4027-E-Nightmare-Prob Sits1-4-2ed08R0002.pdf

COLLEGE OF INTERNATIONAL AND SECURITY STUDIES

Program on Terrorism and Security Studies

Exercise

Cerulean Nightmare

English

Edition 2 #4027-E

#4027-E 2nd Edition

Exercise CERULEAN NIGHTMARE

Counterterrorism

Background Welcome to the fictitious region of Cerulea, which includes four countries: Denabia, Goria, Marislova, and Tashmara. These four nations have characteristics similar to many of the countries from which Marshall Center course participants come. However, none of these countries represent any specific states. To make the exercise more realistic and because the Marshall Center specializes in Eurasia and Europe, this fictitious area is located between Iran, Russia, and Ukraine and the events take place in the year 2008.

Cerulean Regional Data

Nation Population Defense share of GDP

Marislova 10,894,000 2.8% Goria 7,500,000 2.7% Denabia 4,500,000 * Tashmara 17,000,000 3.5%

* Central government spends virtually nothing for defense. Provincial expenditures are not known.

The Cerulean Region: History, Demography and Resources

The Cerulean region has several important geographic features. For more than 1500 kilometers, its southern border is bounded by the Cerulean Sea, from which the territory takes its name.

From this shoreline, the coastal plain stretches north to the Gorian Highlands, which form a 500-kilometer border across the north. The mountains, more than 4000 meters high, act as a watershed and are a natural political barrier that separates Cerulea from countries to the north.

From east to west the coastal plain progresses through a variety of agricultural climatic zones.

The eastern region is hot and dry with waterless deserts dominating the border areas with what is now Iran. To the west the land is richer and enjoys a higher rainfall. For centuries farmers have successfully cultivated cereals and citrus fruits in this area.

The central coastal plain is dominated by the Dena, a river that flows south across central Europe through the Gorian Highlands and across the Cerulean coastal plain. The river describes several huge bends as it crosses the plain from Rokno until it reaches the delta area of Hannibal where it empties into the sea. The River Dena has been a trade route since the first settlement of the region. It is navigable as far north as central Ukraine.

The earliest settlements were established in the fertile river delta at Hannibal and along the banks of the River Dena. From these early civilizations three nations initially emerged. In the western areas an agricultural people farmed the plains around Istvannograd, now Marislova. In the foothills to the north, a mountain people, who were mainly herdsmen, lived among the passes in what is now Goria. In the dry plains to the east, the tribes of the desert lands, also herdsmen, inhabited the largest area, presently the country of Tashmara. The desert tribes of Tashmara followed Islam. In Marislova and Goria the prevailing religion was mainly orthodox Christian.

Denabia did not become an independent state until much later. For centuries Marislova’s eastern border ran along the current Denabian/Tashmaran frontier. Thus the Marislovan state included most of the River Dena as well as what are now Denabian lands. However several distinct ethnic groups populated the Denabian area. On the west bank of the Dena, the people were primarily part of the same early Christian civilizations as the Marislovans. On the northeastern banks of the Dena in the South Kammar province (see map) the population was derived from the Kammar tribes, which straddle both sides of the Goria/Denabian border. On the southeastern bank the people were directly related to the Tashmar tribes. The religion of the east bank peoples was mainly Islam. When the Marislovan empire collapsed in the late 1980s, Denabia became a fully independent state. Its people, who once identified themselves with one of three ethnic groups, the Kammars, the Tashmars, and West Bank Marislovans, now prefer to be identified as Denabs.

In the 1800s, thanks to a wealthy agricultural system, Marislova became the most powerful state in the region. By 1850, Goria and Tashmara realized the need for protection within the growing Marislovan sphere of influence, and accepted annexation into Marislova along with the consequent loss of their independent status. Over the next fifty years, power and wealth in Marislova gradually transferred from the traditional ruling families to a new urban class of merchants and manufacturers. By 1900 the population had started to migrate from the rural communities to the urban areas. The working classes became more articulate, assertive, and politicized.

Within the Marislovan region, state resources began to be organized collectively. Large coal and ore fields were discovered in the north and around Istvannograd, Hokha, and Rokno. By the 1960s these areas had become more densely populated as large manufacturing towns grew up around the industrial resources and the inland navigation routes.

The River Dena was successfully harnessed by a canal and irrigation system. Two huge irrigation and hydroelectric complexes were created, one in Rokno, Goria, to the north and the other at Garchuk, Denabia, in the south, forming Lake Riban, almost 100 kilometers long. This improved navigation of the river and provided an irrigation system for the agricultural plains.

The Cerulean Region: Recent Developments

In early 1946 the Communist Party won elections, and Marislova swiftly became a one-party state. The 1948 Constitution reorganized Marislova as a federal union of three republics:

Marislova, Denabia, and Goria. All had the right to secede. During this period, a fourth country in the region, Tashmara, a former Soviet republic, gained its independence.

In economic terms for the next forty years, Marislova was, a slowly developing member of the Soviet bloc. Its location on one of the USSR’s principal export-import routes and heavy investments along the River Dena corridor, particularly in the armaments sector, were important benefits for the Marislovan economy. But Marislova’s economy collapses at the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s. The USSR refused to pay Marislova cash for weapons, and by 1990 the country was in crisis. The government began looking to the West to take up the USSR’s slack.

