strategy; the Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Policy; the Urban Policy; the Water and Development Strategy;

Local Systems Policy; Conflict Strategy; and others2. This Task Order further reflects the recommendations set forth in the 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review for the United

1 USAID defines resilience as “the ability of people, households, communities, countries, and systems to mitigate, adapt to, and recover from shocks and stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth.” For more information on the concept of resilience, please see “Building Resilience to Recurrent Crisis: USAID Policy and Program Guidance.”

https://pages.usaid.gov/system/files/policy_program_guidance_-_building_resilience_to_recurrent_crisis_dec_2012.pdf 2 https://www.usaid.gov/results-and-data/planning/policy https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/302sad.pdf https://pages.usaid.gov/system/files/policy_program_guidance_-_building_resilience_to_recurrent_crisis_dec_2012.pdf https://www.usaid.gov/results-and-data/planning/policy

States Government (USG) to work with indigenous peoples to “strengthen traditional resource management strategies, legalize and demarcate their territories, and improve their livelihoods.”3

C.3 BACKGROUND

C.3.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT

Weak property rights is one of the most limiting factors to achieving economic growth, peace and security, and democratic governance throughout the developing world, where an estimated 70 percent of land is unregistered. A large proportion of the poor lack adequate access to land, and when they do have access, they have limited rights. For example, they might be able to use land for cultivation but cannot use it as collateral, rent or sell it, or hold the land for a long enough period to recoup labor and capital investments. Others are unable to enforce the rights they do have because they are unaware of those rights, cannot afford the required paperwork, or because the legal or customary authorities do not recognize their rights.4 This is especially true for women who are often unable to enforce their rights because of community pressure to keep them dispossessed, differences in how the laws are applied to men and women, lack of bargaining power, and/or a lack of access to unbiased forums to resolve land disputes and claim inheritance.

Where property rights are ill defined or cannot be enforced at minimal cost, investors from smallholder farmers to small business owners to multi-national companies – must spend scarce resources defending their land and/or resources – whether by building fences or defending court cases – thus diverting valuable resources from investments that enhance productivity, such as soil and water conservation. This also prevents landholders from being able to supplement farm income with off-farm income, an important and necessary source of capital for rural families. Insecure land tenure and the associated uncertainty for long-term investment also creates incentives for landholders to employ inefficient crop production methods such as monocrop and/or annual crop agriculture rather than more sustainable agroforestry, silvopastoral, and other integrated cropping methods. Similarly, for marine areas and lakes, weak resource governance is a driving factor contributing to productivity declines in global fisheries, as well as biodiversity losses in coral reef and other ecosystems. In contrast, when land and resource rights are secure, fisheries’ productivity increases, agricultural productivity improves and incomes rise.

Weak land and resource governance is also linked to the unsustainable use of natural resources. For instance, the lack of clear and defined rights to land and resources by forest communities, has often resulted in disastrous long-term impacts locally and globally, including the reduction in ecosystem services such as food (fruits, nuts), fiber (building materials), erosion control, water regulation, coastal and storm protection, and carbon sequestration. Furthermore, weakened resource tenure institutions and ambiguous land policies are primary factors that have decreased traditional systems’ ability to benefit from and sustainably manage forest and marine resources.

Fierce and sometimes violent contestation over the control of and access to subsurface rights, including mining sites owned by smallholders, has long characterized resource tenure issues, especially in the artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) sector. Through strengthening tenure security and clarifying property rights, these resource conflicts can be reduced significantly while also providing incentives for mitigating environmental impacts and increasing responsible economic opportunities.

3 USG, 2015. Ensuring Leadership in a Dynamic World: Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review.

Accessed November 5, 2016 at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/241429.pdf.

4 USAID, 2013. Land Tenure and Food Security: USAID Issue Brief. Accessed October 21, 2016 at http://www.land-links.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Land-Tenure-and-Food-Security.pdf http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/241429.pdf http://www.land-links.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Land-Tenure-and-Food-Security.pdf http://www.land-links.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Land-Tenure-and-Food-Security.pdf

Without secure land tenure, it can be more difficult to access credit. In contrast, where financial markets are accessible, secure property rights can also enable rights holders to access credit for additional investments and also act as an insurance substitute in case of shocks.5 Clear and well-administered property rights are also essential to the collection of revenue from property taxes, which can be an important source of income for local governments.6 Effective land taxation can be an important driver of both local government revenue generation and accountability, particularly where land remains an important productive asset.7 If land and resource governance is poor, it can impede countries from effectively facilitating economic structural transformations. It can also inhibit good land use planning and investment, which are important tools for countries to garner the most from land and resources, including ecosystem benefits, food security, and revenue, among others.

