Post_to_FBO_OK_TulsaIAP_HangarFireEval_501_Bid_Document.pdf

Fire Protection Evaluation Building 501 - Maintenance Hangar

Tulsa International Airport

Inspect/Evaluate Hangar Fire Protection Systems Project:

Contract:

Task Order:

11 March 2016

Fire Protection Evaluation Building 501 - Maintenance Hangar prepared for

Tulsa International Airport Inspect/Evaluate Hangar Fire Protection Systems

Tulsa, OK

Project No.

Contract:

Task Order:

11 March 2016 prepared by

Burns & McDonnell Engineering Company, Inc.

Fire Protection Engineering Group

Minneapolis, Minnesota

COPYRIGHT © 2016 BURNS & McDONNELL ENGINEERING COMPANY, INC.

INDEX

Tulsa International Airport Fire Protection Evaluation

Building 501 - Maintenance Hangar

Report Index Chapter Number Chapter Title

Number of Pages

1.0 Executive Summary 4

2.0 Operational Reliability Analysis 1

3.0 Evaluation of Assessment Points 7

4.0 Fire Protection System Testing and Maintenance 2

5.0 Builder Direct Conditional Ratings 1

Appendix A Applicable Codes and Standards 2 Appendix B Assessment Points 50

Building 501 - Maintenance Hangar Table of Contents

Tulsa International Airport i Burns & McDonnell

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................... 1-1

1.1 Facility Evaluation ............................................................................................... 1-1

1.2 Unusual Circumstances ........................................................................................ 1-1

1.3 Reliability of Facility Systems ............................................................................. 1-1

1.4 Costs to Increase Reliability and Obtain Code Compliance ................................ 1-2

1.5 Hard Broke and Reliability Corrective Actions ................................................... 1-2

1.6 Inadvertent Foam/Water Releases ....................................................................... 1-4

1.7 Testing and Maintenance Programs ..................................................................... 1-4

2.0 OPERATIONAL RELIABILITY ANALYSIS ...................................................... 2-1

2.1 Operational Reliability Overview ........................................................................ 2-1

2.2 Operational Reliability Scores ............................................................................. 2-1

3.0 EVALUATION OF ASSESSMENT POINTS ..................................................... 3-1

3.1 Purpose of the Assessment................................................................................... 3-1

3.1.1 Determination of ROM Cost Estimations ............................................. 3-1

3.1.2 Evaluation of Reliability and Inadvertent Discharge Mitigation .......... 3-1

3.1.3 Evaluation of Compliance with Current Codes and Standards ............. 3-1

3.2 Assessment Points and Evaluation System .......................................................... 3-2

3.3 Assessment Points Not Evaluated ........................................................................ 3-2

3.4 Corrective Actions to Reduce Inadvertent Discharges and Increase

Reliability ............................................................................................................. 3-2

3.5 Corrective Actions to Obtain Code Compliance ................................................. 3-5

3.6 Corrective Actions Not Included in the Cost Estimate ........................................ 3-5

3.7 Humidity and Temperature Requirements ........................................................... 3-6

3.7.1 Humidity and Temperature Results and Recommendations ................. 3-7

3.8 Seismic Protection Requirements ........................................................................ 3-7

3.8.1 Seismic Protection Results and Recommendations .............................. 3-7

4.0 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM TESTING AND MAINTENANCE ...................... 4-1

4.1 Testing and Maintenance Overview .................................................................... 4-1

4.2 Reliability of Testing and Maintenance and Records Obtained .......................... 4-1

4.3 Testing Personnel and Qualifications .................................................................. 4-2

4.4 Testing and Maintenance Results and Recommendations ................................... 4-2

5.0 BUILDER DIRECT CONDITIONAL RATINGS ................................................. 5-1

5.1 Direct Conditional Rating Overview ................................................................... 5-1

APPENDIX A – APPLICABLE CODES AND STANDARDS

APPENDIX B – ASSESSMENT POINTS

Building 501 - Maintenance Hangar Table of Contents

Tulsa International Airport ii Burns & McDonnell

LIST OF TABLES

Page No.

Table 1-1: Reliability Score by Fire Protection System .......................................................... 1-2 Table 1-2: Facility ROM Cost Estimates ................................................................................. 1-2 Table 2-1: Reliability Score by Fire Protection System .......................................................... 2-1 Table 3-1: Assessment Points Not Evaluated .......................................................................... 3-2 Table 3-2: Corrective Actions to Fix Hard Broke Items ......................................................... 3-3 Table 3-3: Corrective Actions to Convert System from Manual to Automatic Mode ............ 3-3 Table 3-4: Corrective Actions to Reduce Inadvertent Discharges........................................... 3-3 Table 3-5: Corrective Actions to Reduce the Impact of Inadvertent Discharges .................... 3-4 Table 3-6: Corrective Actions to Increase System Reliability and Aircraft Protection ........... 3-4 Table 3-7: Summary of Corrective Action ROM Cost Estimates for Building 501 ................ 3-4 Table 3-8: Summary of ROM Cost Estimate for Code Compliance for Building 501............ 3-5 Table 3-9: Temperature and Humidity Limitations ................................................................. 3-6 Table 4-1: Systems and Components Reviewed ...................................................................... 4-1 Table 4-2: Reliability of Testing and Maintenance and Records Obtained ............................. 4-2 Table 4-3: Testing Personnel and Qualifications ..................................................................... 4-2 Table 5-1: Direct Conditional Ratings Scale ........................................................................... 5-1

Building 501 - Maintenance Hangar List of Abbreviations

Tulsa International Airport iii Burns & McDonnell

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation Term/Phrase/Name

AF Air Force

AFB Air Force Base

AFCEC Air Force Civil Engineering Center

AFF Above Finished Floor

ANG Air National Guard

AFFF Aqueous Film Forming Foam

BMcD Burns & McDonnell

ETL Air Force Engineering Technical Letter

FACP Fire Alarm Control Panel

FSCP Fire System Control Panel (e.g. Releasing Panel)

