HR001118S0009.pdf

Broad Agency Announcement Protected Forward Communications (PFC)

STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY OFFICE

HR001118S0009

December 7, 2017

Protected Forward Communications

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I: OVERVIEW INFORMATION

PART II: FULL TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT

1. FUNDING OPPORTUNITY DESCRIPTION

1.1. PROGRAM OVERVIEW

1.2. PROGRAM METRICS, MILESTONES, DELIVERABLES

2. AWARD INFORMATION

2.1. GENERAL AWARD INFORMATION

2.2. FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH

3. ELIGIBILITY INFORMATION

3.1. ELIGIBLE APPLICANTS

3.2. ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

3.3. COST SHARING/MATCHING

3.4. OTHER ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA

4. APPLICATION AND SUBMISSION INFORMATION

4.1. ADDRESS TO REQUEST APPLICATION PACKAGE

4.2. CONTENT AND FORM OF APPLICATION SUBMISSION

4.3. FORMATTING CHARACTERISTICS

4.4. SUBMISSION DATES AND TIMES

4.5. FUNDING RESTRICTIONS: NOT APPLICABLE

4.6. OTHER SUBMISSION REQUIREMENTS: NOT APPLICABLE

5. APPLICATION REVIEW INFORMATION

5.1. EVALUATION CRITERIA

5.2. REVIEW AND SELECTION PROCESS

6. AWARD ADMINISTRATION INFORMATION

6.1. SELECTION NOTICES AND NOTIFICATIONS

6.2. ADMINISTRATIVE AND NATIONAL POLICY REQUIREMENTS

6.3. REPORTING

6.4. ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS

7. AGENCY CONTACTS

8. OTHER INFORMATION

8.1. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

9. APPENDIX 1: PROPOSAL SLIDE SUMMARY

10. APPENDIX 2: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO) ADDENDUM REQUEST

FORM

11. APPENDIX 3: VOLUME 1 COVER SHEET TEMPLATE

VOLUME I, TECHNICAL AND MANAGEMENT PROPOSAL

12. APPENDIX 4: VOLUME 2 COVER SHEET, CHECKLIST AND SAMPLE

TEMPLATES

PART I: OVERVIEW INFORMATION

Federal Agency Name – Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Strategic Technology Office

Funding Opportunity Title – Protected Forward Communications (PFC) Announcement Type – Initial Announcement Number – HR001118S0009 Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) – Not applicable Dates o BAA Posting Date: December 7, 2017 o Proposers Day: December 14, 2017 o Request for FOUO (for official use only) appendix: December 15, 2017 o Proposal Abstract Due Date and Time: January 3, 2018 4:00PM Eastern o Questions Due Date: January 3, 2018, 4:00 PM Eastern o Proposal Due Date and Time: February 14, 2018 4:00PM Eastern o BAA Closing Date: June 6, 2018 4:00 PM Eastern

Concise description of the funding opportunity - The Protected Forward Communications (PFC) Program will enable small unit tactical operations to persist in diverse electronic warfare (EW) conditions by developing an integrated communication system protecting local, airborne, and reachback communications from exploitation and denial.

Total amount of money to be awarded – A total of $26,000,000 for multiple efforts, divided between an estimated $14,000,000 for anticipated multiple 15-month base efforts, and an additional $12,000,000 for multiple (at least two desired) anticipated 15-month continuing options.

Anticipated individual awards - Multiple awards are anticipated Types of instruments that may be awarded - Procurement contract or other transaction.

Any cost sharing requirements: none Agency contact o Points of Contact:

The BAA Coordinator for this effort may be reached at:

HR001118S0009@darpa.mil.

DARPA/STO

ATTN: HR001118S0009

675 North Randolph Street Arlington, VA 22203-2114 mailto:HR001118S0009@darpa.mil

PART II: FULL TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT

1. FUNDING OPPORTUNITY DESCRIPTION

This publication constitutes a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) as contemplated in Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 6.102(d)(2) and 35.016 and 2 CFR § 200.203. Any resultant award negotiations will follow all pertinent law and regulation, and any negotiations and/or awards for procurement contracts will use procedures under FAR 15.4, Contract Pricing, as specified in the BAA.

The PFC program will develop the architecture and demonstrate the system components that would enable small unit tactical operations to persist under EW conditions. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is soliciting proposals for the system conceptual design, modeling and simulation (M&S) validation, and component brass-board demonstrations.

The result of the PFC program is intended to be a qualified design with experiential support ready for full development and user trial (DUT) activity.

1.1. PROGRAM OVERVIEW

The PFC Program will enable small unit tactical operations to persist under diverse EW conditions by developing an integrated communication system protecting local, airborne, and reach-back communications from exploitation and denial.

