J.4_The_Future_of_Stability_in_Somalia.pdf

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The Future of Stability in Somalia

Mombasa, April 11-13, 2011

Composed by:

Patrick Noack (pn@scenariodevelopment.com)

Maddalena Campioni (mc@scenariodevelopment.com)

Commissioned by:

Revision 2: June 21, 2011

Scenario Development

Scenario Development specialise in scenarios and structural approaches to complex problems in current affairs, social and international development issues, climate change, science and health.

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Document Index

Executive summary – the Future of Stability in Somalia.......................…. Page 3

The starting point……………………………………………………...……….. Page 5

How have our participants defined “Stability” in the Somali context?........ Page 6

Panel of key themes …........................…………………………….………. Page 8

Juggling and dealing with large amounts of information: themes………... Page 11

The emerging questions.............……………………………………….....…. Page 16

How to use the questions and next steps......…………………………....… Page 17

Appendix 1: Full list of questions.....................…………………….………. Page 18

Appendix 2: Glossary........................................…………………….……….Page 20

Appendix 3: List of participants........................…………………….………. Page 21 info@ScenarioDevelopment.com 3

Executive summary – the Future of Stability in Somalia

The Transition Initiative for Somalia (TIS) “seeks creative and flexible programmes to address the needs in Somalia”1. Critical aspects of the TIS thus are flexibility and “quick response”. The practice of building scenarios can help the TIS to be strategic and responsive, while avoiding to be dispersive and non-focussed:

1. Identify a range of plausible futures that could materialise at any time, whether we like it or not. This way strategies and programming can be front-loaded to hedge against possible change and ensuring a higher degree of flexibility.

2. Identify critical questions that are going to influence the course of events and the future, but to which the answers are currently not known or not yet addressed.

3. Form a critical mass of participants who share a common language

4. and other important characteristics of scenarios.

The questions form the backbone of scenarios and were the core objective of the three-day workshop in Mombasa. A schematic of the products within the process is provided to the right. A second workshop will be convened during the latter part of 2011 to review the responses to the questions, and to develop scenarios, which will provide insights and an outlook into the future in order to address possible opportunities and challenges. Hence, the months between the two workshops will be used to explore the questions and responses with the key interlocutors throughout Somalia.

The challenges associated with future-oriented questions are many and those we have tackled are the following:

• it can be a good sign if the answers to one question point in different directions: this means that the future is uncertain but that we have a set of basic notions about what the future scenarios may look like;

• we are faced with a different challenge, however, if there are questions which we have never considered to ask;

• for some questions the answers remains elusive because it is difficult to determine how the future may play out.

The workshop has aimed to surface as many of such questions as possible, in an effort to reduce the unknown areas that may shape the future of Somalia.

There are no “right” or “wrong” questions since the future is inherently unpredictable. At this stage, however, there are questions that challenge our thinking and our assumptions, and these are the questions we must focus on. What has become evident during the workshop was that the Somali realities change frequently and quickly. There is hence no space for complacent least-resistance thinking, but a need for challenging our thinking to avoid being caught off-guard or surprised as events change. By asking key questions and by using them to develop scenarios, the TIS Programme, its implementing partners and everyone dealing with the daily reality of Somalia, are in a better position to anticipate and respond to change.

The workshop has aimed to challenge current events-reactive thinking (i.e. “the Somali situation changes by the hour”) to identifying the underlying structures that determine the events. Five panels on themes (1/ Victimisation, 2/ Youth, 3/ Non-state armed groups, 4/ Culture and religion, 5/ Economics and business) have produced some 100 key structures, which have resulted in10

1 Quoted from USAID EA TIS Synopsis document.

info@ScenarioDevelopment.com 4 underlying common themes relative to the future of stabilisation in Somalia. These themes are:

Trust, Judiciary Justice, Armed non-state actors, Conceptual thinking & knowledge, Geopolitics, Power, Livelihoods and Economy, Youth, Gender, Community, Culture and

Religion, Identity, Public institutions.

Within each theme some hard questions have been developed. Some questions are open-ended, inviting reflection and likely attracting a significant breadth of responses. Others are specific and narrow, soliciting a precise answer to an identified challenge. Ultimately, while a very large number of questions has been articulated by the workshop participants, the questions had to be narrowed and condensed to the following, to enable a focussed conversation with the key interlocutors over the coming months:

• People trust some systems (clan, business) more than others (government) – how can trust be spread more widely?

• What will be the impact of global climate change and environmental degradation on

Somalia and how will regional authorities settle disputes over common resources and land?

