Woodward_PFC_ProposerDay_2017_12_08_Public_case_28883_distribution.pdf

Protected Forward Communications (PFC) T. K. Woodward, Ph.D.

Program Manager, DARPA/STO

Briefing Prepared for PFC Proposer’s Day 14 Dec 2017

Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, Case No. 28883

Enable small unit operations to persist in electronic warfare conditions by developing an integrated communication system to protect local, airborne, and reach-back communications from exploitation and denial

• PFC Problem, motivation, and vision

• Systems perspective, schedule, and approach

• Structure of events, why and what

• Security Posture

• Alignment of incentives

• Technical topics and alignment to approach: Goals and metrics

• V&V team and M&S posture

• Proposal development

• Abstracts, notes

• Proposed Approach section

• Evaluations

• End

Outline

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Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, Case No. 28883

Small units with big impact: Precision weapons and full-scope communications

• 100 Years of Air – Ground Partnership

• Today: Special forces teams with air support: precision weapons, strategic effects

• Key: Comprehensive networked communications

• Integrated team sharing

• Reach-back to rear echelon

• Precise coordination of diverse air assets:

from Apache to MQ-1C

CAS: Close Air Support ANGLICO: Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies (Marine terminology) :

JTAC: Joint terminal attack controller TACP: Tactical Air Control Party

Operation Precision Munitions

Desert Storm 9 %

Afghanistan 70%

Communications and weapons integration provides small unit strategic leverage SSGT Bart Decker, AF Combat Controller

ANGLICO team in Iraq

TACP Overwatch

Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) : Full-scope small-unit communications challenge

HQ Three Key Conversations

1. Local Unit

2. Aircraft

3. Headquarters (HQ)

Unit Comms (local)

EW

empowered adversary

Close Air Support (CAS): key ex. of collaborative combat power

• Effectiveness requires communications

• Three key conversations (information channels) Problems:

• Today’s progress: SWaP, capacity, interoperability

• Unaddressed: Geolocation, Jamming

HQ Comms (BLOS)

Aircraft Comms

(LOS)

SWaP: Size, Weight and Power LOS: Line of Sight

JTAC: common function, many names

[JTAC/JFO/ANGLICO/TACP/CC/MARSOC/

AFSOC/JSOC/SEAL, Recon]

BLOS: Beyond Line of Sight EW: Electronic Warfare

JTAC: Joint Terminal Attack Controller HQ: Headquarters

State of the art: Persistent Close Air Support (PCAS) does not protect the radio

HQ

UAS: Unmanned Aircraft System PCAS: Persistent Close Air Support RAA: Remote Advise and Assist ADAPT: Advanced Digital Advisor Partnering Technologies ATAK: Android Tactical Assault Kit SRW: Solider Radio Waveform LTE: Long Term Evolution MUOS: Multi-user Objective System MANET: Mobile Ad Hoc Network TTNT: Tactical Targeting Network Technology

Digital cockpitPCAS / RAA / ADAPT Features

• Dynamic real time targeting

• Video sharing: aircraft and HQ

• Coalition interoperable

• UAS surveillance support

Unaddressed: built on existing Radio Layer

• Satellite communications (SATCOM)

• Commercial-derived wideband radio

• Legacy radio; low capacity

• SWaP demands vehicles in many cases

Issue: existing radio layer is vulnerable

ISR

Applications (New): Control station, ATAK, video, chat, ID

Applications (New): targeting, blue force ID, Chat, video

IP Radio Cloud (Legacy)

(LTE, Wi-Fi, SRW, SATCOM, MUOS, TTNT, MANET, …)

Fires

JTAC

Threat: Adversary kill-chain enabled by EW

Detect

Attribute

Geolocate

Engage:

Kinetic / Jam

/ Other

• Impact: Tactics change;

communications carefully planned, limited, or denied entirely

• Choices: Mission failure, death, or both!