HEF High Expansion Foam

Hrs Hours

LF Linear Feet

NEC National Electric Code

NEMA National Electrical Manufacturers Association

NFPA National Fire Protection Association

ROM Rough Order of Magnitude

SF Square Feet

SOW Scope of Work

T.O. Technical Order

UFC Unified Facilities Criteria

UFGS Unified Facilities Guide Specifications

Building 501 - Maintenance Hangar Executive Summary

Tulsa International Airport 1-1 Burns & McDonnell

1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 Facility Evaluation

This document is a summary of the fire protection systems evaluated by Alan Moore, PE from Burns &

McDonnell's Fire Protection Engineering Group on 13 August 2015 for Building 501 at Tulsa

International Airport, Tulsa, OK.

This facility was constructed in 1959 and houses F-16 aircraft. The fire protection systems were installed in 2014. The total area of this facility is approximately 81,138 sq ft where approximately 31,927 sq ft is hangar bay area. The hangar bay is protected with a wet-pipe sprinkler system and a supplementary low level high expansion foam system. The foam/water system appears to be released by a dedicated releasing panel from manual releasing stations, waterflow from the overhead sprinkler system or cross-zoned heat detectors. Support areas within this facility are provided with a wet-pipe sprinkler system and a fire alarm system.

Fire water is provided from a combined fire and domestic water supply provided by the city. The fire water supply is boosted by the facility's two fire pumps (one electric fire pump and one diesel fire pump each rated at 2,500 gpm at 75 psi).

1.2 Unusual Circumstances

1.3 Reliability of Facility Systems

Table 1-1 shows the average reliability of the three fire protection systems in the facility. Further explanation on how the rankings are calculated can be found in the Base Report. In general, the scores in

Table 1-1 should be interpreted as follows:

• 100 to 99 – The system and subsystems are reliable and expected to operate as intended.

• 98 to 80 – The system and subsystems will probably operate as intended, however there is an opportunity to increase system reliability.

• 79 to 51 – The system and subsystems may not operate as intended, or may inadvertently operate leading to a nuisance alarm or inconvenience.

• 50 to 0 – The system and subsystems will not operate as intended, may fail during operation, or may operate inadvertently leading to the release of the foam/water system.

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Table 1-1: Reliability Score by Fire Protection System

Fire Suppression Fire Alarm Life Safety Overall Building

Average: 58 Average: 64 Average: 91 Average: 71

1.4 Costs to Increase Reliability and Obtain Code Compliance

Three individual cost estimates were provided for this facility in Table 1-2. These are listed in order of priority: The hard broke cost; the reliability cost; and the code compliance cost. Hard broke costs are items which need corrective action for the system to operate as intended. Reliability costs include hard broke costs, recommended corrective actions to increase the system reliability, and reduce the occurrence and impact of inadvertent operation of systems. Code compliance costs include hard broke costs, reliability costs, and the cost to bring the facility’s systems into compliance with current and forthcoming codes.

The estimates shown in Table 1-2 represent the combined estimates of fire suppression, fire alarm, and life safety system repairs recommended to address hard broke, reliability, or code compliant deficiencies.

Estimates are based on RSMeans cost information, which includes the installers 10% overhead and profit on labor, equipment and materials. The estimates shown below have been modified for geographical location per RSMeans and increased for 10% for sub-contractors design, 20% for general contractor’s overhead and profit, 12% for A/E design and commissioning, 20% contingency, and 30% anticipated escalation. For a full breakdown of ROM cost estimates, see Section 3.1.1. For a list of items not included in the cost estimate below, refer to Section 3.6.

Table 1-2: Facility ROM Cost Estimates

Cost to Repair Hard Broke Items $ 152,516 Cost to Repair Hard Broke Items and Increase Reliability $ 1,276,339 Cost to Repair Hard Broke Items, Increase Reliability, and Comply with Codes $ 2,694,416

1.5 Hard Broke and Reliability Corrective Actions

During the evaluation, the facility was assessed for hard broke and reliability corrective actions. A hard broke corrective action is required to enable the fire protection system, or permit it to operate at full capacity. The following corrective actions are required to fix the hard broke items in this facility.

• Enable electric fire pump; currently it is disabled

• Replace diesel fire pump; currently damaged and inoperable

Tulsa International Airport 1-3 Burns & McDonnell

In an effort to better protect the occupants, aircraft, and building, it is recommended that the foam/water releasing mechanisms be configured to activate automatically in addition to manual releasing stations. No corrective actions are required to convert the system from manual to automatic mode.

In an effort to reduce the occurrence of inadvertent operation of the foam systems, there are often times corrective actions that, when implemented, can reduce the likelihood of a false discharge. The following corrective actions are recommended to reduce the occurrence of inadvertent foam/water activations.

• Provide lock and signage on hangar inspectors test connection and drains stating: 'Discharging water from this connection may release the foam system'

• Remove the fire pump room fire sprinkler system supply from the hangar fire sprinkler system riser

• Relocate hangar sprinkler system drain and test lines to areas not subject to freezing

• Provide tamper seals and signage on foam/water riser trim valve

• Cross-zone the foam system releasing mechanisms such that no single initiating device or zone can initiate foam release

• Revise the conduit such that it does not enter the top of the foam/water releasing panel

• Provide NEMA 4 foam system pull stations and backboxes with conduit looped into bottom of backbox with drain

In order for facility occupants to reduce the impact of inadvertent foam/water releases, a complete foam stop system that can halt the release of foam should be provided.