In urban areas, insecure property rights often prevent landholders from accessing critical services such as waste removal, electricity provision, and clean water and sanitation access. Infrastructure projects in both urban and rural areas can negatively impact landholders through involuntary displacement and resettlement. Furthermore, even if landholders are compensated fairly for their lost property and livelihoods, few projects share benefits with local landholders. Large-scale investments for agriculture, forestry, energy generation and distribution, or others can also face substantial tenure-related constraints and risks, as a lack of clear land tenure and/or compensation for wayleaves8 may result in land speculation or movements of people onto the land in question and increased tenure insecurity for landholders.

In rural areas, insecure land tenure, particularly in indigenous territories, is a significant threat to stability, cohesion, development and economic health.9 For example, failure to protect customary land rights in places like Africa, where an estimated 90 percent of rural land is undocumented, leaves communities vulnerable to infringements of their rights, which can lead to conflict. Additionally, the lack of recognition of informal land administrative systems not only deepens the vulnerability of indigenous peoples who inhabit those lands, it limits the effectiveness of efforts to mitigate climate change and protect biodiversity that appear to be most successful where indigenous peoples enjoy collective property rights.10

C.3.2 IMPORTANCE OF GOOD LAND AND RESOURCE GOVERNANCE TO ACHIEVE CRITICAL

DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

Strong land and resource governance is seen as a necessary factor for the achievement of positive development outcomes, including: 1) Inclusive economic growth, resilience, and food security; 2) Sustainable natural resource management and biodiversity conservation; 3) Good governance, conflict mitigation, and disaster mitigation and relief; and 4) Empowerment of women and other vulnerable populations.

5 Deininger, K., 2003. Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction: A World Bank Policy Research Report. Washington, DC: The World Bank and Oxford University Press.

6 USAID, July 9, 2013. “Property Taxes Can Encourage Government Transparency and Efficient Land Use.” Online article.

Accessed October 21, 2016 at http://usaidlandtenure.net/commentary/2013/07/property-taxes-can-encourage-government-transparency-and-efficient-land-use.

7 Deininger, 2003.

8 A wayleave is a right of way, usually in the nature of an express easement and granted by deed or by reservation in consideration of a rent or other charge being exacted.

9 Perch, F. “Common Ground: Securing land rights and safeguarding the earth.” Land Rights Now, International Land Coalition, OXFAM and Rights and Resources, March 2016.

10 Ibid.

http://usaidlandtenure.net/commentary/2013/07/property-taxes-can-encourage-government-transparency-and-efficient-land-use http://usaidlandtenure.net/commentary/2013/07/property-taxes-can-encourage-government-transparency-and-efficient-land-use

1) Inclusive Economic Growth, Resilience, and Food Security

Land tenure impacts investment, credit availability, poverty rates, land values, and agricultural productivity, which are all linked to economic growth. When land tenure and property rights are secure, risks are reduced and individuals can make investments, secure credit, sell land, and make longer term decisions about land management and agricultural practices. In developing countries that have a large informal sector, and in which land tenure is insecure, people lack opportunities to invest in or profit from land, and their transactions are not protected by the state. In order to encourage investment and reduce financial risks, governments should formalize property rights and ensure secure tenure rights. When governments seek to stimulate economic growth through outside investment in large land areas, the lack of secure tenure presents a problem for the existing individuals or community holders who occupy that land but are not recognized as rightful holders of property. These people are at risk of displacement and being denied fair, prompt and adequate compensation for resources and livelihoods lost. For this reason, USAID supports the United Nations-negotiated Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security11, the Operational Guidelines for Land-Based Investment12, and the Analytical Framework for Land-Based Investments in African Agriculture13. When applied correctly, these guidelines will improve the security of property rights for all, facilitate the development of more economic opportunities for small, medium and large-scale producers, and contribute to food security and economic growth.