At the same time, perestroika in the neighboring USSR was reflected in a more liberal, less repressive central government in Marislova. The Istvannograd administration tolerated Denabian, Gorian, and other nationalist movements in the hope that accommodating potentially divisive forces might hold the Marislovan state together. The European Commission and the US tacitly supported Istvannograd in this policy, but the USSR did not.

In September 1989, European Union members and the US doubled the number of work visas available to Marislovan nationals. Crowds assembled outside the US and other West European embassies in Istvannograd, and violent anti-Communist demonstrations erupted. In October, the worried Communist government asked Washington and the EU to scale down their benevolent concern for Marislovan welfare as this was destabilizing the capital. The result was a riot. Crude police efforts intended to suppress the disturbances instead caused them to spread. These riots revealed a deeply felt sense of injustice, the result of decades of autocratic government. Within three days, fighting had spread to every major town and city in the country and Communist institutions were attacked. Unable to face slaughtering thousands to restore order, the Communist government resigned. A caretaker government, headed by the President, liberalized politics and announced elections for July 1991. The ballot included a referendum on the future of the Federation. Voters in each republic could choose either to remain part of the federation or to become independent.

There was an immediate explosion in political activity. All of the nationalist movements turned into increasingly powerful political parties. At the same time other non-nationalist groups started to organize themselves within each of the three constituent republics of Marislova and it became clear that the federation could not hold together. In the July elections, a majority of the electorate in Goria and Denabia voted to secede from Marislova. Goria and Denabia became independent in September 1991.

However, reorganizing the constituent parts of the Marislovan state structure took far longer. The River Dena was crucial to all three states. Accordingly, in October 1993, the three states’ representatives met under the leadership of the European Union Presidency, held then by Luxembourg. The Esch Agreement – also witnessed by Russia, Ukraine, and Tashmara— committed all three parties to maintain freedom of movement along the river and gave the

Marislovan Navy responsibility for the waterway’s security in Denabia. The agreement also set a schedule of tariffs for the locks at Rokno and Garchuk and stipulated that the fees could not be changed without the consent of the other two signatories.

The Cerulean Region: Marislova In-country Brief

Structures of Governance Marislova is a highly centralized, unitary state. A powerful executive President appoints its government. The bicameral parliament is divided into a directly elected House of Deputies and the House of Counsel, which is appointed by a committee of representatives from various professions (law, business, academia, etc.); the House of Deputies, with a majority vote of 2/3 of its members, can dismiss the government; the House of Counsel can delay or veto legislation by a vote of three-quarters of its members. The President appoints the Ministers, who need not be members of the legislature. However, since the President must maintain control over the parliament, ministers frequently are party leaders. Ten percent of the seats in the House of Counsel are reserved for retired senior officers in the Armed Forces. House of Counsel members may not be affiliated with a political party.

Political Parties The principal parties and the percent of their representation in the House of Deputies are:

Democratic Left (DL) (21%, former Communist Party; Freedom Party (FP) (20%, right); Free Liberals (FL) (14%, center); True Democrats (TD) (12%, slightly fascist); Movement for the Left (ML) (11%, center-left); and Green Tank (GT) (10%, green, pacifist, anti-nationalist). The government is left wing and fairly authoritarian, and relies on coalition between DL, FL, & ML to govern. Each party is represented in the Cabinet; the TD, while not formally a part of the coalition, votes frequently with the government; the leader of the TD is Minister of Defense.

The ban on political parties in the House of Counsel means that certain quasi-formal associations hold considerable influence there. These include the Octobrists (22% of members), a centrist group particularly concerned with human rights who see themselves as guardians of the October 1989 revolution; the League of Piety (18%), center-right, of priests and church members; the Legion (17% − not including the 10% of retired senior officers) of military veterans, close to the Denabian Unity Party; and Earth (13%), a green group.

See section CER 2E (Cerulean Region Political Structure tables).

Armed Forces Organization The Marislovan Armed Forces are strong, well trained, and equipped with good, though often obsolete, equipment. Conscription is still used to fill the ranks and draft evasion stands at less than 10%. Defense spending is running at 2.8% of GDP. Compared with other countries in the region, the Marislovan armed forces are in relatively good shape.

Army:

• 3 standing divisions;

o 13th Armored Division (Istvannograd)(with T72 tanks), o 8th Motor Rifle Division (central Marislova), o 10th Infantry Division (Kommersgrad).

• 2 brigades; Presidential Guard Brigade & 3rd Airborne Brigade (Mossaek).

• Deployments: A battalion from 10th Infantry is deployed along the Tashmara-S. Kammarjan border, and a battalion from 8th Motor Rifle along the Tashmara-Tashmak border.

• Active service units are manned at 75% of their authorized strength, with the exception of the Presidential Guard Brigade and the 3rd Airborne Brigade, which are at 90%. There are also four reserve divisions.

Navy:

• 3 destroyers, (30 years old, with surface-to-surface missiles, torpedoes, light guns, and anti-aircraft artillery)

• 6 frigates, (15 years old, with older technology anti-aircraft and anti-submarine capabilities)

• 2 corvettes, (40 years old, with old 4-inch guns and old anti-aircraft artillery)

• 2 minesweepers, (20 years old, with old mine countermine capability)

• 4 diesel-electric submarines, (25 years old, with torpedoes)

• 12 river patrol vessels. (5 years old, with light guns)

• A Naval Infantry brigade is stationed in Hannibal, with one battalion in Kommersgrad.