• How will the uprising in the Middle East, the referendum in Southern Sudan or the trends towards regional integration affect Somalia?

• Can we sustain the pockets of stability regionally and will Somalis solve their problems without interference from the international community?

• Will fragmented regions ever unite and what will be their incentive – could clan-based divisions be reversed?

• What political system will Somalis prefer; is federalism a solution?

• How can we get the full potential from women's participation without devaluing religious beliefs, culture and identity; will we create a critical mass of women and men who exhibit a

“blend” or will we continue programming in an “either...or” context?

• Will emerging leadership be legitimate and will it allow people a choice or will clans continue to dominate politics?

• How will increasing numbers of Diaspora affect identity and what impact will Diaspora lobbying have?

• How will a shift to a more regulated economic sector be accepted and adapted by the private sector and will this improve employment opportunities for Somalis?

• How can culture and religion be used in a positive way: can Islam be the single most uniting factor among the Somali people? Will there be new ideologies?

• Why are youth more marginalised and what has created this marginalisation – what has been/is the government’s role in this?

The quality of the conversations and the depth of the themes have been highly stimulating, and questions have illustrated a clear shift from events-based here-and-now thinking towards greater structural analysis and is a step toward assessing the matters which will shape the future. The work detailed in this report is the result of three days' collective work by an extremely resourceful and energetic participant group. The new task now, for workshop participants, will be to explore these questions and seek answers from the individuals and institutions they normally interact with.

This may be more challenging than it appears at first: others may not be as ready and prepared to discuss these very fundamental future-oriented questions because they have not participated in the workshop and are instinctively rooted in the here-and-now analysis. On the other hand, some interlocutors may jump at the opportunity as they understand the opportunity and dedicate thought to these questions. But this range of answers should not discourage workshop participants, as all answers are important.

In addition, like during the workshop, each of the questions has sub-questions: how would other

(non-present) actors respond? What are topics within each question we are not addressing or not discussing? Are there any further underlying structures we need to explore in order to respond to these questions?

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Each of the questions can be addressed as part of a scheduled interview with key individuals, or they can be explored as part of a separate conversation (“...by the way, what do you think about...”). When we reconvene for the second part of the process, the scenario building workshop, the questions and their responses will form the starting point to developing scenario stories.

The starting point

Scenarios are illustrations to plausible futures, they are not a palette of futures to choose from, but rather a way to anticipate events. By acknowledging and understanding that several scenarios are possible, we are better able and inclined to make sense of developments and changes as they take place: unfolding events may fit into one scenario, or may help in understanding other plausible futures which might not have been considered and addressed before. Ultimately the thinking that is enabled through the practice of building scenarios allows for a better understanding of the present, and of current events and their possible implications for the future.

Just as scenarios offer improved understanding of the present, the development of scenarios is also based on the current understanding and perception of the present. So, assessing the present helps us understand the future, which in turn assists us in understanding the present. This is not to be confusing, but to illustrate why it is important to invest time in understanding the future, and the questions it generates about the present.

The purpose of the Mombasa workshop was twofold: first, to develop a set of questions which will determine the outlook of stabilisation in Somalia2; second, to initiate a scenario building process with a group of participants who have intimate knowledge and experience in Somalia. The questions will be addressed by the participants with their interlocutors ahead of the second scenario building workshop.

This document is not a word-for-word chronicle of the presentations, conversations and interventions. Rather, it is intended to remind participants of some of points that were discussed; it provides a snapshot of the workshop and its outcomes and it leads the reader to the questions, which were developed by the close of the meeting.

2 Please note that “Somalia” in this report is meant to be shorthand for the regions of Somaliland, Puntland, Galmudug and South Central.

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How have our participants defined “Stability” in the Somali context?

Stabilisation, or stability assumes different dimensions and definitions depending on whom you ask. The workshop offered a unique opportunity to canvass the views of Somalis, and others, of different geographical and professional backgrounds. The exercise has highlighted at least three important findings:

1. There are almost as many different conceptions of “stability” as people at the workshop.

2. There are different “levels” which are seen to signify stability. For example “access to services” is a downstream product that may result from “cessation of all violence”.

3. Overall, it could be argued, there are four (or five) distinct categories into which the individual definitions of stability fall:

! Cessation of violence and the consequent stability in life

! The need for the rule of law and ownership

! Social development

! Economic development

! The predictability and unpredictability nexus

4. All elements are linked as (full and universal) social development cannot happen without the cessation of violence, without the rule of law and without economic development.

Similarly, the end of a conflict is hard to achieve without communities at peace with themselves and their neighbours. Nevertheless, it may be instructive to map the various definitions into the format of a mind map to attempt to identify linkages and priorities, as well as objectives.