Evidence from across the globe shows that when land and resource rights are secure, agricultural productivity improves and incomes rise. For instance, in Thailand, land titling was positively correlated with economic growth, leading to increased investment, input use, and yields, especially when credit was available.14 In Ethiopia, land certification led to land productivity increases of 40-45 percent in the Tigray Region, and soil and water conservation investments rose by 30 percent in the Amhara Region.15,16

Fisheries’ productivity – a key to achieving food security in many developing countries – also increases with secure tenure and access rights and improved governance structures.17 As women produce a significant amount of food grown in the developing world, including being substantially involved in the fishing industry,18 securing property rights for women is especially paramount. Also, pastoral livestock systems play an important role in food security and economic growth across many African countries -e.g., in Tanzania, the traditional livestock sector produces 70 percent of the country’s milk, and the livestock and associated products in just Kenya and Ethiopia amount to more than $900 million per year.19 In rural areas, secure land tenure may lead to economic growth as it allows farmers to more easily

11 http://www.fao.org/nr/tenure/voluntary-guidelines/en/ 12 https://land-links.org/tool-resource/operational-guidelines-for-responsible-land-based-investment/ 13 https://new-alliance.org/resource/analytical-framework-responsible-land-based-agricultural-investments 14 Feder, G. and A. Nishio, 1999. “The Benefits of Land Registration and Titling: Economic and Social Perspectives” (Land Use Policy 15(1): pp. 25-43.)

15 Holden, S. and K. Otsuka, 2014. “The Roles of Land Tenure Reforms and Land Markets in the Context of Population Growth and Land Use Intensification in Africa” in Food Policy “Boserup and Beyond: Mounting Land Pressures and Development Strategies in Africa” 48 edited by T. Jayne, D. Headey and J. Chamberlin, Elsevier pp. 88-97. Accessed October 21, 2016 at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919214000451 16 Deininger, K. et al, 2008. “Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment and Land Markets: Evidence from Ethiopia” (World Bank Policy Research Working paper 4764 [subsequently published in Land Economics 87(2) pp. 312-34 2011]. Accessed October 21, 2016 at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/507061468315363246/pdf/WPS4764.pdf 17 USAID, June 2013. Sustainable Fisheries and Responsible Aquaculture: A Guide for USAID Staff and Partners. Accessed October 21, 2016 at https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/FishAquaGuide14Jun13Final.pdf 18 In a study of nine wild fisheries, women comprised 46 percent of those engaged in pre- and post-harvesting activities; and overall, nine out of ten persons engaged in fisheries’ secondary activities are women. In USAID, April 2016. Fishing for Food Security: The Importance of Wild Fisheries for Food Security and Nutrition.

19 Helen de Jode, ed., 2010. Modern and bobileMobile: the future of livestock production in africa’s Africa’s drylands. Published by the International Institute for Environment & Development (IIED) and SOS Sahel International UK.

https://land-links.org/projects/voluntary-guidelines https://land-links.org/projects/voluntary-guidelines http://www.fao.org/economic/est/issues/investments/prai/en/ http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306919214000451 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/507061468315363246/pdf/WPS4764.pdf https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/FishAquaGuide14Jun13Final.pdf access credit to finance investments in better agricultural practices and inputs and see returns on those investments. Secure land tenure also allows farmers to pass land on to their heirs and to choose whether they want to use their land for agriculture or lease it out, whereby they could pursue an alternative, possibly off-farm, livelihood.

Secure property rights are critical for broad and inclusive economic growth. Clear and secure property rights for landowners and users reduce the potential for conflict and the threat of eviction, which provides incentives to conserve and improve both natural and built assets and implement land-related investments.

Secure property rights also contribute to vibrant markets by incentivizing productivity-enhancing and climate-resilient investments and facilitating credit access where other enabling conditions are present.20,21 Clear and well-administered property rights are essential to the collection of revenue from property taxes, which can be an important source of income for local governments.22 As the world grows increasingly more urban, and the nature of this growth is often informal – e.g., the urban slum population is projected to increase to two billion people by 2030 – it is essential that land and resource governance issues are addressed in order for this population to access critical services such as water, sanitation, waste removal, and electricity and access to meaningful employment.

2) Sustainable Natural Resource Management and Biodiversity Conservation

Secure and clear resource tenure – including reducing unchecked open access to resources – is essential for sustainable natural resource management and biodiversity conservation. When resource tenure and property rights are insecure, the potential for sustainable resource management is undermined. Clarifying property rights reduces threats to biodiversity by reducing confusion and conflict over access and improving use and management of biological resources, including both terrestrial and marine biodiversity.