• Most ships remain in port; two thirds of this force and most of the navy’s dockyard facilities are based in Hannibal. The rest is in Kommersgrad.

• Naval missions are infrequent, mostly coastal in nature, and usually designed to stop smuggling.

Air Force:

• 1st Fighter Regiment (Kommersgrad) (40 MiG 21 old jet fighter-bombers)

• 2nd Ground Attack Squadron (Istvannograd) (20 MiG23 old jet fighter-bombers)

• 3rd Transport Squadron (Mossaek) (12 An-2 old light transport airplanes)

• 5th Helicopter Squadron (central Marislova) (12 Mi 8 medium sized helicopters)

• Aircrews are operating at 40% of required flying time

Border Guards: Six 500-person, lightly equipped battalions. Two battalions are based in Denabia. The Border Guards report to the Minister of the Interior, except for the Denabian battalions, which report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

National Police Force: The President appoints the Chief of the National Police force. The Chief officially reports to the Minister of the Interior. There are around 1000 federal agents that conduct intelligence gathering and assessment, investigations, and enforcement of federal laws that concern national security. The Intelligence division has loose ties, but no formal connectivity to surrounding countries. Only the Chief has infrequent meetings with similar departmental heads from Goria and Denabia. This Chief and the similar department head in Tashmara do not meet either formally or informally. The Federal Police Force informs Marislovan local police of potential security threats. There is no established forum that allows local police to provide the Federal Police Force with information concerning security threats.

Economy The Marislovan economy is healthy but vulnerable. GDP has grown at 2.5% or more for six consecutive years. Inflation is stable at 4.2%. Manufacturing, the most important sector (44% of

GDP, and 55% of hard currency earnings), is concentrated in a belt along the River Denab in the north. Production of machine tools, canned goods, and kitchen wares is strong. The River Dena carries 80% of manufactured, and 49% of overall, exports. Agricultural production is inefficient (the break-up of the state farms created many small farmers) but profitable; exports (wheat, wine, fruit) mostly travel through Kommersgrad. Marislova depends on Goria and Denabia for power supplies; Goria and Denabia will not barter power, and Marislova requires nearly $100 million a year in hard currency to pay for this electric power − this is not a problem as long as the River Dena remains open as a conduit for heavy industry.

Strategic Concerns Marislova’s principal strategic concern is the River Dena basin. Marislova sees the Denabia- Tashmara border as its first line of defense; it cannot afford to see the eastern bank of the river in hostile or unstable hands. It must have free navigation down the river to provide money for power and a route for its manufactured goods, without which its economy would be crippled. It therefore wants a stable Goria and, above all, a stable Denabia. Though it needs to retain its bases in Denabia, it has no desire to reincorporate the country, feeling this would worsen the nationalities problem. It also needs to counter any potential threat from Tashmara.

The Cerulean Region: Goria In-Country Brief

Structures of Governance Goria is divided into three provinces: Hokr, Klav, and North Kammarjan. An elected regional council that controls the provincial police administers each province. A directly elected, largely ceremonial President heads the state. A Prime Minister, appointed from the group with a governing majority in the National Assembly, leads the government. The National Assembly, the principal legislative body, is elected by universal franchise. The second chamber, the Council of Elders (created in 1991 and made up of the hereditary chiefs of the mountain clans) is a consultative body with the power only to delay legislation. The National Assembly passes legislation by a simple majority vote. According to the 1991 constitution, ministerial posts must be filled by members of the legislature. Only a member of the Council of Elders can hold the post of Minister of Nationalities.

Political Parties The government is a weak coalition of the Progress Party (center-left, 25% of seats), Liberal Party (center-right, 14%), and Gorian Hearth (romantic nationalist, 12%). The Motherland Party (formerly the Communist Party, 32%) is the principal opposition.

See section CER 2E (Cerulean Region Political Structure tables.

Armed Forces Organization Goria’s armed forces are in transition. The standing forces have not yet entirely absorbed the pre-independence provincial militias. Tribesmen from the three rural provinces are over-represented in the military because draft evasion among other segments of the population is widespread.

Morale is low, apart from the Mountain Division.

Army:

• Four ‘divisions’ (in reality of brigade-plus size, about 6000 soldiers each), each of one standing and one reserve ‘brigade,’ based in the four provincial capitals, o Tank Division (Hokha) o Mountain Division (Krashut) o Rifle Division (Gronovlad) o Motorized Division (Klavkag).

• Of the active brigades, only the Mountain Division, with about 80% of its authorized strength, and the Tank Division are combat capable. The Mountain Division is deployed against smugglers on the eastern and northern borders. The active brigade of the Tank Division includes one tank regiment (70 older, medium-sized T-62 tanks) and one motorized rifle regiment with 80 BTR-60 armored personnel carriers. The remaining divisions are at less than 50% strength.

Navy: Goria has no navy.

Air Force: One Air Division (30 MiG 21 fighter jets, 15 MiG 23 fighter jets, 8 IL 28 aircraft, 8 Mi-8 & 6 Mi-2 helicopters). Aircraft availability is usually about 30%. Flying training is well below the desired level.

Border Guards: six lightly equipped, 500 person battalions. One battalion is based in each province. Two battalions in the capital serve as a national reserve police force and Presidential Guard and are in a high state of readiness.