The map below makes such an attempt. It is important to understand that this is an attempt and not the last word: the map can be a useful starting point for a conversation or for developing ideas about the current state of play.

The orange branch shows the impact cessation of violence and a peaceful environment may have, such as the ability to go to Mogadishu Beach – which would not be possible unless the was an end to violence.

The green branch speaks to the rule of law and communities being at peace – ultimately communities understanding they are better off by collaborating and achieving their (collective) potential, than fighting and being content with limited opportunity.

The blue branch reflects on social development and services. Benefits, of course, would include education, health and much more. There is a clear link to communities and their ability of acting as service providers (of the green branch). For this to occur, mindsets have to change, and this is the starting point of the green branch.

Economic development and growth are housed on the turquoise branch. Of course, economic opportunities exist in war-torn countries, but these do not lead to “economic development” not to livelihood opportunities on a country-wide scale, including all people.

Finally, the purple branch refers to predictability and the ability to manage uncertainty. The more predictable the environment, the more its inherent uncertainties can be managed, the greater the stability, the more trips are taken to Mogadishu Beach, the more children go to school and complete their curriculum, and the more the government will be able to function. There are some

“stretches” in this logic, but greater predictability offers more opportunity to achieve stability.

It's always instructive and stimulating to ask an apparently “simple” question and find a wealth of information in return. We'd be interested in having your thoughts on the stability map that has been developed using your definitions at the start of the workshop.

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Everyone contributes to the future, but different people and institutions will aim to achieve different futures. It is therefore important to try to gain the perspectives of all the groups that have a stake in the future of Somalia. The absent stakeholders – constituents who were not present at the workshop in Mombasa but whose contributions would be important to know were identified. The list of “absent” stakeholders, as it turns out, is large and includes, for example armed groups (warlords, al-shabaab), refugees, elders and traditional leaders, women's groups, youth groups, neighbouring countries, business groups, fishing communities, pirates, elected representatives and more. A further workshop may attempt to include these constituents, or experts on them, in order too create better scenarios for the future.

What would “absent” stakeholders say? How would they react?

How would they be impacted? How would they influence the outcome differently?

Panel of key themes A set of five panels on key themes have been used as a way of starting the conversation on the underlying structures and on topics that are generally not discussed. The panels were 1/

Victimisation, 2/ Youth, 3/ Non-state armed groups, 4/ Culture and religion, 5/ Economics and business.

The panel on victimisation has highlighted that:

• The perception of violence is often greater than the actual data bears out.

• Vastly diverse security situation. In terms of programming we need to look at a district level

• Internationally the Somali region crime rates are comparable with developed countries.

Somalia is not so extreme.

Participants were asked to identify the structures that underlie the information from the panel. The table below summarises all of the key structures reported from the panel on victimisation and, underneath, the areas that were felt are not discussed adequately when addressing the issues of victimisation.

Key Structures generated

Resource manipulation, poverty, lack of legitimacy protection, lack of respect for legitimacy, inaccurate information, lack of political will and resource, state collapse, Institutional justice system, foreign laws that don’t fit the culture, conflict between customary and statutory law, unfair judgements, weak judiciary, Somalis don’t make their own laws, lack of just/representative government, geopolitical game, clan matters, federalist region matters, lack of democracy, dictatorship, corruption, state collapse, failed institutions, mistrust in police and courts, male dominated institutions, power struggle, historical injustice, regional actors, lack of resources, male dominated culture/laws.

Undiscussables

Communities effected by piracy, land grabbing, violent conflict over water, illegal tree cutting, FGM, forced marriages, domestic violence, lacks of discussion of committed crimes due to lack of accountability, external actors, perceptions of stereo types, donor psychology, culture, violence, self interest, personal gain, freedom of speech, domestic violence, fraud, bribery, corruption, environmental degradation and Sharia law.

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The panel on youth and the subsequent conversation has highlighted the following:

• Somali youth are one of the largest and most marginalised group, at the forefront of most of the change in Somalia, be it positive or negative.

• In Somalia there is a lack of opportunity in terms of education and livelihood.

• Al Shabaab may pay $200, but they also provide the youth a status, a meaning in life and a purpose they are contributing to.

• Al Shabaab may be killing or destroying youth physically, but TFG has destroyed the youth spiritually. The passive destruction of the youth has also been provided by the politicians.

• In the old days the father was the head of the household, now the mother goes and provides for the family. There is also a greater family unit as people are more dependent on a cousin, for example, for remittance.

