SOL-623-14-000015_Strengthening_Somali_Governance_(SSG).pdf

Issue Date: May 21, 2014 Q & A Closing Date: June 2, 2014 Q&A Closing Time: 0800 Nairobi, Kenya Time Closing Date: June 27, 2014 Closing Time: 0800 Nairobi, Kenya Time

Subject: Request for Proposal (RFP) # SOL-623-14-000015 Strengthening Somali

Governance (SSG) program

The United States Government, represented by the U.S Agency for International Development to East Africa (USAID/East Africa), is seeking a Contractor for the Strengthening Somali Governance (SSG) program as stipulated in the subject RFP.

Electronic Responses are required. Please submit your Proposals to all of the e-mail addresses below by 0800 hours Nairobi time, June 27, 2014 to Maria Televantos, Ali Ali, Evans Mutende, and Zeb Simpson. Answers will be sent to all interested parties. Receipt by any of these three addresses will constitute timely receipt for this RFP. Receipt time is when the Proposal is received by AID/Washington internet server. The addresses for the receipt of proposals are:

mtelevantos@usaid.gov, alali@usaid.gov, emutende@usaid.gov, jsimpson@usaid.gov. All attachments must be less than 15MB and no zip files should be included.

Any questions regarding the RFP’s requirements must be submitted no later than the time and date stated above to Maria Televantos, mtelevantos@usaid.gov, and Ali Ali, alali@usaid.gov .

The Technical Proposal has a strict 50 page limit. Offerors are advised that any pages exceeding this limit will not be evaluated. Offerors are reminded that the Evaluators have to be able to read the proposals, so presentation and legibility are crucial. This is discussed in more detail in Section L. USAID encourages the participation to the maximum extent possible of small business concerns, small disadvantaged business concerns and women-owned small business concerns in this activity or as a subcontractor in accordance with Part 19 of FAR. USAID also encourages the use of the Interested Vendor List (IVL) on the Federal Business Opportunities website page so that firms can contact one another for consideration of teaming arrangements and/or small business subcontracting opportunities in response to this solicitation. USAID discourages the use of exclusive agreements with international or regional/local organizations as this limits USAID’s ability to receive the best services.

USAID plans to award a three year Cost-Plus Fixed-Fee (CPFF) Completion type contract with a total estimated cost in the range of approximately $22,000,000 to $24,000,000 for the implementation of this activity. Revealing the cost range for the contract does not mean that offerors should strive to meet the maximum amount. Cost proposals shall be evaluated as part of a Best Value determination for the contract award. Offerors are to propose activities and staffing according to their proposed approach for achieving results. Sections B through J of the solicitation will become the contract, with blanks completed by the Contracting Officer based on the successful proposal.

This RFP does not obligate the United States Government to award a contract, nor does it commit USAID to pay for any costs incurred in the preparation or submission of proposals. USAID reserves the right to award this contract without discussions.

Regards, ________/s/________

Linda McElroy Regional Contracting Officer USAID/East Africa

PART I - THE SCHEDULE

SECTION B - SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICE/COSTS

B.1. PURPOSE

B.2. CONTRACT TYPE

B.3. ESTIMATED COST, FIXED FEE, AND OBLIGATED AMOUNT

B.4. BUDGET

B.5. APPROVALS (TBD)

B.6. INDIRECT COSTS

B.7. CEILING ON INDIRECT COSTS

B.8. COST REIMBURSABLE

SECTION C - DESCRIPTION/SPECIFICATIONS/STATEMENT OF WORK

C.1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

C.2. BACKGROUND

C.3. DEVELOPMENT HYPOTHESIS

C.4. OBJECTIVES AND ANTICIPATED RESULTS

C.5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OBJECTIVES

C.6. SELECTING KEY INSTITUTIONS

C.7. CONTRACT IMPLEMENTATION

C.8. ANALYSES

C.9. LINKS TO USG STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND THE NEW DEAL

C.10. LINKS TO OTHER USG PROGRAMS

C.11. LINKS TO THE WORK OF OTHER DONORS

C.12. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

C.13. KEY PERSONNEL

C.14. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

C.15. GRANTS UNDER CONTRACT (GUCs)

SECTION D - PACKAGING AND MARKING

D.1. 752.7009 MARKING (JAN 1993)

D.2. BRANDING POLICY

D.3. MARKING AND BRANDING STRATEGY

SECTION E - INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE

E.1. NOTICE LISTING CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

E.2. INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE

SECTION F - DELIVERIES OR PERFORMANCE

F.1. NOTICE LISTING CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

F.2. PLACE AND PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE

F.3. REPORTS AND DELIVERABLES

F.4. PERFORMANCE STANDARDS

F.5. 752.242-70 PERIODIC PROGRESS REPORTS (OCT 2007)

F.6. KEY PERSONNEL

F.7. 752.7005 SUBMISSION REQUIREMENTS FOR DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE

DOCUMENTS (JAN 2004) (September 2013) (Class Deviation OAA-DEV-13-01c)

SECTION G - CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION DATA

G.1. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING OFFICE

G.2. CONTRACTING OFFICER’S AUTHORITY

G.3. CONTRACTING OFFICER’S REPRESENTATIVE (COR)