• Public reports show this happening now

Standoff threat (Russian Tu-214R prototype)

BM-30 Smerch Multiple rocket launcherJamming Threat

Stand-in threat

Stand-in threat New

Legacy

Insight and approach: Maximize adversary complexity

Protection Prevent confident decisions about detection, attribution, location Today: Spread Spectrum insufficient Future: Exploit new tools

Spatial

Spectral

Temporal

Signature

Environment (e.g. power) Coding /

Noise

Interference

Algorithmmore

Spatial

Spectral

Temporal

Signature

Environment (power)

Coding / Noise

Interference

Algorithm more

PFC

Today: Spread Spectrum (coding in thermal noise)

TODAY New: Add spatial, interference, & power (as shown in DARPA

CLASS)

CLASS: Computational Leverage Against Surveillance Systems Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited, Case No. 28883

Readily Detected on all conversations

Not detected on all conversations

Result: Interrupt the adversary kill chain

Detect

Attribute

Geolocate

Engage:

Kinetic / Jam

/ Other

• Use cluttered spectrum to advantage (uncertainty)

• Metric: Geolocation error

• Metric: jamming tolerance level, capacity under jamming

The more elements PFC interrupts, the better

Geolocation Uncertainty

False position offset

Pfa

Pd et maximum uncertainty

• Metric: adversary confusion P(detect) – P(false alarm) <

Protected Forward Communications (PFC) Vision

What: man-portable radio system resistant to geolocation and jamming for all 3 small unit conversations against EW equipped adversary

How: systems approach integrating technology investments to impose adversary complexity;

(RF interference, agility, spatial, signature, & environmental SA)

HQ

Air

Unit HQ

Payoffs Today: keep JTAC-enabled teams safe from exploitation and targeting

Future: comprehensive small unit communication protection

• Manned / unmanned teaming

• Recon Teams / Forward Observers, other precision coordinated strike needs

• Rear echelon reach-back coordination Smaller, more mobile, effective systems

Backward compatibility to legacy facilitates introduction (not LPE)

PFC

RF: Radio Frequency SA: Situational Awareness LPE: Low probability of Exploitation

PFC program philosophy: Achieve the deployment decision

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• Ultimate Objective: A deployed PFC communication system: One system, Three Conversations

• Requires: Development decision by others besides DARPA. Focus on that goal

• Produce what is needed to achieve the DUT decision.

• The more maturity we can achieve, the better – thus exceeding expectations is encouraged

• Use an approach and create artifacts familiar to program office (PO) partners

• Third party validation will increase credibility, so use a government verification and validation (V&V) team

• DARPA investment is being made to motivate objectives and align interests

• Approach:

• PFC: Full DARPA investment: Technology maturity, risk reduction, full design specification and feasibility established

• Follow-on Development and User Trial (DUT) effort (not part of PFC) undertaken with at least 50% joint funding by partner

• Produce Trial-ready system: Develop integrated system ready for trial.

• Procure and conduct User Trials

• User Engagement from the start. Program Office Interactions include: USSOCOM, Air Force ACC-A3J, PEO-

C3T/CERDEC, OUSD, MARCORSYSCOM

PFC program focused on the deployment decision

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BAA Reference: Section 1.1.1 Technical Approach, 1.1.2, Program Structure

PFC performers will design a complete system

BAA Reference: Section 1.1.1 Technical Approach , Section 1.1.2, Section 1.2.3

Performers are doing systems design

Trade off technology to yield compelling systems capability

Conversation 1 (Local Unit)

Conversation 2 (Weapons Platform, e.g. Air)

Conversation 3 (BLOS to HQ)

Kill Chain Defeat: Detection, Attribution, Geolocation, Jamming

Backwards Compatibility and Coexistence

Air-Integration

Situational Awareness and Control Plane

Human Integration

Air

Unit HQ

PFC

One system, 3 Conversations

PFC Systems Design / Optimization Domain

• Wide band DSSS

• Distributed coherent transmission

• Burst mode

• MIMO STAP

• Low-Energy techniques

• Directional links

• Novel waveform design

• Low power ASICs

• Efficient phased arrays

• Novel BLOS methods

• Your ideas here/…..

• High dynamic range methods

• Cognitive Radio methods

• Smart control plane

• Novel waveform design

• Algorithm / signature exploits

• Machine Learning

• RF and waveform situational awareness

• Efficient front ends: PA, Filter, etc

• Your idea here….

