Post_to_FBO_OK_TulsaIAP_HangarFireEval_304_Bid_Document.pdf

Fire Protection Evaluation Building 304 - Maintenance Hangar

Tulsa International Airport

Inspect/Evaluate Hangar Fire Protection Systems Project:

Contract:

Task Order:

11 March 2016

Fire Protection Evaluation Building 304 - Maintenance Hangar prepared for

Tulsa International Airport Inspect/Evaluate Hangar Fire Protection Systems

Tulsa, OK

Project No. A Contract:

Task Order:

11 March 2016 prepared by

Burns & McDonnell Engineering Company, Inc.

Fire Protection Engineering Group

Minneapolis, Minnesota

COPYRIGHT © 2016 BURNS & McDONNELL ENGINEERING COMPANY, INC.

INDEX

Tulsa International Airport Fire Protection Evaluation

Building 304 - Maintenance Hangar

Report Index Chapter Number Chapter Title

Number of Pages

1.0 Executive Summary 4

2.0 Operational Reliability Analysis 1

3.0 Evaluation of Assessment Points 7

4.0 Fire Protection System Testing and Maintenance 2

5.0 Builder Direct Conditional Ratings 1

Appendix A Applicable Codes and Standards 2 Appendix B Assessment Points 41

Building 304 - Maintenance Hangar Table of Contents

Tulsa International Airport i Burns & McDonnell

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................... 1-1

1.1 Facility Evaluation ............................................................................................... 1-1

1.2 Unusual Circumstances ........................................................................................ 1-1

1.3 Reliability of Facility Systems ............................................................................. 1-1

1.4 Costs to Increase Reliability and Obtain Code Compliance ................................ 1-2

1.5 Hard Broke and Reliability Corrective Actions ................................................... 1-2

1.6 Inadvertent Foam/Water Releases ....................................................................... 1-3

1.7 Testing and Maintenance Programs ..................................................................... 1-4

2.0 OPERATIONAL RELIABILITY ANALYSIS ...................................................... 2-1

2.1 Operational Reliability Overview ........................................................................ 2-1

2.2 Operational Reliability Scores ............................................................................. 2-1

3.0 EVALUATION OF ASSESSMENT POINTS ..................................................... 3-1

3.1 Purpose of the Assessment................................................................................... 3-1

3.1.1 Determination of ROM Cost Estimations ............................................. 3-1

3.1.2 Evaluation of Reliability and Inadvertent Discharge Mitigation .......... 3-1

3.1.3 Evaluation of Compliance with Current Codes and Standards ............. 3-1

3.2 Assessment Points and Evaluation System .......................................................... 3-2

3.3 Assessment Points Not Evaluated ........................................................................ 3-2

3.4 Corrective Actions to Reduce Inadvertent Discharges and Increase

Reliability ............................................................................................................. 3-2

3.5 Corrective Actions to Obtain Code Compliance ................................................. 3-5

3.6 Corrective Actions Not Included in the Cost Estimate ........................................ 3-5

3.7 Humidity and Temperature Requirements ........................................................... 3-6

3.7.1 Humidity and Temperature Results and Recommendations ................. 3-6

3.8 Seismic Protection Requirements ........................................................................ 3-6

3.8.1 Seismic Protection Results and Recommendations .............................. 3-7

4.0 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM TESTING AND MAINTENANCE ...................... 4-1

4.1 Testing and Maintenance Overview .................................................................... 4-1

4.2 Reliability of Testing and Maintenance and Records Obtained .......................... 4-1

4.3 Testing Personnel and Qualifications .................................................................. 4-2

4.4 Testing and Maintenance Results and Recommendations ................................... 4-2

5.0 BUILDER DIRECT CONDITIONAL RATINGS ................................................. 5-1

5.1 Direct Conditional Rating Overview ................................................................... 5-1

APPENDIX A – APPLICABLE CODES AND STANDARDS

APPENDIX B – ASSESSMENT POINTS

Building 304 - Maintenance Hangar Table of Contents

Tulsa International Airport ii Burns & McDonnell

LIST OF TABLES

Page No.