Al Shabaab have good public relations, Al Shabaab offer belonging to youth, youth easy to manipulate, political and social economic instability, lack of livelihood and opportunity, lack of government and political structure, youth lack experience and wisdom, lack of traditional/spiritual guidance, unemployment, low capacity in government institutions, elderly refuse to give up positions to youth, an attitude of better off to leave and youth are absent in decision making, failed sate, family structure, culturally do not believe in the youth, elderly don’t retire, lack of youth leadership, youth can be easily exploited, power struggle.

Youth not a productive member of peace dialogues, by immigrating to westernised countries youth feel they will live a better life, paternalistic society, government lack adequate resources.

The panel on non-state armed groups and the subsequent conversation have indicated the following:

• Local/international criminal groups are the most common, followed by security militias, then clan militias, followed by political armed groups and finally freelance militias.

• Half of the non-state armed groups are a loose alliance of individuals. Only a small amount of the groups have sophisticated organisation with financial networks.

• The community has leverage over about half of the armed groups.

• Only four per cent of group members are women; it was said that women are not engaged directly but they are a source for intelligence gathering and recruitment, as well as provision of ammunition.

• 62% of the groups had members who are below the age of 18 years old, with Al Shabaab recruiting children at 10 years old. Four other groups were known to start recruiting youth at 14 years old in Mogadishu.

• Galkayo is not at sea but acts as base for pirates. This determines business dynamics that drives up prices and generates a negative livelihood impact clan supremacy, culture, lack of efficient resource use due to corruption, ideology, injustice, religion, power hungry, frustration of youth, lack of law/current governance, misuse of funds, corruption, sense of injustice, clan hegemony and no central/accepted government.

women’s role, Al Shabaab, role of the international community, international mafia link, depletion of marine resources, misappropriation of resources, the criminal groups that come from the same clan as the authorities are often the most powerful

The panel on culture and religion and the subsequent conversation has highlighted that:

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• Leaders are reflections of the society’s state of mind.

• The young men in Somalia have a very confusing profile; they do not have the right role models.

• When considering the programming within the context of spirituality time dictates agenda, you may be doing the right thing at the wrong time and get the wrong result.

• When we talk about the Somali context today it is the misinterpretation of the religion that is the problem not the cultural beliefs from the beginning.

Wahabbi-anti traditional Somali culture, three legal systems (Sharia, traditional and religious), lack of income, identity, perception of Islam, bad leadership, collapse of social fabric, politicalisation of religion, personal agenda, lack of respect, critical interpretation by scholars, lack of youth identity and lack of role models.

Sharia/Xeer law, dialogue, changing culture, Islam, clan systems (elders support clan system), too personal to criticise, external agenda, Sufism and cultural law.

The panel on the Somali business and economy has highlighted the following:

• The Diaspora is the main driving source of the economy and the civil war has dispersed Somalis all over the world.

• The Diaspora are creating networks and building trust.

• The main resource for capital is through remittance, which is valued between $1 billion to

$2 billion and O.D.A which provide are $850 billion that goes towards schools and health care. Aid donations only account for one third of money the Somali’s get for Diaspora.

• The modern clusters of business are money transfer companies, Universities and Telecentres.

Impact of aid, recipient of aid, dependence, culture of trust, free enterprise, business booming, successful economy, lack of profitability for framers, globalisation, lack of cooperate responsibility, weak government and unreliable structure of economic data.

War economy, insecure to conduct business, war profits, price control, dual role of business community, Arab states keeping prices down and illicit/illegal economic activity.

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Juggling and dealing with large amounts of information: themes

The review and discussion of panel topics have generated close to 100 key structures (reported in the tables above). By the close of the second day, participants were asked to consider all 100 structures and cluster them into common themes which will form the basis for developing the critical questions. The 100 structures have been separated into 13 themes:

• Trust,

• Judiciary Justice,

• Armed non-state actors,

• Conceptual thinking & knowledge,

• Geopolitics,

• Power,

• Livelihoods and the Economy,

• Youth,

• Gender,

• Community,

• Culture and Religion,

• Identity,

• Public institutions.

These 13 themes lie at the heart of what constitutes life in Somalia, what contributes towards stability and instability, and what needs to be addressed in order to think in a systemic way about the future of Somalia.

Somalia has endured an ongoing civil war since 1991, and has been described by many as a

“failed state”, at various junctures over the past 20 years. It is clear, from the list of the themes, that speaking of a “failed state” shortchanges the complexity and opportunities that make up the Somali context. The notion of a failed state closes an inquiry or conversation, whereas the themes offer a tool to begin and encourage a dialogue through a facilitated scenarios exercise.