Examples of technology in-feed

Tasks FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 PFC Program Mature Technology System Risk Reduction Qualified System Design

Development and User Trial (DUT) (notional projection)

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PFC program produces qualified design to feed development & user trial (DUT) effort

BAA

Trial Ready System

PDR: Preliminary Design Review M&S: Modeling and Simulation SRR: System Requirements Review

User Trials

System Integration

Trials procurement, execution ICD: Interface Control Document WF: Waveform OTA: Over the Air PO: Program Office

PDR expectationsSRR expectationsCoDR expectations

• Conceptual Design

Closure (CoDR)

• Integrated link + control approach

• Risk register

• Operational vignettes

• Red team V&V start

• Fully-qualified design w/data artifacts (PDR)

• Brassboard real time system element tests

• SWaP-C estimates

• All risks acceptable

• User events

• M&S system validation

• WF and ICD definition

• HW / SW / Control arch

• Functional OTA prove-in of 3 link approaches

• System design meets mission goals (SRR)

CoDR SRR PDR

PDR

Option

Produce fully qualified PFC design with experimental artifacts, ready for DUT (not part of this program)

BAA Reference: Figure 3, Section 1.2.1 Schedule and Milestones, Section 1.2.3 Deliverables

• Conceptual Design Review (CoDR):

Traditional PLUS

• Modeling and simulation (M&S) Environment up and running

• V&V team interactions underway

• Link validation plans

• System Requirements Review, traditional

PLUS

• Over the air validation of any unproven link technologies (all 3 conversations)

• M&S prove-in using operational vignettes

• Control plane

• V&V Team M&S validation

• Preliminary Design Review: traditional PLUS

• Increased validation of system elements

• Experimental Brass-board system elements

• User Capstone Event puts concepts into action

• Real time operation

• Control plane validation

• V&V Team Experimental Validation

• Result: readiness to proceed to full Development and User Trial (DUT)

• Speculative scope for perspective: ~100 ground elements, ~10 air elements, ~5 HQ elements (these are not firm figures)

PFC uses structured systems engineering approach

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BAA Reference: Section 1.1.2, Program Structure and section 1.2.3, Deliverables

• PFC is an Unclassified BAA with certain metrics and threats described in a For Official Use Only (FOUO) restricted distribution Addendum

• Upon request, Proposers will receive the FOUO information along with a relevant FOUO Air Force Communications Security Guide to inform their proposal development

• Proposal submission guidelines for unclassified and FOUO (online), and classified portions are provided in BAA Section 4

• Execution: A program-specific PFC SCG will be provided

Security posture

SCG: security classification guide

BAA Reference: Section 3, (3.1.3), Section 4 (4.2.1 and 4.2.3) and Appendix 2

• Resources: $26M in awards, inclusive of all options, performers, and GFE / GFI

• $14M base efforts to SRR: multiple awards

• $12M: fully priced PDR options: expect multiple to proceed – at least two

• These estimates may change

• Why disclose?

• Align incentives to maximize accomplishments on available funds

• Exceeding goals is encouraged

• Government Furnished Equipment / Information (GFE / GFI) support is part of this budget

• Not part of Performer Cost

• Proposer provides estimate of Government resources required. DARPA funds directly

Incentives and motivations

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GFE

Estimates to

DARPA

Prime Costs

Subcontractor Costs

Total all items: $26M

In Cost Proposal

Not in cost proposal

BAA Reference: Part 1 (p.4), Section 1.2.4 GFE/GFI

Technical topics and alignment to approach

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• Three protected conversations lie at the heart of the PFC system

• Challenge and Opportunity

• Integrated system supporting and protecting three distinct information exchanges

• Seeking synergies from being able to address all three in an integrated manner

• A compelling system rationale will connect the proposer’s PFC system to defeating the EW-driven kill chain for all three conversations

Some questions to consider

• Is there a unifying theme to your system, and have you articulated it?

• How do your innovative technical claims connect to the theme and the conversations?

• Have you provided quantitative support to your innovative claims?

• Does your approach rely on unproven link technologies? If so, how are you proving them?

