1_4042-E-ColdTurkey-Problem5ed.pdf

Edition 5 #4042-E

COLLEGE OF INTERNATIONAL AND SECURITY

STUDIES

Program in Advanced Security Studies (PASS)

Exercise

Cerulean “Cold Turkey” Problem

English

EXERCISE CERULEAN “COLD TURKEY”

International Action Against Drug Trafficking in Cerulea

Background This exercise is set in the fictitious region of Cerulea. The events depicted in this exercise take place in 2009. You must read the Cerulean Region Background pamphlet before studying the exercise as it provides a map of Cerulea and general information about the countries in the region. You will need this for reference during the exercise. It is also recommended that you read the background briefing at Annex A, entitled “Heroin as a Security Challenge in Europe and Eurasia” before studying the scenario below.

Transnational Narcotics Crime in Cerulea In recent years, the narcotics trade, especially in opiates, has become a particular problem for Cerulea. A well-established drug trafficking route crosses Iran and Tashmara to depots in northern Denabia and Goria, where criminal syndicates arrange for the processing and onward transmission of drugs to Marislova, Russia and Ukraine. The main smuggling routes cross the Tashmaran border through Denabia’s South Kammar Province, then through Goria and on to Russia or Marislova. Secondary routes run from Tashmara through Goria’s Klav Province to Russia, and a third route of lesser importance runs from Tashmara through Denabia’s Tashmak Province to Marislova and Ukraine. Penalties for drug trafficking in Iran and Tashmara are severe. The use of the death penalty for convicted drug traffickers is not uncommon. However, these punishments have failed to act as a deterrent. Traffickers stand to make large profits and have exploited corrupt officials as well as ethnic and religious kinships to facilitate their activities.

The growing illegal trade in opiates is having a deleterious impact on security and social stability in the Cerulean region. Drug seizures have increased by 40%, but senior officials have conceded that this is due to a big increase in the amount of drug trafficking activity rather than improved policing. Heroin addiction rates and related criminality are growing, especially in Gronovlad, Garchuk and Klyj. After a period of decline, HIV/AIDS cases in the region have risen sharply.

The Marislovan Surgeon General has reported that only about 10% of heroin addicts in the region have access to clean needles or drug substitution therapy, such as methadone. Intelligence from Interpol has highlighted cooperation between Kammarjan separatist groups in both Goria and Denabia and drug trafficking gangs. Militias provide protection for the traffickers in return for “transit taxes”. Kammarjan militia members have also been implicated in attacks on government officials, police and customs officers engaged in counternarcotics’ investigations.

Most worrying for the Denabian authorities are reports that the militias’ association with organized crime has enabled them to finance the recruitment of disaffected and unemployed Kammarjan youths and purchase sophisticated communications equipment and weaponry. There are fears that this will fuel the secessionist ambitions of the Kammar Justice Party and trigger an armed conflict in the unstable Cerulean region.

The situation in Cerulea is also attracting interest from the wider international community. The Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation has reported a significant increase in heroin trafficking in southern Russia and recently suggested that troops from his ministry should be deployed to Goria to assist the local authorities to police the border with Tashmara. EU officials

#4042-E 5th Edition have complained that Cerulea is rapidly becoming the conduit of choice for the drugs’ trade into Western Europe and at a recent conference sponsored by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), an official described Denabia as “little better than a narco-state”.

Following independence in the early 1990s, all the states in the region acceded to the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs And Psychotropic Substances.

However, this has had little practical impact on counter narcotics cooperation between states in the region and only Marislova and Denabia have an extradition agreement for drug offences.

The Current Situation in Marislova Marislova, the most powerful state in Cerulea, continues to benefit from stable government, an absence of ethnic tensions and steady economic growth. In the longer term, the President hopes that Marislova will be able to join NATO and accede to the EU. The President’s main worries concern Denabia, which has a weak central government and continues to be plagued by ethnic tensions and a failing economy. The security of the Dena basin remains strategically vital for Marislova and its troops are stationed in Denabia under a long-standing bi-lateral defense pact.

Recently Denabia has attracted increasing attention from transnational crime syndicates keen to benefit from the absence of strong law enforcement measures and the relative independence and corruption of officials in the provincial administrations.

The Current Situation in Goria The long, mountainous border between Goria and Tashmara is porous. Although the Gorian border guards, assisted by troops from the Mountain Division, are efficient and highly reliable, they are severely overstretched. Even so, the Border Guards have increased drug seizures by 30% in the past year and recently destroyed two heroin processing laboratories in the mountains close to the Tashmaran border. But, well-armed traffickers frequently overmatch the Border Guards. Despite steady GDP growth, the government claims that there are limited funds available to increase their numbers or improve their equipment. The situation is not helped by the long tradition of smuggling between Russia and Tashmara through the North Kammar and Klav Provinces. This traffic sustains a thriving black economy. Recently lawlessness has increased.

Gorian police have reported bloody feuds between the “traditional” criminal gangs that mainly smuggle cigarettes, fuel and pirated CD/DVDs and the new breed of opiate drug traffickers.

