HR001122S0011.pdf

Broad Agency Announcement

Resilient Supply-Demand Networks (RSDN)

INFORMATION INNOVATION OFFICE

HR001122S0011

February 28, 2022

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART II: FULL TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT

I. Funding Opportunity Description

A. Program Overview B. Program Structure C. Program Metrics D. Government-Furnished Property/Equipment/Information E. Intellectual Property

II. Award Information A. General Award Information B. Fundamental Research

III. Eligibility Information A. Eligible Applicants B. Organizational Conflicts of Interest C. Cost Sharing/Matching D. Other Eligibility Criteria

IV. Application and Submission Information A. Address to Request Application Package B. Content and Form of Application Submission

V. Application Review Information A. Evaluation Criteria B. Review of Proposals

VI. Award Administration Information A. Selection Notices and Notifications B. Administrative and National Policy Requirements C. Reporting D. Electronic Systems E. DARPA Embedded Entrepreneur Initiative (EEI)

VII. Agency Contacts VIII. Other Information

IX. APPENDIX 1 – PROPOSAL SUMMARY SLIDE

PART I: OVERVIEW INFORMATION

Federal Agency Name – Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Information Innovation Office (I2O) Funding Opportunity Title – Resilient Supply-and-Demand Network (RSDN) Announcement Type – Initial announcement Funding Opportunity Number – HR001122S0011 Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) – 12.910 Research and

Technology Development Dates o Posting Date: February 28, 2022 o Proposers Day: March 1, 2022 o Abstract Due Date and Time: March 15, 2022, 12:00pm (ET) o Questions Due: April 11, 2022, 12:00pm (ET) o Proposal Due Date and Time: April 25, 2022, 12:00pm (ET) o Solicitation Closing Date: August 28, 2022, 5:00 pm (ET)

Program Overview – By providing situational awareness and stress testing, RSDN will enable the Department of Defense and commercial partners to appropriately address systemic risk in procurement and acquisition and to identify and mitigate systemic fragilities before they cause disruptions. The RSDN program will achieve these capabilities by developing a data integration platform and analytical toolkit for supply-and-demand networks. RSDN will use data on supplies of pharmaceuticals, military metals, and military food to implement these novel capabilities in realistic environments and to facilitate transition to operational partners. RSDN’s capstone will be a stress-testing framework to check for strategic vulnerabilities and explore possible mitigations.

Total amount anticipated to be awarded – $32 million.

Anticipated individual awards – Multiple awards are anticipated.

Types of instruments that may be awarded – Procurement Contracts, Cooperative

Agreements, or Other Transactions.

Agency contact o Points of Contact The BAA Coordinator for this effort can be reached at:

Email: RSDN@darpa.mil.

DARPA/I2O

ATTN: HR001122S0011

675 North Randolph Street Arlington, VA 22203-2114

PART II: FULL TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT

I. Funding Opportunity Description

This publication constitutes a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) as contemplated in Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 6.102(d)(2) and 35.016 and 2 C.F.R. § 200.203. Any resultant award negotiations will follow all pertinent laws and regulations, and any negotiations and/or awards for procurement contracts will use procedures under FAR 15.4, Contract Pricing, as specified in the BAA.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is soliciting innovative proposals in the following areas of interest: network maps of supply chains, stress testing and scenario design for supply chains as networked systems, natural language processing and computational modeling of procurement contracts, legal entity identification and resolution, threat/vulnerability modeling and mitigation/resilience policy development for procurement networks. Proposed research should investigate innovative approaches that enable revolutionary advances in science, devices, or systems. Specifically excluded is research that primarily results in evolutionary improvements to the existing state of practice.

A. Program Overview

Introduction

The Department of Defense (DoD) has a critical need to secure its sources of materiel against both intentional (including adversarial) and unintentional disruptions. Extensive global networks of private-sector vendors, commonly called “supply chains,” collaborate to provide these key resources, including precursor components and materials. The Resilient Supply-and-Demand Network (RSDN) program adopts the phrase “supply-and-demand network” (SDN) in lieu of “supply chain” to emphasize that the strategic challenges are more extensive than the logistic challenges of delivering (“supplying”) materiel.

SDNs are open, complex, evolving systems, whose dynamics reflect the impact of both external factors (e.g., conflict, climate change, etc.) and internal behavior (e.g., inventory management) driven by the often locally-focused decisions of SDN participants themselves. The economic forces of globalization have historically emphasized SDN efficiency (cost and timeliness) over SDN resilience (response to shocks). SDN resilience is a characteristic of the SDN system as a whole. Resilience enhancements, therefore, require coordinated action among SDN participants, who may individually lack the incentive and discretion to undertake this complex process.