Equipment includes armored cars, mortars and light anti-tank weapons. The border guards have three very old, 40-ton armed patrol boats, which are responsible for borders and the River Dena.

The Border Guards, although hugely overstretched in its regional deployments, are considered to be highly reliable and reasonably capable. They report to the Minister of the Interior.

Federal Police Force: The Prime Minister appoints the Chief of Federal Police. The Force of about 500 police has a good relationship with the Border Guards, which helps considerably to control illegal immigration and smuggling. However the North Kammarjan Province Federal Police Force district leader frequently complains that pro-Kammerjan independence sympathizers thoroughly infiltrate the local police, enabling illegal proliferation of weapons, significant smuggling of illegal goods, and frequent trafficking of people. The Force also has its own intelligence bureau, which is often at odds with the Federal Intelligence Service. Since he could not rely on the Federal Intelligence Service, the Chief of Federal Police created this Federal Police intelligence bureau. To do this he took 50 federal police off the streets and reassigned them to this intelligence bureau.

Federal Intelligence Service: The Prime Minister appoints the Chief of Federal Intelligence.

The intelligence force is under-funded, undermanned, and subsequently extremely ineffective.

Opposition parties often complain that the ruling coalition abuses the intelligence for political purposes. The Federal Intelligence Service believes it must protect its limited information sources, and should only share information via the Prime Minister. The Federal Intelligence Service routinely neglects sharing new information with the Federal Police Force, Border Guards, and Military.

Economy After years of decline, the economy is beginning to grow again (2.5% GDP growth, 1999-2000).

Although manufacturing has contracted, it is now well positioned to expand. Agricultural production (wool, wheat, and fruit) has remained constant, though revenue from hydroelectric production (HEP) and the tolls from the Rokno locks have suffered with regional economic difficulties. Over 50% of Cerulean trade is in barter, making external sources of hard currency extremely important. Sources of hard currency are agriculture, 40%; manufacturing, 35%;

electricity, 15%; and tolls (on traffic through the locks at Rokno), 10%. The River Dena carries 70% of agricultural and 95% of manufacturing exports. Principal non-Cerulean trading partners are Turkey, Ukraine, Russia, and Iran. There is also a substantial trade smuggling contraband over the borders.

Strategic Concerns Goria’s internal strategic concerns are: 1) Rokno—this site controls navigation along the River Dena and provides the country’s principal source of power. 2) Territorial integrity—Goria is made up of many different ethnic groups; it cannot accept secessionist movements.

Externally, Goria depends on access to the River Dena basin. Thus, Goria must be certain that beyond its southern border and until the river reaches the sea, it flows through territory controlled by one, stable entity. In relations with Russia and Tashmara, Goria wants to minimize conflict caused by the smuggling trade.

The Cerulean Region: Denabia In-Country Brief

Structures of Governance Denabia is divided into the three provinces: South Kammarjan, Tashmak, and Cisdenab. Each province has wide administrative authority, tax-raising powers, and control over police and National Guard formations; provincial power has increased as the center conceded authority over recent years. Both the President (head of state) and the Prime Minister (head of executive) are now weak. The State Assembly in the capital city of Klyj is a unicameral parliament, made up of directly elected members (45) and representatives from the provincial councils (15, divided equally between the three provinces); legislation requires a majority of each block to pass. A simple majority vote can dismiss the government. Tashmak and South Kammarjan provinces provide 28 seats.

Political Parties The strongest Cisdenabian group is the Progressive Party (center-left, 17 seats, including 1 in South Kammarjan and 2 in Tashmak). The Unity Party (10 seats, including 1 in Tashmak) is the former Communist Party and favors reunification with Marislova. The Liberal Party (center-right, 4 seats) is largely urban; the nationalist Denabian Popular Front (4 seats) is rural; and one independent is an Orthodox priest.

The strongest Kammarjan grouping is the Justice Party (JP) (10/15 seats), which was initially nationalist, but is now openly secessionist. The moderate Movement for Kammajar Democracy (4 seats) is now discredited. Only one Denabian (from the Progressive Party) sits for a Kammarjan seat (Garchuk).

The strongest Tashmak grouping is the Tashi People’s Party (5/13 seats); originally a party of the old nomenklatura, it is now becoming Islamist and affiliated with the Truth Party of Tashmara.

The Tashmak Democrats (4 seats) is a fairly conventional center-right group. Three Klyj seats are held by non-Tashmaks, representing the Progressive Party (2) and Unity Party (1). The Sword Party (hard line Islamist) has one seat.

The minority government (29 seats) is a weak, center-left coalition made up of the Progressive Party, Liberal Party, Movement for Kammajar Democracy, and Tashmak Democrats.

See section Cerulean Region Political Structure tables.

Armed Forces Denabia’s armed forces are in a disorganized state and lack clear direction for their future restructuring. Political opposition has blocked attempts to integrate each province’s National Guard (NG) formations into a standing military. The National Guard formations are in charge of their own training and answer to the provincial councils; the central Ministry of Defense has control only over the tiny, grounded air force (10 MiG 21 older fighter jets) and the defense pact with Marislova. The Cisdenab NG is under strength, poorly armed (much of its equipment was sold to South Kammarjan formations), and closely linked with the Unity Party; the Cisdenab National Guards’ most able personnel have transferred to the Marislovan Armed Forces. The full strength Tashmak National Guard is enthusiastic rather than competent; however, its key personnel have Marislovan or Tashmak Armed Forces training. The South Kammarjan National

Guard is heavily armed and heavily politicized (JP), but not very well trained. Of division size, it has artillery, armor, and 12 Mi-4 helicopters.