The impacts from global climate change, including increased variability in rainfall, the incidence of extreme weather events, rising temperatures and sea levels all have implications for resource availability and food production in both terrestrial and aquatic environments, as well as the way that natural resources are managed and benefits of these resources are distributed. And given the mass displacement and migration that is expected to occur because of weather and climate variability, it is important to continue to better understand and address the linkages between insecure tenure and the effects of climate variability.

Water is an essential component of human health, food security, economic growth, national and regional political security, and environmental sustainability, yet 664 million people, living primarily in sub- Saharan Africa, currently lack access to an improved water supply, and 2.4 billion people have no access to improved sanitation. Recent projections hold that by 2025, two-thirds of the world's population will be living in severe water stress conditions with significant adverse effects on individuals, communities, economies, and ecosystems around the world. Clarifying water access rights, improving watershed management, and developing water use plans is essential in ensuring that people have access to critical drinking water and sanitation and good hygiene.

Secure property rights can also incentivize people to invest in their land and resources for the long term, including reducing deforestation or the degradation of ecosystems that provide various and valuable ecosystem services. Insecure resource rights have shown to result in short-term decision-making that when associated with large-scale agro-commodity supply chain development often results in unsustainable landscape conversion and forest resource degradation. Furthermore, renewable energy

20 Deininger, 2003.

21 Lawry et al, 2014.

22 USAID, July 9, 2013.

projects that provide electricity, bolster economic growth, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions are most likely to succeed when local landholders’ property rights are secure, allowing them to more effectively negotiate with project developers for compensation, among other benefits.

3) Good Governance, Conflict Mitigation, and Disaster Mitigation and Relief

Securing land and resource tenure is essential to reduce conflict, much of which is driven by competition over land and resources and can be exacerbated by natural disasters. Whether the contest is over access to and control of land in the wake of a natural disaster or over control of scarce fertile land and mineral-rich areas or valuable water sources, people in many parts of the world resort to violence to control and use land because existing land governance systems and disaster relief programs are unable to manage these disputes. The incongruence of coexisting land tenure systems – e.g., statutory law, customary law, and/or at times religious law has “repeatedly fueled misunderstanding, resentment and tension, insecure land tenure and the likelihood of exploitation, deprivation, exclusion, and abuse of the most vulnerable.”

Historical inequities in landholding within a community, region, or country sometimes contribute to land-related violence. In many places, rapidly rising demand for land for biofuel and/or food production is compounding historical tensions. At the same time, climate change is increasing the number of populations vulnerable to increasingly severe natural disasters. And rapid urbanization often means large populations of new city-dwellers residing on the outskirts of cities where land and resource tenure is unclear.

Conflict over land is more likely to escalate and become violent when land tenure and resource rights are weak or insecure; when landholders are vulnerable after natural disasters; and when the existing land governance systems are ineffective, corrupt, or otherwise dysfunctional. Typically, the poor and other vulnerable groups, notably women, suffer disproportionately from such competition and the ensuing conflict. These problems contribute to the incidence of violence in many countries and to instability and insecurity, some of which may threaten US national security interests.

Precisely because land-related issues cause, or contribute to, conflict, it is critical that development interventions work to mitigate those likely social impacts. In conflict, post-conflict, or post-disaster situations, tenure and property rights are critical to meet demands for security, peace, protection, restoration of property and livelihoods, and the reestablishment of functioning institutions and commitment to reform—all pre-conditions for broader reconstruction and development. Efforts to protect land records, mediate land disputes between and among displaced persons and settlers, and rebuild the capacity of land governance systems can help reduce tension, stabilize a locale, and set the stage for productive investments and growth. These, in turn, can help break the conflict trap and promote U.S.

national security interests.