U.S. forces have grown increasingly effective at achieving military goals with precision weapons applied using comprehensive networked communications. This combination has transformed small unit effectiveness from tactical point solutions to strategic impact as evidenced in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and current Middle Eastern conflicts. The Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) enables precision strike to achieve desired effects while minimizing unintended consequences. However, these forward operating units often find themselves operating in proximity to adversary forces and non-combatants and thus the targeting information exchanges are vulnerable to EW exploitation. These information exchanges fall into three categories, or conversations (see Figure 1):

1. Local communications between and among forward units;

2. Observer to weapons-platform communications, typically ground-to-air, generally assumed to take place in a line of sight (LOS) condition; and

3. Observer to rear-echelon communications to locations such as headquarters (HQ) that are outside the immediate conflict zone and generally assumed in a beyond line of sight (BLOS) condition.

These conversations must have capacity sufficient to share key context about targets (e.g.

locations of targets, adversary, and friendly forces) and with the availability/latency appropriate to weapons delivery and command and control.

Figure 1. The three conversations of the joint terminal attack controller (JTAC). LOS: line of sight, BLOS:

beyond line of sight, EW: electronic warfare

Current tactical communication approaches to these conversations put U.S. forces in danger of having their communications jammed and their positions targeted with weapons when operating against an adversary with sophisticated EW capabilities (e.g., signal exploitation enabled EW-driven kill chains). Therefore, these three conversations must be secure against both denial and exploitation.

Using a systems-driven approach that addresses the communications needs of the JTAC small unit in a holistic fashion, the PFC program will leverage advanced technology capabilities (e.g.

low probability of exploitation (LPE), low probability of intercept (LPI), low probability of detection (LPD), and anti-jam (AJ) technologies) to develop a system to defeat the adversary EW-driven kill chain and jammers.

The overarching EW-driven kill chain attempts to detect, attribute, geolocate, and target forward units based upon their communications (Figure 2). The goal of the PFC communication system is to complicate an adversary’s ability to make decisions about detection, attribution, and geolocation of communication signals, thereby breaking the EW-driven kill chain. PFC systems will also provide jamming resilience.

PFC focuses on achieving the necessary system readiness to allow a full development and user trial (DUT) follow-on effort in partnership with the Services.

Figure 2. Example of EW-driven kill chain with standoff and near-end threats1.

1.1.1. Technical Approach:

The JTAC communication needs in contested environments will serve as a focusing problem for the program. However, PFC technology should be extensible to the full range of small unit communication demands.

As a systems effort, PFC will jointly address all three JTAC conversations in an integrated system and this BAA does not stipulate specific technologies. PFC systems will draw upon progress in LPD/LPI/LPE/AJ technology including but not limited to innovative combinations of the following techniques:

• Power-managed wide-band spread spectrum communications

• Distributed coherent transmission using disconnected collaborating radios

• Burst mode systems

• Multi-aperture space-time-adaptive receive processing to cancel interfering signals

• Energy-efficient physical link technology hosted opportunistically on ground and compact air assets

• Directional communications techniques including millimeter wave or other methods

1 Photo sources (clockwise from top-left):

1) https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tupolev_Tu-214R_inflight.jpg

2) https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Infauna_K1Sh1_UNSh-12.jpg

3) https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:BM-30_Smerch-5175.JPG

4) https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:TB2015ExhibitionP2-52.jpg https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tupolev_Tu-214R_inflight.jpg https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Infauna_K1Sh1_UNSh-12.jpg https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:BM-30_Smerch-5175.JPG https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:TB2015ExhibitionP2-52.jpg

• High dynamic range RF front end techniques and cognitive radio methods

• Smart control plane technologies

• Agile and covert waveform design

• Low power ASIC design

• Efficient phased array systems

• Novel resilient BLOS technologies of various types

• Algorithm and signature confusion techniques

• Obfuscation techniques of various types

• Machine learning methodologies

• Other technologies

PFC will provide defense in depth by interrupting multiple elements of the EW-driven kill chain depicted in Figure 2. To accomplish this program goal, PFC will draw on technology and systems methods that are now sufficiently mature (≥ TRL 5 unless compellingly justified) and permit the system designer the freedom to flexibly optimize the technologies employed to deliver compelling systems capability with appropriate capacity/availability/security and backwards compatibility to facilitate system introduction.

The PFC program will include concept definition, system requirements definition, preliminary system design, and will culminate with a brassboard system element demonstrations of federated components. A Government-sponsored Verification and Validation (V&V) team will interact with performers throughout the PFC Program to assist in providing threat characterization and PFC component/system performance assessment.

1.1.2. Program Structure

The 30-month PFC program (see Figure 3) is a single-phase program with a mid-point option exercise, having three key milestones: Conceptual Design Review (CoDR), System Requirements Review (SRR), and a Preliminary Design Review (PDR). Multiple awards are anticipated. Proposers shall submit proposals with a base period of performance concluding at SRR and a fully priced option to complete the program encompassing the preliminary design review (PDR). The basis for exercising the PDR option will include quality of effort and availability of funds. Quality measures may include performance against BAA metrics, system risk posture, and transition potential.

Figure 3. High level schedule with key artifacts for PFC program. V&V: verification and validation; M&S = modeling and simulation; WF=waveform; ICD=interface control document; OTA=over-the-air; SWaP-C:

Size, weight, power, and cost

To assist in promoting PFC transition opportunities, the proposers shall prepare Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) cost and effort estimates for the full system DUT effort in their proposal.