G.4. TECHNICAL DIRECTIONS/RELATIONSHIP WITH USAID

G.5. CONTRACTOR’S PRIMARY POINT OF CONTACT

G.6. 752.7003 DOCUMENTATION FOR PAYMENT (NOV 1998)

G.7. PAYING OFFICE

G.8. INVOICING INSTRUCTIONS

G.9. ACCOUNTING AND APPROPRIATION DATA

SECTION H - SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS

H.1. NOTICE LISTING CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

H.2. AIDAR 752.7007 PERSONNEL COMPENSATION (JULY 2007)

H.3. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PERSONNEL COMPENSATION

H.4. 752.225-70 SOURCE AND NATIONALITY REQUIREMENTS (FEB 2012) (CLASS

DEVIATION NO. OAA-DEV-12-01C)

H.5. 752.7004 EMERGENCY LOCATOR INFORMATION (JUL 1997)

H.6. SUBCONTRACTING

H.7. INSURANCE AND SERVICES

H.8. 752.228-70 MEDICAL EVACUATION (MEDEVAC) SERVICES (JULY 2007)

H.9. GOVERNMENT FURNISHED PROPERTY

H.10. AUTHORIZED GEOGRAPHIC CODE

H.11. LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS

H.12. AUTHORIZED WORK WEEK

H.13. CONFIDENTIALITY AND OWNERSHIP OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

H.14. 752.7034 ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND DISCLAIMER (DEC 1991)

H.15. 752.231-71 SALARY SUPPLEMENTS FOR HG EMPLOYEES (OCT 1998)

H.16. EXECUTIVE ORDER ON TERRORISM FINANCING

H.17. FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DELEGATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES (JAN

2002)

H.18. REPORTING OF FOREIGN TAXES

H.19. USAID DISABILITY POLICY - ACQUISITION (DEC 2004)

H.20. ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST

H.21. CONFLICT OF INTEREST

H.22. STANDARDS OF CONDUCT – IMPROPER BUSINESS PRACTICES

H.23. 752.7032 INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL APPROVAL AND NOTIFICATION

REQUIREMENTS (JAN 1990)

H.24. BUSINESS CLASS TRAVEL

H.25. ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE

H.27. CONTRACTOR’S USE OF PROJECT VEHICLES AND LIABILITY INSURANCE

REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES

H.28. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION

H.29. NONDISCRIMINTATION (JUNE 2012)

H.30. PROHIBITION ON THE PROMOTION OR ADVOCACY OF THE LEGALIZATION OR

PRACTICE OF PROSTITUTION OR SEX TRAFFICKING (ACQUISITION) (JUNE 2005) . 62

H.31. COMPLIANCE WITH THE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION

REAUTHORIZATION ACT

H.32. SPECIAL SOMALIA CONDITIONS

H.33. LOGISTIC SUPPORT

H.34. SUBCONTRACTING CONSENT

H.35. GRANTS UNDER CONTRACT

H.36. MOBILE BANKING

PART II - CONTRACT CLAUSES

SECTION I - CONTRACT CLAUSES

I.1. NOTICE LISTING CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

I.2. 52.252-2 CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE (FEB 1998)

I.3. 52.203-7 ANTI-KICKBACK PROCEDURES (OCT 2010)

I.4. 52.209-9 UPDATES OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION REGARDING

RESPONSIBILITY MATTERS (FEB 2012)

I.5. 52.215-23 LIMITATIONS ON PASS-THROUGH CHARGES (OCT 2009)

I.6. 52.217-7 OPTION FOR INCREASED QUANTITY -- SEPARATELY PRICED LINE ITEM

(MAR 1989)

I.7. 52.232-99 PROVIDING ACCELARATED PAYMENT TO SMALL BUSINESS -

SUBCONTRACTORS (DEVIATION) (AUG 2012)

I.8. 52.243-7 NOTIFICATION OF CHANGES (APR 1984)

I.9. 52.247-67 SUBMISSION OF TRANSPORTATION DOCUMENTS FOR AUDIT (FEB 2006) 75

I.10. 752.219-70 USAID MENTOR- PROTÉGÉ PROGRAM (JUL 2007)

PART III LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

SECTION J - LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

PART IV REPRESENTATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS

SECTION K - REPRESENTATIONS, CERTIFICATIONS, AND OTHER STATEMENTS

K.1. NOTICE LISTING SOLICITATION PROVISIONS INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE ... 77

K.2. 52.204-8 ANNUAL REPRESENTATIONS AND CERTIFICATIONS (JAN 2014)

K.3. 52.209-5 CERTIFICATION REGARDING RESPONSIBILITY MATTERS (APR 2010)

K.4. 52.209-7 INFORMATION REGARDING RESPONSIBILITY MATTERS (JUL 2013)

K.5. 52.219-22 SMALL DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS STATUS (OCT 1999)

K.6. INSURANCE ‐ IMMUNITY FROM TORT LIABILITY

K.7. AGREEMENT ON, OR EXCEPTIONS TO, TERMS AND CONDITIONS

K.8. 52.230-1 COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NOTICES AND CERTIFICATION (MAY

2012)