Federal Police Forces: The only competent, statewide, armed organization is the 4,000 person State Police, a paramilitary force trained primarily in public order duties. Organized in company-size groups, lightly motorized and without any heavy weapons, it is answerable to the Minister of the Interior. Denabia has no navy or border guards, but maintains State Police patrol boats on the River Dena. The Marislovan Navy provides some measure of security in the region where the River Dena delta empties into the Cerulean Sea. South Kammarjan, Tashmak, and Cisdenab each have their own police forces. These forces are not known for cooperating with each other.

Federal Intelligence Agency: Denabia does not have a federal intelligence body. South Kammarjan, Tashmak, and Cisdenab each have their own provincial intelligence agencies but cooperation among these separate agencies is minimal.

Economy Denabia’s political difficulties have hurt its economy, which is shrinking for the fifth successive year. Denabia is still primarily agricultural, but 60% of its produce is bartered rather than sold.

Heavy provincial taxes have hampered the development of the manufacturing sector, which potentially could be very strong. Plans for a free port at Hannibal have also been postponed. The tourist industry has received the only significant foreign investment, and resorts have been developed around Lake Riban.

Economic difficulties have crippled the central government. Its powers to raise revenue from businesses have been surrendered to the provinces. Income tax is widely evaded. Trade is increasingly informal. Denabia’s deficit is running at 12% of GDP, while inflation is at 44%. The only substantial sources of foreign revenue are the port at Hannibal and the locks and dam at Garchuk; Denabia refuses to barter its hydroelectric power. South Kammarjan’s Provincial Council is now demanding 50% of the revenue earned from the Garchuk locks and dam.

Strategic Concerns Denabia is the weakest state in the Cerulean region. The comparatively homogeneous populations of her neighboring states provide them with an important sense of cultural identity.

Denabia lies at the crossroads of these cultures. The Denabian population represents the ethnicity of each of its neighboring nations, but the nation has not created a critical center of gravity that can unite these disparate elements as a viable country. Denabia’s principal concern is therefore its survival as a state. This means it must resist any secessionist efforts. It must also retain the revenues from Garchuk and Hannibal. Decision makers in the capital city of Klyj cannot afford to make any more concessions to separatists.

Externally, Denabia must maintain independence from Marislova, but appreciates its support.

Denabia also needs to control its territory to ensure its troubles do not undermine Goria. Both internal and external concerns focus on a stable, freely navigable River Dena. Without this, Denabia cannot resist external or internal pressures.

Cerulean Region: Tashmara In-Country Brief

Structures of Governance Tashmara is a highly centralized state. Its executive President appoints his own government. He also oversees the commission that approves candidates for the parliament, which has two directly elected Chambers (the Elders and the Deputies). Because of Presidential oversight, both are Chambers are compliant, often mute bodies. The principal obstacle to his will is the Council of the Guardians of the Faith, a quasi-official grouping of the leading mullahs, which has huge moral authority. This Council also controls the Guardians of the Faith, an unofficial militia that harasses and closes down organizations it deems heretical. The only genuinely representative democracy exists at the county level; the 36 elected county councils control local issues, and much of the Guardians of the Faith’s popular strength comes from their unpaid work on welfare and reconstruction projects. The once-secular councils are gradually becoming more Islamist.

The President’s attempt to suppress the Islamist movement in the early 1990s only caused it to grow; now he tries to accommodate and absorb it.

Political Parties There are three main groups. The Islamic Socialist Party (ISP) (55% of the Deputies, 46% of the Elders) is secular with an Islamic influence, and associated with the President. The Liberal Party (LP) (22% of the Deputies, 21% of the Elders) is a weak official opposition, broadly centrist.

The Truth Party (TP) (18% of the Deputies, 25% of the Elders) is nationalist, tacitly Islamist, and anti-Socialist; it is closely associated with both sets of Guardians. The direction of the government is secular and unthreatening, though with occasional concessions to the Islamist movement. The ISP is gradually losing ground on the councils to the TP.

See section CER 2E (Cerulean Region Political Structure tables.)

Armed Forces The Tashmaran Armed Forces are large but weak. Most of their equipment is obsolete. Morale is variable; there is some Islamist infiltration of the officer corps.

Army:

• Four ‘armies’, each with one active and two reserve ‘divisions’ (each about 6,000 strong); 2nd

Army has two active divisions. Three of the armies are located near the Russian and Iranian borders. Reserve units are, in actuality, militia organizations under the general control of the army commanders, from whom they received equipment and support. They are poorly armed, poorly led, and are highly politicized.

o The 2nd Army (of the 21st Tank [T55 very old tanks] and 29th Tank [T62 old] Divisions.)

is based south of Sukra. Reserve Divisions are the 28th and 82nd Infantry Divisions.

o 1st Army (Kubai) 3d Tank Division (active), 15th Infantry and 23 Infantry Divisions

(reserve) o 3rd Army (Kurgan-Khar) 9th Tank Division (active) and 12th Infantry and 17th Infantry

Divisions (reserve) o 4th Army (Labrog) 11th Tank Division (active) and 7th Infantry and 27th Infantry Divisions

(reserve) o The Presidential Guard ‘division’ (about 5,000 personnel, 40 T72 15 year old tanks), based in Sukra, is the best formation in the army.