This ROM will be updated at SRR and at PDR.

Conceptual Design

During the conceptual design activity, which culminates in the Conceptual Design Review (CoDR) performers shall deliver a PFC concept of operation (CONOP), system technology trade-studies, system concept design meeting performance metrics and program goals as outlined in Section 1.2.2, and develop a system-development risk assessment.

CONOP: Performer-generated JTAC operational vignettes that consider the operating construct and environments, backward compatibility with legacy systems, and aircraft integration and inter-operability.

System Technology trade studies: Performers should define and perform trade studies for critical technology and subsystems necessary to develop a robust system that includes the three conversations, resilience to jamming, and breaking the EW kill-chain.

System Concept Design: Develop a conceptual design that meets stated performance metrics. The concept definition will demonstrate the feasibility and achievability of a design that meets program objectives. The design exercise identifies system attributes and critical technologies.

Risk Assessment: Develop a system risk register that describes the overall risk management approach. The performer shall include a discussion of their methodology for risk identification, assessment, and handling.

During the conceptual design cycle, the performer will coordinate with the Government V&V team to establish M&S validation approach including simulation environment definition, data exchanges, operational vignettes, and team interactions.

At CoDR, performers will deliver a viable architecture with associated trade studies, a complete risk register, and a plausible approach to resolution of design challenges. See Section 1.2.3 “Deliverables” for a complete listing of CoDR deliverables.

System Requirements

During system requirements definition, which culminates in the System Requirements Review (SRR), the performer shall identify a complete set of system functions and characteristics and translate those elements into an appropriate set of system performance requirements.

Traceability to the performers CONOPS and conceptual design will be assessed to substantiate that a complete set of system functions, characteristics, and program goals have been identified and captured in an appropriate set of system requirements (the System Requirements Document (item 11, Table 4)). Performers will also identify and define system requirements for external interfaces, including waveforms. The performer shall develop an initial architecture at the next level of system detail (i.e. hardware/software/control) by performing an initial allocation of system functions and requirements to those elements.

During this system requirements development period, the performer shall begin executing the risk mitigation plans identified at CoDR. By SRR, initial risk mitigation of enabling technologies, including experimental validation of any unsubstantiated or unproven link technologies shall substantiate the viability of system link technologies.

At the SRR, the performer shall demonstrate by analysis and M&S that the baseline conceptual design meets the defined system functional/performance/interface requirements, showing clear traceability between system design features/solutions and system requirements. The performer shall demonstrate that their PFC system, including control plane concepts, have been validated in an appropriate M&S environment against the general threats of Section 1.2.2.2 as well as specific ones developed in collaboration with the V&V team. See Section 1.2.3, “Deliverables” for a complete listing of SRR deliverables.

Preliminary Design

During preliminary design, which culminates in closure of the preliminary design review (PDR), the performer shall develop a complete system design that is traceable to the performer-defined system requirements and CONOPS. The preliminary design shall consist of system definition and requirements at the subsystem and component level. Performers are expected to conduct trade studies to establish subsystem architectures and required component functionality, perform testing and analysis (as necessary), and benchmark system performance to substantiate system design, control plane performance and viability, and component maturity at PDR. The performer shall continue M&S of system performance, which should encompass control plane operation as well as hardware in the loop evaluation. The performer shall develop experimental brass-board system elements, when necessary, to demonstrate system elements and goals. In conjunction with the V&V team, performers shall develop and execute a user capstone event appropriate to their system concept that validates system performance with substantiation through V&V team interaction and justifies entry into full system DUT.

At PDR, the performer shall demonstrate that their preliminary design and description of preferred system architecture down to the component level is traceable to and satisfies the BAA program goals and performance metrics. The performer shall show clear traceability between system, subsystem, and component design solutions and any associated requirements. SWaP compliance, full software realization and complete hardware / software / control plane integration are not required, but performers will identify SWaP estimates and any remaining tasks needed to complete these design activities. Section 1.2.3 provides a complete listing of PDR deliverables. In the three-month period following PDR, the performer shall update all program deliverables based on resultant action items and Government feedback.

1.2. PROGRAM METRICS, MILESTONES, DELIVERABLES

In order for the Government to evaluate the effectiveness of a proposed solution in achieving the stated program objectives, proposers should note that the Government hereby promulgates the following program metrics that may serve as the basis for determining whether satisfactory progress is being made to warrant continued funding of the program. Although the following program metrics are specified, proposers should note that the Government has identified these goals with the intention of bounding the scope of effort, while affording performers maximum flexibility, creativity, and innovation in proposing solutions to the stated problem.

1.2.1. Schedule and Milestones

Figure 4 shows a detailed program schedule indicating key milestones, dates, and events.