Reliability corrective actions are recommended to increase the overall reliability of the system including both the hangar bay and support areas as well as increase the level of aircraft protection. The following corrective actions are recommended to increase the reliability of the system and the level of aircraft protection.

• Re-pipe bladder tanks to the dry side of the foam system deluge valve to remove pressure from the bladders

• Remove or supervise the unsupervised valve on hydraulic ball valve line

• Replace the existing foam concentrate piping with approved piping connections

• Provide Det-Tronics Eagle Quantum Premier releasing panel and optical flame detection such that no single initiating device or zone can initiate foam release

• Repair the trouble conditions on the foam/water releasing panel

Tulsa International Airport 1-4 Burns & McDonnell

1.6 Inadvertent Foam/Water Releases

Base personnel were interviewed regarding inadvertent foam/water releases at the facility. Knowledge or documentation of an inadvertent foam/water system release at this facility was not available.

1.7 Testing and Maintenance Programs

The fire suppression, fire alarm, and life safety systems were inspected for signs of routine maintenance.

When available, maintenance records were reviewed for conformance with UFC 3-601-02 regarding testing procedures and frequency. Base personnel were interviewed regarding general knowledge of the system’s operation, testing procedures and qualifications of testing personnel, and preventative maintenance programs.

In general, there is room for improvement regarding the testing and maintenance at the Base. The fire systems are one year old and therefore have not been through a full maintenance cycle. The existing testing procedures and frequency should be expanded to align better with the requirements of UFC 3-601-

02. Base personnel would benefit from additional training regarding the specifics of the system operation, testing procedures, and periodic maintenance requirements. For specific recommendations, refer to Section 4.0.

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Building 501 - Maintenance Hangar Operational Reliability Analysis

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2.0 OPERATIONAL RELIABILITY ANALYSIS

2.1 Operational Reliability Overview

In order to provide a benchmark on which to evaluate the reliability of the fire protection systems in a facility, the following operational reliability score was created. This reliability score weights the likelihood the system will operate as intend, and only when intended. The more unreliable the system is and greater the consequences upon system failure, the lower the reliability score. For additional information regarding how the reliability is calculated, refer to the Base Report.

The operational reliability score is based on a scale of 100 to 0 where:

• 100 to 99 – Indicates the system is reliable and expected to operate as intended.

• 98 to 80 – Indicates the system will probably operate as intended, however there is an opportunity to increase system reliability.

• 79 to 51 – Indicates the system may not operate as intended, or may inadvertently operate leading to a nuisance alarm or inconvenience.

• 50 to 0 – Indicates the system will not operate as intended, or may operate inadvertently leading to a release of the foam/water system.

2.2 Operational Reliability Scores

The average operational reliability score for each of the three fire protection systems and the overall facility score are shown below in Table 2-1. For a more detailed breakdown of the reliability scores, refer to the individual assessment points in Appendix B. For additional information on reliability weighting and how this facility compares to other facilities on the Base, refer to the Base Report.

Table 2-1: Reliability Score by Fire Protection System

Fire Suppression Fire Alarm Life Safety Overall Building

Average: 58 Average: 64 Average: 91 Average: 71

Building 501 - Maintenance Hangar Operational Reliability Analysis

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Building 501 - Maintenance Hangar Evaluation of Assessment Points

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3.0 EVALUATION OF ASSESSMENT POINTS

3.1 Purpose of the Assessment

The scope of this evaluation included an assessment of fire suppression, fire alarm, and life safety systems installed within each facility. Each system was assessed for three main objectives: The ability to reduce inadvertent discharges of the foam/water system; the ability to operate reliably as intended and designed;

and the system’s compliance with current and forthcoming codes.

3.1.1 Determination of ROM Cost Estimations

A cost estimate is included in Appendix B for each deficiency noted except as excluded in Section

3.6. These estimates were determined using RSMeans data which includes the installers 10% overhead and profit on labor, equipment, and materials.

In Section 1.3, Section 3.4, and Section 3.5, the RSMeans costs estimates were further modified to estimate an overall ROM. The overall estimate includes an adjustment for location, 10% for sub-contractors design, 20% for general contractor’s overhead and profit, 10% for A/E services, 20% contingency, and 30% anticipated escalation. These percentages were based on RSMeans, industry standard rates, previous project costs, and engineering judgment.

3.1.2 Evaluation of Reliability and Inadvertent Discharge Mitigation In evaluating the existing system, each assessment point was reviewed to determine if it will operate as intended during a fire event. Additionally, each assessment point was reviewed to verify it will not inadvertently activate or release the foam/water system when not intended. For further information on guidance used in evaluation the fire protection system reliability, refer to the Base Report.

3.1.3 Evaluation of Compliance with Current Codes and Standards The evaluation also assessed the extent of modifications needed to bring the existing fire protection systems in the facility up to current codes and standards. For this portion of the evaluation to be the most effective, the facility was evaluated against the most recent draft versions of UFC 3-600-01, UFC 4-211-01, and the most current published editions, as of August 2014, of applicable NFPA standards.

Tulsa International Airport 3-2 Burns & McDonnell

3.2 Assessment Points and Evaluation System

The assessments were broken into three main systems: Fire Suppression, Fire Alarm, and Life Safety.

For each of these points, the evaluator was given a comprehensive list of the common and uncommon deficiencies found with the associated system. Each point was checked for these deficiencies, and a deficiency was removed where not found. For additional information regarding the systems and subsystems evaluated, refer to the Base Report.

3.3 Assessment Points Not Evaluated

The following assessment points in Table 3-1 were not evaluated as part of this assessment.