The Army is deployed principally in counter smuggling operations, though high levels of corruption make this difficult. All units are poorly supplied with fuel and spare parts; the infantry has been detached to support the effort against smugglers on the borders. The 2nd Army, due to its headquarters in Sukra, is relatively better off than the other armies.

Navy: The Tashmaran navy is a coastal force, based in Damask. It has 2 frigates (25 years old, with older technology anti-aircraft and limited anti-submarine capabilities), 2 corvettes (40 years old, with old 4 inch guns and old anti-aircraft artillery), 2 diesel electric submarines (25 years old, with torpedoes), and 8 fast attack boats (5 years old, with light guns and light surface-to-surface missiles). Only a third of the fleet is seaworthy at any time. There is also a naval air squadron of 6 Super Etendard jets (none are operational).

Air Force:

• There is a shortage of spares and trained aircrew, but morale is high and the force is professional and apolitical.

o 5th Fighter Wing (Damask) (8 MiG 29 new jet fighters, 12 MiG 21);

o 21st Ground Attack Wing (Sukra) (12 MiG 23, 6 U.S. built F-4 old jet fighters);

o 30th Reconnaissance Wing (central Tashmara) (16 Il 28);

o 32nd Fighter Wing (eastern Tashmara) (18 MiG 21, 6 Mirage old jet fighters).

Border Force: Members of this force are recruited from the frontier tribes. The force is lightly armed, using civilian vehicles or horses and camels. It has 4,900 personnel, organized in Lashkars, or tribal battalions, of 350 persons each. The Truth Party has considerable influence upon the border guards. Some border guards carry on smuggling activities despite their official military status.

Federal Police Forces: The President appoints the Director of the Federal Police Force. The force is small, under 300, but well equipped and funded. Although members of the force are not paid particularly well, most seem to live in very nice homes and drive very nice automobiles.

Their family members seem to attend the best schools. Most of the County Police Chiefs complain the Federal Police Force regularly ignores questionable tactics used by the unofficial Guardians of the Faith militia members. The actions of the Force are not very transparent. There is very little oversight of the Federal Police Force. The Federal Police has its own Intelligence Branch, which does not normally interact with the Federal Intelligence Agency.

Federal Intelligence Agency: The President appoints the Director of the Federal Intelligence Agency. The current Director is closely linked to the Council of the Guardians of the Faith. The Director does not normally respond to requests for coordination with Security or Intelligence Services from neighboring countries. The Agency is very secretive.

Economy The Tashmaran economy is weak. Growth has been in the 0-1% bracket for five years. Its manufacturing sector (textiles, canned goods) is small (12% of GDP) and outdated. Its agricultural sector, though large (52% of GDP) is also primitive. There is a newly created offshore oil industry in the Cerulean Sea (6% of GDP) and a shrinking tourism industry (4%).

Inflation is 28% and debt is increasing. The only hope for substantial economic growth is the oil industry and investment in increasing agricultural productivity − both dependent on outside financing and sensitive to regional political instability.

Strategic Concerns Tashmara’s principal strategic concern stems from its internal pressures. On the external borders, the President wants to curb the Islamist influence without confronting it; all neighbors would view an overtly Islamic state as a threat. However, a visible element of the population lies in Tashmak Province of Denabia and its security and welfare is a source of popular concern. He is thus anxious to avoid being drawn into Denabia’s troubles, yet unwilling to crack down on the Guardians of the Faith's activities in support of Tashmak and South Kammarjan separatists.

Above all, Tashmara needs stability; a prosperous River Dena basin will also benefit Tashmara’s ailing economy.

CERULEAN REGION: POLITICAL STRUCTURE

Denabia: Political Parties

SEATS PARTIES CISDENAB TASHMAK S. KAMMARJAN PERCENT

17 * PROGRESSIVE 14 2 1 28.33%

10 UNITY 9 1 16.67%

4 * LIBERAL 4 6.67%

4 NATIONAL 4 6.67%

1 INDEPENDENT 1 1.67%

10 JUSTICE 10 16.67%

4 * MKD 4 6.67%

5 TPP 5 8.33%

4 * TD 4 6.67%

1 SWORD 1 1.67%

60 TOTALS 32 13 15

53.33% 21.67% 25.00%

* MINORITY GOVERNMENT (29/60 SEATS): Unicameral parliament with weak President & Prime Minister

*Goria: Political Parties

PARTY MAJORITY MINORITY

PROGRESS PARTY 25%

LIBERAL PARTY 14%

GORIAN HEARTH 12%

MOTHERLAND 32%

OTHER 17%

TOTALS 51% 49%

* The government is led by a Prime Minister appointed by the governing majority. The position of president is largely ceremonial. Majority is a weak coalition.