Tashmaran border police tend not to cooperate with their Gorian opposite numbers and have traditionally tolerated smuggling in return for bribes.

The Current Situation in Denabia The border between northern Denabia and Tashmara is also difficult to police. Marislova has a battalion of troops stationed in South Kammar Province, along with a further battalion of lightly equipped Border Guards. However, the regular armed forces have a territorial defense role and are not trained or equipped for law enforcement. The Marislovan Border Guards are highly efficient and well motivated, but in the past the Foreign Ministry has placed restrictions on their employment because of fears that they might clash with the Kammar Provincial National Guards.

The latter are poorly paid and trained and increasingly unreliable. Some have links with the Kammarjan militias linked to the separatist minded Justice Party. Denabia’s well-trained paramilitary State Police are primarily engaged in internal security operations against potential separatist groups throughout the country. The State Police lack up to date surveillance equipment and information technology to counter the criminal gangs, but have benefited from training

#4042-E provided under the EU’s Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS) program.

Given the weakness of the Denabian government, any initiatives to curb the drugs’ trade needs to have the support of the governor of South Kammar Province and the provincial council. The province has considerable devolved authority, including administrative and tax raising powers and control over police and National Guard formations. However, South Kammar is the poorest province of Denabia and corruption and tax evasion are widespread. Many council members, if not the governor, favor secession from Denabia.

The Current Situation in Tashmara The Tashmaran economy has benefited in recent years because of foreign investment in the offshore oil fields in the Cerulean Sea. However, increased oil revenues have so far had little impact on endemic poverty in the country and there is growing support for Islamist movements.

The state remains highly centralized, but the President is conscious of the need to placate the mullahs of the increasingly influential Council of the Guardians of the Faith. As a result there is tacit government support for Islamist assistance to separatist militias in Denabia. So far this cooperation has been limited to small arms smuggling and propaganda and has not provoked a direct clash with the Denabian security authorities.

The Tashmaran law enforcement agencies are well aware of increased drug transit activity across the country from Iran to Denabia and Goria. Drug seizures have increased and three convicted drug traffickers have been put to death this year alone. The Council of the Guardians of the Faith has spoken out strongly against the drugs trade. However, the government has been given counter-narcotics a low priority, mainly because the vast bulk of the drugs being smuggled are simply in transit and not destined for Tashmara. Despite this fact, in-country heroin addiction rates and HIV have grown significantly in recent years. Effective law enforcement is also hindered by widespread corruption among poorly paid police officers and border guards.

Equipment and training are also inadequate. The border with Goria and Denabia is sparsely populated and largely porous. Nevertheless the army has made sporadic efforts to target narcotics traffickers, but senior commanders have noted with concern that these groups are increasingly well armed and organized.

The Initiative by the President of Marislova The President of Marislova has decided that firm action needs to be taken against narcotics trafficking in Cerulea. In a recent speech, he announced “war on the scourge of heroin in Cerulea” and pledged his full support to other regional governments in efforts to combat the illegal drugs trade. As a first step, the President has called for a regional conference to be held at Istvannograd in Marislova, which he hopes will bring together regional experts and specialist law enforcement agencies to discuss the problem. The President hopes for a free and frank exchange of ideas at this meeting and therefore does not want senior ministers to attend or formal government-to-government negotiations to take place. Nevertheless, he wants the conference to generate concrete proposals that can be presented to the governments of the states in Cerulea and perhaps form the basis of a regional counter-narcotics action plan. Analysts from throughout Cerulea have agreed to attend and international agencies concerned with counter-narcotics measures have also expressed interest, along with the Russian, US and a number of EU state embassies.

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In keeping with the Marislovan President’s wishes to canvass the widest possible range of ideas and options from attendees, a non-attribution policy has been agreed and the media will not be present during the conference. There is no formal agenda for the conference or specific list of topics to be discussed or included in any proposed counter narcotics strategy.

At the request of the President, the Marislovan Deputy Foreign Minister will chair the conference.

Exercise Cerulean “Cold Turkey” You will be a delegate at the conference and will discuss with your colleagues in seminar measures that could be included in a regional anti-narcotics action plan for Cerulea. You will play a regional expert or a representative from an international agency specializing in counter-narcotics work. Each delegate will receive a separate written briefing outlining their specific interests and the measures that they wish to advocate or oppose.

Each seminar team will be expected to agree four or five concrete proposals, which will be briefed to the seminar leader. These might include military and law enforcement operations, cooperation or coordination, measures for improving border security, regional and international assistance, and possibly proposals to counter corruption and narco-terrorism. Your briefing should include the reasons why particular measures were agreed or not agreed. The final briefing to the seminar leader should last no longer than 15 minutes.

It is essential that you study the regional brief, the exercise scenario and your own role carefully.

You will only enjoy the exercise and derive benefit from it if you are well prepared. Good luck!

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Background Brief: Heroin as a Security Threat in Europe and Eurasia (Prepared by James Wither)

“Without a doubt the greatest single threat today to global development, democracy and peace is transnational organized crime and the drug trafficking monopoly that keeps this sinister enterprise rolling” Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

The illicit global drugs trade is far more profitable than human trafficking or illegal firearms.