Table 3-1: Assessment Points Not Evaluated

Assessment ID Assessment Point Reason for Exclusion

FS-2 Fire Pump House Facility is not a Fire Pump House

FS-3 Fire Water Storage The facility does not have dedicated fire water storage

FS-21 Hangar Bay AFFF Foam/Water Distribution System AFFF not provided in this facility

3.4 Corrective Actions to Reduce Inadvertent Discharges and Increase Reliability

Where the assessment point contains deficiencies that impact the functionality of the system, corrective actions are recommended to increase the reliability of the system to operate as intended and reduce the potential for inadvertent discharges. The following paragraphs include facility-specific corrective actions in five priority levels.

When applying the corrective actions indicated in this report, the priority of execution should follow the outline as shown below from highest to lowest priority. Refer to Section 3.7 of the Base Report for details and examples.

• Actions to remedy hard broke items that affect system performance.

• Actions that allow the fire suppression system to be switched from manual to automatic mode.

• Actions that would reduce inadvertent releases of the existing foam/water suppression system.

• Actions that would reduce the impact of inadvertent releases of the existing foam/water suppression system.

• Actions that increase the operational reliability of the existing system as currently installed.

• Actions to increase the effectiveness of the fire protection systems to protect the aircraft.

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• Actions to bring the fire protection systems up to current codes and standards.

It should be noted proper maintenance of the fire suppression, fire alarm, and life safety systems also contribute to increasing the operational reliability. Routine inspections and testing of the systems will create familiarity with the systems as well as allow for detection of system deficiencies as they arise.

Table 3-2: Corrective Actions to Fix Hard Broke Items

Assessment ID Corrective Action RSMeans

Estimate

FS-8

FS-8

Table 3-3: Corrective Actions to Convert System from Manual to Automatic Mode

Assessment ID Corrective Action RSMeans

Estimate

- No corrective actions are required to convert the system from manual to automatic mode

Table 3-4: Corrective Actions to Reduce Inadvertent Discharges

Assessment ID Corrective Action RSMeans

Estimate

FS-15

FS-16

Provide lock and signage on hangar inspectors test connection and drains stating: 'Discharging water from this connection may release the foam system'

FS-15 Remove the fire pump room fire sprinkler system supply from the hangar fire sprinkler system riser

FS-16 Relocate hangar sprinkler system drain and test lines to areas not subject to freezing

FS-17 Provide tamper seals and signage on foam/water riser trim valve

FA-1 Cross-zone the foam system releasing mechanisms such that no single initiating device or zone can initiate foam release

FA-1 Revise the conduit such that it does not enter the top of the foam/water releasing panel

FA-2 Provide NEMA 4 foam system pull stations and backboxes with conduit looped into bottom of backbox with drain

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Table 3-5: Corrective Actions to Reduce the Impact of Inadvertent Discharges

Assessment ID Corrective Action RSMeans

Estimate

Provide a complete foam stop system that can halt the release of foam. At a minimum, the following components are required:

FA-3 Provide NEMA 4 dead-man stop stations and backboxes, conduit loop into bottom of backbox with drain, and dedicated distinct signage

FS-17

Provide flow control valve for foam/water riser with brass trim package for electric releasing, remote resetting, and adjustable opening/closing speed control Upon final design, The following components may also be required:

FS-17 Provide new fire pumps to account for pressure loss caused by adding flow control valves

FS-13

FS-15

FS-17

Provide new PRV on all risers due to the addition of new pumps

Table 3-6: Corrective Actions to Increase System Reliability and Aircraft Protection

Assessment ID Corrective Action RSMeans

Estimate

FS-18 Re-pipe bladder tanks to the dry side of the foam system deluge valve to remove pressure from the bladders

FS-19 Remove or supervise the unsupervised valve on hydraulic ball valve line

FS-19 Replace the existing foam concentrate piping with approved piping connections

FA-1

FA-4

Provide Det-Tronics Eagle Quantum Premier releasing panel and optical flame detection such that no single initiating device or zone can initiate foam release FA-1 Repair the trouble conditions on the foam/water releasing panel

Table 3-7: Summary of Corrective Action ROM Cost Estimates for Building 501

Sub-Total RSMeans Location Modifier

Adjusted Sub-Total Increase for Sub-Contractor Design Documents

Increase for General Contractor Overhead and Profit Increase for Architecture/Engineering Services and Commissioning

Increase for Additional Contingency Increase for Anticipated Escalation

Total ROM Estimate

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3.5 Corrective Actions to Obtain Code Compliance

The ROM cost estimates for code compliance are summarized in Table 3-8. These costs estimates include the corrective actions indicated in section 3.4, and the additional requirements to obtain conformance with current and forthcoming codes. For a list of all deficiencies and recommended corrective actions, refer to assessment points in Appendix B.

Table 3-8: Summary of ROM Cost Estimate for Code Compliance for Building 501

Reliability Score

Summary of Corrective Actions RSMeans Estimate

58 Fire Suppression Systems 64 Fire Alarm Systems 91 Life Safety Systems

Sub-Total RSMeans Location Modifier

Adjusted Sub-Total Increase for Sub-Contractor Design Documents

Increase for General Contractor Overhead and Profit Increase for Architecture/Engineering Services and Commissioning

Increase for Additional Contingency Increase for Anticipated Escalation

Total ROM Estimate

3.6 Corrective Actions Not Included in the Cost Estimate

For many of the assessment points, the corrective actions are straight forward (e.g. Pull station has an incorrect NEMA rating; replace manual foam/water releasing stations with NEMA 4 rated device.)

However, in some cases there is more than one solution (e.g. Releasing panel is operating outside it’s recommend temperature; provide an A/C split system, duct A/C into the room to provide cooling, or relocate the panel to a conditioned room.) In these cases, only one of the possible corrective actions is included in the cost estimates.

Then there are corrective actions which are not provided within the cost estimates because of the large degree unknown, or additional design required to establish an acceptable solution. This level of exploratory service and design is outside the scope of this evaluation.

• Resolving troubles and supervisory signals on the foam releasing and fire alarm panels.