Table 1-1: Reliability Score by Fire Protection System .......................................................... 1-2 Table 1-2: Facility ROM Cost Estimates ................................................................................. 1-2 Table 2-1: Reliability Score by Fire Protection System .......................................................... 2-1 Table 3-1: Assessment Points Not Evaluated .......................................................................... 3-2 Table 3-2: Corrective Actions to Fix Hard Broke Items ......................................................... 3-3 Table 3-3: Corrective Actions to Convert System from Manual to Automatic Mode ............ 3-3 Table 3-4: Corrective Actions to Reduce Inadvertent Discharges........................................... 3-3 Table 3-5: Corrective Actions to Reduce the Impact of Inadvertent Discharges .................... 3-4 Table 3-6: Corrective Actions to Increase System Reliability and Aircraft Protection ........... 3-4 Table 3-7: Summary of Corrective Action ROM Cost Estimates for Building 304 ................ 3-4 Table 3-8: Summary of ROM Cost Estimate for Code Compliance for Building 304............ 3-5 Table 3-9: Temperature and Humidity Limitations ................................................................. 3-6 Table 4-1: Systems and Components Reviewed ...................................................................... 4-1 Table 4-2: Reliability of Testing and Maintenance and Records Obtained ............................. 4-2 Table 4-3: Testing Personnel and Qualifications ..................................................................... 4-2 Table 5-1: Direct Conditional Ratings Scale ........................................................................... 5-1

Building 304 - Maintenance Hangar List of Abbreviations

Tulsa International Airport iii Burns & McDonnell

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation Term/Phrase/Name

AF Air Force

AFB Air Force Base

AFCEC Air Force Civil Engineering Center

AFF Above Finished Floor

ANG Air National Guard

AFFF Aqueous Film Forming Foam

BMcD Burns & McDonnell

ETL Air Force Engineering Technical Letter

FACP Fire Alarm Control Panel

FSCP Fire System Control Panel (e.g. Releasing Panel)

HEF High Expansion Foam

Hrs Hours

LF Linear Feet

NEC National Electric Code

NEMA National Electrical Manufacturers Association

NFPA National Fire Protection Association

ROM Rough Order of Magnitude

SF Square Feet

SOW Scope of Work

T.O. Technical Order

UFC Unified Facilities Criteria

UFGS Unified Facilities Guide Specifications

Building 304 - Maintenance Hangar Executive Summary

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1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 Facility Evaluation

This document is a summary of the fire protection systems evaluated by Alan Moore, PE from Burns &

McDonnell's Fire Protection Engineering Group on 13 August 2015 for Building 304 at Tulsa

International Airport, Tulsa, OK.

This facility was constructed in 1961 and houses F-16 aircraft. The fire protection and alarm systems were installed in 2014. The total area of this facility is approximately 10,504 sq ft where approximately

9,460 sq ft is hangar bay area. The hangar bay is protected with an overhead wet-pipe sprinkler system and a supplementary low level high expansion foam system. The foam/water system appears to be released by a dedicated Siemens foam control/monitoring panel with a secondary Potter foam releasing panel. A foam system release appears to be activated from manual releasing stations, waterflow from the overhead system, or cross-zoned heat detectors. Support areas within this facility are provided with a wet-pipe sprinkler system and a fire alarm system.

Fire water is provided from a combined fire and domestic water supply provided by the city.

1.2 Unusual Circumstances

The entire wet-pipe sprinkler system including mains and branchlines in the hangar bay are heat taped and insulated to protect against freezing. The insulation appears to obstruct the sprinkler spray patterns.

1.3 Reliability of Facility Systems

Table 1-1 shows the average reliability of the three fire protection systems in the facility. Further explanation on how the rankings are calculated can be found in the Base Report. In general, the scores in

Table 1-1 should be interpreted as follows:

• 100 to 99 – The system and subsystems are reliable and expected to operate as intended.

• 98 to 80 – The system and subsystems will probably operate as intended, however there is an opportunity to increase system reliability.

• 79 to 51 – The system and subsystems may not operate as intended, or may inadvertently operate leading to a nuisance alarm or inconvenience.

• 50 to 0 – The system and subsystems will not operate as intended, may fail during operation, or may operate inadvertently leading to the release of the foam/water system.

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Table 1-1: Reliability Score by Fire Protection System

Fire Suppression Fire Alarm Life Safety Overall Building

Average: 83 Average: 61 Average: 81 Average: 75

1.4 Costs to Increase Reliability and Obtain Code Compliance

Three individual cost estimates were provided for this facility in Table 1-2. These are listed in order of priority: The hard broke cost; the reliability cost; and the code compliance cost. Hard broke costs are items which need corrective action for the system to operate as intended. Reliability costs include hard broke costs, recommended corrective actions to increase the system reliability, and reduce the occurrence and impact of inadvertent operation of systems. Code compliance costs include hard broke costs, reliability costs, and the cost to bring the facility’s systems into compliance with current and forthcoming codes.

The estimates shown in Table 1-2 represent the combined estimates of fire suppression, fire alarm, and life safety system repairs recommended to address hard broke, reliability, or code compliant deficiencies.