K.9. 52.230-7 PROPOSAL DISCLOSURE – COST ACCOUNTING PRACTICE CHANGES (APR

2005)

K.10. SIGNATURE

SECTION L - INSTRUCTIONS TO OFFERORS

L.1. NOTICE LISTING CONTRACT CLAUSES INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE

L.2. 52.216-1 TYPE OF CONTRACT (Apr 1984) L.3. 52.233-2 SERVICE OF PROTEST (Sep 2006) L.4. 52.215-1 INSTRUCTIONS TO OFFERORS - COMPETITIVE ACQUISITION (JAN 2004) ... 89

L.5. GOVERNMENT OBLIGATION

L.6 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

L.7 SUBMISSION/DELIVERY INSTURCTIONS

L.8. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE TECHNICAL PROPOSAL

L.9. INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARATION AND SUBMISSION OF THE COST PROPOSAL .. 99

L.10 INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PREPARATION OF BRANDING IMPLEMENTATION AND

MARKING PLANS

SECTION M - EVALUATION FACTORS FOR AWARD

M.1 GENERAL INFORMATION

M.2 TECHNICAL EVALUATION CRITERIA

M.3 COST EVALUATION

M.4 SOURCE SELECTION

ATTACHMENT J1: LIST OF LINKS

PART I - THE SCHEDULE

SECTION B - SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICE/COSTS

B.1. PURPOSE

The purpose of this contract is to provide technical assistance as described in detail in Section C, Statement of Work.

B.2. CONTRACT TYPE

This is a Cost-Plus Fixed-Fee (CPFF) Completion type contract.

B.3. ESTIMATED COST, FIXED FEE, AND OBLIGATED AMOUNT

(a) The estimated cost for the performance of the work required hereunder, exclusive of fixed fee, if any, is $TBD. The fixed fee, if any, is $TBD. The estimated cost plus fixed fee, if any, is $TBD.

(b) Within the estimated cost plus fixed fee, if any, specified in paragraph (a) above, the amount currently obligated and available for reimbursement of allowable costs incurred by the Contractor (and payment of fee, if any) for performance hereunder is $TBD. The Contractor shall not exceed the aforesaid obligated amount.

(c) Funds obligated hereunder are anticipated to be sufficient through [to be inserted at the time of award].

B.4. BUDGET

The following budget table captures the final negotiated cost elements for the performance of the work required hereunder.

ITEM Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Total

LABOR

INDIRECT COSTS

GRANTS UNDER CONTRACT

TOTAL ESTIMATED COST

FIXED FEE

TOTAL ESTIMATED COST

PLUS FIXED FEE

B.5. APPROVALS (TBD)

The use of contract funds is approved for the following (A, B, C, D & E) below:

A. Project Non-Expandable Property (NXP) specifically identified in the detailed budget accepted by USAID (if separate Source /Origin /Nationality approval is required; the request must be submitted to the Contracting Officer in advance).

B. (TBD) project vehicles specifically requested for funding in the detailed budget accepted by USAID.

However prior to purchase of any of the (TBD) vehicles, the contractor is required to obtain Contracting Officer’s final approval and, additionally, obtain separate Source/Origin/Nationality approval if applicable.

C. Subcontracting with: TBD

D. Six day work week may be authorized on a case-by-case basis for STTA at the discretion of the CO.

B.6. INDIRECT COSTS

Pending establishment of revised provisional or final indirect cost rates, allowable indirect costs shall be reimbursed on the basis of the following negotiated provisional or predetermined rates and the appropriate bases for the prime contractor and its major subcontractors (“major subcontractors” are those subcontractors expected to perform at least 20% or a prominent part of the technical effort)::

Prime:

Description Rate Base Type Period

TBD TBD 1/ 1/ 1/

TBD TBD 2/ 2/ 2/

1/ Base of Application: TBD

Type of Rate: TBD Period: TBD

2/ Base of Application: TBD

Type of Rate: TBD Period: TBD

Major Subcontractor(s):

Description Rate Base Type Period

TBD TBD 1/ 1/ 1/

TBD TBD 2/ 2/ 2/

1/ Base of Application: TBD Type of Rate: TBD Period: TBD

2/ Base of Application: TBD Type of Rate: TBD Period: TBD

The Contractor is allowed to recover applicable indirect costs (i.e., overhead, G&A, etc.) on other direct costs (ODCs), if it is part of the Contractor’s usual accounting procedures, consistent with FAR Part 31, and Negotiated Indirect Cost Rate Agreement (NICRA). Indirect costs shall not be allowed for organizations that do not have a NICRA. All costs for organizations without a NICRA shall be budgeted and billed as direct costs.

B.7. CEILING ON INDIRECT COSTS

Reimbursement for allowable indirect costs shall be at final negotiated rates but not in excess of the following ceiling rates:

Offeror Fringe Rate

Fringe Ceiling Rate %

Overhead Rate %

Overhead Ceiling Rate%

G&A Rate %

G&A Ceiling Rate %

PRIME

MAJOR

SUBCONTRACTOR(S)

NOTE 1: Insert additional indirect rates as needed for all primes and major subcontractors in the above table.

NOTE 2: If the Contractor does not have a NICRA, all costs must be budgeted and billed as direct costs, and this clause is not applicable.