Indeed, each theme was employed to assess firstly its current situation; what is predictable about its future and what is not; whether there are any further underlying forces; and, finally, what are the emerging critical questions. The boxes that follow provide a summary of the group work on themes, which will mainly be of interest to participants of the workshop as the information will remind them of the conversations they had engaged in. Following the boxes will be the list of key questions.

Trust, Judiciary Justice, Armed non-state actors and conceptual knowledge and critical thinking3

Where are we now?

• Lack of trust and sense of injustice

• No ownership to make it binding

• Three parallel systems used according to a particular need: Civil legal system, Traditional legal system and Sharia.

• Economic activity: Why is there no trust in other aspects of the Somali context. In business there is accountability, ownership and quality control that is not found in politics.

• Armed non-state actors: Three distinct circles that overlap, the TFG (Somaliland), religious groups

3 The theme “Trust, Judiciary Justice, Armed non-state actors and conceptual knowledge and critical thinking” was the result of merging four separate themes. The working group felt that there were strong unifying elements, which warranted addressing them as one. Hence the table is somewhat different from the tables of the other themes.

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(Al Shabaab) and clan traditional group (pirates, private business and NGOs).

• Conceptual thinking: There is always as division of “us and them” or “male/female”, “urban/rural”.

So there is a negative dilemma of “either this or that”.

• How can we bridge society to prevent that belief you have to fit into a certain sector?

• Can you be religious and secular? Can you be traditionalist and modern?

Where could we be in the coming 20 years?

• Judiciary system: in places where people “blend and bridge”.

• Business sector: if business is cross-clan it works.

• Blending/mixing structures will exist in the future.

• Bridging: linking with other groups and actors.

• Inclusive ownership

• Internal processes

• Implicit thinking process

• Cut and paste: explicit action, exclusive predatory, externally stamped product. It will create mistrust, collaboration, armed groups, higher rates of crimes and conflict

Livelihoods and the economy

• Little investment going on in terms of FDI and knowledge

• Globalisation is a reality

• Focus on trade at the expense of productive sector

• High in unemployment

• Needs for regulatory framework

What is relatively predictable?

• Globalisation

• Migration patterns

• Needs will continue to grow

What is not predictable?

• Market trends

• Climate change

• Political dynamics

• International community engagement.

Other underlying forces?

• Chronic political instability

• Globalisation

• Dependency on aid and remittance

• Cultural mindset: focused on being traders

• Resilience and ability to innovate

Where could we be in the coming 20 years?

• Environmental degradation

• One of the leading regional gateways for trade

• Somali business people will emerge to be global traders

• Returnee’s skills bring innovations to increase capacity for industry

• Strong regulatory framework

Geopolitics

• Too many international players

• Militarisation

• Little focus on social development

• Imported ideologies

• High level of mistrust (Diaspora)

• High influence of geopolitics (lobbying by Diaspora)

What is relatively predictable?

• Strategic interest: China, What is not predictable?

• Level of individual engagement

Other underlying forces?

• Extremist ideologies

• Dysfunctional authority info@ScenarioDevelopment.com 13

Piracy, counter terrorism, extremist and IGAD

• Exploitation

• Regional stability • Resource exploitation

• Foreign geopolitical interest

Where could we be in the coming 20 years?

• Stability, prosperity, progress

• Expansion of extremism in the region

• Increased regional integration

• Continued exploitation

Power

• (Poor) Quality of leadership

• New and emerging ADM

• Elite capture - corruption and rent seeking

• Theocracy, warlords and secularism

• Proxy war

What is relatively predictable?

• Emergence of more regional authorities

• Competition for power

(external and internal)

• Political parties emerging

What is not predictable?

• Future of TFG (internal/ restructure / Collapse?)

• Future of Shabaab extremism

(divided/stronger?)

• Stability of regions

• Other new forces may emerge

Other underlying forces?

• Clan competition

• Religious

• International (divide and rule)

• Resource competition

• Attitude of people (fatigue)

Where could we be in the coming 20 years?

• New generation of leadership

• Federalism

• New political system

• Women/youth empowered

• Survival of the fittest

Youth

• Inequality

• Lack of youth based programs

• Lack of access to education

• Lack of positive role models

What is relatively predictable?

• Further marginalisation:

community perception that marginalises most of the youth, it will take a long time to change the perceptions of the community.

• More vulnerable to crimes, more susceptible through lack of employment.

• Increased migration:

What is not predictable?

• Change of perception: we need to engage the elders to show the potential of the youth.