SDNs are potential sources of strategic surprise for the DoD. Surprise in the context of SDNs is rarely beneficial. Key underlying sources of SDN surprise are:

Imperfect knowledge of the current structure of the SDN itself;

Difficulty in predicting different kinds of shocks from the large space of threats and vulnerabilities; and, Difficulty in predicting changes in the SDN due to endogenous behavioral shifts, which can be amplified abruptly and dramatically through feedback effects.

To expose and mitigate these sources of surprise, RSDN will develop novel information resources and practical analytical tools, including:

Granular, up-to-date maps of SDNs, identifying individual providers (network nodes) and their specific trading relationships with each other (network edges);

Augmentation of the basic network maps with detailed organizational features describing the nodes and detailed descriptions of the procurement relationships governing the edges, including models of observability;

A broad and extensible set of analytical tools for exploring fragilities (threats and vulnerabilities) in SDNs; and, Techniques for stress testing SDNs by specifying and simulating their responses to exogenous shocks and endogenous feedback.

Background

There is a fallacy of composition in analyzing risks at the system level. The whole is not the sum of the parts. Despite this fallacy, current approaches to SDN resilience are generally the purview of individual vendors, who address risk in the broader context of overall supply-chain management. Individual vendors may be unavoidably myopic, with good visibility into their immediate (first-tier) trading relationships, but lacking awareness of the full SDN system.

In this context, practitioners have historically monitored and managed for efficiency, rather than risk, creating an efficiency-resilience tradeoff that is usually optimized for efficiency. For example, although inventory buffers can dampen supply shocks, inventory is costly. Lean management techniques, such as just-in-time inventory, strongly emphasize one side of the efficiency-resilience trade-off, implicitly increasing risk. This increase can be non-linear due to network effects and the public-good nature of systemic resilience, which tend to magnify risks at the level of the system as a whole.

For the DoD, legacy processes for supply-chain risk management (SCRM) tend to emphasize local vulnerabilities, neglecting systemic threats and vulnerabilities. Critical information is trapped in proprietary, confidential silos, and the U.S. lacks system-wide maps and strategic situational awareness. SCRM illuminations tend to be tightly targeted – non-systemic in scope – and to emphasize factors that disrupt delivery and/or contaminate production. This focus tends to discount the abrupt behavioral shifts in inventory and funding management that often propagate following stress events.

At the same time, the DoD cannot rely on the private sector alone to create system-wide solutions for SDN risk monitoring and analysis. Industry lacks the incentives to do this work at the requisite scale/scope. SDNs generally involve many distinct decision-making units, primarily profit-driven firms. Addressing issues that operate at system scale, like SDN resilience, involve coordination problems that individual vendors are ill-equipped to handle, in part because competitive pressures discourage data sharing among vendors. There is a relative handful of major players, such as Amazon and Walmart, with both significant corporate resources and extensive internal supply networks. But they are exceptions to the rule. Most individual vendors lack both the data and the analytical capacity to attempt looking at the entire system, so the data sufficiency, data quality, and model-risk problems all loom large. Moreover, DoD has both special concerns, such as highly specialized materiel and threats from nation-state adversaries, and special resources, such as SCRM teams and Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) standards, that do not apply to ordinary situations in industry.

Program Scope The RSDN program will develop a data integration platform and analytical toolkit for SDNs.

Although the ultimate goal is a collection of capabilities that will be broadly applicable to a wide range of materiel, RSDN will focus on three specific use-cases for purposes of research and prototyping:

pharmaceuticals, including precursor components and raw materials, military metals, focusing on copper as a specific example, and military food, including food services and meals ready-to-eat (MREs).

These use-cases will explore the capabilities in realistic environments and facilitate transition to operational partners.

RSDN will emphasize fragilities that emerge at the level of the system (or SDN) as a whole, but many of the mapping and analytical tools may also support more localized illuminations. Under RSDN, the set of analytical tools should be open-ended, encouraging extensions of the capabilities as novel data and techniques arise.

RSDN’s capstone will be a stress-testing modeling and simulation framework to check for strategic vulnerabilities and explore possible mitigations. The goal is an understanding of the fragilities and likely response of SDNs under a wide range of potentially unprecedented stress episodes and system configurations.

B. Program Structure

The RSDN program is planned as a 48-month program organized into three phases. Phases 1 and 2 will each be 18-months, followed by a 12-month Phase 3. Phases 2 and 3 should be included as separately priced options. Options may be exercised, at the Government’s sole discretion, based on technical progress measured against the metrics and milestones defined in the BAA and funding availability.

The program is divided into three Technical Areas (TAs) to support program goals. TA2 depends on the resources provisioned by TA1. TA3 depends on both TA1 and TA2.

TA1: Data curation and reconciliation TA2: SDN augmentation and analysis TA3: SDN stress-testing and fragility-mitigation simulator

While a proposing organization may submit separate proposals to any or all of the three technical areas, each organization will be selected for award for, at most, one single technical area. For more information see Section III. D.1.