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M6 QPR2 M6

M7 M7 M8 M8 M9 Mid SRR M9

M10 M10 M11 M11

M12 QPR 4 M12

M13 M13 M14 M14

M15 SRR M15

M16 M16 M17 M17

M18 QPR 6 M18

M19 M19 M20 M20 M21 mid PDR M21 M22 M22 M23 M23

M24 QPR 7 M24

M25 M25 M26 M26

M27 PDR M27

M28 M28 M29 M29 M30 End M30 M31 M31

Q9 Q9

Q10 Q10

Q6 Q6

Q7 Q7

Q8 Q8

Q3 Q3

Q4 Q4

Q5 Q5

Q0 Q0

Q1 Q1

Q2 Q2

Dates Schedule Milestones Dates

Figure 4. Detailed program schedule (read vertically downward).

Key milestone reviews will take place at CoDR, SRR, and PDR. Quarterly reviews will take place at DARPA or at performer locations. For costing, please assume that four of these reviews will take place at the DARPA facility in Arlington, VA.

1.2.2. Program Goals and Performance Metrics

DARPA is interested in developing an integrated PFC system that interrupts as many elements of the adversary EW-driven kill chain as possible (see Figure 2). DARPA desires proposed solutions that credibly meet or preferably exceed the performance metrics and maturity goals discussed in Section 1.2.2.1. The final three columns of Table 1 and the generic commercially-derived threat characteristics of Section 1.2.2.2 for use in proposal preparation are provided in a For Official Use Only (FOUO) Addendum (see Section 4.2.1 and Section 10 for instructions on how to obtain this Addendum). Additional threat information developed during program execution may include classified elements. Proposers should therefore plan to analyze specific threat systems during the program and provide for the generation and storage of classified information (see also Sections 1.2.4, 3.1.2, and 4.2.1).

1.2.2.1. System Performance Goals

This section describes desired performance goals for the PFC system. Table 1provides specific communication-related performance metrics, with the data in the final three columns available in the FOUO addendum. The helpful construct of a ‘range ratio’ between the communicating parties (Rb) and the threat (Ri) is introduced inTable 1. Communications must provide high availability (e.g. robust connectivity) and low latency suitable for tactical operations.

Table 1. Table of key conversation performance metrics. Threshold (objective) metrics are referenced without and with parentheses, respectively. Rb: range to communications host from unit operating point, Ri:

range to threat. SEE FOUO ADDENDUM FOR MISSING ENTRIES.

Radio Links Users Range

(km) Capacity (Mb/s)

Range Ratios (Rb/Ri)

Threat offset range from unit (km)

Detection, Geolocation, and Jam-resistance metrics

HQ

(BLOS)

Point to point

(500) 0.01 (1) See FOUO

Addendum

Aircraft Point to point

(250) 1 (10) See FOUO

Addendum

Unit (local) 10 (100) 0.1 (1) 1 (1000) See FOUO

Addendum

See FOUO Addendum see FOUO Addendum

Detection: PFC will measure detection uncertainty by assessing the difference between the probability of detection (Pdet) and the probability of false alarm (Pfa), which if driven to zero indicates maximum uncertainty. Baseline detection methods will include radiometric detection, as well as correlation-based methods including at least cyclostationary methods. For proposal purposes, specific detection metrics and threat locations in the final two columns of Table 1 are available in the FOUO Addendum and will be further explored during program execution.

Attribution is the capacity of an adversary to distinguish a detected signal in the environment as a high value target. Since this environment is mission dependent, the program will include exemplary rural, suburban, and urban vignettes with associated RF background characteristics/data to assess the capacity to thwart attribution by adversary systems.

Computational assets available to execute attribution depend on tactical asset capability as discussed in Section 1.2.2.2.

Geolocation resistance will be evaluated against location errors induced against various modern EW location-finding approaches. The program will consider diverse approaches to geolocation.

These will include at least the use of multiple platforms employing multiple apertures and / or directional antennas, time and frequency difference of arrival (TDOA / FDOA) approaches, as well as correlated detection methods established through an interaction with the V&V team, including techniques such as MUSIC2 algorithm and derivatives. Maximizing geolocation confusion is desirable, and specific performance goals can be mission and environment dependent. For proposal purposes, specific geolocation-error metrics and threat locations in the final two columns of Table 1 are available in the FOUO Addendum, and provide a baseline example to be refined during execution.

Anti-Jam: In addition to protecting transmitters from detection and geolocation, PFC receiver protection through jam-resistance methods is desirable. During program execution, exemplary electronic attack (e.g. jamming) vignettes will be considered, and performance will be assessed against a variety of system-specific techniques. Jamming methods will vary depending on the specific proposed system, whether successful detection, attribution, or geolocation is assumed to have taken place, and whether knowledge or adherence to specific protocol can be assumed.

Further techniques include future evolution of the threat in terms of bandwidth, sweep rate, level of cognition (e.g. record and replay up to full protocol awareness) and power. For proposal purposes, specific jamming tolerance metrics and threat locations in the final two columns of Table 1 are available in the FOUO Addendum, and will be further refined during program execution.