(1) The Government will not be obligated to pay any additional amount should the final indirect cost rates exceed the negotiated ceiling rates. If the final indirect cost rates are less than the negotiated ceiling rates, the negotiated rates will be reduced to conform to the lower rates.

(2) This understanding shall not change any monetary ceiling, obligation, or specific cost allowance or disallowance. Any changes in classifying or allocating indirect costs require the prior written approval of the Contracting Officer.

B.8. COST REIMBURSABLE

The U.S. dollar costs allowable shall be limited to reasonable, allocable and necessary costs determined in accordance with FAR 52.216-7, Allowable Cost and Payment, FAR 52.216-8, Fixed Fee, if applicable, and AIDAR 752.7003, Documentation for Payment.

[END OF SECTION B]

SECTION C - DESCRIPTION/SPECIFICATIONS/STATEMENT OF WORK

C.1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The USAID/East Africa/Somalia Office is requesting proposals for a flexible and adaptive project that will: 1) improve the legislative, representative, and oversight functions of Somalia’s federal and state (including Somaliland and Puntland) deliberative bodies; 2) improve the ability of targeted government institutions to carry out essential functions; and 3) increase citizen awareness of and engagement in government decision-making.

This three-year project is anticipated to begin October 1, 2014. The United Nations agencies and aid organizations have taken steps to re-establish a presence in Somalia since the formation of a new government and relative improvements in security since 2012. The Contractor must be based in Somalia, with primary and/or satellite office locations that will best meet project needs. Any presence in Nairobi must be justified.

The Contractor must utilize local partners to the extent possible in the implementation of the project to build capacity of local organizations.

The goal of the Strengthening Somali Governance (SSG) Project is to support the development of more effective and accountable Somali government institutions. This project seeks to support the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), as well as state and local administrations in their efforts to meet the New Deal Framework and their commitments to develop sound government institutions.1 These include developing the capacity of governance institutions in Somaliland and Puntland, as well as other entities that emerge as legitimate government structures that are ready and in need of assistance. The activities will aim to improve the reach of government; systematize opportunities for representation and inclusion of citizen interests in the political process; increase the legitimacy of government institutions and representative bodies; and support women’s empowerment and leadership.

This project seeks to link to stabilization and social sector activities to ensure that activities are holistic and complementary in their implementation. It will also work in coordination and collaboration, where possible, with USAID and other donor programs to support Somalia in moving from crisis and stabilization interventions to medium and longer-term development.

C.2. BACKGROUND

For more than two decades, the citizens of Somalia have lived under statelessness or weak transitional governments. The South Central Region of Somalia has borne the brunt of Somalia’s instability and humanitarian emergencies since the collapse of the central government in 1991.

A series of weak transitional governments have struggled to reestablish a central government since the signing of the first Transitional Federal Charter in 2004, with minimal success. The Charter provided a framework for governance based on a power-sharing formula between Somalia’s main clans known as the “4.5 Formula.” The formula apportioned seats in the new parliament, with each of the four main clans having equal representation and a coalition of minority clans having a quota equivalent to half the share of one of the major clans.

1 See www.newdeal4peace.org for more information on the New Deal process, including the Somaliland Special Arrangements.

Internal leadership competition and insurgent control of much of the country paralyzed the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) between 2004 and 2009. In 2009, the Djibouti Peace Agreement was signed between the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). This agreement provided for a new power-sharing arrangement and the ending of the transition by 2010. This deadline was extended several times due to political infighting between TFG presidents, prime ministers, and parliamentary leaders that ultimately led to intervention by the international community and brokering of the Kampala Accord in July of 2011. The Accord was a truce between the speaker of parliament and the president, who forged an agreement to work together, and which provided a new deadline for ending the transition by August 2012. Efforts to form a new government and reestablish control of the country have been hindered by attacks from the militant group Al-Shabaab, a U.S.-designated terrorist group that has been seeking to overthrow the government.

In the Accord, the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) remained tasked with drafting, consulting on, and ratifying a new federal constitution. Subsequent consultative meetings by key stakeholders developed road maps and milestones to work towards the August 2012 deadline.

A new provisional federal constitution was adopted on August 1, 2012, by a constituent assembly consisting of 1,000 clan representatives drawn from all sectors of society, based on the 4.5 power-sharing formula as stipulated in the Federal Charter. The provisional constitution establishes two legislative chambers—a House of the People (or lower house) with 275 members of parliament and a House of the Regional States (or upper house) whose membership will be determined when the Federal States are established. While the upper house has yet to be formed, the lower house was successfully established in September 2012 with the appointment of members of parliament (MPs) and has gained wide acceptance across clans. The lower house, in turn, elected a speaker and federal president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, on September 16, 2012, ushering in a time of hope and optimism for Somalia.

With the formation of Somalia’s first permanent government in more than twenty years and the successful, peaceful 2012 selection of national leaders, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced formal U.S. recognition of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s government on January 17, 2013. This was the first time that the United States recognized a Somalia government since 1991, paving the way for increased engagement in Somalia. Following the formal recognition of the FGS, the international community began to more actively support political processes related to the implementation of the provisional constitution and the development of federal structures. In response to the opening of the development space in Somalia, USAID began to consider ways to better support the emerging government and governance structure.