Operational Use-Cases

RSDN’s TAs will address the three use-cases of specific operational SDNs, noted in Program Scope above. The use-cases represent a diversity of operational domains with the intent that the RSDN framework should ultimately be flexible enough to address a wide variety of other use-cases not included specifically in the RSDN program. Performers must be prepared to support all three use-cases.

TA1 – Data curation and reconciliation The TA1 performer(s) will procure commercial data and integrate them with relevant government data as required to represent SDNs as directed network maps, consisting of individual vendors (nodes) and the procurement relationships (edges) between them.

The TA1 performer(s) should augment the nodes in the basic network maps with details to include, but not be limited to:

Organizational structure – large vendors will have many subsidiaries, often located in foreign jurisdictions, potentially exposing the vendor to espionage, foreign legal liability, and geographically specific threats (e.g., monsoons);

Mergers – commonplace organizational changes, through mergers, acquisitions, major ownership shifts, partnerships, joint ventures, etc., can increase a vendor’s exposure to threats from espionage, economic competition, and financial shocks; and, Finances – a vendor’s weakening financial condition can increase its likelihood of bankruptcy and may tempt the vendor to partner with funders/organizations based in adversary nations.

The TA1 performer(s) should augment the edges in the basic network maps with details to include, but are not limited to:

Procurement agreements – these contracts contain critical risk information, via complete specifications of supplier-customer relationships, detailing in structured fashion (as legalese) all the key contingencies foreseen by the counterparties;

Ordering details – ordering/invoicing messages within procurement relationships are raw evidence of possible incipient shortages of materiel and may also reveal emerging inventory bullwhips (a “bullwhip” is the uncertainty-driven amplification of inventory shocks and new orders as one moves further up the supply chain); and, Shipping records – for transoceanic markets, shipping manifests and customs records provide raw evidence of actual materiel supplied, which may reveal incipient shortages and emerging logistical bottlenecks.

The TA1 performer(s) should, as possible, capture both the event date (date of merger, contract signing, shipment delivery, etc.) and measurement date (for data versioning purposes). In addition, the TA1 performer(s) should implement detailed provenance logs for all data items.

The TA1 performer(s) will marshal these SDN network maps for all three use-cases and provision them to users, including performers on the other TAs, via a data-access application programming interface (API). For cases where the underlying data are non-public or otherwise restricted, the TA1 performer(s) must offer privacy-preserving functionality that permits analysis of the sensitive data without exposing the data directly. In provisioning the network maps, the TA1 performer will develop and maintain standard, abstract representations of the data, including globally unique identification of nodes and edges, and detailed provenance information for all data in the RSDN repository. An important consideration is to support interoperability for downstream consumers of the data through the use of consistent data formats and well documented semantics across the API.

The TA1 performer(s) should prepare to make the data for RSDN network maps available to potential government transition partners, who may contribute (perhaps non-public) government data to the effort. Certain TA2 performer(s) may not be cleared for direct access to confidential data, so TA1 proposals should include approaches, such as anonymous surrogate data or remote execution facilities, to permit uncleared TA2 performer(s) to interact with the data, together with meaningful functionality to guarantee (within tolerances to be specified by the TA2 performer[s]) that the privacy approach(es) would not leak restricted information. For TA1 clearance requirements, reference Section III.D.2.

For evaluation of TA-level performance, TA1 proposers will suggest appropriate measures of performance (MOPs), categorized according to the four-part rubric outlined in the section below on “government evaluation.”

TA2 – SDN augmentation and analysis The TA2 performer(s) will develop an extensible set of analytical tools to instrument SDNs to describe and explore their fragilities (threats and vulnerabilities). Strong proposals will explore mechanisms, such as academic workshops, for encouraging external input and ideation to ensure that the resulting toolkit is wide-ranging and heterogeneous. TA2 must expose the analytical toolkit to users, including performer(s) on the other TAs, via an analytics API. An important consideration is to support interoperability for downstream consumers of the data through the use of consistent data formats and well-documented semantics across the API.

The central goal for TA2 is to improve situational awareness and limit surprise from SDNs, especially fragility modes that are both highly impactful and non-obvious. For example, correlated shocks (such as pandemic closure of Chinese factories/ports and pandemic surge in U.S. consumer demand for personal protective equipment (PPE)) and “wrong-way risk” (such as contingency plans to surge delivery of critical materiel when bottlenecks appear) are likely to trigger impactful and surprising fragility modes. In addition, analytics that aid in understanding the nature and role of (a) causality; (b) sensitivity; and/or (c) stability in an SDN are of particular interest.