Additional exploratory testing is required to determine the reason for the fault.

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• A determination of the configuration for power to the hangar doors requires further investigation and a design solution. See Assessment Point LS-3

• A design solution is required to determine the resolve the 40 foot clearance issue between the hangar and other non-hangar facilities. See Assessment Point LS-1

Items which are technically not correct per the current or forthcoming codes, but have little impact on the overall system operation were not included.

• Replacement of stranded wire with solid wire for all fire alarm circuits. This corrective action for code compliance does not provide a benefit, where crimped connections have been installed.

• Replacement of 18 AWG or smaller wiring with 16 AWG wiring. This corrective action for code compliance does not provide a benefit, where voltage drop calculations can support a small gauge conductor.

3.7 Humidity and Temperature Requirements

Fire alarm systems are required to comply with the humidity and temperature limitations of NFPA 72, UL 864, or FM 3010 requirements as shown in Table 3-9. Where fire alarm panels or devices have been installed in locations that exceed these limitations, the effect of a malfunctioning device is typically only a nuisance alarm.

However, for releasing systems this is not the case. Where these devices have malfunctioned, the result has varied from a nuisance alarm to the inadvertent release of a foam/water system. Since the potential for damage is greater from a malfunctioning releasing system, as part of this evaluation the releasing systems have been assessed for compliance with NFPA 72, UL 864, FM 3010, the current draft version of

UFC 4-211-01, and the recommendations of AFCEC.

Table 3-9: Temperature and Humidity Limitations

Reference Applicable System Temperature Limitation Humidity Limitation

NFPA 72 Both 32 to 120°F 85% RH at 86°F (159 gr/lb) UL 864 Both 32 to 120°F 93% RH at 90°F (200 gr/lb)

FM 3010 Both 32 to 120°F 90% RH at 100°F (260 gr/lb) UFC 4-211-01 Releasing Only 60 to 80°F 85% RH at 86°F (159 gr/lb)

AFCEC Releasing Only Design – 60 to 80°F

Equipment - 32 to 120°F Design – Less than 85% RH

Equipment – Less than 93% RH

Tulsa International Airport 3-7 Burns & McDonnell

3.7.1 Humidity and Temperature Results and Recommendations

For this location the fire alarm panel is required to be located in a heated area, and the releasing panel and addressable releasing devices are required to be located in a heated and conditioned area to comply with

Table 3-9. Refer to the Base Report for additional information regarding Air Force Engineering Weather

Data and the humidity and temperature analysis. For specific equipment evaluations and recommendations, refer to section 3.4 and the assessment points in Appendix B.

3.8 Seismic Protection Requirements

The current draft of the UFC 4-211-01 requires foam/water systems to be seismically braced per NFPA

13 regardless of geographical location. UFC 3-600-01 requires seismic bracing of non-foam systems in accordance with NFPA 13 when required by ASCE 7-10. Only locations with a Seismic Design Category of C or higher require seismic bracing of the non-foam systems.

3.8.1 Seismic Protection Results and Recommendations

For this location the most restrictive Seismic Design Category is B and therefore seismic bracing installed in accordance with NFPA 13 is not required on non-foam fire suppression systems. Refer to the Base

Report for additional information regarding the seismic protection analysis. Refer assessment points in

Appendix B for specific equipment evaluations and recommendations.

Tulsa International Airport 3-8 Burns & McDonnell

Building 501 - Maintenance Hangar Fire Protection System Testing and Maintenance

Tulsa International Airport 4-1 Burns & McDonnell

4.0 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM TESTING AND MAINTENANCE

4.1 Testing and Maintenance Overview

The testing and maintenance systems and subsystems reviewed at this facility are provided in Table 4-1.

For a more detailed list, refer to Assessment Points FS-22, FA-10, and LS-8 in Appendix B.

Table 4-1: Systems and Components Reviewed

Systems Subsystems Fire Suppression Hydrants, Wet-pipe Sprinklers, Foam/Water Systems, and Fire Pumps

Fire Alarm Fire Alarm Control Panel, Foam/Water Releasing Panel, and Associated Devices

Life Safety Exit Signage, Emergency Lighting, Passive Fire Protection Integrity, and Portable Fire Extinguishers

As part of the testing and maintenance evaluation, the following were assessed for fire suppression, fire alarm, and life safety systems.

• Reviewed testing procedures and maintenance records at each facility.

• Interviewed Base personnel responsible for performing or supervising testing and maintenance for each system. Refer to the Base Report for a list of personnel interviewed during the evaluation.

• Assessed the qualifications of the personnel testing and maintaining the systems at each facility.

• Reviewed the preventative maintenance programs in place to verify conformance with the requirements of UFC 3-601-02.

4.2 Reliability of Testing and Maintenance and Records Obtained The reliability scores for testing and maintenance at this facility are provided in Table 4-2. Further explanation on how these rankings are calculated can be found in the Base Report. In general, the scores in Table 4-2 should be interpreted as follows:

• 100 to 99 – In general, the system and subsystems are provided with regular testing and maintenance in conformance with UFC 3-601-02.

• 98 to 51 – The systems and subsystems are provided with infrequent testing and maintenance, or the procedures do not align with the requirements of UFC 3-601-02.

• 50 to 0 – The system is currently not tested or maintained.

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Where testing and maintenance records were available, the systems were assessed against the requirements of UFC 3-601-02. Maintenance records for the fire suppression, fire alarm, and life safety systems are compiled and Maintenance records for the fire suppression, fire alarm, and life safety systems are compiled and stored in AEIS..

Table 4-2: Reliability of Testing and Maintenance and Records Obtained

System Reliability Scored Testing and Maintenance Records

Obtained and Reviewed Fire Suppression 93 No Records Available (system is one year old)

Fire Alarm 93 No Records Available (system is one year old) Life Safety 65 Partial Set of Records Obtained

4.3 Testing Personnel and Qualifications

A summary of the testing personnel for each system and their qualifications are provided in Table 4-3.

