RFI 72068523RFI00002_ MDM in the Sahel_ Final English version.signed.RT.pdf

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RFI) - Sahel Regional Office (SRO) Regional Misinformation, Disinformation, and Malinformation (MDM) in the Sahel

RFI # 72068523RFI00002

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission in Senegal / Sahel Regional Office (SRO) is in the early stages of designing a new mis/dis/mal-information (MDM) activity for the Sahel region. To that end, USAID/Senegal/SRO is reaching out to all stakeholders and interested parties to obtain comments and suggestions in order to incorporate relevant information and innovative approaches in the design of a potential activity.

By issuing this Request for Information (RFI), USAID/Senegal/SRO will solicit input from the broad community of private sector actors, public institutions, development partners, non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, industry associations, think tanks, and academia concerned with the issue of mis/dis/malinformation in the Sahel. Comments will be used to inform a design document that is clear, maximizes development impact, facilitates coordination with existing and planned U.S. Government (USG) and USAID activities and other development partner programs, and aligns with the priorities of partner governments.

DISCLAIMER

The information contained within the RFI is intended solely as a thought-piece; ideas may change significantly during the activity’s design and approval process. In addition, this RFI is issued solely for information and planning purposes. It does not constitute a Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO), Request for Applications (RFA), an Annual Program Statement, a Request for Proposal, a Request for Quotation, an Invitation for Bids, a Solicitation, or any indication that SRO will make an award from this RFI. Responses to this RFI shall not be portrayed as applications and will not be accepted by the USG to form a binding agreement.

This RFI is not to be construed as a commitment by the USG to issue any NOFO or ultimately award of an agreement on the basis of this RFI, or to pay for any information submitted as a result of this request. Responders are solely responsible for all expenses associated with responding to this RFI. It is the respondent’s responsibility to monitor www.sam.gov or www.grants.gov for the release of any further subsequent procurement. Note that responding to this RFI will not give any advantage to any firm or organization in any subsequent procurement and will not lead to an organizational conflict of interest. Responses will be strictly held confidential.

INSTRUCTIONS

Responses to this RFI must be in Microsoft Word or PDF format and submitted by June 02, 2023, 17:00, Dakar Local Time (GMT). To expedite our review and also be considerate of your time, please keep responses to no more than 4 pages in length, 12 pt font. Responses may http://www.sam.gov/ http://www.grants.gov/ be submitted in English or French. Please number each page consecutively. While the limit on the length of submissions is four pages, we value concise, issue-specific comments.

USAID has identified 10 questions in Attachment 1. Responses to this RFI may include feedback on any, all, or none of those specific questions, which reflect the areas of interest and/or knowledge gaps that USAID has prioritized to date. However, USAID recognizes that not every respondent will be interested or able to respond to each and every question. Further, if you have additional observations, information or recommendations to USAID related to mis/dis/mal-information outside of those questions, we welcome them.

Please send responses to this RFI via email to Aminata Diallo at amdiallo@usaid.gov and copy to rtrimble@usaid.gov and hcisse@usaid.gov with the subject title “Request for Information (RFI): USAID/Senegal-SRO Regional MDM” no later than the date/time stated above. You will only receive an electronic confirmation acknowledging receipt of your response. No feedback or debrief will be provided on comments received. Phone calls or hard copy responses will not be accepted.

Thank you for your assistance and interest in USAID programming.

Sincerely, Robert Trimble, Regional Agreement Officer

Attachment-1 - Questions For Response.

mailto:rtrimble@usaid.gov mailto:hcisse@usaid.gov

I. Background

Development Problem

Access to the internet and social media is on the rise in the Sahel, and with that has come a growing trend of online misinformation. Along with already-existing rumors and false information, recent reports have noted a proliferation of coordinated disinformation campaigns across the region, including in Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.1 These have had an outsized impact in a region with underdeveloped independent media–including print, broadcast and online sources--and limited alternative reliable news sources.

Definition of terms:

USAID’s Disinformation Primer defines disinformation as “information that is shared with the intent to mislead people,” and misinformation as “false information spread by someone who believes [it] to be true,” and notes that regardless of intent, the sharing of such false information is dangerous.2 The primer also defines the related concern of malinformation as “deliberate publication of private information for personal or private interest, as well as the deliberate manipulation of genuine content.”3 The three together make up the broader problem of information disorder. Misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation are often discussed together as

MDM.