TA2 analytics should include tools, such as extensions of network reconstruction algorithms, for identifying and prioritizing blind spots and other data quality issues in the TA1 network maps. In particular, TA2 performers should propose ways to assign degrees of confidence to both raw and derived information (analogous to analytic confidence in intelligence estimates). The TA2 toolkit should include innovations for effective communication/interaction with expert users regarding SDN fragilities.

Strong proposals will include approaches for analyzing the organizational structure of SDN vendor nodes, which often have subsidiaries exposed to local threats across numerous jurisdictions, and extracting risky contingencies from procurement contracts and detecting patterns in the cross-section of the Defense Logistics Agency’s (DLA) corpus of procurement agreements based on the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). Because contractual details are likely to be non-public, TA2 performers will need to coordinate with TA1 in their approaches to the analysis of procurement agreements (for example, by passing TA2 functions to TA1, rather than by passing TA1 data to TA2).

For evaluation of TA-level performance, TA2 proposers will suggest appropriate measures of performance, categorized according to the four-part rubric outlined in the section below on “government evaluation.”

TA3 – SDN stress-testing and fragility-mitigation simulator The TA3 performer(s) will develop a stress-testing framework for counterfactual (i.e., not simple recapitulations of historical experience) future SDN disruption scenarios and related mitigation policies. The stress testing framework should include: (a) tools for simulating the response of an SDN to well defined “what-if” scenarios, with or without the introduction of mitigation policies;

and (b) tools for designing scenarios that explore the space of SDN threats and vulnerabilities while plugging seamlessly into the simulator.

The process of designing and simulating scenarios will be critical for calibrating the simulation tools. The TA3 performer(s) will implement a detailed, structured approach to stress scenario design, addressing the very large space of SDN threats, vulnerabilities, and mitigating policies within the context of a finite scenario budget. Within this space, the subset of scenarios that are both plausible and “interesting” (both impactful and surprising) will typically be sparsely distributed. Strong TA3 proposals will consider both forward stress testing – i.e., understanding the set of unacceptable SDN disruptions that would likely ensue from a given stress event; and reverse stress testing – i.e., identifying the set of stress events that could cause a given (unacceptable) SDN disruption.

Strong TA3 proposals will also consider “dynamic” scenarios that evolve over time to capture unfolding intertemporal dynamics of both the scenario and SDN system response (i.e., dynamics that have future repercussions and potentially limit future options). To enhance the explainability of stress-test results, strong proposals will include techniques for formally representing sequences of events and decisions that describe the unfolding of a dynamic scenario and the resulting SDN response. SDN system response will often be a monotonic function of the magnitude of a stress event, but this may not always be true. Strong TA3 proposals will suggest techniques for identifying situations in which a more severe shock fails to generate a more severe response.

Endogenous feedback – such as inventory bullwhips generated by hoarding – following an external shock to an SDN is a common source of nonlinear response. Strong proposals will include mechanisms for identifying and calibrating the behavioral parameters that control such endogenous responses. Strong proposals will also include protocols for designing plausible cases in which multiple exogenous shocks occur in concert, or in which endogenous feedback within the SDN triggers knock-on events (i.e., events that compound the stress).

The TA3 performer(s) will use the data API provisioned by TA1 and the analytics API provisioned by TA2, while also developing protocols and storage for identifying and saving simulation results.

For evaluation of TA-level performance, TA3 proposers will suggest appropriate measures of performance, categorized according to the four-part rubric outlined in the section below on “government evaluation.”

For TA3 clearance requirements, reference Section III.D.2.

The following figure provides an overview of each TA and how they are related.

Figure 1: RSDN Program Vision

Government Evaluator

The RSDN program will include a government team to conduct overall program evaluation. This government evaluator will take responsibility for hosting the tools developed under TA1, TA2, and TA3 and ensuring these components interoperate. The evaluator will also provision non-public data, such as DLA procurement contracts and SCRM benchmarks, that are not available to non-government performers. Using the metrics detailed below, the evaluator will assess program-level effectiveness, testing that the overall system achieves the overall strategic objectives of SDN resilience and reductions in strategic surprise emanating from SDN disruptions.

Program-level metrics for RSDN are designed to avoid constraining particular technical approaches while nonetheless assessing overall confidence in the models developed and conclusions they support. The metric framework is designed to enhance overall predictive power despite the reality that fully comprehensive SDN data and models are not achievable.

Proposers are expected to develop internal metrics (measures of performance) that are predictive with respect to the elements of the overall RSDN metric framework and suitable for their individual approaches.

The RSDN metric framework has four dimensions:

(1) Completeness and confidence in the underlying SDN representations. This is significant because SDN data can be difficult to acquire and is often partial.

(2) Calibration of the stress-test simulation. This is significant because stress tests model different kinds of interactions, on the basis of which overall results will depend.

(3) Historical back-testing, following similar practices in other areas of data-informed modeling and simulation. This is significant because it gives a measure of confidence regarding the influence of real-world factors not encompassed in the data and models.