The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States was officially launched by the FGS, Somali civil society, and donor representatives on April 14, 2013 in Mogadishu, marking the start of structured dialogue on the New Deal in the Somali context. Discussions during the latter part of 2012 to identify a successor framework to the Somali Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) coincided with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s vision of a Somali-led and owned process to define the country’s future development priorities. It is within this context that the idea matured to put in place a Compact.

The FGS is currently drafting a final constitution and plans to hold a referendum and direct elections of the president and parliament by September 2016. Somalia is currently working closely with international donors to design interventions to meet the Peace-building and State-building Goals (PSGs) established under the New Deal process.

Somaliland and Puntland have established relatively stable and functioning regional administrations that have unique and varying relationships with the recently established FGS. Somaliland claimed secession from greater Somalia in 1991, when clans from the northern regions resolved to form a government independent of Somalia. They adopted a new constitution and formed a bicameral parliament: a House of Elders (Gurti) and a House of Representatives. The former Somaliland president, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, established a modest administration that successfully held together after his death in 2003; his deputy, Riyale Kahim, succeeded him as president. Somaliland has held successive local and presidential elections since, followed by the peaceful transfer of power from one leader to another, an important milestone in the region’s democratization effort.

Puntland, on the other hand, has remained part of Somalia’s federal architecture but with an autonomous administration. It has been impacted not only by the political and security challenges of South Central Somalia, but also the relative stability of neighboring Somaliland. Puntland’s parliament has selected a new president and ratified its state constitution in 2012. The administration has established its own parliament through clan representatives, which in turn elects the president. On January 8, 2014, Puntland’s parliament, selected by clan elders in December of 2013, elected the current president, Abdiweli Mohamed Ali Gas.

With the election of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, recognition of the FGS, and the positive governance trends in Somaliland and Puntland, including the internationally-supported New Deal process, the United States Government (USG) seeks to support the development of credible governance institutions that can deliver services to citizens.

As the federal government works to achieve the goals outlined in the New Deal and as states or regions are established, there are increasing opportunities for the USG to support the governance processes in Somalia. Though progress has been made, there remains uncertainty over what the state and federal relationships will look like as the process unfolds. As states form, there will be opportunities for the international community to support their internal governing systems and to build bridges between the federal and local actors. In addition, while the federal and the Somaliland parliaments are more developed, capacities of individuals and institutions remain weak. In the new Federal Parliament of Somalia (FPS) and the parliaments of Somaliland and Puntland, the capacity and experience of MPs remains low. The Puntland parliament has 66 MPs and 13 committees, but has little authority or capacity to exercise its oversight role over the executive.

The FGS has established a framework for moving forward in establishing viable governance structures.

Notwithstanding FGS efforts to develop a stable governing structure that can deliver on citizen needs, there remain serious capacity gaps within the country’s government institutions. The country’s civil service development has obviously lagged over the past two decades and there is a lack of competent civil servants that are able to perform essential administrative, planning, policy, management, and other functions. As leaders are replaced through elections or political appointments, it is civil servants and government staff who must maintain a functioning and stable system. Somalia has recognized the need to reform its civil service, but this is a massive undertaking that is in its infancy.

Public financial management is an area where Somalia faces major challenges. The recent resignation of the Central Bank governor in November 2013, after acts of corruption were alleged in the financial sector, highlights the challenges facing Somalia in this sector. The international community’s lack of confidence in the country’s financial sector and the apparent rampant corruption in Somalia has sparked increased donor interest and support for building a stronger and more accountable financial system. Revenue generation and revenue expenditure have also become areas of interest. As the government seeks to build capacity in this area, increased oversight and engagement by all stakeholders in the budgeting and planning process is needed to mitigate opportunities for corruption and ensure the central bank and related government agencies are transparent stewards of public resources.

USAID support has been instrumental in helping Somalia arrive at its present stage of relative political progress. However, the new government remains overwhelmed by the magnitude of its tasks, including the consolidation of control over territories recently liberated from Al-Shabaab. USAID’s Post-Transition Strategy in Somalia focuses on increasing stability through targeted interventions that foster good governance, promote economic recovery, and reduce the appeal of extremism. By supporting legitimate governance through inclusive political processes and thereby improving access to public services and economic opportunity, USAID expects public confidence in government to increase and the influence of extremists and divisive political forces to decrease.

C.3. DEVELOPMENT HYPOTHESIS

USAID’s Post-Transition Strategy in Somalia focuses on increasing stability through targeted interventions that foster good governance, promote economic recovery, and reduce the appeal of extremism. USAID’s overall development hypothesis in Somalia, which informs this project, is: if legitimate governance is supported through inclusive political processes and access to public services and economic opportunity are improved, then public confidence in government will increase. The theory is that a more effective and accountable government and increased public confidence in this government will decrease the influence of extremists and divisive political forces.

In 2010, USAID funded a study, “The Future of Stability in Somalia,” based on extensive consultations with a broad range of Somalis. This project is informed by the findings of that study, which are depicted in the diagram below. The white hexagons show factors that influence the “drivers” of stability (shown in blue) identified by Somalis. The purple circles show the areas where the SSG Project seeks to support the theory of change.