Current challenges:

MDM is a critical threat to the development and social cohesion of Sahel countries in several ways.

Above all, MDM undermines public confidence in democratic and civic institutions, including governments and media, at a time when the region confronts daunting threats of food insecurity, climate change, economic fragility, and violent extremism. MDM leads to a loss of “information integrity,” meaning facts and data that shape public debate are no longer perceived as reliable or easy to discern. As the information landscape or “ecosystem” lacks credible sources or truth-tellers, it is increasingly difficult to bring a range of perspectives to the table for constructive discussions to achieve consensus on solutions to common problems. Importantly, the initial falsehood tends to outlast any efforts to counter or discredit it. That is particularly problematic in a region with a low level of media literacy, a high percentage of illiteracy, and weak or underdeveloped independent media (a traditional source of alternative fact-based information).

MDM is also a threat to peace and security in fragile environments as it capitalizes on polarizing narratives that drive its dissemination. It is salient in conflict-prone contexts when conditions in society make people feel a greater need for in-grouping and when high profile leaders or political figures encourage their followers to indulge their desire for identity-affirming misinformation;

1 Africa Center for Strategic Studies. Mapping Disinformation in Africa. April 26, 2022. Retrieved at:

africacenter.org/spotlight/mapping-disinformation-in-africa/ (also available in French) 2 Disinformation Primer page 3.

3 Ibid.

https://www.usaid.gov/democracy/documents/disinformation-primer social media fuels this kind of MDM’s spread, as Nobel Laureate Maria Ressa said, “lies laced with anger and hate spread fastest” and ‘belonging’ to one’s in-group is stronger than facts.4

The threat posed by MDM to development and social cohesion comes both from external and internal actors. Over the past two years, foreign influence campaigns weaponizing disinformation have made international headlines, particularly in Mali and Burkina Faso. False narratives have been deployed to shape public opinion and exacerbate social tensions to advance certain foreign interests. According to the African Center for Strategic Studies, Russia has been the leading originator of foreign influence operations, which employ a common Soviet strategy of dezinformatsiya:

This strategy amplifies grievances and exploits divisions within a targeted society, fostering fragmentation and inaction—all while affording the perpetrators plausible deniability. The objective often is less to convince as to confuse citizens—thereby creating false equivalences between democratic and nondemocratic political actors, precipitating disillusion and apathy. 5

These campaigns have had an almost immediate and dramatic impact, with opinion polls showing drastic changes in the attitudes of how local populations perceive foreign countries and affecting international relations, security partnerships, and the ability of journalists to report. For example, campaigns to spread anti-French sentiment corresponded with an accelerated French military drawdown and the expulsion of international news organizations, such as Radio France International (RFI) and France 24, further decreasing access to information. The campaigns are having a chilling effect on local journalists, who are less inclined to report on the role of Russia.6

Observers have noted the increasing sophistication of these campaigns and their pervasiveness in local popular culture, with some efforts developing animated comics, computer-generated images, and “infotainment”-type content to appeal to young people. The complexity of the networks through which the content is distributed and amplified has also increased and obscures its origins, making it harder for ordinary consumers to understand its sources. This threat is particularly acute in societies where a rapid expansion of internet access is exponentially increasing the sources from where people get information, drowning out traditional purveyors of information, and allowing malign actors to take advantage. Coincidentally, as detailed in a 2022 report from Search for Common Ground, the Sahel has some of the highest growth rates of internet usage in the world (even if the base number of users remain low),with internet users increasing by 18.5% in Mali, 18.9% in Burkina Faso, and 20.9% in Niger between 2020 and 2021.7

In many countries, MDM is also pushed and spread by domestic actors for various reasons. “Fake News in West Africa,” a report published by the Nigeria-based Centre for Democracy and Development, identifies seven different types of actors who spread MDM in the region, most of

4“Belonging Is Stronger Than Facts’: The Age of Misinformation,” The New York Times. May 7, 2021 https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/07/world/asia/misinformation-disinformation-fake-news.html 5 Mapping Disinformation in Africa 6 Reporters Without Borders. What it’s like to be a journalist in the Sahel. March 4, 2023.