(4) Expert-informed forward-looking A/B comparison exercises. This is significant because it affords a direct comparison between state-of-the-art (SOTA) best practices and emerging RSDN capabilities.

Specifically, these four dimensions involve:

1. Completeness and confidence of SDN representations. The evaluator will use the results of traditional SCRM illuminations as a ground truth benchmark. The government evaluation will assess the SDN maps along three dimensions:

a. Scope – coverage, including vendor nodes identified, procurement relationships identified, and mapping of known blind spots;

b. Detail – the fidelity of the SDN network map in each use-case as the difference (e.g., graph edit distance) between an SCRM baseline and the corresponding subgraph of the SDN network map; and,

c. Timeliness – the time (in days) since a node or edge was most recently observed in the data.

2. Calibration of the stress-test simulation. The evaluator will assess the reasonableness of the calibrated parameters for the TA3 stress-test simulator by checking the simulated SDN system response against acceptable ranges for both the likelihood and magnitude of system response in various measured dimensions. For example, the system response for the metals SDN might be measured in terms of aggregate system-wide demand for refined copper (in thousands of pounds);

simulation parameters could include the elasticity of copper demand at each vendor node with respect to the implied volatility of the future price of copper.

3. Historical backtesting of the stress-test simulation. The government evaluator will use disruptive events – such as the Covid-19 pandemic, which shocked both demand and supply in numerous economic sectors – as the basis for designing stress-test scenarios.

4. Expert-informed A/B comparison exercises assessing RSDN’s force multiplier.

Program-level hands-on exercises will compare the effectiveness of RSDN-equipped

(R) versus unequipped (X) teams using SOTA techniques in managing fragility and surprise in SDNs. Both teams (R and X) will have access to typical DLA resources for supply-chain risk management. Effectiveness will have different meanings pre-shock (predictions regarding fragilities, measured as the count of high-impact, high surprise fragilities identified), mid-shock (measured as the count of affected vendor nodes, stratified by the severity of effects), and post-shock (benefits of mitigations, measured as the count of distinct mitigation policies proposed to address the identified fragilities). For each stage (pre-shock, mid-shock, post-shock) the government evaluator will define minimum acceptability rubrics (pass-fail) for the items to be included in these counts. As noted, performers are expected to develop internal measures that support overall analyses of effectiveness.

C. Program Metrics

Table 1 (see below) provides detail on the program-level metrics.

In addition, the government evaluator, in collaboration with DARPA, will review/refine the TA-level metrics (for TA1, TA2, and TA3) as the program runs. As noted above, performers for TA1, TA2, and TA3 will propose TA-level metrics. In this context, the task for the government evaluator will be to ensure that these TA-level metrics are mutually coherent and sufficiently rigorous.

All program-level metrics and TA-level metrics are subject to revision as the program evolves and experience accumulates. These program-level metrics and TA-level metrics will be informed by internal performance metrics developed by performers.

Table 1 summarizes the program performance metrics for each phase. The Government will use these metrics when making program decisions and evaluating performers’ progress.

Table 1: Program-level performance metrics

Schedule Figure 2 lays out the project schedule for each phase:

Figure 2: Program Technical and Management Milestones

Deliverables

Performers are responsible for providing the following deliverables, as applicable:

Technical Papers – Any technical papers derived from work funded by RSDN.

Slide Presentations – Annotated slide presentations must be submitted within one month after the program kickoff meeting and after each program event (program reviews, PI meetings, and technical interchange meetings).

Monthly Technical Status Reports – A monthly technical status report to the DARPA Vault reporting system describing progress made towards objectives, tasks accomplished, major risks, resources expended, changes to key personnel, upcoming objectives, and any issues requiring the attention of the Government team will be provided within 10 calendar days after the end of each month.

Monthly Financial Reporting – Monthly expenditure reports and uploading of required deliverables to the DARPA Vault reporting system are required for all RSDN performers.

System Development Plan (SDP) – The SDPs for each phase will be based on the performers’ proposal and will be presented at the kickoff meeting for each phase. The SDP will describe the scope of the design and development effort, describe the hardware and software architecture in sufficient detail for review and planning, reference any applicable documents, and provide a program schedule. The SDP should define metrics for testing and evaluation including a concept of operations for conducting evaluations of any software that requires user interaction, to be produced in collaboration with the Government Evaluator. A SDP deliverable will be submitted within one month after the kickoff meeting for each phase, and shared with other performers for synchronization.

Software – For all performers developing software, code drops will be provided to the Government Evaluator quarterly as source and object executable code. Include the source listings and source code, build scripts, test harnesses, development environments, unit tests, system tests, or other technical information required for the Government to compile all delivered source code.

Software Documentation – Software documentation deliverables will be provided within one month after the end of each phase documenting source code, hardware description language specifications, system diagrams, part numbers, and other data necessary to maintain and to produce copies of the software.