Soldier PFC Component - Size, Weight, Power and Cost (SWaP-C): The soldier-hosted elements of PFC should not impose additional burden on the forward unit. The JTAC radio kit provides a useful baseline, and specific targets depend on how much of the current JTAC kit a proposed PFC system will augment or replace and how the burden may be distributed. For proposal purposes the production system weight target including all PFC communication electronics, antennas and batteries is 20 lbs with an objective of 12 lbs, not including user interface devices (e.g. tablet, or laptop). For unit communications, a non-JTAC member will also need a radio, with a baseline weight target of 2 lbs, inclusive of battery and antenna, with an objective to minimize this figure. PFC systems will operate with or without access to grid power. When operating disconnected, a long endurance is desirable. For proposal purposes, a threshold endurance consistent with a 24-hour mission reliant on a fixed energy source of 180 W-Hrs (derived from the capacity of two standard issue 5590 battery systems) is desired, and strategies that go beyond this are of interest. The production cost of the system will be assessed during the program and compared against those elements replaced by the PFC system.

2 R. O. Schmidt, “A Signal Subspace Approach to Multiple Emitter Location and Spectral Estimation,” Ph.D.

dissertation, Stanford Univ., Stanford, CA, 1981.

Backwards compatibility and coexistence: To facilitate PFC systems introduction, a backwards-compatibility capability is needed. The intent of backward compatibility is to allow interoperation of PFC systems with unmodified legacy systems as well as an ability to tolerate and coexist with other systems. A threshold goal is to support interoperation with at least one of today’s legacy communication links for unit, airframe, and BLOS communication, without incorporating any new PFC features. Proposals that exceed threshold in types of links and PFC feature support with unmodified or minimally-modified legacy systems may be favorably reviewed, based on the details of the methods proposed.

Air integration: PFC will consider diverse radio / airframe integration methods. It is desirable to maximize the number of weapons platforms (e.g. aircraft, artillery or other support elements) with which forward units may communicate. Airborne platforms may include manned or unmanned aircraft of fixed wing or rotorcraft nature, as well as potential future weapon systems.

Accordingly, airborne communication methods that can be rapidly introduced, afford broad cross-platform compatibility with current and forthcoming platforms, and minimally disturb airborne operations and qualification processes are all desirable. Staged approaches that allow rapid introduction through operations that fall outside the operational flight profile (OFP) with a follow-on approach spanning multiple platforms may offer a promising option.

HQ integration: BLOS communications will require certain resources at the headquarters (HQ) units, and possibly between the unit and the HQ. In consideration of the need to maximize robustness of the HQ communications link, it is appropriate to minimize the numbers, distribution, and vulnerability of all elements required to achieve the BLOS communication. HQ technology integration is assumed to be more flexible than airframe integration.

Human Integration: The focus of the PFC system is the unit it supports, which is composed of people, potentially in a range of environments. These may include urban, suburban, and rural environments that may be austere, disconnected, and hazardous. Appropriate provision for human factors such as body position and user mobility, along with physical vulnerability factors such as light and noise discipline are necessary in a final design. PFC user interfaces will ideally require no new hardware and be compatible with familiar devices (e.g. tablet, handheld, or laptop) to reduce both SWaP and training demand.

1.2.2.2. Generic threat characteristics (SEE FOUO ADDENDUM)

To facilitate proposal analysis, characteristics of generic threat systems are provided in this section as the FOUO Addendum. As discussed in Section 1.2.2.1 above, during program execution, the Government V&V team will work together with the performers to define appropriate threat systems. Some threat system details will require performers to have classified materials handling capability (see also Section 1.2.4). Since particular proposed approaches may vary, proposers may make appropriate modifications to RF characteristics to address individual approaches provided these are stated and justified.

Table 2. Generic intercept receiver characteristics. SEE FOUO ADDENDUM

Table 3. Generic Jammer characteristics. SEE FOUO ADDENDUM

1.2.3. Deliverables

PFC deliverables motivate progressively increasing levels of system design maturity as the effort proceeds. Table 4 provides expectations on these deliverables at key points in the program (CoDR, SRR, PDR, and end of program). More details for reporting and meeting deliverables are provided in Section 6.2.1 and 6.3

Table 4: Table of Deliverables Item Deliverable CoDR SRR PDR Program

End 1 Presentation Materials for each review 48 hrs in advance 48 hrs in advance

48 hrs in advance

48 hrs in advance

2 Design Document providing comprehensive view of data, control plane, timing concepts intended to meet program goals

Draft due Updated Finalized for

PDR

Review updates

3 System Risk Register Due Updated Updated / Retired

Finalized

4 Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Tool and plan for system validation using it

In Use Utilized Utilized Finalized

5 Verification and Validation Team Interaction Plan

Draft due See 8 See 8 See 8

6 Link technology description with maturity and validation plan

Due See 9 See 9 See 9

7 System concept of operations (CONOPS) with embodiments in Operational vignettes identified in collaboration with V&V team

Due Updated (See 8)

Updated (See 16,17)

