J.4 SECURITY SCENARIO.docx

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USAID/Ukraine Partner Liaison Security Operation (PLSO) Activity
Solicitation number
72012124R00010
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The document provided is the Attachment J.4 - Security Scenario from the USAID/Ukraine Partner Liaison Security Operation (PLSO) Request for Proposals (RFP) # 72012124R00010. The scenario describes an incident where an implementing partner's team traveling to Novomykolaivka in Ukraine went missing, and the information and actions the PLSO should take in response. The RFP solicits proposals from qualified organizations to provide services required to implement the PLSO activity. The RFP has a closing date of May 9, 2024 at 15:00 local Kyiv time for Phase 1 proposals. The PLSO is being procured by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Ukraine.

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USAID/Ukraine Partner Liaison Security Operation (PLSO)

RFP # 72012124R00010

ATTACHMENT J.4 - SECURITY SCENARIO

Initial Contact:

On October 10, 202X, at 14:00 local Ukraine time, the PLSO received a phone call from the Implementing Partner (IP) XYZ's Security Manager Sasha who relays the following incident: an IP team of 4 staff - a driver, and 3 programming staff - traveled to Novomykolaivka in the Zaporiz'ka oblast to visit a subcontractor’s office, check the progress of the subcontractor’s implementation, and deliver some IT equipment, as per the contract. They drove an unmarked, soft skin SUV. The team left Kyiv on October 9th early in the morning and arrived at Dnipro around 18:00 on October 9th where they spent a night in a hotel. The team reported to the IP’s dedicated travel group on Signal while passing each large oblast center and upon arrival. The travel plan shows that the team planned to leave the hotel in Dnipro at 08:00 on October 10th and arrive at Novomykolaivka by 12:00, then depart back to Dnipro around 17:00 from Novomykolaivka on the same day (October 10th). The team reported upon departure from the hotel at 08:02, and upon leaving Zaporizzhia at 10:22. Up until this point, the trip had been going per the plan. The next expected message about arrival to Novomykolaivka never came. The cell phones of all members of the team were reported to be “out of reach”, and the satellite phone provided to them was inactive. The subcontractor in Novomykolaivka called at 13:00 on October 10 to inform XYZ’s Security Manager that the IP’s team had not arrived. In addition, the subcontractor mentioned the town was heavily shelled with artillery and aerial gliding bombs recently. There were rumors combat actions near Huliai Pole intensified, and military patrols were operating with increased intensity in the area, likely seeking Russian subversive groups. The IP’s Security Manager checked the vehicle’s GPS tracker location and found that it shows a location 5 km outside of Novomykolaivka on the road towards Orikhiv (south of Novomykolaivka). The IP asked for the PLSO’s advice and assistance.

Questions:

1. What’s the PLSO’s assessment of the situation given the only above information under “Initial Contact”?

2. What advice could the PLSO give to this IP knowing only the above information under “Initial Contact”?

3. What next actions should the PLSO consider knowing only the above information under “Initial Contact”?

Later Stage:

At 17:57 of the same day (October 10th), one of the IP team members (a Programming Officer named Yuriy) called from his cellphone to the Security Manager of XYZ to briefly report that the vehicle was stopped on approach to Novomykolaivka by armed men appearing to be Ukraine Special Forces. The armed men demanded to “borrow” the IP’s SUV vehicle right away since the security situation in the area had worsened significantly, and Russian military units had broken the frontline near Huliai Pole and were moving towards Novomykolaivka. The lead member of the IP team, Serhiy, denied their demand and requested to make a call. However, all IP team members were taken out of the vehicle, searched, and forcefully taken to an unknown location near Novomykolaivka town by the armed group. Yuriy managed to negotiate with one of the armed guards about a phone call, making a brief call to the Security Manager of XYZ, however, the phone call died mid-conversation. The Security Manager of XYZ, at 08:00 on October 12th, called the PLSO to report this call from Yuriy. Open sources and contacts in the area confirm that combat had intensified, but the frontline has moved very little near Huliai Pole (by hundreds of meters).

Questions:

4. What’s the PLSO’s assessment of the situation knowing all information above under “Initial Contact” and “Labor Stage”?

5. What advice could the PLSO give to this IP knowing all information above under “Initial Contact” and “Labor Stage”?

6. What next actions should the PLSO consider knowing all information above under “Initial Contact” and “Labor Stage”?

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