Phase and Final Technical Reporting – End-of-phase reports are due at the conclusion of each phase, including through final phase contract completion. A separate Final Technical Report is due at the end of the period of performance. The reports will concisely summarize the effort conducted, technical achievements, remaining challenges, and provide any lessons learned during the development of the RSDN technology. These reports should be delivered to the DARPA Vault reporting system.

In addition, the following deliverables are required for particular technical areas:

TA1 – Documentation for the data access API, permitting TA2 and TA3 performers access to the developed platform and member datasets, and detailed technical plans for preserving the necessary protections and privacy of data on the TA1-developed platform.

This documentation must be provided every 6 months, starting no later than 6 months after kickoff.

TA2 – Documentation for the analytics API permitting users, including TA1 and TA3 performers, access to the TA2-developed analytical toolkit. This documentation must be provided every 6 months, starting no later than 6 months after the first phase kickoff.

TA3 – A detailed plan for developing protocols and storage for generating and saving simulation results and outputs without divulging any Controlled Technical Information (CTI) or classified information. These simulation results and outputs must include details about experimental setup, shock scenarios evaluated, quantitative results, and proposed mitigations.

D. Government-Furnished Property/Equipment/Information

Performers should bring their own sources of data relevant to their particular approaches and provide detailed plans for how they plan to store and process that data, including if there are any restrictions on its use (e.g., non-public, procurement sensitive, proprietary). In some cases, the Government may be able to furnish the same or equivalent data at a lower cost. Additionally, the Government intends to furnish other supplemental data for use by performers.

Proposals should clearly state any assumptions regarding the use of proposed Government data.

Proposers should not assume that the Government will provide them with any tools, software, or equipment needed to perform their tasks.

E. Intellectual Property

The program will emphasize creating and leveraging open source technology and architecture.

Intellectual property rights asserted by proposers are strongly encouraged to be aligned with open source regimes.

A key goal of the program is to establish an open, standards-based, multi-source, plug-and-play architecture that allows for interoperability and integration. This includes the ability to easily add, remove, substitute, and modify software and hardware components. This will facilitate rapid innovation by providing a base for future users or developers of program technologies and deliverables. Therefore, it is desired that all non-commercial software (including source code), software documentation, hardware designs and documentation, and technical data generated by the program be provided as deliverables to the Government, with a minimum of Government Purpose Rights (GPR), as lesser rights may adversely impact the lifecycle costs of affected items, components, or processes.

II. Award Information

A. General Award Information

DARPA anticipates making multiple awards for this effort. The amount of resources made available under this BAA will depend on the quality of the proposals received and the availability of funds.

The Government reserves the right to select for negotiation all, some, one, or none of the proposals received in response to this solicitation and to make awards without discussions with proposers. The Government also reserves the right to conduct discussions if it is later determined to be necessary. If warranted, portions of resulting awards may be segregated into pre-priced options. Additionally, DARPA reserves the right to accept proposals in their entirety or to select only portions of proposals for award. In the event that DARPA desires to award only portions of a proposal, negotiations may be opened with that proposer. The Government reserves the right to fund proposals in phases with options for continued work, as applicable.

The Government reserves the right to request any additional, necessary documentation once it makes the award instrument determination. Such additional information may include but is not limited to Representations and Certifications (see Section VI.B.2., “Representations and Certifications”). The Government reserves the right to remove proposers from award consideration should the parties fail to reach agreement on award terms, conditions, and/or cost/price within a reasonable time, and the proposer fails to timely provide requested additional information. Proposals identified for negotiation may result in a procurement contract, cooperative agreement, or other transaction, depending upon the nature of the work proposed, the required degree of interaction between parties, whether or not the research is classified as Fundamental Research, and other factors.

Proposers looking for innovative, commercial-like contractual arrangements are encouraged to consider requesting Other Transactions. To understand the flexibility and options associated with Other Transactions, consult http://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/contract-management#OtherTransactions.

In accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 2371b(f), the Government may award a follow-on production contract or Other Transaction (OT) for any OT awarded under this solicitation if: (1) that participant in the OT, or a recognized successor in interest to the OT, successfully completed the entire prototype project provided for in the OT, as modified; and (2) the OT provides for the award of a follow-on production contract or OT to the participant, or a recognized successor in interest to the OT.

http://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/contract-management#OtherTransactions

In all cases, the Government contracting officer shall have sole discretion to select award instrument type, regardless of instrument type proposed, and to negotiate all instrument terms and conditions with selectees. DARPA will apply publication or other restrictions, as necessary, if it determines that the research resulting from the proposed effort will present a high likelihood of disclosing performance characteristics of military systems or manufacturing technologies that are unique and critical to defense. Any award resulting from such a determination will include a requirement for DARPA permission before publishing any information or results on the program. For more information on publication restrictions, see the section below on Fundamental Research.