• Can your approach scale beyond the JTAC problem to address small unit communications more generally?

• How are you imposing complexity on the adversary decision making process?

• How will your user capstone event support system readiness and DUT decisions?

One system, three conversations

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BAA Reference: Section 1.1 Program Overview, Section 1.2.5 Proposed Approach

Air

Unit HQ

PFC

PFC performance goals are system driven

Radio Links Users Range (km) Capacity (Mb/s)

Range Ratios (Rb/Ri)

Adversary standoff (km)

LPD / LPE / AJ Goals

HQ (BLOS) Point to point 100 (500) 0.01 (1)

Aircraft Point to point 60 (250) 1 (10)

Unit (local) 10 (100) 0.1 (1) 1 (1000)

High availability at threshold capacities SWaP tied to current JTAC load Squad communications burden Limited Backwards Compatibility

Threshold Metric (Objective Metric)

Threat Receiver

HQ, Aircraft, other unit elements

Ri Rb

Unit Goal: Large Range Ratio Rb / Ri

CEP: Circular Error Probability

These Columns in FOUO addendum

BAA Reference: Section 1.2.2.1, System Performance Goals, Table 1 and FOUO Addendum

Generic detection threats for proposal analysis in FOUO Addendum

BAA Reference: Section 1.2.2.2, Generic Threat Characteristics and FOUO Addendum

Generic jamming threats for proposal analysis in FOUO Addendum

BAA Reference: Section 1.2.2.2, Generic Threat Characteristics and FOUO Addendum

• For Proposal

• Reports and information from CLASS Technology Day

• If you are interested in information from other DARPA efforts, let us know or contact appropriate performers

• Access: send e-mail to BAA Mailbox per BAA footnote Must be able to receive export-controlled and Distribution C or D materials – U. S. Person and Government Contractor affiliation

• In Execution

• Operational vignettes collected from transition partners, shared in narrative form by CoDR. May require classified materials handling

• Specific threats to analyze – likely to require classified materials handling capability

• Should ongoing access to government furnished information or equipment be needed by your project – e.g.

equipment, or manpower assistance from Government or cognizant FFRDC, develop these estimates and provide them in your proposal separate from your cost volume

Government furnished information / equipment

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BAA Reference: Section 1.2.4 GFE/GFI

• Robustness to unit detection attempts is a foundational PFC capability

• Detection techniques to be employed will vary depending on the proposed approach

• Detection methods to be assessed include but are not limited to

• Radiometric Detection

• Correlated detection methods such as

• Cyclostationary methods

• Direct correlation methods for known protocols

• Proposers are responsible for providing a credible detection resistance rationale with quantitative analysis based on program goals

• E.g. don’t just say “my system is robust to your generic threat so I’m done…”

• Key metric :

Some questions to consider

• How are you imposing complexity on the adversary decision making process?

• Can you address diverse threats and methods, or are your approaches brittle and vulnerable?

• Can your approach scale beyond the JTAC problem to address small unit communications more generally?

• Does your approach rely on unproven link technologies? If so, how are you proving them?

• Are you considering the most significant threats to your approach?

• Have you provided quantitative support to your innovative claims?

Detection: Threats to PFC transmitters

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BAA Reference: Section 1.2.2.1 System Performance Goals

• Attribution can be a subtle but important element of the EW-drive kill chain

• Some communications may rely entirely on this element (“hide in plain sight”)

• Under certain circumstances, reliance on attribution alone will be insufficient

• Attribution assessments will vary depending on the proposed approach

• A central concept is the effort required to determine a signal is worth prosecution

• V&V teams will consider the processing difficulty imposed on an adversary

• Vignettes will be particularly useful to assess attribution

• Proposers are responsible for providing a credible analysis of any attribution-resistance strategy

Some questions to consider

• How are you imposing complexity on the adversary decision making process?

• Can you address diverse threats and methods, or are your approaches brittle and vulnerable?

• Can your approach scale beyond the JTAC problem to address small unit communications more generally?

• Does your approach rely on unproven link technologies? If so, how are you proving them?

• How does attribution figure into your overall PFC strategy? If not, why not?