The goal of this project is to support the development of more effective and accountable Somali government institutions. The three objectives of this project support the regional and federal parliaments and targeted executive government institutions to carry out their essential functions, thereby increasing government effectiveness, and increasing citizen and civil society awareness of and input into government decisions, increasing accountability. Under this goal, there are two theories of change. The first is:

IF targeted Somali government institutions are better able to respond to the needs of citizens, THEN public confidence in the government will be increased and people will be more likely to rely on government rather than oppose it

AND THEN the influence of extremists and divisive political forces will decrease.

The second theory of change is:

IF targeted Somali government institutions are more accountable to their citizens, THEN people are more likely to feel included and able to address grievances non-violently.

C.4. OBJECTIVES AND ANTICIPATED RESULTS

The goal of this project is to support the development of more effective and accountable government institutions in Somalia. Illustrative activities provided below under each objective are illustrative only.

Offerors are encouraged to suggest additional relevant activities for consideration in the Somalia context, as well as details about how the activities might be carried out.

The New Deal process in Somalia was officially launched by the FGS, Somali civil society, and donor representatives on April 14, 2013 in Mogadishu. The FGS is currently working closely with the international donors to develop strategies, policies, and interventions that are aligned with the New Deal process.2 USAID assistance needs to be firmly rooted in the context of the New Deal Framework and the Peace-building and State-building Goals (PSG). The project must align in particular with the objectives outlined in PSG 1, Inclusive Politics. The project must support the constitutional implementation process, the federal and regional parliaments, and engage key government institutions and civil society to ensure that the foundations for sound governance are established in Somalia.

While the following objectives are distinct and suggest activities and results that relate to specific sectors, they are interlinked. The project must be conceived of and implemented in a way that creates synergy and achieves results that are greater than the sum of the individual parts.

Objective One: To improve the legislative, oversight, and representational functions of Somalia’s deliberative bodies

In 2008, USAID developed a legislative strengthening and political process support project to enable the newly appointed members of the transitional parliaments to understand and carry out their roles. USAID’s

2 Please see http://www.newdeal4peace.org and http://www.pbsbdialogue.org for more information on the New Deal. Somalia’s Compact can be found at www.pbsbdialogue.org/The%20Somali%20Compact.pdf legislative strengthening and political process support continued to subsequent parliaments after the transition ended and the permanent government was installed in August of 2012 under a new provincial constitution, new president, and new parliament with 275 members. USAID continued support to the new parliament by training members on rules of procedure, legislative agenda setting, formation of new committees of parliament, and oversight. Similar support was provided to the parliaments of Somaliland and Puntland. In addition, USAID supported democratization, civic society engagement, and political party support in Somaliland.

The support provided under this objective will build on previous USAID-funded programming to increase the functionality and capacity of the federal and regional (Somaliland and Puntland initially, and perhaps others as they are created) Somali parliaments. Activities under this objective will help parliamentarians deliberate on, amend, draft (where applicable), and enact laws; engage in the caucus process around issues, where it makes sense; more effectively engage with citizens and civil society; represent their constituents’ interests in larger debates; coordinate with the executive branch on key legislation; and provide effective oversight of the executive as appropriate.

Turkey pledged to rebuild Somalia’s parliament building that was destroyed in the war. The FPS operates out of a hall based at the presidential compound in the meantime. Parliamentarians conduct their affairs in a town-hall-like manner with rudimentary physical and communication facilities. The offices of parliamentary administration, the speakers’ offices, and committee offices all lack basic equipment to facilitate their work and often do not have spaces for conducting business. Parliamentary staff lack the skills to manage the parliament’s workflow and coordination. The various departments of the FPS including budgets, finance, human resources, research, and administrative oversight are in a rudimentary state.

The Speaker’s Office has prepared a detailed strategic plan that catalogues the kinds of support he thinks are needed for establishing an effective parliament, including physical infrastructure, equipment, and technical support, which will be helpful in beginning to determine areas of potential technical assistance and provision of essential equipment.

This project seeks to support committees of parliament and regional assemblies to effectively conduct their oversight functions, especially those responsible for public expenditure and budget. Such support should assist parliament, within its capacity, to support and coordinate with independent oversight offices, such as the auditor general, accountant general, and anti-corruption authorities once they are set up in areas such as monitoring the use of public resources and supervising the conduct of public officials. The priority for this support is the FPS.

The federal and regional parliaments’ ability to play a constructive and independent role within Somalia’s political system is vital for a functioning and cohesive government system in Somalia. The use of rules and procedures, as well as the committee process, guide MPs in performing their duties and responsibilities. In 2013, the FPS introduced new rules and procedures, which remain a work in progress and are not well integrated into parliamentary routines. Members and staff of the Somali parliaments will also need continued assistance to help strengthen their abilities to draft (where applicable), amend, and pass laws.

Objective One will link to Objective Two by supporting constructive dialogue and linkages among members of the FPS, the executive, regional parliaments, local governments, and civic actors around targeted issues. It will support Objective Three by supporting parliaments’ public relations and communications offices to ensure media coverage of legislative proceedings and decisions. In addition, the project seeks to work with the federal and regional parliaments to ensure that women, youth, political minorities, and civil society organizations have opportunities to articulate their concerns and interests to those bodies.