7 Jiaxuan Yue, Habibou Bako, Kelsey Hampton, Katie Smith, “Conflict and Online Space in the Sahel:

Challenges and Recommendations,” Search For Common Ground, July 2022 https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/07/world/asia/misinformation-disinformation-fake-news.html them domestic.8 For example, the report notes the increasing reliance on “cyberwarriors” rallied (and sometimes paid) by politicians to promote propaganda and disinformation to bolster their bids for office and to attack rivals.9 Political disinformation has also been produced and pushed out on an industrial level, by specialist consultancy firms; such activity has been unveiled in Senegal and Niger.10 Additionally, the report highlights the role of other actors who may not be aiming to spread MDM but who, due to their influence and access to social media, have also been vectors or transmission points, such as diaspora communities. Finally, the report identifies local media itself as a transmitter of MDM, noting that “[m]edia outlets engage in the spreading of falsehoods indirectly by poor reporting, not verifying stories before they publish them, or by being paid to print press statements or stories that are heavily politicized”.11

The problem of MDM is closely linked to hate speech and online harassment. The USAID Disinformation Primer notes that disinformation may have a “disproportionate impact on marginalized populations” and that harassment campaigns use MDM to “silence…opposing opinions and/or specific groups in society, such as women or ethnic groups” (page 6). The issue of gendered disinformation, which aims to discourage women’s participation in public life, has recently been gaining more attention. Hate speech and harassment have been on the rise in some Sahel countries. A December 2022 report from the International Crisis Group (ICG) details the rise in online threats and divisive language alongside a sharp increase in the proportion of the population with access to the internet in Chad over the last three years, and notes that this has the potential to “...amplif[y] socio-political tensions already exacerbated by the [political] transition.”12

The general public often encounters MDM via WhatsApp threads, SMS, audio messages or even community radio, but lack access to alternate sources of information that could provide fact-based information and fact-checks. Youth are particularly prone to searching out information through videos on TikTok and Instagram, as noted in Mali, where influencers use the platforms to spread

MDM.

Finally, the increased public awareness of MDM is a double-edged sword for individuals trying to protect or advance democratic principles. Amid a rising tide of MDM, many governments have also labeled diverse viewpoints, opposition positions, and civil society voices that challenge official narratives as “fake news” to advance their political interests.

Countering MDM:

While the literature on MDM and how to address it has been growing, there is very little research on this issue in Africa in general, and the Sahel in particular. Existing research–mainly from Europe and North America–indicates that there are some effective approaches to countering

8 Jamie Hitchen and Idayat Hassan, “Fake News in West Africa: Flows, Facilitators and Fixes,” Centre for Democracy & Development, June 2022.

9 Ibid, p. 5 10 Ibid, p. 10 11 Ibid, p. 9 12 International Crisis Group. “Chad’s Transition: Easing Tensions Online,” Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°183, 13 December 2022. Retrieved at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/b183-chads-transition-easing-tensions-online (also available in French) https://www.state.gov/gendered-disinformation-tactics-themes-and-trends-by-foreign-malign-actors/ https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/b183-chads-transition-easing-tensions-online https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/b183-chads-transition-easing-tensions-online disinformation including tracking disinformation trends; using digital forensics to observe, monitor, and expose the spread of MDM; and mapping its sources, diffusion, and audiences.

Successful approaches have also mapped key disinformation messages and narratives that are exploited by disinformation purveyors. Those efforts can help pre-bunk and counter emergent narratives before they gain traction, or conduct fact-checking or debunking. Broader efforts can include educating populations on media literacy and building greater social resilience to disinformation, and supporting local media to fill information voids with accurate, credible content.

Significant evidence of best practices against MDM has come out of Ukraine and Eastern Europe in recent years. And while models from other contexts may not be effective or appropriate in the Sahel, it is important to understand to what extent those efforts have been effective, given that the originators of foreign disinformation campaigns are the same in at least some cases and will likely use similar tactics and approaches.