Tashmara: Political Parties

PARTY ELDERS # DEPUTIES #

ISLAMIC SOCIALIST 46% 55%

LIBERAL 21% 22%

TRUTH PARTY 25% 18%

OTHER 8% 5%

TOTALS 100% 100%

# President oversees commission that approves candidates for Chambers of Elders & Deputies Guardians of the Faith: (unofficial militia under a Council of Mullahs: Principal opposition to the President)

*Marislova: Political Parties

PARTY HOUSE OF DEPUTIES NON PARTY ASSOCIATIONS HOUSE OF COUNSEL#

DEMOCRATIC LEFT 21% OCTOBRISTS 22%

FREEDOM 20% LEAGUE OF PIETY 18%

FREE LIBERALS 14% LEGION 17%

TRUE DEMOCRATS 12% EARTH 13%

MOVEMENT LEFT 11% RETIRED SENIOR OFFICERS 10%

GREEN TANK 10% OTHER 20%

OTHER 12%

TOTALS 100% 100%

* Bicameral parliament with two houses and a powerful Executive President # House of Counsel members are not allowed to be affiliated with a political party

CER S-1

2nd Edition

Situation 1

1. General. Seminar participants will be divided into four country teams. Each country team will have a designated leader. The teams, each representing Marislova, Goria, Denabia, or Tashmara) should develop a definition for terrorism for their notional country. Each participant will use his or her actual duty title, but will play this role as a citizen of the assigned country.

Participants will be given a list of incidents that could be considered terrorist acts. Then participants will compare these acts with their team’s definition to decide whether the selected case studies would be considered terrorism according to their definition. The teams will explain their terrorism definition and their decisions on the terrorist acts to the seminar. Each team will also submit assessments of selected case studies to the seminar leader.

2. Scenario. The Seminar participants of the four country teams are members of an all-ministry group convened by the National Security Advisor, one of the most powerful figures in the government. At a meeting earlier today the National Security Advisor told you this:

“I am becoming increasingly aware that the present government has inherited what can only be described as an improvised system for countering terrorism. For years the government has been almost entirely reactive in responding to events. What I need is a definition for terrorism, which will enable our great country to anticipate and prioritize developments rather than being continuously surprised by them.

So I want you to develop a definition for terrorism that could be used to increase our nation-state’s security. I want you to include a list of the acts that should normally be considered as terrorist acts. As you put acts on this list, consider the nature of the acts in terms of the act’s intent, purpose, and target. Break the list down into at least two parts, as to whether they are single purpose acts or are part of a long-term, organized campaign. Scrutinize your list carefully. Ask yourself if such acts are actually terrorism, or if the acts are something else.”

3. Case Studies. After you complete the requirements of paragraph 2 above, then review the following events that occurred in the region. Using your definition of terrorism, assess each of these to determine whether it was a terrorist act or something else. Again, assess these in terms of the intent, purpose, and target, as well as any other major factors your group decides.

A. Members of a militant Christian group have been traveling in groups and beating civilians who are dressed in traditional Muslim clothing. The militant Christian group demands an end to Islamic expansion in your country.

B. An unknown assailant mailed a letter bomb to the elected leader of a small town. The bomb killed the leader’s secretary.

2nd Edition

C. Three people in a vehicle carrying a bomb were killed, and twenty-five civilians were severely injured when a bomb being transported in the vehicle apparently exploded unintentionally in the center of a Kammarjan section of a city. One of the dead was from Goria, one of the dead was from Marislova, and the last of the dead was from Tashmara.

The dead have no known ties with any organizations, but are rumored to be working for an organized crime syndicate. There is no known purpose for their travel with the bomb.

D. A Tashmaran, claiming to represent the Kammarjan independence movement, shot six foreign soldiers visiting the North and South Kammarjan portions of Goria and Denabia.

The Tashmaran demanded Kammarjan independence prior to escaping apprehension by the police.

E. A self-declared religious leader in Tashmara issued a Fatwa (religious command) ordering all Muslims to participate in a Jihad (holy war) against Denabia’s ruling government, and lead to its replacement by an Islamic State. The religious leader has not personally participated in any violent activities.

F. A group of skinheads, calling themselves the Warriors of Orthodox Christianity, travels about a major city and steals money from people wearing traditional Muslim clothing.

The group uses guns and physical violence to threaten victims but makes demands for nothing except money and jewelry.

G. A foreign suicide bomber detonated a bicycle bomb in a civilian schoolyard in your country. A previously unknown group claimed responsibility for the attack, saying it was in revenge for the country’s lack of compliance with Islamic Law. The group called for the establishment of an Islamic State in your country.

H. The leader of a Tashmaran charity-sponsored Madrasa (Islamic religious school, also Madrassah) which is known in your country for its militant, extremist teachings, insisted that the school’s students take all available measures to stop negative Western ideals from further tainting Cerulean society. The leader insisted that all graduates of the school participate in movements to overthrow your country’s government and to establish Islamic States in all countries of Cerulea. Due to socio-economic conditions, the children attending this school currently have no other schools to attend. The female students also receive money each month if they wear traditional Islamic clothing and headscarves.

I. The Tashmaran government refuses to extradite a Denabian citizen to Goria. The Denabian citizen was convicted by a Gorian court (in absentia) of planting a bomb at an Orthodox Christian religious gathering. Twelve civilians and 2 policemen were killed by the bomb attack. At the time of the bombing, this Denabian citizen issued a manifesto calling for the establishment of a free and independent Kammarjan, ruled under the strict guide of Islamic laws as written in the holy Koran. The Tashmaran government says the Denabian, a member of the Sword Party, was granted political asylum in Tashmara.