Activities could include supporting, for example:

Human and institutional capacity building of the federal and/or regional parliaments;

Parliamentarians’ understanding of their roles and responsibilities in line with the constitution;

Strengthening of women parliamentarians’ leadership and participation;

Improvement of parliamentary operations, including the provision of essential equipment and supplies;

Increased public awareness of, and opportunities to participate in, the legislative process; and

Increased understanding and support by Somalia federal parliamentarians of the accountability institutions envisioned in the constitution, such as the auditor general, accountant general, and anti-corruption authorities.

Anticipated Results

Somalia’s federal and regional parliaments better understand and are better able to carry out their legislative, oversight, and representational roles;

Male and female parliamentary staff are better able to draft law summaries, committee reports, and legislative analysis, including analyses of how legislation impacts men and women;

Women MPs play more active roles in meetings and plenary sessions;

Parliamentary proceedings are more transparent and open to the public; and

Increased citizen and civil society input into parliamentary deliberations and decision-making processes, with an emphasis on increased participation of women.

Objective Two: To improve the ability of targeted government institutions to carry out essential functions This objective is primarily focused on the executive branch of government. It aims to increase the capacity of policymakers and staff and/or civil servants to develop plans and policies, including legislation, and implement programs that support the provisional constitution and reflect the will of the people. It is intended to improve targeted government institutions’ administrative capabilities so that staff and/or civil servants and decision-makers are better able to carry out essential functions such as planning, conducting analysis, developing policy, carrying out day-to-day activities, tracking decisions, implementing programs, managing government systems, and coordinating policy and implementation efforts. Where appropriate, the project should assist in the sharing of best practices among target institutions. Provision of essential equipment and supplies may also be required.

Since the collapse of the central government in 1991, the Somali people have relied on public services provided by non-state actors (Nongovernmental organizations, United Nations (UN) agencies, and the private sector). When there have been governments, they have allocated their limited resources primarily to security and general administration. Ministries of finance have lacked the data and information systems necessary to develop sound economic policy and create budgets that address needs on the ground.

Activities under this objective will support key ministries where there is a critical need and where other donors are not active, for example in the areas of budget development or public financial management.

Areas of possible support could include helping to ensure that the government’s development priorities are funded, the process is coordinated across the government, and public input is gathered. In addition, support could include advising government counterparts on ways to mitigate corruption and reduce waste, for example through competitive procurement processes, financial controls, regulations, and legislation.

The capacity of key government actors to develop and plan for fiscally sound budgets that are based on input from ministries and local governments to meet realistic service delivery needs is low, though there are donor partners working in this area, including the African Development Bank and World Bank. There remains a need for greater transparency and accountability in the public financial management system, which is a high priority for any interventions in this area.

The constitution of the FGS mandates the establishment of thirteen commissions. These commissions will address critical issues of state formation and, it is hoped, help to resolve controversial issues such as the borders and boundaries of new states and regions, anticorruption mechanisms, and constitutional processes. The commissions provide an opportunity to streamline contentious issues and set the stage for establishing the building blocks for a Federal Somalia, but they will need assistance. The project seeks to support targeted commissions as necessary to fulfill their mandates. At this time, USAID has identified the Electoral, Human Rights, Civil Service, and Judicial Services commissions as potential targets of assistance under this project, though some of them have yet to be formed.

The new federal government is seeking to expand its reach by facilitating district-level community meetings in which local community leaders select administrative officials from amongst themselves.

USAID’s Transition Initiatives for Stabilization (TIS) project facilitates community-based deliberative processes that set local priorities, establish locally-driven oversight and accountability approaches, and expand community-based investment in local service delivery infrastructure by rehabilitating markets, health care centers, and other local infrastructure. There may be possibilities under this project to pilot targeted capacity building support to enhance the deliberative and representational capacities of local decision-making bodies in close collaboration with the Ministry of Interior and other programs and projects in this area.

The ministries and government institutions envisioned for support under this project are those supporting democratic processes, economic development, and the facilitation of service delivery. At present, this list includes the ministries of finance, planning, and interior, although final determinations about the primary focus institutions will be made in consultations between the Contractor and USAID, depending on factors such as identified need, opportunity for engagement, the chances of success, estimated cost, and potential impact.

Communications within and among institutions during the development of policies, budgets, and/or implementation of programs is often weak. As the project supports government institutions in developing policy, budgets, and legislation, or in carrying out processes, communication and coordination with and among relevant government institutions must be encouraged. For example, the project could work to increase the capacity of executive institutions at the federal and state levels to gather information from local government and other actors as part of decision-making processes.

To the extent possible, capacity building efforts should take a learning-by-doing approach, by linking capacity building efforts to fulfillment of actual government objectives, for example through development of important policies, legislation, or processes.

Activities under Objective Two will be coordinated with activities under Objective One to support oversight and legislative functions in the regional and national parliaments. Objective Two will be coordinated with activities under Objective Three to ensure that citizen and civil society engagement is encouraged and supported. This should include the meaningful participation, particularly of women, but also youth and other marginalized groups. Supporting increased transparency and accountability of all government institutions will be critical. Assistance will support the implementation of the constitution and achievement of the goals established under the New Deal framework.