Table 4-3: Testing Personnel and Qualifications

System Testing Personnel Personnel Qualifications

Fire Suppression Fire Suppression Contractor Simplex/Grinnell

Testing personnel have acquired a minimum NICET Level III in Inspection and Testing of

Water-Based Systems

Fire Alarm Fire Suppression Contractor Simplex/Grinnell

Testing personnel have acquired a minimum NICET Level III in Inpection and testing of

Fire Alarm Systems

Life Safety Base Fire Department The qualifications of the testing personnel could not be verified

4.4 Testing and Maintenance Results and Recommendations

The fire suppression, fire alarm, and life safety systems were inspected for signs of routine maintenance.

When available, maintenance records were reviewed for conformance with UFC 3-601-02 regarding testing procedures and frequency. Base personnel were interviewed regarding general knowledge of the system’s operation, testing procedures and qualifications of testing personnel, and preventative maintenance programs.

In general, there is room for improvement regarding the testing and maintenance at the Base. The fire systems are one year old and therefore have not been through a full maintenance cycle. The existing testing procedures and frequency should be expanded to align better with the requirements of UFC 3-601-

02. Base personnel would benefit from additional training regarding the specifics of the system operation, testing procedures, and periodic maintenance requirements.

Tulsa International Airport 4-3 Burns & McDonnell

Since most foam/water releasing systems have a degree of complexity and often the personnel who maintain these systems are not familiar with the specifics of the system, it would be advantageous to post instructions next to each foam/water riser explaining: How the system operates; how to disable the releasing function when testing; how to manually release the system in emergency situations; and how to shut the system down after an event.

It should be noted proper maintenance of the fire suppression, fire alarm, and life safety systems also contribute to increasing the operational reliability. Routine inspections and testing of the systems will create familiarity with the systems as well as allow for the detection of system deficiencies as they arise.

Tulsa International Airport 4-4 Burns & McDonnell

Building 501 - Maintenance Hangar BUILDER Direct Condition Ratings

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5.0 BUILDER DIRECT CONDITIONAL RATINGS

5.1 Direct Conditional Rating Overview

As part of the report of findings, each assessment point is given a direct conditional rating and added to the Builder database. This rating is an assessment of the system and subcomponents current condition in regards to wear and tear or the ability for the system to perform as required. A general overview of each direct conditional rating is shown below in Table 5-1. The direct conditional rating for each assessment point is indicated in Appendix B. For more information regarding direct conditional ratings refer to the

Base Report.

Table 5-1: Direct Conditional Ratings Scale

When comparing Direct Conditional Ratings with Reliability Scores some components may be scored with a low direct conditional rating while scoring a high reliability score or vice versa. This is due to the different criteria used to assign the scores. As an example, a foam/water releasing panel may receive a direct conditional rating of green, but score a low reliability score because of the probability and magnitude of the system operating inadvertently. Additionally, a foam/water riser may score a relatively high reliability score but a red direct conditional rating because of the full system modification required to upgrade the system to comply with current codes and standards.

Rating Deterioration Maintenance and Repair Requirements

Green Fully Operational - Minimal wear or system defects Routine maintenance or minor repair

Amber Reduced Operation - Moderate wear or system defects which may impair the system from operating effectively.

Significant repair, modification, or replacement of one or more subcomponents of the system

Red

Loss of Operation - Significant wear, system component failure, or missing component which impairs the system from operating effectively.

Major repair, full system modification, or system replacement

APPENDIX A – APPLICABLE CODES AND STANDARDS

UFC 3-230-02 Operation and Maintenance: Water Supply Systems, 10-Jul-2001

UFC 3-400-02 Design: Engineering Weather Data, 28-Feb- 2003

UFC 3-600-01 Fire Protection Engineering for Facilities, 90% Draft 06-Oct-2014

UFC 3-601-02 Operations and Maintenance: Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Fire Protection systems, 8-Sep-2010

UFC 4-021-01 Design and O&M: Mass Notification Systems, Change 1, Jan-2010

UFC 4-211-01 Unified Facilities Criteria 95% Draft copy 09-Oct-2014

UFC 3-520-01 Interior Electrical Systems, Change 2, 01-Jul-2012

UFC 3-550-01 Exterior Power Distribution Systems, Change 1, 01-Jul-2012

UFC 3-501-01 Electrical Engineering Preliminary Considerations, Change 2, 01-Jul-2012

UFC 3-560-01 Electrical Safety, O & M, 6 December 2006, Change 4, 01-May-2012

ETL 01-1-1 Air National Guard Design Policy, Mar-2004

ETL 02-15 Fire Protection Engineering Criteria – New Aircraft Facilities, 03-Dec-2002

ETL 98-8 Fire Protection Engineering Criteria – Existing Aircraft Facilities, 25-Jun-1998

AFCEC Department of the Air Force Memorandum for ALMAJCOM/A7, FOAs, DRUs, Subject: Protecting Aircraft Hangars – Reducing Inappropriate Fire System Activations, 2010

AFCEC Department of the Air Force Memorandum for ALMAJCOM/A70s, Subject: Preventing Inappropriate Aircraft Hangar Fire Protection System Activations, 2011

AFCEC Department of the Air Force Memorandum, Inadvertent Foam Lessons Learned Attachments 1-5, 2012

AFCEC Process for Location Fire System Control Panels in Accordance and Humidity Limits

AFCEC Hangar Foam Fire Suppression System Manual Start Stop Control Locations

NFPA 11 Standard for Low-, Medium-, and High-Expansion Foam – 2010

NFPA 13 Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, 2013

NFPA 16 Standard for the Installation of Foam-Water Sprinkler and Foam-Water Spray Systems – 2015

NFPA 20 Standard for the Installation of Stationary Fire Pumps, 2013

NFPA 24 Standard for the Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and Their Appurtenances – 2013

NFPA 70 National Electrical Code – 2014

NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code – 2013

NFPA 101 Life Safety Code – 2015

NFPA 409 Standard on Aircraft Hangars – 2011

ASCE 7-10 Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, 2010

NEMA 250 Enclosures for Electrical Equipment, 2014

BUILDER Data Collection Guide for Air Force Aircraft Hangar Evaluation and Assessment (Appendix B), UL 864 Standard for Control Units and Accessories for Fire Alarm Systems, 01-Dec-

AWWA American Water Works Association Standards for Water Distribution and Storage Systems for Potable and Non-potable Applications.