See 16, 17

8 System operation validated in M&S vignettes, V&V report

Due Updated Finalized

9 Link technologies functionally validated with OTA experimental support

Due Updated as needed

Finalized

10 System functional baseline with allocation to hardware/software/control as captured in Design Document

Due Updated as needed

Finalized

11 System requirements document capturing all system performance goals

Due Updated as needed (see 15)

Finalized

12 System Physical architecture with traceability to system requirements

Due Updated as needed

Finalized

13 System Interface Control Document Draft due Finalized Review updates

Item Deliverable CoDR SRR PDR Program End

14 Waveforms definition document with performance and constraints validated in simulation

Due Finalized Review updates

15 Subsystem and component requirements including traceability to system requirements

Due Finalized

16 Fully qualified design with experimental and simulation artifacts, captured in design document and presentation

Due Review updates

17 Brassboard real time system element test documentation with V&V team validation

Due Finalized

18 Production SWaP-C estimates Due Review updates

19 Approach to DUT and DUT ROM update Update from proposal

Update Update Review updates

20 User event definition, host, report documentation

Update from proposal

Define Report on execution

Review updates

1.2.4. Government Furnished Equipment/Information (GFE/GFI)

Relevant points relating to GFE/GFI for this effort include the following:

During program execution, the Government will develop a set of sample operationally relevant vignettes for evaluation of performer systems in rural, suburban, and urban settings. The government expects to provide such information in narrative form by CoDR. Information may be classified up to the SECRET level (see also Section 3.1.2).

During program execution, threat system data for further analysis will be provided by the Government and may include classified information currently anticipated to extend to SECRET level (see also Section 3.1.2).

To assist in proposal development, the Government will make available a proposers’ library with information from other potentially relevant programs, including the DARPA Computational Leverage Against Surveillance Systems (CLASS) program, consisting of the data and presentation materials discussed at the CLASS Technology Day3.

Information on how to address needs for GFE / GFI in the proposal are found in Section 1.2.5.

1.2.5. Proposed Approach

Compelling proposals will provide a convincing narrative well-supported by quantitative analysis of how the proposed PFC system will meet the expectations described in Section 1.1.1, and will meet or exceed the metrics described in Section 1.2.2 while following a systems engineering development process consistent with the expectations outlined in Section 1.1.2.

3 CLASS Technology Day held June 27, 2017 and announced here:

https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=b9c1b92a891577a2c04f4033afcce3d1&tab=core&_cvi ew=0 . Access to documentation relating to CLASS technology day can be made available to U.S. Persons by contacting the BAA administrator.

https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=b9c1b92a891577a2c04f4033afcce3d1&tab=core&_cview=0 https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=b9c1b92a891577a2c04f4033afcce3d1&tab=core&_cview=0

Proposals that exceed program goals are encouraged. A summary list of proposal expectations follows.

1) Show with quantitative analysis how the proposed system will meet or preferably exceed all the target metrics of Section 1.2.2.1 for the threats most relevant to the proposed approach, including methods and techniques described in Section 1.2.2.2. Describe the system readiness commitments at each of the three major program milestones (CoDR, SRR, and PDR) relative to the benchmarks discussed in Section 1.1.2 and the deliverables of Table 4.

Proposed efforts that credibly exceed benchmarks may be reviewed more favorably than those that meet benchmarks. In particular, proposals should:

a) Show how the proposed approach will interrupt as many of the elements of the adversary kill chain as possible (Figure 2). In particular:

i) With specific reference to Section 1.2.2.2, provide quantitative support for resistance to detection, attribution, and geolocation for all of the conversations supported by the system in accordance with the remarks of Section 1.2.2.1. Proposers should consider threats of particular relevance to their proposed approach and the likely technical evolution of these threats.

ii) With specific reference to jamming tolerance, provide quantitative support for jam tolerance against the baseline threats outlined in Section 1.2.2.2, and address specific concerns relevant to the proposed approach for all the conversations supported by the system, consistent with the expectations of Section 1.2.2.1. As outlined therein, discuss and analyze the jamming technique(s) assumed and the receiver protection methods employed.

b) Contain a description of key attributes of the PFC concept, including integrated link and control approach (control plane) at the conceptual level. If environmental situational awareness is used in the control plane, proposals should explain how it is acquired.

c) Show how the proposed PFC system will adapt to diverse threats and operating environments to support Table 1 objectives with robust connectivity and quantify the intended availability and latency anticipated for each conversation.

2) Describe the disciplined systems engineering process used to ensure an optimized PFC solution. Discussion should include approach to and relationships between system performance analysis, planned design trade studies, CONOPS development, requirements development and capture, and risk management and mitigation needed to achieve the end of program goals for a qualified design by PDR as outlined in Section 1.1.2. Proposals should include an initial view of the system risk register (See also Figure 5 of Section 4.3.2)

3) Provide an analysis of how the proposed approach will deal with spectral clutter and unintentional interfering signals.

4) Explain how the proposed approach will scale beyond the exemplary JTAC communications case to meet the challenges of future small unit operations. These include increased use of manned / unmanned teaming, greater penetration of automation and sensing systems at the small unit level, the use of organic precision munitions, and general cross-domain operations against adversaries with sophisticated EW capability.