Activities could include supporting, for example:

Increased coordination and communication both within and between targeted government institutions, including federal and regional parliaments and executive branches;

Strengthened policy-making capacity in targeted government institutions, including helping key decision-makers and male and female staff and/or civil servants understand complex policy issues and trade-offs when developing policies, including impact of policies on men and women;

Provision of essential equipment to targeted organizations in support of project activities;

Increased skills and knowledge in leadership and management among targeted male and female staff and/or civil servants of selected institutions;

Increased knowledge and capacity of male and female staff and/or civil servants in targeted areas and institutions, for example, in legislative drafting, consultation, consensus-building, coalition-building, negotiation, mediation, communications, and public speaking;

Increased capacity of targeted constitutionally-mandated commissions to carry out their mandates, including to develop policies and actions; conduct both formal and informal oversight actions (such as public hearings and question and answer sessions); investigate and gather information about government programs and actions; and conduct research and analysis on mandated issues;

Increased effectiveness and inclusiveness of the budget planning and development processes, including the capacity of key actors to gather and incorporate interests and needs from citizens and local actors;

Increased capacity of targeted male and female government actors to work constructively with the media and civil society;

Better representation of citizens’ interests, including of women and other marginalized groups, in the decision-making processes of targeted government institutions;

Increased capacity of key government actors to: develop and plan for fiscally sound and responsive budgets that are based on input from ministries and local governments to meet realistic service delivery needs; improve communications within and between institutions during the development of policies, budgets, and/or implementation of programs; and increase transparency and accountability and improve internal checks and balances on the budgeting process; and

Empowerment of women to be leaders and politicians.

Targeted male and female government staff and/or civil servants are better able to provide decision-makers with the analysis, background, and information necessary to make informed decisions;

Targeted male and female government staff and/or civil servants understand their roles and responsibilities and more effectively carry out their essential functions;

Targeted government institutions are better able to develop and implement effective policies;

Targeted government institutions are better able to coordinate internally, as well as vertically and horizontally with other government institutions;

Increased transparency and accountability of targeted government institutions;

Increased citizen and civil society input into budget, policy, and other government decision-making processes, with a focus on increased women’s participation; and

Improved executive communication and collaboration with parliament(s).

Objective Three: To increase citizen awareness of and engagement in government decision-making Civil society organizations (CSOs) and the media in Somalia have played both positive and negatives roles during the past two decades of civil war. In general, they lack experience engaging constructively with government. Today, Somalia’s political and security challenges constrain interactions between citizens/civil society and their counterparts in government. There are few opportunities for citizens to interact with government and influence legislative or executive decision-making at any level of government. At the same time, increased public and civil society input is an important part of increasing government legitimacy.

Under this objective, the project seeks to engage civil society and the media to increase citizens’ awareness about the constitutional implementation process, government structures, and the roles and responsibilities of elected officials and citizens. It will also support opportunities for citizen groups, civil society organizations, business associations, universities, think tanks, and others to engage effectively with government institutions.

Because of the lack of a central government in Somalia for the last 20 years, there is limited knowledge about governance and what government should do. There is also limited knowledge and understanding of the governance structures and process that are being established in Somalia. If citizens are going to participate meaningfully in the governance process, they will need to become better informed. Increasing citizen awareness may also help to increase government legitimacy, as citizens understand how their government works and what it is doing.

Local Somali CSOs have few, if any, members and little, if any, skills or experience in soliciting citizen input or ideas and representing these interests to government. Supporting targeted CSOs to better mobilize citizens; gather citizen input, ideas, opinions, and/or feedback; and represent citizen interests to relevant government institutions will need to be an important aspect of working with Somali civil society.

Somali media does not always understand or report on political developments in a constructive and informative manner. This is complicated by the fact that government actors are not always equipped with the skills and abilities needed to communicate effectively to the media. Where possible, the project should support engagement with the media around key issues, policies, legislation, or processes that the project is supporting. This could also include limited assistance to media actors.

As under Objective One, there may be opportunities to collaborate with the TIS project to better link communities to parliaments and executive branches at the local, regional, and national levels.

The activities under this objective will cut across, link to, and support the other two objectives in this project.

Activities could include supporting, for example:

Targeted capacity strengthening of select CSOs to gather and represent citizen input, raise awareness, conduct analysis, advocate, and give input to government on key policies, legislation, and programs, including the constitutional process and gender equality;

Increased and more effective male and female citizen participation in government decision-making;

Civic education of male and female citizens by targeted CSOs around key areas and/or issues;

and

Engagement with and limited support to Somalia media outlets around government and program priorities.

Male and female citizens have a better understanding of their government, constitutional rights and responsibilities, and opportunities for constructively engaging government;

Increase in the number and quality of interactions between parliaments and CSOs;

Increase in the number and quality of interactions between targeted government ministries and CSOs representing citizen interests;

Targeted CSOs are able to engage political actors in issues-based discussions and advocate for citizens’ interests in the decision-making process;

Targeted CSOs and media outlets are better able to hold government accountable; and

Increased quantity and quality of media and/or CSO reporting on government plans, policies, programs, deliberations, and activities.

C.5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OBJECTIVES

This activity is designed for the objectives to be interconnected and for the…