Estimates are based on RSMeans cost information, which includes the installers 10% overhead and profit on labor, equipment and materials. The estimates shown below have been modified for geographical location per RSMeans and increased for 10% for sub-contractors design, 20% for general contractor’s overhead and profit, 12% for A/E design and commissioning, 20% contingency, and 30% anticipated escalation. For a full breakdown of ROM cost estimates, see Section 3.1.1. For a list of items not included in the cost estimate below, refer to Section 3.6.

Table 1-2: Facility ROM Cost Estimates

Cost to Repair Hard Broke Items Cost to Repair Hard Broke Items and Increase Reliability Cost to Repair Hard Broke Items, Increase Reliability, and Comply with Codes

1.5 Hard Broke and Reliability Corrective Actions

During the evaluation, the facility was assessed for hard broke and reliability corrective actions. A hard broke corrective action is required to enable the fire protection system, or permit it to operate at full capacity. At the time of this assessment, there were no hard broke items that required corrective action.

In an effort to better protect the occupants, aircraft, and building, it is recommended that the foam/water releasing mechanisms be configured to activate automatically in addition to manual releasing stations.

The releasing systems in this facility are currently in automatic mode and no corrective actions are required.

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In an effort to reduce the occurrence of inadvertent operation of the foam systems, there are often times corrective actions that, when implemented, can reduce the likelihood of a false discharge. The following corrective actions are recommended to reduce the occurrence of inadvertent foam/water activations.

• Provide lock on hangar inspectors test connection

• Relocate hangar sprinkler system drain and test lines to areas not subject to freezing

• Provide tamper seals and signage on foam/water riser trim valve

• Cross-zone the foam system releasing mechanisms such that no single initiating device or zone can initiate foam release

• Revise the conduit such that it does not enter the top of the foam/water releasing panel

• Provide NEMA 4 foam system pull stations and backboxes with conduit looped into bottom of backbox with drain

In order for facility occupants to reduce the impact of inadvertent foam/water releases, a complete foam stop system that can halt the release of foam should be provided.

Reliability corrective actions are recommended to increase the overall reliability of the system including both the hangar bay and support areas as well as increase the level of aircraft protection. The following corrective actions are recommended to increase the reliability of the system and the level of aircraft protection.

• Provide a 10 gallon hydraulic surge arrestors on hangar bay wet-pipe sprinkler riser or foam/water

• Re-pipe bladder tanks to the dry side of the foam system deluge valve to remove pressure from the bladders

• Remove or supervise the unsupervised valve on hydraulic ball valve line

• Replace the existing foam concentrate piping with approved piping connections

• Provide Det-Tronics Eagle Quantum Premier releasing panel and optical flame detection such that no single initiating device or zone can initiate foam release

1.6 Inadvertent Foam/Water Releases

Base personnel were interviewed regarding inadvertent foam/water releases at the facility. Knowledge or documentation of an inadvertent foam/water system release at this facility was not available.

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1.7 Testing and Maintenance Programs

The fire suppression, fire alarm, and life safety systems were inspected for signs of routine maintenance.

When available, maintenance records were reviewed for conformance with UFC 3-601-02 regarding testing procedures and frequency. Base personnel were interviewed regarding general knowledge of the system’s operation, testing procedures and qualifications of testing personnel, and preventative maintenance programs.

In general, there is room for improvement regarding the testing and maintenance at the Base. The fire systems are one year old and therefore have not been through a full maintenance cycle. The existing testing procedures and frequency should be expanded to align better with the requirements of UFC 3-601-

02. Base personnel would benefit from additional training regarding the specifics of the system operation, testing procedures, and periodic maintenance requirements. For specific recommendations, refer to Section 4.0.

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Building 304 - Maintenance Hangar Operational Reliability Analysis

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2.0 OPERATIONAL RELIABILITY ANALYSIS

2.1 Operational Reliability Overview

In order to provide a benchmark on which to evaluate the reliability of the fire protection systems in a facility, the following operational reliability score was created. This reliability score weights the likelihood the system will operate as intend, and only when intended. The more unreliable the system is and greater the consequences upon system failure, the lower the reliability score. For additional information regarding how the reliability is calculated, refer to the Base Report.

The operational reliability score is based on a scale of 100 to 0 where:

• 100 to 99 – Indicates the system is reliable and expected to operate as intended.

• 98 to 80 – Indicates the system will probably operate as intended, however there is an opportunity to increase system reliability.

• 79 to 51 – Indicates the system may not operate as intended, or may inadvertently operate leading to a nuisance alarm or inconvenience.

• 50 to 0 – Indicates the system will not operate as intended, or may operate inadvertently leading to a release of the foam/water system.

2.2 Operational Reliability Scores

The average operational reliability score for each of the three fire protection systems and the overall facility score are shown below in Table 2-1. For a more detailed breakdown of the reliability scores, refer to the individual assessment points in Appendix B. For additional information on reliability weighting and how this facility compares to other facilities on the Base, refer to the Base Report.