One well-documented counter-MDM model is a sophisticated “integrated system” in Lithuania that builds linkages between technology-driven monitoring efforts (which use algorithms to identify, track, and rank the threat of specific MDM threads in a given information environment), individuals that confront MDM where it spreads (by responding to trolls sharing or amplifying those threads), and journalists (who report on and debunk false claims driving MDM).13 A recent report on civil society responses to MDM in Ukraine also highlights “open networks of cooperation” across a wide variety of actors, as well as the use of new technologies and “deep preparation” facilitated by long experience with Kremlin disinformation campaigns.14 Again, while these models are context-specific, USAID welcomes broader community feedback on how Sahel-relevant approaches might respond to similar threats or dynamics.

II. Activity Concept

USAID/Senegal’s Sahel Regional Office (SRO) is exploring a regional approach to countering MDM and considering how USAID technical assistance might be most effective on this issue.

SRO primarily supports four country offices in the region: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and The Gambia. However, a potential activity could engage with other Sahel countries with USAID Missions, such as Niger. The activity will prioritize learning and adaptation, and should draw lessons from USAID/Mali’s ongoing efforts in this area. USAID anticipates a strong focus on supporting local leadership in understanding, tracking, and countering MDM in the Sahel region.

This will include learning from local and regional organizations active in this space, and supporting efforts to build networks of such organizations across the region and with other regions where like-minded actors are responding to disinformation threats.

13 Global Engagement Center. “A Counter-Disinformation System That Works,” GEC Counter- Disinformation Dispatches #1, January 8, 2020, retrieved at https://e.america.gov/t/ViewEmail/i/C18DF8CD7B64226D2540EF23F30FEDED 14 Adam Fivenson, Galyna Petrenko, Veronika Vichova, and Andrej Polkscuk, “Shielding Democracy:

Civil Society Adaptations to Kremlin Disinformation about Ukraine,” National Endowment for Democracy, February 2023, retrieved at: https://www.ned.org/shielding-democracy-civil-society-adaptations-kremlin-disinformation-ukraine/ https://e.america.gov/t/ViewEmail/i/C18DF8CD7B64226D2540EF23F30FEDED

III. Key Resources

USAID Disinformation Primer - An overview of "disinformation culture," including key concepts and terminology, case studies, and programmatic design options

Department of State Global Engagement Center Disarming Disinformation page - Provides reports and research particularly on Russian-origin disinformation and efforts to counter it. Available in English, French, Arabic, and other languages.

Countering Disinformation - Provides information and resources on election-related disinformation.

https://www.usaid.gov/democracy/documents/disinformation-primer https://www.state.gov/disarming-disinformation/#reports https://counteringdisinformation.org/

ATTACHMENT 1: Questions for Response

IMPORTANT: Responses may include feedback on any, all, or none of the following 10 questions.

These questions reflect the areas of interest and/or knowledge gaps that USAID has prioritized to date. However, we recognize that not every respondent will be interested or able to respond to each and every question. Further, we welcome additional observations, information or recommendations to USAID related to mis/dis/mal-information outside of the questions below.

MDM Patterns in the Sahel

1. How are organizations currently monitoring and tracking the actors most commonly spreading MDM in the Sahel?

2. To what extent does MDM in West Africa circulate across language barriers and/or national borders?

Efforts to Counter MDM

3. Are there examples or models for countering MDM that have proven effective or are showing progress in Sahel countries or in West Africa more broadly?

a. Who is leading on these examples?

b. What are their approaches?

c. What about these approaches is working?

d. Conversely, are there examples or models for countering MDM that have failed? If so, how and why did they fail?

4. Are there communities in the Sahel that have shown resilience to MDM? What have been the factors contributing to that resilience?

a. How can USAID reinforce resilience factors?

5. Given the diversity of contexts in the Sahel (i.e. urban/rural, generational, online-connected/not online, etc.), who are the trusted community members that have historically served as reliable purveyors of information, as well as purveyors of media literacy information?

6. Who are the most prominent local and/or regional organizations that are conducting monitoring and observation of the information ecosystem?

a. How is their monitoring and observation being used?

b. What could they be doing better?

7. How can traditional media organizations become more effective in providing accurate, authoritative information, gain more trust in communities, and be ahead of or competitive with purveyors of false information?

8. How are different social media companies engaging on MDM in the Sahel? What opportunities exist for further engagement?

9. How can USAID minimize the risk that technical assistance related to countering MDM might potentially harm, compromise or discredit the work of local actors?

10. Are there any other points that USAID should consider in designing a potential new regional activity to counter MDM?