• Stable environment: to pursue activities we need to change underlying issues

• We have to engage the youth which is currently not possible with an unstable environment

Other underlying forces?

• Weak institutions

• Lack of governance

• Lack of youth engagement programs: if there were more programs the youth would not have to engage in crime as they would feel they were contributing to society.

info@ScenarioDevelopment.com 14 instability leads to youth migrating to other countries.

Where could we be in the coming 20 years?

• More recruitment in the education sector to engage the youth

• Diaspora overseas will return and influence the youth within the country and show them their full potential.

• Improve institutions, communities engaging the youth will create positive change.

Gender

• The Somali women are highly empowered economically

• Bread winners of the family

• Women have a role in the situation whether positive or negative

• Male dominated institutions

What is relatively predictable?

• Women’s role in stability

• Increased women’s participation in political and social economic life

• Women physically engaging in conflict (from what we have been seeing in the last couple of weeks not just selling but using).

• Civil elections

• Clan dynamics will continue.

What is not predictable?

• Culture that is more receptive to women participation

• A sincere political source

Other underlying forces?

• Culture and religion will continue to marginalise women,

• History of economic dependence on women

• Political marginalisation

• Society still male dominant

Where could we be in the coming 20 years?

• A continued male dominance and increased women influence on men

Community

• Completely divided

• Vibrant business community

• Change of lifestyle

• Diminishing roles of traditional leaders

What is relatively predictable?

• Traditional mechanism will still prevail

• Local peace structure will continue to play a key role in bringing peace

• There is war fatigue

What is not predictable?

• Will there ever be a consensus for peace

• Will conflict resolutions be ever left for the Somali’s to figure for them-selves?

Other underlying forces?

• Lack equitable distribution of resources

• Unjust historical calls and leadership by previous leaders

• Geopolitics

• International actor’s involvements

Where could we be in the coming 20 years?

• Stable region states

• Talk & talk & less action

• Women role will drastically increase in the community info@ScenarioDevelopment.com 15

Culture

• Closely intertwined

• Interpretation of religion has changed

What is relatively predictable?

• Foreign political interference

• Western tolerance law for

Islamic state

What is not predictable?

• Where religious practice will be in the future as religious sects change

Other underlying forces?

• Poverty: people try to make sense of poverty through religion to make sense of daily chaos

• Education: very critical, very limited social services and special education. Unfortunately governments don’t have the financial capacity or general know how to provide education to its people.

Where could we be in the coming 20 years?

• Peace

• Economic benefits

• Stabile and productive society

• Gradual shift away from religion

• Different priorities such as clan influence

• Become one country or could end up being a country with small states

• Strong central authority as democracy has failed

Identity

• What is Somali identity?

• Language, ethnicity, name, lineage, religion and patriarchal.

What is relatively predictable?

• Arabization

• Role of women increases

What is not predictable?

• Pan Somalia idealism

• Language

• Somaliland recognition

Other underlying forces?

• Business and economy

• Education

• Religion and culture

Where could we be in the coming 20 years?

• Identity crisis

• More fragmentation

• Limited potential

• Greater stress

• Somalia identity info@ScenarioDevelopment.com 16

Public institutions

• Mistrust

• Corruption

What is relatively predictable?

• Lack of accountability

• Corruption

• Potential for fragmentation

What is not predictable?

• Clan influence

• Ability to improve capacity

• Federalism

Other underlying forces?

• External support

• Loss of cultural identity

• War/conflict

Where could we be in the coming 20 years?

• Strong public institutions coming from a Somali context

• Decentralised state/centralised?

The emerging questions

The working groups that have developed each of the above themes have also generated questions around them. There have been a total of 38 questions, which are listed in full in Appendix 1.

Recognising the importance and specificity of each question, the facilitators have attempted to reduce the number by combining, rewording and re-shaping them to reduce the total number to 12 critical questions. Every effort has been made to retain the concepts and main thrusts of all original questions. Considerations of practicality had to prevail: it will be far more compelling and productive to discuss some 12 questions with prospective interviewees than 38!

• People trust some systems (clan, business) more than others (government) – how can trust spread more widely?

• What will be the impact of global climate change and environmental degradation on Somalia and how will regional authorities settle disputes over common resources and land?

• How will the uprising in the Middle East, the referendum in Southern Sudan or the trends towards regional integration affect Somalia?

• How can we get the full potential from women without devaluing religion, culture and identity; will we create a critical mass of individuals who exhibit a “blend” or will we continue programming in an “either...or” context?

• Will emerging leadership be legitimate and will it allow people a choice or will clans continue to dominate politics?