5) Identify the technical readiness of all proposed technologies and systems. Describe functional validation plans for any new, un-proven, or low-maturity link technologies proposed, as outlined in Section 1.1.2 and Table 4.

6) Provide a narrative discussion of the PFC rollout strategy with particular attention to backwards compatibility, airframe integration, and soldier total burden as below:

a) Explain how the approach provides backward compatibility to legacy systems at both unit, aircraft, and HQ level. Proposals should highlight the level of PFC features, if any, than can be supported under legacy operation, consistent with information provided in Section 1.2.2. Harmonious coexistence with existing systems should be balanced with new and compelling features.

b) Explain what provisions are made for proposed PFC systems to coexist with existing systems of both communications and force protection in nature.

c) Explain in detail how airframe integration will be achieved so that PFC system capabilities can be provided to the maximum number of airborne or other weapons platforms with the fewest number of unique airframe integration schemes. Describe the qualification activities required to accommodate said schemes and the time expected to execute them. Proposer’s capabilities and experience in achieving that integration are relevant to proposal review. Proposers should designate a primary airframe to target design and list other platforms with which direct compatibility is expected.

d) How projected production SWaP-C of man-portable PFC elements will fall below what our soldiers carry today (see Section 1.2.2), and what particular advantages and challenges are presented by the proposed approach to human integration (e.g. human factors design considerations).

7) Describe and provide examples of the use of M&S tools capable of validating the proposed PFC approach at appropriate fidelity (e.g. fields in space) for operational vignettes in rural, suburban, and urban environments and with which a Government-sponsored verification and validation (V&V) team may interact. List specific examples of M&S tools the proposer knows how to use to assist the program office in selection of a common tool.

8) Describe methods, and provide examples of the proposer’s approach to V&V team interaction.

9) Summarize plans for experimental brassboard system validation tests and describe the user event concept.

10) Describe any expectations for Government-furnished equipment (GFE) or information (GFI) and provide estimates of the cost or effort anticipated to meet these expectations. Make these estimates entirely separate from any funding requests to DARPA.

11) Describe capability, experience, and historical background for proceeding to a possible future DUT effort. Proposals should present an analysis of conditions required to achieve an affirmative business case decision for undertaking DUT and steps the proposer intends to take to facilitate it.

12) Provide a rough order of magnitude (ROM) estimate for the DUT effort (cost and schedule), as described in Section 1.1.2

13) Plausibly justify how any key external inputs needed by the system are provided (e.g. any necessary location, timing, or distributed situational awareness information).

14) Provide a credible approach to addressing information security needs (e.g. red / black traffic) including multi-level security and encryption for both U. S. only operations as well as coalition operations.

2. AWARD INFORMATION

2.1. GENERAL AWARD INFORMATION

Multiple awards are anticipated. The amount of resources made available under this BAA will depend on the quality of the proposals received and the availability of funds.

The Government reserves the right to select for negotiation all, some, one, or none of the proposals received in response to this solicitation and to make awards without discussions with proposers. The Government also reserves the right to conduct discussions if it is later determined to be necessary. If warranted, portions of resulting awards may be segregated into pre-priced options. Additionally, DARPA reserves the right to accept proposals in their entirety or to select only portions of proposals for award. In the event that DARPA desires to award only portions of a proposal, negotiations may be opened with that proposer. The Government reserves the right to fund proposals in phases with options for continued work, as applicable.

The Government reserves the right to request any additional, necessary documentation once it makes the award instrument determination. Such additional information may include but is not limited to Representations and Certifications (see Section 6.2.10. “Representations and Certifications”). The Government reserves the right to remove proposers from award consideration should the parties fail to reach agreement on award terms, conditions, and/or cost/price within a reasonable time, and the proposer fails to timely provide requested additional information. Proposals identified for negotiation may result in a procurement contract or other transaction, depending upon the nature of the work proposed, the required degree of interaction between parties, whether or not the research is classified as Fundamental Research, and other factors.

Proposers looking for innovative, commercial-like contractual arrangements are encouraged to consider requesting Other Transactions. To understand the flexibility and options associated with Other Transactions, consult http://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/contract-management#OtherTransactions.

In all cases, the Government contracting officer shall have sole discretion to select award instrument type, regardless of instrument type proposed, and to negotiate all instrument terms and conditions with selectees. DARPA will apply publication or other restrictions, as necessary, if it determines that the research resulting from the proposed effort will present a high likelihood of disclosing performance characteristics of military systems or manufacturing technologies that are unique and critical to defense. Any award resulting from such a determination will include a requirement for DARPA permission before publishing any information or results on the program. For more information on publication restrictions, see the section below on Fundamental Research.

http://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/contract-management#OtherTransactions http://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/contract-management#OtherTransactions

2.2. FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH

It is DoD policy that the publication of products of fundamental research will remain unrestricted to the maximum extent possible. National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 189 defines fundamental research as follows:

‘Fundamental research’ means basic and applied research in science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the scientific community, as distinguished from proprietary research and from industrial development, design, production, and product utilization, the results of which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or national security reasons.

