Sample Information Paper HQ019321360001000.pdf

Attachment C, Sample Information Paper (HQ019321360001000)

INFORMATION PAPER

AAMH-HDC

7 August 2009 SUBJECT: U.S. Withdrawal from Nicaragua

1. Purpose: To provide information on the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Nicaragua in 1932

2. Facts:

a. The American military intervention in Nicaragua (1926-32) began following a successful coup in 1925 by a conservative against a coalition government. The liberal party initiated a revolt in 1926.

A U.S. Marine brigade deployed to the country in May, leading to a brokered peace agreement and the removal of the coup leader from office. One minor liberal revolutionary, Augusto Cesar Sandino, refused to put down his arms until American troops withdrew from the country. His fiery nationalism drew many supporters, while some criminal gangs joined in to take advantage of the turmoil. His opposition continued even after a liberal won the U.S.-supervised election in 1928.

b. Following defeat in a conventional assault on the town of Ocotal in July 1927, Sandino and his men fought a guerrilla war in the sparsely inhabited central and eastern parts of the country. The Marine brigade initially carried out most operations, but simultaneously formed the Guardia Nacional. This constabulary force was composed of Nicaraguan soldiers, with Marine officers and NCOs initially filling all commissioned ranks (usually one or two levels above their Marine Corps rank). Its projected strength was 190 officers and 2,200 men, though it eventually grew somewhat larger. As the Guardia gained experience, it took over most security duties outside the few large cities. Platoon-size Guardia units garrisoned each town and actively patrolled the countryside.

c. The initial plan for forming the Guardia had assumed that a number of years would be available to build up a Nicaraguan officer corps, with junior officers rising through the ranks and eventually supplanting all Marine leaders. This provided a means for Nicaraguan officers to not only gain experience in combat and in leading an organization, but also to have apolitical attitudes inculcated under the tutelage of the marines. To minimize political interference, the selection of cadets and the promotion of officers fell exclusively under the control of the head of the Guardia, a Marine lieutenant colonel serving as a Guardia brigadier general.

d. The Marine Corps established a Guardia military academy in the spring of 1930. An initial class of 13 experienced NCOs completed a short course and graduates were commissioned that June. A second larger class of NCOs and civilians began a seven-month course that fall. The third class, with 75 cadets, nearly all civilians, began in August 1931, with 59 completing the course in May 1932. The new officers filled junior billets in the Guardia, with marines still holding all the senior positions.

e. At the peak of the Marine intervention, July 1928, there were 5,365 marines and 456 naval personnel in Nicaragua. As the Guardia increased in size and capability, the Marine force was reduced in January 1929 to 3,561 and further reduced to 2,300 in July. By February 1931, the number had declined to 1,500 marines. Due to Congressional and public opposition to the continuing intervention, in early 1931 President Herbert Hoover set a firm deadline for a complete withdrawal of all marines, including those in the Guardia, by the end of 1932. This would follow a Nicaraguan presidential election in November 1932. Juan Sacasa, a liberal, won the election.

f. The decision in 1931 to withdraw all marines in 1932 short-circuited the process of establishing a professional Nicaraguan officer corps. By October 1932, Nicaraguans held just 96 of the 238 line officer billets in the Guardia, although another cadet class was slated for graduation in December 1932. The most senior Nicaraguan officers had barely two years of experience. In the final few weeks of 1932, Sacasa appointed numerous officers directly from civilian life to fill out most of the senior billets being vacated by the marines. The new head of the Guardia was Anastasio Somoza.

He had received some education in the United States and was married to the new president’s niece, but had no qualifications that prepared him to lead a military force. He ensured that the Guardia quickly became personally loyal to him.

g. Soon after the departure of American troops, President Sacasa negotiated a truce with Sandino, with the rebel agreeing to lay down his arms and accept the new government. In February 1934, Somoza ordered his Guardia to kidnap Sandino and several of his senior leaders while they were in the capital visiting Sacasa. Somoza had them executed. In 1936, with the Great Depression undermining popular support for the government, he used his power as commander of the Guardia to force Sacasa to step down. Somoza soon took over the presidency himself; he would wield dictatorial power in Nicaragua for the next 20 years.

h. The early withdrawal of the marines played a major role in the ultimate failure of the Guardia to remain a professional and non-partisan force. As a consequence, the efforts to establish a stable and democratic system in Nicaragua also failed. This highlights the potential problems arising when American support to an indigenous security force is withdrawn before that force is ready to stand on its own feet.

3. Further reading.

Merrill, Tim L., ed. Nicaragua: A Country Study. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994.

Nalty, Bernard C. The United States Marines in Nicaragua. Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1958; reprint 1968.