• What political system will Somalis prefer; is federalism a solution?

• How will increasing numbers of Diaspora affect identity and what impact will

Diaspora lobbying have?

• Can we sustain the pockets of stability regionally and will Somalis solve their problems without interference from the international community?

• How will a shift to a more regulated economic sector be accepted and adapted by the private sector and will this improve employment opportunities for Somalis?

• How can culture and religion be used in a positive way: can Islam be the single most uniting factor among the Somali people? Will there be new ideologies?

• Why are youth more marginalised and what has created this marginalisation – what has been/is the government’s role in this?

• Will fragmented regions ever unite and what will be their incentive – could clan-based divisions be reversed?

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How to use the questions and next steps

The 12 critical questions are compelling in their own right and will shape the future of stability in

Somalia. Therefore, thinking and talking about these issues will prove vital when developing, evaluating and adapting programmes. As indicated, in an earlier section, the questions have the two-fold purpose of 1/ exploring responses to them in “the field”, as well as 2/ to serve as tools to interrogate and strengthen activities. How to go about this?

1/ exploring responses to questions in the field:

• Identify key individuals (also referring to the list of who was “absent”) and set up a formal scenario-oriented interview. Many of these questions are composites of two or three sub questions and are open-ended. It is therefore advisable to select from the 12 critical questions a set that is most closely matched to the experience of the interviewee.

Realistically between five and six questions can be addressed in an hour during a formal interview.

• Convene a facilitated round table/focus group discussion. This is similar to the interview with individuals: convene a small group of people (5-7) and have them discuss each question as a group. Select again four to five questions to be addressed in about an hour.

• Explore responses to the questions informally. Keep some of the questions in mind or written in your notebook and discuss them with people you meet, over coffee or as part of your regular meetings. This is a useful approach because it may provide a more informal yet more authentic response from individuals, keeping in mind the future-oriented context of the workshop..

2/ using the questions as tools to interrogate and strengthen activities:

• Print the questions on a sheet of paper and post next to your computer, and when working on your programme, designing programmes or evaluating progress, refer to them. Refer to the responses you have obtained to these questions when assessing your programme: how will these influence your programming and your aims?

• Assess whether you are making implicit assumptions about these questions in your programmes. For example are you promoting trust in one constituency rather than in another, promoting social divisions? Are you supporting youth activities without addressing the underlying causes of youth marginalisation? Are we promoting secularism, when including religious aspects would prove more productive?

At any stage, if needed, do not hesitate to contact the scenario facilitator.

The responses to the questions will form the basis for the second workshop. When we reconvene later in the year to develop scenarios we will begin with the review of the responses that have been obtained. These will likely be hugely diverse because each interviewee will have had different opinions. This is where the challenge lies: different opinions mean different futures and therefore different scenarios. The scenario facilitator's task at this stage will be to make sense of the wealth of information and identify the emerging trends. What is clear, however, is that the conversation has moved from a “failed state” closed conversation to an open one about possibilities, outlooks and real questioning.

The rationale behind this project is to offer an opportunity to collaboratively make sense of long-term developments in a challenging and sensitive environment; to explore questions relative to stabilisation in futures that may or may not be the ones we hope for, but which we may have to address; to ensure that plans and strategies find relevance and application even when new developments lead to scenarios we may not have considered individually, but as a group can develop and find answers to.

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Appendix 1: Full list of questions

Trust (business) Judiciary Justice, Armed non-state actors and Conceptual thinking & knowledge.

1. Why is trust/accountability/ownership existing in the private sphere but not the public?

2. How to transform this trust from private sector into the public sector?

3. How do you program in an “either...or” context?

4. How do we create a critical mass of individuals who exhibit a “blend”?

5. People trust the clan system more than the government system, how can we transform the clan trust to trust the system?