B. Fundamental Research

It is DoD policy that the publication of products of fundamental research will remain unrestricted to the maximum extent possible. National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 189 defines fundamental research as follows:

‘Fundamental research’ means basic and applied research in science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the scientific community, as distinguished from proprietary research and from industrial development, design, production, and product utilization, the results of which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or national security reasons.

As of the date of publication of this solicitation, the Government expects that program goals as described herein may be met by proposed efforts for fundamental research and non-fundamental research. Some proposed research may present a high likelihood of disclosing performance characteristics of military systems or manufacturing technologies that are unique and critical to defense. Based on the anticipated type of proposer (e.g., university or industry) and the nature of the solicited work, the Government expects that some awards will include restrictions on the resultant research that will require the awardee to seek DARPA permission before publishing any information or results relative to the program.

Countering Foreign Influence Program (CFIP)

DARPA’s CFIP is an adaptive risk management security program designed to help protect the critical technology and performer intellectual property associated with DARPA’s research projects by identifying the possible vectors of undue foreign influence. The CFIP team will create risk assessments of all proposed Senior/Key Personnel selected for negotiation of a fundamental research grant or cooperative agreement award. The CFIP risk assessment process will be conducted separately from the DARPA scientific review process and adjudicated prior to final award.

University or non-profit research institution performance under this solicitation may include effort categorized as fundamental research. In addition to Government support for free and open scientific exchanges and dissemination of research results in a broad and unrestricted manner, the academic or non-profit research performer or recipient, regardless of tier, acknowledges that such research may have implications that are important to U.S. national interests and must be protected against foreign influence and exploitation. As such, the academic or non-profit research performer or recipient agrees to comply with the following requirements:

(a) The University or non-profit research institution performer or recipient must establish and maintain an internal process or procedure to address foreign talent programs, conflicts of commitment, conflicts of interest, and research integrity. The academic or non-profit research performer or recipient must also utilize due diligence to identify Foreign Components or participation by Senior/Key Personnel in Foreign Government Talent Recruitment Programs and agree to share such information with the Government upon request.

i. The above described information will be provided to the Government as part of the proposal response to the solicitation and will be reviewed and assessed prior to award. Generally, this information will be included in the Research and Related Senior/Key Personnel Profile (Expanded) form (SF-424) required as part the proposer’s submission through Grants.gov.

1. Instructions regarding how to fill out the SF-424 and its biographical sketch can be found through Grants.gov.

ii. In accordance with USD(R&E) direction to mitigate undue foreign influence in DoD-funded science and technology, DARPA will assess all Senior/Key Personnel proposed to support DARPA grants and cooperative agreements for potential undue foreign influence risk factors relating to professional and financial activities. This will be done by evaluating information provided via the SF-424, and any accompanying or referenced documents, in order to identify and assess any associations or affiliations the Senior/Key Personnel may have with foreign strategic competitors or countries that have a history of intellectual property theft, research misconduct, or history of targeting U.S. technology for unauthorized transfer. DARPA’s evaluation takes into consideration the entirety of the Senior/Key Personnel’s SF-424, current and pending support, and biographical sketch, placing the most weight on the Senior/Key Person’s professional and financial activities over the last 4 years. The majority of foreign entities lists used to make these determinations are publicly available. The DARPA Countering Foreign Influence Program (CFIP) “Senior/Key Personnel Foreign Influence Risk Rubric” details the various risk ratings and factors. The rubric can be seen at the following link:

https://www.darpa.mil/attachments/09202 1DARPACFIPRubric.pdf

iii. Examples of lists that DARPA leverages to assess potential undue foreign influence factors include, but are not limited to:

1. Executive Order 13959 “Addressing the Threat From Securities Investments That Finance Communist Chinese Military Companies”:

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2020-11-17/pdf/2020- 25459.pdf

2. The U.S. Department of Education’s College Foreign Gift and Contract Report: College Foreign Gift Reporting (ed.gov)

3. The U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, List of Parties of Concern:

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.ph p/policy-guidance/lists-of-parties-of-concern

4. Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging https://www.darpa.mil/attachments/092021DARPACFIPRubric.pdf https://www.darpa.mil/attachments/092021DARPACFIPRubric.pdf https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-11-17/pdf/2020-25459.pdf https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-11-17/pdf/2020-25459.pdf https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-11-17/pdf/2020-25459.pdf https://sites.ed.gov/foreigngifts/ https://sites.ed.gov/foreigngifts/ https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/lists-of-parties-of-concern https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/lists-of-parties-of-concern https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/lists-of-parties-of-concern

Technology (CSET) Chinese Talent Program Tracker:

https://chinatalenttracker.cset.tech

5. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) “World Wide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community”: 2021 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S.