As of the date of publication of this BAA, the Government expects that program goals as described herein either cannot be met by proposers intending to perform fundamental research or the proposed research is anticipated to present a high likelihood of disclosing performance characteristics of military systems or manufacturing technologies that are unique and critical to defense. Therefore, the Government anticipates restrictions on the resultant research that will require the awardee to seek DARPA permission before publishing any information or results relative to the program.

Proposers should indicate in their proposal whether they believe the scope of the research included in their proposal is fundamental or not. While proposers should clearly explain the intended results of their research, the Government shall have sole discretion to select award instrument type and to negotiate all instrument terms and conditions with selectees. Appropriate clauses will be included in resultant awards for non-fundamental research to prescribe publication requirements and other restrictions, as appropriate. This clause can be found at http://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/additional-baa.

For certain research projects, it may be possible that although the research being performed by the awardee is restricted research, a subawardee may be conducting fundamental research. In those cases, it is the awardee’s responsibility to explain in their proposal why its subawardee’s effort is fundamental research

3. ELIGIBILITY INFORMATION

3.1. ELIGIBLE APPLICANTS

All responsible sources capable of satisfying the Government’s needs may submit a proposal that shall be considered by DARPA.

3.1.1. Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) and Government Entities

3.1.1.1. FFRDCs

FFRDCs are subject to applicable direct competition limitations and cannot propose to this BAA in any capacity unless they meet the following conditions: (1) FFRDCs must clearly demonstrate that the proposed work is not otherwise available from the private sector. (2) FFRDCs must provide a letter on official letterhead from their sponsoring organization citing http://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/additional-baa the specific authority establishing their eligibility to propose to Government solicitations and compete with industry, and their compliance with the associated FFRDC sponsor agreement’s terms and conditions. This information is required for FFRDCs proposing to be awardees or subawardees.

3.1.1.2. Government Entities

Government Entities (e.g., Government/National laboratories, military educational institutions, etc.) are subject to applicable direct competition limitations. Government entities must clearly demonstrate that the work is not otherwise available from the private sector and provide written documentation citing the specific statutory authority and contractual authority, if relevant, establishing their ability to propose to Government solicitations.

3.1.1.3. Authority and Eligibility

At the present time, DARPA does not consider 15 U.S.C. § 3710a to be sufficient legal authority to show eligibility. While 10 U.S.C.§ 2539b may be the appropriate statutory starting point for some entities, specific supporting regulatory guidance, together with evidence of agency approval, will still be required to fully establish eligibility. DARPA will consider FFRDC and Government entity eligibility submissions on a case-by-case basis; however, the burden to prove eligibility for all team members rests solely with the proposer.

3.1.2. Non-U.S. Organizations

Due to security requirements associated with the PFC program, only organizations that are capable of receiving, processing, and storing export controlled and classified information associated with this effort are eligible for awards. Non-U.S. organizations and/or individuals may therefore not participate in this effort as a prime contractor. Non-U.S. organizations and/or individuals may act as subcontractors to the extent that the prime contractor can ensure such participants comply with any necessary nondisclosure agreements, security regulations, export control laws, and other governing statutes applicable under the circumstances. Non-U.S.

organizations or individuals acting as subcontractors will perform solely at the unclassified level.

Since DARPA does not intend to provide classified or export controlled data to any international participants, proposers are reminded that implementation of applicable agreements and licenses is the responsibility of the proposer. See Section 4.2.1 “Security and Proprietary Issues” regarding the proposer’s capabilities to perform research and development at the classification level they propose.

3.1.3. Applicants Considering Classified Submissions

DARPA expects submissions to this BAA may include classified portions. For such proposals, applicants will ensure all industrial, personnel, and information systems processing security requirements are in place and at the appropriate level (e.g., Facility Clearance Level (FCL), Automated Information Security (AIS), Certification and Accreditation (C&A), and any Foreign Ownership Control and Influence (FOCI) issues are mitigated prior to submission. Additional information on these subjects can be found at http://www.dss.mil.

http://www.dss.mil/

3.2. ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

FAR 9.5 Requirements In accordance with FAR 9.5, proposers are required to identify and disclose all facts relevant to potential OCIs involving the proposer’s organization and any proposed team member (subawardee, consultant). Under this Section, the proposer is responsible for providing this disclosure with each proposal submitted to the BAA. The disclosure must include the proposer’s, and as applicable, proposed team member’s OCI mitigation plan. The OCI mitigation plan must include a description of the actions the proposer has taken, or intends to take, to prevent the existence of conflicting roles that might bias the proposer’s judgment and to prevent the proposer from having unfair competitive advantage. The OCI mitigation plan will specifically discuss the disclosed OCI in the context of each of the OCI limitations outlined in FAR 9.505-1 through FAR 9.505-4.

Agency Supplemental OCI Policy In addition, DARPA has a supplemental OCI…