Attribution: Threats to PFC transmitters

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• Geolocation is the final step in the kill chain prior to targeting, and so it is critical to defeat

• While it seems unwise, some approaches rely exclusively on defeating geolocation

• Geolocation threats will vary depending on the proposed approach. May include at least

• Multiple line of bearing using directional systems

• Signal subspace methods employing multi-aperture systems such as MUSIC algorithms

• Time / frequency difference of arrival methods

• Other methods to be developed during the program

• Key metric: Circular Error Probability (CEP) radius, or false location projection

• Proposers are responsible for providing a credible, geolocation resistance rationale with quantitative analysis based on program goals

Some questions to consider

• How are you creating confusion in the geolocation process?

• Can you address diverse geolocation methods, or are your approaches limited in their utility?

• Does your approach rely on unproven link technologies? If so, how are you proving them?

• Does your approach impose additional burdens on the small unit beyond the PFC radio kit?

• How are they obtained?

• Does your approach require resources beyond the small unit?

• Are you considering the most significant threats to your approach?

• Have you provided quantitative support to your innovative claims?

Geolocation: Threats to PFC transmitters

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• Jamming is a target exploitation option the adversary is likely to employ

• It may be tried even if detection, attribution, and geolocation have failed

• A wide range of jamming methods may be used

• Proposers should demonstrate awareness of methods relevant to the proposed approach

• Techniques may vary depending on whether detection, attribution, and geolocation have been successful

• Methods may be both protocol-independent and protocol-aware

• Key metric: communication capacity maintained under jamming for each conversation

• Proposers are responsible for providing a credible jam-resistance rationale with quantitative analysis based on performance goals

Some questions to consider

• How will your approach perform depending on whether preceding elements of the kill chain have been executed successfully or not?

• What information can the jammer collect from your signal that would make it more effective?

• How are you imposing complexity on the adversary in executing the jamming task?

• Are different conversations more or less susceptible to jamming attack? Can this be utilized to advantage in system design?

• Are you considering the most significant threats to your approach?

• Have you provided quantitative support to your innovative claims?

Anti-Jam: Threats to PFC receivers

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• The control plane is the method by which the system configures and maintains itself

• Answers the question, “How does PFC know what to do and when to do it?”

• The control plane is a necessary part of any PFC system

• Different proposed approaches will place different demands on control plane

• Information to be collected

• Information to be exchanged

• Coordination to be executed

• Proposals should demonstrate awareness of control plane and present concept for providing it

• Control plane design will be assessed progressively in the program

Some questions to consider

• Look beyond steady state operation. How will the system initiate a cold start for all conversations?

How to participants join and leave the system?

• What information needs to be collected? How will it be collected?

• What information needs to be shared? How will it be shared?

• What coordination processes are needed?

• Does the control plane represent a vulnerability to the system? How is it defended?

Control Plane: A key necessary element

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BAA Reference: Section 1.1.1, Section 1.1.2, Section 1.2.3 (item 2), Section 1.2.5 (item 1b)

Size, weight, power, and cost (SWaP-C)

Production targets set by current JTAC radio elements and current Squad Radio systems.

Warning: there is not one uniform kit

JTAC PFC:

Low Rate PFC Initial Production Target: 20(12) lbs

Squad: Low Rate Initial Production Target: 2 (or less) lbs

Includes PFC Radio(s), Antenna, Batteries

Threshold (objective)

Basis of threshold estimate, not a suggested solution

Endurance:

24 hour mission on 180 W-Hrs (2 x 5590 batteries)

Includes Squad PFC Radio, Antenna, Batteries

BAA Reference: Section 1.2.2.1 System Performance Goals

Basis of threshold estimate

• Backward Compatibility

• How will your PFC systems concept get introduced?

• What happens when you encounter non-PFC elements in air, ground, or HQ configurations

• PFC must communicate with at least one legacy system, but protected behavior may not be possible. Can this goal be exceeded?

• Coexistence

• How will your PFC work in presence of other systems that try to do their job?