Intelligence Community (dni.gov)

6. Various Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) products regarding targeting of US technologies, adversary targeting of academia, and the exploitation of academic experts:

https://www.dcsa.mil/

DARPA’s analysis and assessment of affiliations and associations of Senior/Key Personnel is compliant with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Information regarding race, color, or national origin is not collected and does not have bearing in DARPA’s assessment.

University or non-profit research institutions with proposals selected for negotiation that have been assessed as having high or very high undue foreign influence risk, will be given an opportunity during the negotiation process to mitigate the risk.

DARPA reserves the right to request any follow-up information needed to assess risk or mitigation strategies.

iv. Upon conclusion of the negotiations, if DARPA determines, despite any proposed mitigation terms (e.g.

mitigation plan, alternative research personnel), the participation of any Senior/Key Research Personnel still represents high risk to the program, or proposed mitigation affects the Government’s confidence in proposer’s capability to successfully complete the research (e.g., less qualified Senior/Key https://chinatalenttracker.cset.tech/ https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2021/item/2204-2021-annual-threat-assessment-of-the-u-s-intelligence-community https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2021/item/2204-2021-annual-threat-assessment-of-the-u-s-intelligence-community https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2021/item/2204-2021-annual-threat-assessment-of-the-u-s-intelligence-community https://www.dcsa.mil/

Research Personnel) the Government may determine not to award the proposed effort. Any decision not to award will be predicated upon reasonable disclosure of the pertinent facts and reasonable discussion of any possible alternatives while balancing program award timeline requirements.

(b) Failure of the academic or non-profit research performer or recipient to reasonably exercise due diligence to discover or ensure that neither it nor any of its Senior/Key Research Personnel involved in the subject award are participating in a Foreign Government Talent Program or have a Foreign Component with an a strategic competitor or country with a history of targeting U.S. technology for unauthorized transfer may result in the Government exercising remedies in accordance with federal law and regulation.

i. If, at any time, during performance of this research award, the academic or non-profit research performer or recipient should learn that it, its Senior/Key Research Personnel, or applicable team members or subtier performers on this award are or are believed to be participants in a Foreign Government Talent Program or have Foreign Components with a strategic competitor or country with a history of targeting U.S.

technology for unauthorized transfer , the performer or recipient will notify the Government Contracting Officer or Agreements Officer within 5 business days.

1. This disclosure must include specific information as to the personnel involved and the nature of the situation and relationship.

The Government will have 30 business days to review this information and conduct any necessary fact-finding or discussion with the performer or recipient.

2. The Government’s timely determination and response to this disclosure may range anywhere from acceptance, to mitigation, to termination of this award at the Government’s discretion.

3. If the University receives no response from the Government to its disclosure within 30 business days, it may presume that the Government has determined the disclosure does not represent a threat.

ii. The performer or recipient must flow down this provision to any subtier contracts or agreements involving direct participation in the performance of the research.

(c) Definitions

i. Senior/Key Research Personnel

1. This definition would include the Principal Investigator or Program/Project Director and other individuals who contribute to the scientific development or execution of a project in a substantive, measurable way, whether or not they receive salaries or compensation under the award. These include individuals whose absence from the project would be expected to impact the approved scope of the project.

2. Most often, these individuals will have a doctorate or other professional degrees, although other individuals may be included within this definition on occasion.

ii. Foreign Associations/Affiliations

1. Association is defined as collaboration, coordination or interrelation, professionally or personally, with a foreign government-connected entity where no direct monetary or non-monetary reward is involved.

2. Affiliation is defined as collaboration, coordination, or interrelation, professionally or personally, with a foreign government-connected entity where direct monetary or non-monetary reward is involved.

iii. Foreign Government Talent Recruitment Programs

1. In general, these programs will include any foreign-state-sponsored attempt to acquire U.S.

scientific-funded research or technology through foreign government-run or funded recruitment programs that target scientists, engineers, academics, researchers, and entrepreneurs of all nationalities working and educated in the U.S.

2. Distinguishing features of a Foreign Government Talent Recruitment Program may include:

a. Compensation, either monetary or in-kind, provided by the foreign state to the targeted individual in exchange for the individual transferring their knowledge and expertise to the foreign country.

b. In-kind compensation may include honorific titles, career advancement opportunities, promised future compensation or other types of remuneration or compensation.

c. Recruitment, in this context, refers to the foreign-state-sponsor’s active engagement in attracting the targeted individual to join the foreign-sponsored program and transfer their knowledge and expertise to the foreign state. The targeted individual may be employed and located in the U.S. or in the foreign state.

d. Contracts for participation in some programs that create conflicts of commitment and/or conflicts of interest for researchers. These contracts include, but are not limited to, requirements to attribute awards, patents, and projects to the foreign institution, even if conducted under U.S.