RSMeans Site Work & Landscape Cost Data – 2013

RSMeans Plumbing Cost Data – 2013

RSMeans Electrical Cost Data – 2013

RSMeans Mechanical Cost Data – 2013

RSMeans Square Foot Costs – 2013

APPENDIX B – ASSESSMENT POINTS

Air National Guard Fire Protection

Systems Assessment Report

Burns & McDonnell

Fire Protection Engineering Group

Aviation & Federal Global Practice

8201 Norman Center Drive

Suite 300

Bloomington, MN 55437

Tulsa International Airport

Maintenance Hangar

Assessment Performed by:

Al Moore

13 August 2015

Operational Reliability Scores by System

Code Compliance Cost Estimates by System

Building

Fire Alarm

Fire Suppression

Life Safety

Fire Alarm Fire Suppression Life Safety

Hangar - Overhead Hangar - Airside

Hangar - Airside Hangar - Landside

Burns & McDonnell - Fire Protection Engineering Group

Air National Guard Facility Assessment Report

FS-5

Area: Exterior

D40 - FIRE PROTECTION

D4020 - FIRE SUPP WATER SUPPLY/ EQUIP

D402001 - FIRE PROTECTION WATER PIPING AND EQUIPMENT

Underground Fire Water Main

Reliability Score

BUILDER Rating

Red

Equipment Details

10 inch underground fire main with PIV. Enters the building below grade through the slab.

Observations

The underground piping and control valve are generally in good condition and meets the requirements except as noted below:

- PIV supervision is not provided with a lock or tamper seal. UFC 3-600-01 para 3-7.2.2

- The PIV is not located more than 40 ft from building (10 ft) or is not at least as far from the building as the height of the wall facing the post indicator valve (collapse zone) per NFPA 24 para 6.2.11. UFC

3-600-01 para 3-7.1.5

- Where the fire piping is routed under the slab, it is not a continuous welded stainless steel pipe.

UFC 4-211-01 para 3-5.4.3

- Where the piping is routed through the floor slab, it is not provided with a sleeve. UFC 3-600-01 para 4-2.4.11

- Fire water piping does not enter the building through a pit. UFC 4-211-01 para 3-5.4.3

Total:

Entrance Pit with Grating

Thrust Restraints in Pit

8" Underground Ductile Iron Pipe

Demolition of Floor Slab and Foundation

8" PIV

Remove Elec Supervision, add Lock

Items

Items

LF

Items

Items

Items

Per Item

Per Item

Per LF

Per Item

Per Item

Per Item

Item QTY Rate

FS-7

Area: Fire Protection Equipment Room

D40 - FIRE PROTECTION

D4020 - FIRE SUPP WATER SUPPLY/ EQUIP

D402001 - FIRE PROTECTION WATER PIPING AND EQUIPMENT

Backflow Prevention

Reliability Score

BUILDER Rating

Red

Equipment Details

10 inch reduced pressure zone backflow preventer.

Observations

The fire suppresion system is fed from a domestic water supply and is protected by a reduced pressure zone backflow preventer. This component is generally in good condition and meets the requirements except as noted below:

- Where the system ties into the domestic water supply, the piping prior to the backflow preventer is not listed for potable water (e.g. ductile iron). UFC 4-211-01 para 3-5.4.5

Total:

Relocate Backflow Preventer to Suction Side 1 Items Per Item

FS-8.1

Area: Fire Protection Room

D40 - FIRE PROTECTION

D4020 - FIRE SUPP WATER SUPPLY/ EQUIP

D402002 - FIRE PUMP

Fire Pump - Electric

Reliability Score

BUILDER Rating

Red

Equipment Details

Electric fire pump rated for 2500 gpm at 75 psi. Manufacturer: SPP Pumps, Model: TE20A. Jockey pump rated for 30.38 gpm at 85 psi. Jockey pump is a centrifugal pump.

Observations

The fire pump is generally in good condition and meets the requirements except as noted below:

- A minimum 3/4 inch relief valve (1/2 inch) is not installed on the pump casing. NFPA 20 para

4.11.1.6

Total:

3/4" Casing Relief Valve 1 Items Per Item

FS-8.2

Area: Fire Protection Room

D40 - FIRE PROTECTION

D4020 - FIRE SUPP WATER SUPPLY/ EQUIP

D402002 - FIRE PUMP

Fire Pump - Diesel

Reliability Score

BUILDER Rating

Red

Equipment Details

Observations

The fire pump is generally in good condition and meets the requirements except as noted below:

- The diesel storage tank is not provided with secondary containment for 100% of the tank capacity.

NFPA 20 para 11.4.1.2.4

- The diesel storage tanks venting does not discharge to the exterior at least 5 ft from any openings.