• Examples:

• Force Protection system (e.g. JCREW)

• Other EW systems

• White signals (non-combatant) such as Wi-Fi, 3G, 4G cellular systems, other radio systems

• General clutter and interference

Backwards compatibility and coexistence

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Related Legacy Blue System

Un-related Blue Systems

White Systems (non-combatant)

• E.g. SRW, ANW2, HNW, SINCGARS, other gnd system

• E.g. Link-16, ARC210 (UHF/VHF), TTNT, other air links

• E.g. MUOS, BFT, HF, other BLOS systems

• Various HQ systems

• Prophet, Duke, JCREW, other EW systems

• Other airborne systems

• Interference management

• DTV, 3G, 4G, 5G,

systems, other systems

• Challenges and interests

• Maximize number of platforms with which PFC communications can be supported

• Simplify qualification process of using PFC on the airframe

• Opportunities

• Dedicated solutions using novel integration methods, e.g. outside the operational flight profile (OFP)

• Legacy interoperability

• ARC210 UHF / VHF Air Traffic Control Radios

• Link-16 (widely deployed airborne data link)

• Special purpose links (e.g. MADL, IFDL)

• Other links (describe)

• Proposal

• Describe the airframe integration concept and how it will be validated

• Identify a primary airborne platform and others whose compatibility logically follows

• Does using PFC put the aircraft at risk?

Describe ways that risk can be reduced?

Air integration

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These are illustrative, not exhaustive

• Challenges and interests

• It is generally assumed that HQ has enough space and power for whatever communication equipment is needed

• How is BLOS communication supported, and what legacy interworking is possible?

• Opportunities

• Enough space and power probably exists at

HQ to accommodate diverse BLOS solutions

• Are diverse solutions possible, beneficial, or harmful at the unit?

• Proposal

• Describe HQ integration concept and how it will interwork with austere unit configuration

• How do other conversations figure into the

HQ link?

HQ integration

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The War Room, Dr. Strangelove

Human integration: human factors matter

BAA Reference: Section 1.2.2.1 System Performance Goals

• JTAC team may be operating in austere and challenging environments

• Urban, suburban, and rural

• Day or night operations

• PFC systems should not endanger the JTAC unit through other methods

• E.g. light and noise discipline

• JTAC or other forward operators may find themselves in diverse body and mobility conditions

• PFC will desirably support existing familiar user interface devices (e.g.

handheld, tablet, or laptop) to minimize SWaP and training

• What?

• Coaching / consulting on systems approach

• “Voice of the adversary”

• Interact with Performer M&S

• Reproducible results using common M&S

• Vignette development

• Field red team assessments

• Assessments for DARPA and transition partners

• How?

• Analytics

• M&S scenario evaluation

• M&S vignette generation

• Reproduction of M&S results

• Field exercise red teaming

• Potential for transition partner involvement

• Why?

• Independent 3rd party validation is very valuable to the Program Office

• When will we know the tool?

• Intention: tools announced at kickoff

• Interaction starts at kickoff; well underway by

CoDR

• Exemplary tools. Tell us your preferences in the proposal

• Llamacomm (MIT-LL, government)

• EDX®

• Planet®

• RemCom® tools

• Other – based on proposer inputs

• Who?

• DARPA is building the team now

• Cost is outside the Performer Budget

Government verification and validation team (not in performer budget)

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BAA Reference: Section 1.1.1 page 8, Section 1.1.2, Section 1.2.3 Deliverables, Proposal preparation, logistics, and evaluation notes

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• Closely read and follow the ENTIRE BAA

• Unclassified Abstracts are strongly encouraged. Abstract feedback is intended as a mid-course update to your ongoing proposal process. Waiting for feedback before starting is a bad strategy

• Read the Proposed Approach section of the BAA and address each item in your proposal

• Proposals will be evaluated in accordance with the BAA evaluation criteria. Read these criteria closely

• If you want to impress the Program Manager, provide quantitative support for relevant innovative technical claims

Helpful proposal hints

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BAA Reference: THE WHOLE THING + Section 1.2.5 Proposed Approach, Section 4, Section 5

• The section provides specific guidance on important proposal content, pointing back to the BAA, and pointing forward to the sections in the proposal where these can be provided

• You still need to read the entire BAA to determine all the areas in which response is called for.