J. A relatively unknown radical group, “The Only Way to Heaven,” issues a manifesto calling on all Muslims in your country to declare war on your government. The manifesto includes a manual instructing sleeper agents how to avoid detection in Denabia, Marislova, and Goria. The group has offices in Tashmara, and receives its funding from Tashmaran sympathizers, weapons smuggling, and illicit drug trafficking.

K. A group of Kammarjan independence movement members based in Denabia, conducted multiple destructive raids on police headquarters and military bases in Goria. The group says it will continue attacks until Kammarjan becomes an independent country. The

2nd Edition government of Denabia says it is does not have the means to stop attacks that are initiated in Denabia.

L. Many parents in both North and South Kammarjan report that an underground Kammarjan independence movement is forcing their daughters to become suicide bombers. The families say a middle-aged woman visits the girls and convinces them to go with her. Several families said after their daughters disappeared, the girls sent messages home in which they said they had to conduct the attacks or their families would be murdered. The next time the family sees their daughter is when they her dead body is returned after she conducted a suicide attack. Several families said they received money from the independence group after their daughter conducted the suicide attack.

4. Requirements.

• Using materials from all modules of this course, the background information on the

Cerulean Region, and the In-country Briefs, prepare a 10-minute briefing to the entire Seminar group. Use the format in Form 1.1 for your briefing. As a minimum, this briefing will include:

- Your assigned country’s definition of terrorism;

- A list of acts that your assigned country would consider terrorist in nature

- An assessment of these terrorist acts, as to whether they are:

- 1. Traditional terrorism?

- 2. Part of a long-term, organized campaign of terrorism?

• Each country team will also assess every case described in paragraph 3 (above).

Complete Form 1.2 and give it to your seminar leader.

- Be prepared to support your answers.

2nd Edition

Form 1.1 Definition of Terrorism:

Terrorist Acts

Traditional Terrorism? Long-term Campaign?

2nd Edition

Form 1.2 Case Study Intent Purpose Target Other

Considerations A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

I.

J.

K.

L.

CER S-2

2nd Edition

Situation 2

1. General. This portion of the exercise allows participants to analyze methods to counter terrorism. Seminar participants will be divided into four country teams, each with a designated leader. Each participant will use his or her actual duty title, but will play this role as a citizen of the assigned notional country (Marislova, Goria, Denabia, or Tashmara). Each country team will be asked to develop a list of objectives for a counterterrorism campaign for their country, the Cerulean Region, and the world. The teams will then review selected methods to counter terrorism.

2. Scenario. The Seminar participants of the four country teams play roles of members of an all-ministry group convened by the National Security Advisor, one of the most powerful figures in the government. At a meeting this morning the National Security Advisor told you:

“Now that we have a working definition of terrorism, I want to further understand our counterterrorism capabilities and efforts. If we are to develop an effective system to counter this threat, then we must list the objectives of our counterterrorism program.

On your list, include the obvious objectives of preventing the overthrow of the government and ensuring the protection of our citizens, resources, and security forces from attacks of all kinds. But there are additional objectives we must meet. Our objectives should enable us to go on the offensive against terrorism. We must at a minimum disrupt actions of terrorist networks and even better, find and capture or destroy them.

We must alienate terrorists from the population. At the same time we must not take actions in the name of counterterrorism that would actually alienate our own people and neighbors from our government and our overall cause. We desire to strengthen the capabilities and the will of our government and people to combat this threat. Our intelligence system must improve, especially in the realm of creating an effective intelligence network with other countries. I offer you these ideas and ask you to construct a prioritized list of objectives for our counterterrorism efforts. I am certain I have not given you a complete list. Add the items you think I missed to those I present here.

Using our definition of terrorism and our list of objectives, I want you to scrutinize some available methods for countering terrorism to see if they are legal and applicable for our country. We need to find the balance between protecting our citizens, while not unnecessarily taking away citizens’ rights and privileges.”

3. Methods Assessment. Assess each of the following methods that domestic law enforcement could use to counter terrorism. Determine if these methods are appropriate. Determine if any limits should be placed on these methods. In the course of your deliberations, feel free to develop

2nd Edition other controversial or problematic methods that can be used to curb terrorism. Your own nation’s experience is most welcome in these discussions.

A. Wiretapping phones that suspected terrorists might use, including cell phone intercepts.

B. Monitoring emails or other electronic communications of suspected terrorists.

C. Intercepting communications from a trespasser within a computer system.

D. Engaging in “roving” surveillance (surveillance that focuses on a target, rather than a place).

E. Collecting information from securities dealers and banks to monitor financial transactions.

F. Confiscating property identified with convicted terrorists.

G. Destroying the homes or property of the relatives of suicide bombers.

H. Taking groups of unemployed people standing on street corners into custody for interrogation.

I. Profiling based on race or religion.

J. Sending members of the losing opposition political party to jail terms after an election, in the name of preventing the overthrow of the government.

K. Torturing suspects that probably have information that could be used to prevent loss of life from a pending terrorist attack.

4. Requirements.

• Using materials from all modules of this course, the background information on the Cerulean Region, and the In-country Briefs, prepare a 10-minute briefing for the National Security Advisor. At a minimum, this briefing will include:

- A list of objectives that you would like to achieve by countering terrorism in your assigned country.

• Each country team will also assess each case in paragraph 3 above.