4) Empower Women, Indigenous Peoples, Pastoralists, and Other Vulnerable Populations

Securing land and resource tenure for vulnerable populations,23 including women, indigenous peoples, pastoralists, and others, can have outsized benefits. For instance, when women have secure rights to land, they make investments to improve land and acquire better quality inputs, participate in land rental markets, and “earn up to 3.8 times more income.”24 These decisions improve the food security and

23 There are five categories of population groups whose vulnerability is potentially increased by land tenure and property rights interventions: women; households that have been directly affected by HIV/AIDS; pastoralist communities; indigenous populations; and people who have been displaced during violent conflicts (refugees, Internally Displaced Persons, and demobilized combatants) or who are threatened to be displaced by natural disasters or climate change (climate refugees). For more information, see http://www.land-links.org/document/ltpr-for-vulnerable-populations-report/ 24 Landesa, Infographic “A Better World: Strengthening Women’s Land Rights”. Accessed October 21, 2016 at http://www.landesa.org/press-and-media/landesa-releases-new-womens-land-rights-infographic-at-trust-women-conference/ http://www.land-links.org/document/ltpr-for-vulnerable-populations-report/ http://www.landesa.org/press-and-media/landesa-releases-new-womens-land-rights-infographic-at-trust-women-conference/ nutrition of the entire household: children whose mothers own land are up to 33 percent less likely to be severely underweight and 10 percent less likely to be sick.25 Female farmers – if they had equal access to resources and knowledge – could produce enough additional food to reduce the number of the world’s hungry by 150 million.26

Likewise, improving tenure security for indigenous peoples (including through collective title), who have historically been important stewards of forests, can have important conservation outcomes, since areas in which indigenous peoples have secure tenure are often better protected than state-controlled protected areas.27,28 A growing body of evidence indicates that when communities hold collective rights to forestland, deforestation rates within those indigenous and community forests are significantly lower than in forests outside of those areas.29 For instance, the economic benefits from averted emissions as well as carbon capture in secure forests in indigenous peoples’ and customary communities’ lands in Guatemala and Brazil will surpass USD 160 billion and greatly outweigh the costs of securing their tenure.30 Similarly, securing tenure for pastoralists can have important economic and ecological benefits, since they have adapted over the centuries to often harsh, dry ecosystems and typically manage their livestock in sustainable ways that make the most of – but do not overexploit – water and other important resources.

In arid and semi-arid rangeland, pastoral systems can be even more productive and viable (in terms of protein production per hectare and environmental benefits) than ranching or sedentary livestock production systems,31 especially if a holistic understanding of sustainable pastoral systems and green economy is brought to bear.32,33

C.3.3 STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN LAND AND PROPERTY RIGHTS

In order to remove the tenure-related barriers to achieving the important development objectives noted in Section C.3.2, this Task Order will develop and implement strategic, targeted interventions, led by the E3/LU office in Mexico, Mozambique and Zambia. It is likely that Zambia’s interventions will require a country office, while activities in Mexico and Mozambique will not require a country office.

In addition to these three countries, the Task Order will provide field support to E3/LU in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Task Order activities will be implemented in more than one country simultaneously. Interventions will vary from short-term assistance to longer-term assistance depending on the needs and objectives in each country.

A broad overview of the land and resource issues that may be addressed in Mexico, Mozambique, and Zambia are presented below, along with the overall objectives of ILRG’s interventions in each of these

25 Ibid.

26 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2014. Building a common vision for sustainable food and agriculture: Principles and approaches.

27 Ricketts, T. H. et al., 2010. “Indigenous lands, protected areas, and slowing climate change.” PLoS Biol 8 (3):e1000331.doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1000331.

28 Stickler, C., et al., 2008. Forest carbon monitoring and landscape modeling in support of REDD: The Xingu River headwaters of the SE Amazon. Woods Hole Research Center, IPAM and UFMG Policy Brief for Poznan UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, Fourteenth Session.

29 USAID, February 2016. Land Resource Tenure and Social Impacts. Accessed November 6, 2016 at https://www.land-links.org/issue-brief/land-and-resource-tenure-and-social-impacts/ 30 Gray, E., et al. 2015. “The Economic Costs and Benefits of Securing Community Forest Tenure: Evidence from Brazil and Guatemala.” Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. Accessed October 21, 2016 at http://www.wri.org/forestcostsandbenefits.

31 Kipuri, N., and C. Sørensen. 2008. Poverty, pastoralism, and policy in Ngorongoro. IIED: London.

32 McGahey, D., Davies, J., Hagelberg, N., and Ouedraogo, R., 2014. Pastoralism and the Green Economy – a natural nexus?

Nairobi: IUCN and UNEP. Accessed October 21, 2016 at http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/wisp_green_economy_book.pdf 33 Helen de Jode. 2014. The Green Quarter: A decade of progress across the world in sustainable pastoralism. Nairobi: IUCN.

http://www.wri.org/forestcostsandbenefits http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/wisp_green_economy_book.pdf countries. Land and resource issues in the below countries are representative of the types of constraints and issues that this Task Order will seek to address.