Geopolitics

1. Will Somalis solve their problems without interference with the international community?

2. Will Somalia join the EAC?

3. Will the uprising in the Middle East affect Somalia?

4. What impact will Diaspora lobbying have?

5. How will the referendum in Southern Sudan effect Somalia?

Power

1. Will emerging leadership be legitimate?

2. Will equity prevail?

3. Will clan continue to dominate politics?

4. Will there be consensus on Government?

Livelihoods and economy

1. How will a shift to a more regulated economic sector by accepted and adapted by the private sector?

2. What interventions will improve employment opportunities for Somalis?

3. What will the impact on Somalia be due to global climate change and environmental degradation?

4. How will regional authorities settle disputes over common resources and land?

5. What effects will the trend towards regional integration be on Somalia?

Youth

1. The youth are more marginalised, why is this the case?

2. What created marginalisation?

3. What is the government’s role and what have they contributed to the marginalisation to the youth?

Gender

1. Without devaluing religion and culture how can we draw and get the full potential from women?

2. Do women have a role in disempowering clan militias if they are supplying ammunition?

3. Can we sustain the pocket of stability regionally?

Community

1. Can Islam be the most single uniting factor among the Somali people?

2. How can culture and religion be used in a positive way?

3. Will fragmented regions ever unite and what will be their incentive?

4. Are there opportunities in reversing clan based divisions?

Culture and Religion

1. Who will influence the power?

2. Will Somalis be able to move away from clan?

3. Will there be new ideologies?

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Identity

1. How do we exploit Somali identity to further our program objectives and the goals of Somalia?

2. How will increasing numbers of Diaspora affect identity?

Public institutions.

1. Where do clans fit politically?

2. Is federalism a solution?

3. What system will Somali’s prefer?

4. Will politicians/ people in power allow citizen lead choice?

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Appendix 2: Glossary

Absent constituents: individuals or institutions that are not taking part in the workshop, for whatever reason.

Common themes: these are themes that represent the many key structures identified through the panel of themes.

Critical questions: questions that have been identified through the analysis of structures. They are thought of as being important in their own right and to be of help in thinking about the future.

Key structures: underlying forces that determine events and outcomes.

Panel of themes: a topic area that is thought of having broad relevance to the future of stability in

Somalia.

Predictable: an area that will develop in a way that we can anticipate already today. This differs from certainty in that there are still options for change.

Questions: areas to explore, which have emerged through the analysis of common themes. This workshop has produced 38 such questions. The 12 critical questions are a reduced sub-set of the 38 and offer a more manageable remit.

Scenarios: Scenarios are descriptions of journeys to possible futures.

Unpredictable: an area that will develop in ways that cannot be anticipated with the information we currently possess.

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Appendix 3: List of Participants

Aarun Kulmie IOM

Abdi Jama Ghedi IOM

Abdi Raghe AFREC abdi.raghe@afrec.org Abdikadir Mohamud Mercy Corps amohamud@so.mercycorps.org

Abdirizak Hassan Abdillahi IOM

Abdishakur Hassan Abdi IOM Abdullahi Mohamed USAID

Ahmed Moalin IOM ahmedmoalin@hotmail.com

Ali Yare Somaction aaiyare114@yahoo.com

Alina Mutua DAI alina.mutua@googlemail.com Amal Ibrahim IOM

Angi Yoder-Maina USAID ayoder-maina@usaid.gov

Brad David IOM bdavid@iom.int Burhaan Warsame ASEP bwarsame@gmail.com

Dekha Ibrahim dekhabdi@gmail.com;

dekha@consultant.com;

Eng. Ahmed Ali Elmi IOM

Eng. Ali Ibrahim Hassan alihassan.ibrahim@yahoo.com

Eng. Muse Sheikh IOM

Faisa Loyaan CARE faisaloyaan@hotmail.com Fred Onyango IOM fonyango@iom.int

Hodan Hassan USAID

Idill Roble IOM Jabril Abdulle CRD jabril@crdsomalia.org

John Lokaala IOM jlokaala@iom.int;lokaala@gmail.com

Josphat Wachira USAID RCMG

Khadra Jama IOM kjama@iom.inc Magret Jobit DAI mjobita@yahoo.com

Mireille Widmer UNDP Community Safety mireille.widmer@undp.org ;

mireille_widmer@hotmail.com Mohammed Adow PACT PEACE II mohamed.adow@pactke.org

Mohammed Alikher Elwak binuali2@hotmail.com

Mohammed Omar IOM momar@iom.int Nasrudin Omar Osman IOM

Natalie Grant IOM ngrant@iom.int

Nicholas Odhiambo IOM nodhiambo@iom.int

Osman Moallim Network/Somali CEWERU osmanmoallim@yahoo.com Patricia Ondari IOM pondari@iom.int

Patrick Noack Scenario Development pn@scenariodevelopment.com

Rebecca Lawrence DAI Rebecca_Lawrence@dai.com Richard Gachinga Munuhe IOM RGachinga@iom.int

Sharazad Dalel IOM

Sharmarke Osman EDC sharmarkeosman@hotmail.com Sophie Kelliher PACT-KENYA sophie.kelliher@pactke.org

Ted LeVassuer DAI Ted_LeVasseur@dai.com

Ubah Hassan Abdi IOM ubah19@yahoo.com

William Luchina IOM wluchina@iom.int Zahra Isse IOM fhassan@iom.int