NFPA 20 para 11.4.1.2.8.3

Total: $4500.00

Extend Fuel Tank Vent to the Building Exterio 1

Items

LF

$2,000.00

$125.00 Per Item

Per LF $2,000

$2,500

Fuel Tank Secondary Containment Curb 3ft Hi

FS-9.1

Area: Fire Protection Room

D40 - FIRE PROTECTION

D4020 - FIRE SUPP WATER SUPPLY/ EQUIP

D402002 - FIRE PUMP

Fire Pump Controller - Electric

Reliability Score

BUILDER Rating

Red

Equipment Details

Electric soft-start fire pump controller, start pressure 190 psi with 0 second delay. Undetermined if the fire pump controller is directly connected to a disconnect switch at the transformer.

Manufacturer: Firetrol Model: FTA1930-AM150B. Jockey pump start pressure 204 psi, and stop pressure 214.

Observations

The fire pump controller is generally in good condition and meets the requirements except as noted below:

- Undetermined if fire pump starts automatically from hangar FACP start signal. UFC 4-211-01 para

3-5.11.4

- Fire pump does not automatically shut down after reaching the stop pressure and the expiration of a minimum 10 minute run timer. UFC 3-600-01 para 3-6.3.1

- The fire pump and the jockey pump sensing lines are not connected between the pump's discharge valve and isolation valve. NFPA 20 para 4.30.2

- The fire pump and the jockey pump sensing lines are not 1/2 inch stainless steel or copper. NFPA

20 para 4.30.3

- Undetermined if the fire pump controller is fed ahead of the main building disconnect. NFPA 70

- Fire pump controller is disabled. (The fire pump is turned off due to the diesel fire pump engine fire that occurred on August 10, 2015.) UFC 3-600-02 para 2-2.12

Total:

Provide separate sensing line

Reprogram controller for automatic stop

Items

Items

Per Item

FS-9.2

Area: Fire Protection Room

D40 - FIRE PROTECTION

D4020 - FIRE SUPP WATER SUPPLY/ EQUIP

D402002 - FIRE PUMP

Fire Pump Controller - Diesel

Reliability Score

BUILDER Rating

Red

Equipment Details

Diesel fire pump controller, start pressure [XXX] psi with [XX] second delay. Manufacturer: Firetrol

Model: FTA1100-JL12N

Observations

The fire pump controller is generally in good condition and meets the requirements except as noted below:

- Undetermined if the fire pump does not start automatically from hangar FACP start signal. UFC 4-

211-01 para 3-5.11.4

- Fire pump does not automatically shut down after reaching the stop pressure and the expiration fo a minimum 10 minute run timer. UFC 3-600-01 para 3-6.3.1

- The sensing line is not 1/2 inch stainless steel or copper. NFPA 20 para 4.30.3

- Undetermined if fire pump controller is not fed ahead of the main building disconnect. NFPA 70

- Fire pump controller has mechanical damage and is disabled. (The fire pump is turned off due to the diesel fire pump engine fire that occurred on August 10, 2015.) UFC 3-600-02 para 2-2.12

Total:

Provide separate sensing line

Reprogram controller for manual stop

Items

Items

Per Item

FS-10

Area: Fire Protection Room

D40 - FIRE PROTECTION

D4020 - FIRE SUPP WATER SUPPLY/ EQUIP

D402002 - FIRE PUMP

Fire Pump Piping

Reliability Score

BUILDER Rating

Red

Equipment Details

Fire pump piping draws from combination fire/domestic water utility, feeds two fire pumps, and supplies the facility.

Observations

The fire pump piping is generally in good condition and meets the requirements except as noted below:

- The fire pump piping is not adequately labeled (e.g. Intake, Discharge, To Bypass, To Test Header, To Fire Water Supply). UFC 3-600-01 para 3-6.1.4

- A bypass is provided around booster fire pumps taking suction from a pressurized main, however it does not include two shutoff valves and a check valve. UFC 3-600-01 para 3-6.5

- The relief valve discharge piping is not the correct size, and has more than one elbow and is not increased to the next size. NFPA 20 para 4.18

- A flow meter is not located such that both the test loop and test header are metered. UFC 3-600-

01 para 3-6.10

- Discharge pressure gauges are not provided. NFPA 20 para 4.10

- Surge arrestor is not floor mounted or independently supported. UFC 4-211-01

- An electronically supervised isolation valves for the surge arrestors are not installed. UFC 4-211-01 para 3-5.4.4

Total:

Surge Valve, Tamper & Support

Flow Meter, 10" x 8" Flg Reducers, 10" Gaske

EMT Conduit with Circuit

10" Check Valve and OS&Y Shutoff Valve, Ta

12" Sch 40 pipe Flg

10" x 12" 90 El Flanged

12" 90 El Flanged

Labor

Items

Items

LF

Items

LF

Items

Items

Hrs

Per Item

Per Item

Per LF

Per Item

Per LF

Per Item

Per Item

Per Hr

FS-15.1

Area: Fire Protection Equipment Room

D40 - FIRE PROTECTION

D4040 - SPRINKLERS

D404001 - SPRINKLER AND RELEASING DEVICES

Hangar Bay Wet-Pipe Sprinkler Riser

Reliability Score

BUILDER Rating

Red

Equipment Details

6 inch wet-pipe sprinkler riser for the hangar bay. Riser is designed for [undetermined] for a total demand of [undetermined] serving a total 31,927 sf. Flow switch manufacturer: Potter, model: VSR.

Mechanical clapper check valve manufacturer: Tyco, model: AV-1.

Observations

The wet-pipe sprinkler riser is generally in good condition and meets the requirements except as noted below:

- The support area fire pump room sprinklers are connected to the Hangar Bay riser. Activation of a fire pump room wet sprinkler will release the hangar bay foam system. UFC 4-211-01 para 3-5.5.3

- Undetermined if the sprinkler density and design area meets or exceeds 0.2 gpm/sf over 5,000 sf.

UFC 4-211-01 para 4-5.4

- Missing hydraulic nameplate information.