Mexico34 Mexico implemented a large-scale land reform that began after the revolution in 1917 and ended in 1992.

The reform distributed more than 100 million hectares from large farms to groups of households organized into ejidos (collective holdings). Indigenous groups also gained rights to their commonly held land during this period, which they organized into comunidades (forms of collective ownership). These comunidades, however, lagged behind the development of privately held farms, and collective owners were more likely to be poor. Also, many states still have highly complex and fragmented land tenure system dominated by overlapping ejido and customary tenure.

In 1992, Mexico fundamentally changed its land regime and allowed privatization and market transfers of ejidal land rights. This reform is now largely completed, though it has been hindered by inadequate state participation in the land certification and registration process, insufficient protection of women‘s land rights, and lack of credit or marketing mechanisms. A large part of Mexico’s rural population faces significant challenges in overcoming poverty and entering a future of broad-based, sustainable development in the countryside.

Women in Mexico were largely excluded from land redistribution programs and men hold most ejidal land. Most women are not voting members (ejidatarios) of ejidos and do not hold use-rights. The 1992 reforms have in some cases further eroded women’s rights on ejidos, as only ejidatarios were allowed to vote on new regularization and tenure regimes, and only ejidatarios’ land rights were strengthened through these processes.

Wind and solar clean energy are new opportunities for businesses (including U.S. firms) to bring economic development to Mexico’s rural areas. However, efforts to increase renewable energy production have resulted in land conflicts with local ejidos and communidades. In Oaxaca, violent conflicts have erupted with local communities and indigenous peoples around the siting and construction of wind farms and the social and environmental impacts of these projects. Conflict appears to be driven by two major factors: a lack of community consultation and involvement in project scoping, design, and execution; and inequitable distribution of rent payments and social benefits associated with projects. The Government of Mexico has responded to these emerging social risks by mandating that all energy projects conduct Social Impact Assessments (SIAs), which is an important step in the right direction. USAID/Mexico is supporting the Government of Mexico to create an enabling environment for renewable energy projects that respect the rights of ejidos and communities and facilitates the adoption of international best practices by developers regarding indigenous consultations, community engagement, social benefit arrangements and cultural sensitivity. USAID’s Mexico Low Emissions Development project (MLED) and the Comunidades y Energías Renovables (Communities and Renewable Energy – CER) project are key efforts toward accomplishing this goal.

The objective of the ILRG Task Order interventions in Mexico will be to contribute to transparent and responsible land-based development in clean energy that engages all stakeholders, especially local and indigenous communities, and reduces social and environmental conflicts.

34 USAID Property Rights and Resource Governance Country Profile: Mexico. Accessed November 25, 2016 at https://www.land-links.org/country-profile/mexico/.

https://www.land-links.org/country-profile/mexico/

Mozambique35 Mozambique’s independence from Portugal in 1975 was followed by 16 years of civil war. The war displaced millions of people, destroyed infrastructure and prevented significant investment in various sectors, including agriculture and mining. As the country entered a period of national reconstruction in the early 1990s, the government gave substantial attention to creating legal frameworks governing land, and these frameworks recognized traditional community rights while encouraging investment.

The resulting legislation was progressive: land is owned by the state, and communities and good faith occupants have perpetual use-rights to land. Grants of 50-year renewable use-rights are available at almost no cost for investors and others seeking land, subject to approved exploitation plans. Investors are required to consult with communities before obtaining concessions for agribusinesses and other development.

The dual objectives of Mozambique’s progressive land law – support for rural community land rights and encouragement of private investment – have been unevenly implemented. The legal framework provides communities with some degree of tenure security over their land, but the majority of rural residents are unaware of their land rights as communities and as individuals, despite significant public awareness building efforts. Those who are aware of their rights almost uniformly lack the financial and technical support necessary to effectively assert those rights. Communities who lack that support are ill-equipped to delimit their land, prepare development plans, consider investment opportunities, or meaningfully engage in negotiations with prospective investors. Smallholders who lack such support are unable to demarcate and register their land rights, limiting their ability to participate in programs, access credit, and defend their rights against third parties.