Although opiate use is less prevalent than other drugs, such as cannabis, heroin, in particular, is responsible for the greatest percentage of drug related health problems and criminal activity.

With the dramatic decline of opium production in Myanmar, Laos and Thailand, Afghanistan is now by far the world’s largest producer. The UNODC estimates that Afghanistan provided 92% of the global supply in 2006. Most of the raw opium is processed into heroin in laboratories in Afghanistan, with facilities also located in border areas of neighbouring Pakistan and Tajikistan.

Heroin is exported overland through Iran, Turkey and the Balkans in quantities between 20 and 200kg concealed in compartments in trucks, buses or private cars to depots in the Balkans and South West Europe for onward distribution to Western Europe. Alternatively drugs are smuggled through the Central Asian republics and Pakistan to Russia, China or the Caucasus and then through Ukraine and Belarus to Poland. The financial stakes can be enormous. UNODC estimates suggest that the Afghan opium trade is worth $60 billion at street prices in Western countries.

Ineffective law enforcement, weak states, corruption and poverty facilitate the drugs’ trade. In Afghanistan, especially Helmand Province, opium poppy cultivation has become an integral part of the rural economy and for many a matter of economic survival. Narcotics cultivation and trafficking are corrupting influences on the Afghan government at virtually all levels and stunt the growth of the legitimate economy. According to the US State Department, opium poppy production accounts for up to 60% of Afghanistan’s GDP. Elsewhere, bribery of poorly paid police, border guards and even government officials has been common practice. Even members of the Russian and Tajik armed forces have been directly implicated in drug trafficking. Along the trafficking routes through Eurasia and into Europe, there is a common pattern of increased drug addiction, corruption, drug related criminal activity and HIV infection. Links between terrorist groups and drug trafficking are also well established. The US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has identified 18 of the 40 groups on the Department of State’s Foreign Terrorist Organizations list as having possible ties to the drugs trade. In some drug source zones, insurgents impose “taxes” on producers and traffickers or involve themselves directly in trading to support their political and military activities. Examples include the PKK in Turkey, the IMU in Central Asia and the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the drug trade continues to be controlled at all levels by traditional drug trafficking criminal cartels. Turkish gangs dominate heroin trafficking in Europe, but with a significant and increasing involvement of ethnic Albanian networks.

Because of geography, Turkey is the main drug smuggling crossroads. Synthetic drugs manufactured in Western Europe, such as amphetamines and ecstasy, pass from West to East and opiates are transported in the opposite direction. The Turkish police have been very active in

#4042-E counter narcotics; up to 25% of heroin is seized by government law enforcement agencies before it gets to market. However, given the increasing quantity of drugs being shipped, their efforts have tended merely to force traffickers to exploit other routes into Europe.

The crime analyst, Mark Galeotti, has suggested that the struggle against organized and transnational crime is the defining security concern of the 21st Century. The international community has tried to rise to the challenge. In 1999, the UN General Assembly adopted an action plan to counter the world drug problem, including measures against trafficking, money laundering and the cultivation of illicit drug crops. The UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs is currently monitoring progress towards the targets set by the Assembly and coordinating international cooperation, including drug control treaties. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime is also active in providing technical assistance to states engaged in fighting transnational criminal networks. Interpol’s Drug Sub-Directorate provides professional advice to the UN and collates, analyses and disseminates drug related information to police forces in 184 countries. In the European Union (EU), the creation of Europol, Eurojust and the European Police Chiefs Task Force has provided a foundation for pan European law enforcement and judicial cooperation. The fruits of this cooperation were demonstrated in June 2007 by a successful joint Europol and Eurojust operation in six EU countries that resulted in the arrest of members of a large, transnational Albanian smuggling network. The EU Strategy on Drugs (2005 – 2012) focuses on cooperative approaches against drug production and cross border trafficking by transnational gangs, money laundering and the prevention of drug related crime. In the US, a policy coordination committee of the National Security Council has been established to improve the flow of information between law enforcement, national security and intelligence agencies to counter threats from terrorists and the related problems of illegal arms trading, drug smuggling and money laundering. Internationally, the Department of State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs has taken the lead in the fight against money laundering through the establishment of regional Financial Action Task Forces, while the Department of Justice has provided criminal investigative training to Balkan police forces seeking to combat the rising tide of illegal trafficking in humans, arms and drugs.

Operational measures are also being taken closer to the source of the problem. The Afghan Government, with training and financial assistance from the UK and US, has adopted a plan to eliminate commercial opium production by 2013 through improved law enforcement measures, the provision of alternative livelihoods for farmers and public awareness campaigns. Russian, Uzbek and Turkish border guards and police have significantly increased their seizures of drug shipments, and the Tajik Drug Control Agency has deployed mobile anti-narcotics units following a bilateral agreement on border security between the Interior Ministries of Afghanistan and Tajikistan.

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Background Brief: Heroin as a Security Threat in Europe and Eurasia