• Example:

• Proposed Approach:

• 1

• 2

• …5 Identify the technical readiness of all proposed technologies and systems. Describe functional validation plans for any new, un-proven, or low-maturity link technologies proposed, as outlined in Section 1.1.2 and Table 4

• Points back to technical approach and deliverables

• Table 4 (deliverables), item 6 (link tech description at CoDR), item 9 (link tech. validated OTA at SRR)

• Section 1.1.2, page 10, SRR expectations

• Points forward to proposal elements:

• Volume 1, section II.C (key supporting technologies), Section III.E (validation approach)

• If you exhaustively address each proposed approach item, you will cover most, if not all, of the key proposal bases (this is not a guarantee).

Use proposed approach section to build a compelling proposal

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BAA Reference: Section 1.2.5 Proposed Approach

• The BAA defines how risk is to be assessed

• MANY proposers abuse the risk section. Don’t let this happen to you!

• An external risk is a dependence on something else happening (e.g. my printed electronics take a long time to build and might come in late, so I’m ordering them early in the program)

• A false risk is one that does not really exist because the proposed approach eliminated it. THIS IS A COMMON ERROR

• e.g. Risk to mission effectiveness from heavy electronics, mitigation are our proposed flexible printed electronics that weights 10% of legacy) WRONG – this is an inherent benefit of the proposed approach.

• An inherent risk is fundamental to proposed approach. All approaches have these. Ignorance indicates lack of understanding

• e.g. My printed electronics dissolve in water, creating a risk of mission failure for operating in the rain. This is an inherent environmental risk. The mitigation of supplying users an umbrella will reduce likelihood of this risk, but not its severity. Deploying redundant lower-performing waterproof backups will reduce the impact of dissolving printed electronics, should it occur

• Presenting only external risks is discouraged, as they are generally readily addressed.

• Presenting false risks is unlikely to result in favorable review

• Mitigations either reduce likelihood or reduce impact of a given risk and should be characterized as such

• Proposals should focus on significant inherent system risks

Risk assessment is important

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BAA Reference: Section 1.1.2, Section 1.2.3, Section 4.3.2, Figure 5 (Page 36)

Proposed Approach 1.

2.

3.

4.

5. Identify the technical readiness of all proposed technologies and systems. Describe functional validation plans for any new, un-proven, or low-maturity link technologies proposed, as outlined in Section 1.1.2 and Table 4

Proposal Sections

II.A

II.B

II.C Key supporting technologies and their state of readiness

II.D

II.E

III.A

III.B

III.C

III.D

III.E Validation Approach

III.F

III.K

III.L

Evaluation Criteria

1. Scientific and Technical Merit

…The proposal clearly identifies major technical risks in the manner requested and clearly defines feasible planned mitigation strategies and efforts to address those risks. …

2. Relevance to the DARPA Mission

3. Cost and Schedule Realism

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Sections of the BAA align with one another

BAA Reference: Section 1.2.5 (page 17) , Section 4.3.2.1 (page 32), Section 5 (page 39)

Proposed Approach 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

9 Summarize plans for experimental brassboard system validation tests and describe the user event concept.

10.

11…

Proposal Sections

II.A

II.B

II.C

II.D

II.E

III.A

III.B

III.C

III.D

III.E Validation approach.

…experimental validation of essential system elements in real time with over the air testing and a capstone user event.

III.L

Evaluation Criteria

1. Scientific and Technical Merit

…The Government will also consider…the quality of proposed deliverables….

technical approach(es)…

2. Relevance to the DARPA Mission …Consistent with Section 1.2.5, the proposer explains clearly how the experience and proposer’s capability positively impact the ability to execute and contribute to a DUT effort.

3. Cost and Schedule Realism

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Sections of the BAA align with one another

BAA Reference: Section 1.2.5 (page 17) , Section 4.3.2.1 (page 32), Section 5 (page 39)

Please submit written questions to the BAA Coordinator Answers will be posted to Fed. Biz. Opps

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Side-Bar Sessions will begin this afternoon and continue tomorrow

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