More and more companies are investing — and will continue to invest — in agricultural land in Africa, given the rising global demand for food, biofuel, forest, and horticultural products. But with the potential benefits of such private sector investments come several risks, including land tenure risks. In Mozambique, land-related risks appear to be especially acute: allegations of land grabbing are rife, and both domestic and foreign investors are scrambling to find ways to invest in a more responsible manner, while communities are fighting to make sure that they can benefit from the investment that is streaming into the country. The lack of reliable land records and cadastral maps exacerbates the situation, as the Government allocates ‘empty’ land to investors that, in fact, is being used or occupied by communities.

USAID/Mozambique is working with the Mozambican government on land governance issues via its Supporting the Policy Environment for Economic Development (SPEED+) project, which also works with the private sector and government to strengthen the business enabling environment in the country.

E3/LU is piloting responsible investment best practices with a private company in Mozambique, including via participatory mapping of outgrower lands and the development of a grievance mechanism.

ILRG Task Order interventions are complementary to the SPEED+ activities and to E3/LU’s responsible land-based investment pilot in Mozambique and the Contractor will be required to coordinate with these USAID implementing partners. The objectives of the ILRG Task Order interventions in Mozambique are to scale up participatory mapping efforts in other geographies, provide legal or paralegal assistance to vulnerable populations, and build alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms that will assist vulnerable populations assert their legitimate land and resource rights.

35 USAID Property Rights and Resource Governance Country Profile: Mozambique. Accessed November 25, 2016 at https://www.land-links.org/country-profile/mozambique/

Zambia Despite a decade of economic growth, two-thirds of Zambia’s population is poor with over half living in extreme poverty. A majority of the country’s rural population is dependent on subsistence and small-scale rain fed farming on customary land. Drought and flooding are common and agricultural productivity is low.

Historically, land in Zambia has been perceived as abundant and widely available. However, changing demographics, a growing middle class, and increased allocation of land for investment opportunities are resulting in pockets of land scarcity and land conflict in some cases. These dynamics are compounded by a lack of documentation, transparency, and robust administration in both state and customary land systems. As a result, land conflicts are ubiquitous across the country among households, between households and traditional leaders, between government and traditional leaders, and between private enterprises and all of the above stakeholders.

The current national discourse on land issues largely focuses on the lack of transparency in land allocation and administration on both customary and state lands, which affects stakeholders from subsistence farmers to large investors. Initial surveys around independence indicated that 94 percent of Zambia was under customary land, with state land largely restricted to municipalities, protected areas and forests, and areas bordering railroad lines.36 Since 1995, the Zambian legal framework has enabled the conversion of customary land to state land through a one way, non-reversible process. Over the past 20 years, conversion has been met with significant distrust by chiefs, many of whom see conversion as a means of diminishing the power of traditional authorities.

As a result, it is unknown how much land has been converted and who the main actors have been in this conversion process (smallholder farmers, traditional authorities, national or international investors).

Estimates suggest that 30 to 40 percent of Zambian land has been converted or is in the process of conversion.37 A large amount of this area is likely only partially converted to state land, as many land holders have gained approvals from traditional authorities and local councils, but have not completed all legally required procedures with the Ministry of Lands for a variety of reasons, including taxes, administrative fees, and lack of access to Ministry of Lands offices.

Traditional authorities have long been responsible for allocating land within chiefdoms through an established customary administration system that includes chiefs, headpersons, and chiefs’ advisors (indunas). Structures exist for traditional authorities to vet applicants and subsequently allocate land, yet these processes are largely undocumented and are not downwardly accountable to local community members. Though the majority of traditional authorities currently lack transparency or tools to document and administer land, they possess a cultural legitimacy and a right to manage land on behalf of the President. Given the legitimacy and the strength of customary authorities in Zambian culture and the difficulty faced by central government in reaching stakeholders in rural lands, the active engagement of traditional institutions is indispensable in land administration.

The current land administration system, as well as the application of the Decentralization Act, is perceived by many as creating ambiguities between the roles and functions of traditional authorities over land and people within chiefdoms. While the Decentralization Act has placed more autonomy at the District level, to date, the engagement of the 108 Districts has largely been focused on municipalities.

36 Sitko, Nicholas, Chamberlain, J., Hichaambwa, M., 2015. "The Geography of Customary Land in Zambia: Is Development Strategy Engaging with the Facts?" (Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute Working Paper No.

98).

37 Ibid.

Rather unfortunately, the…