Table 2-1: Reliability Score by Fire Protection System

Fire Suppression Fire Alarm Life Safety Overall Building

Average: 83 Average: 61 Average: 81 Average: 75

Building 304 - Maintenance Hangar Operational Reliability Analysis

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Building 304 - Maintenance Hangar Evaluation of Assessment Points

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3.0 EVALUATION OF ASSESSMENT POINTS

3.1 Purpose of the Assessment

The scope of this evaluation included an assessment of fire suppression, fire alarm, and life safety systems installed within each facility. Each system was assessed for three main objectives: The ability to reduce inadvertent discharges of the foam/water system; the ability to operate reliably as intended and designed;

and the system’s compliance with current and forthcoming codes.

3.1.1 Determination of ROM Cost Estimations

A cost estimate is included in Appendix B for each deficiency noted except as excluded in Section

3.6. These estimates were determined using RSMeans data which includes the installers 10% overhead and profit on labor, equipment, and materials.

In Section 1.3, Section 3.4, and Section 3.5, the RSMeans costs estimates were further modified to estimate an overall ROM. The overall estimate includes an adjustment for location, 10% for sub-contractors design, 20% for general contractor’s overhead and profit, 10% for A/E services, 20% contingency, and 30% anticipated escalation. These percentages were based on RSMeans, industry standard rates, previous project costs, and engineering judgment.

3.1.2 Evaluation of Reliability and Inadvertent Discharge Mitigation In evaluating the existing system, each assessment point was reviewed to determine if it will operate as intended during a fire event. Additionally, each assessment point was reviewed to verify it will not inadvertently activate or release the foam/water system when not intended. For further information on guidance used in evaluation the fire protection system reliability, refer to the Base Report.

3.1.3 Evaluation of Compliance with Current Codes and Standards The evaluation also assessed the extent of modifications needed to bring the existing fire protection systems in the facility up to current codes and standards. For this portion of the evaluation to be the most effective, the facility was evaluated against the most recent draft versions of UFC 3-600-01, UFC 4-211-01, and the most current published editions, as of August 2014, of applicable NFPA standards.

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3.2 Assessment Points and Evaluation System

The assessments were broken into three main systems: Fire Suppression, Fire Alarm, and Life Safety.

For each of these points, the evaluator was given a comprehensive list of the common and uncommon deficiencies found with the associated system. Each point was checked for these deficiencies, and a deficiency was removed where not found. For additional information regarding the systems and subsystems evaluated, refer to the Base Report.

3.3 Assessment Points Not Evaluated

The following assessment points in Table 3-1 were not evaluated as part of this assessment.

Table 3-1: Assessment Points Not Evaluated

Assessment ID Assessment Point Reason for Exclusion

FS-2 Fire Pump House The facility is not a Fire Pump House

FS-3 Fire Water Storage The facility does not have dedicated fire water storage

FS-8 Fire Pump Located in Fire Pump House FS-9 Fire Pump Controller Located in Fire Pump House

FS-10 Fire Pump Piping Located in Fire Pump House

FS-21 Hangar Bay AFFF Foam/Water Distribution System AFFF not provided in this facility

3.4 Corrective Actions to Reduce Inadvertent Discharges and Increase Reliability

Where the assessment point contains deficiencies that impact the functionality of the system, corrective actions are recommended to increase the reliability of the system to operate as intended and reduce the potential for inadvertent discharges. The following paragraphs include facility-specific corrective actions in five priority levels.

When applying the corrective actions indicated in this report, the priority of execution should follow the outline as shown below from highest to lowest priority. Refer to Section 3.7 of the Base Report for details and examples.

• Actions to remedy hard broke items that affect system performance.

• Actions that allow the fire suppression system to be switched from manual to automatic mode.

• Actions that would reduce inadvertent releases of the existing foam/water suppression system.

• Actions that would reduce the impact of inadvertent releases of the existing foam/water suppression system.

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• Actions that increase the operational reliability of the existing system as currently installed.

• Actions to increase the effectiveness of the fire protection systems to protect the aircraft.

• Actions to bring the fire protection systems up to current codes and standards.

It should be noted proper maintenance of the fire suppression, fire alarm, and life safety systems also contribute to increasing the operational reliability. Routine inspections and testing of the systems will create familiarity with the systems as well as allow for detection of system deficiencies as they arise.

Table 3-2: Corrective Actions to Fix Hard Broke Items

Assessment ID Corrective Action RSMeans

Estimate

- No hard broke corrective actions are required for this facility $ 0

Table 3-3: Corrective Actions to Convert System from Manual to Automatic Mode

Assessment ID Corrective Action RSMeans

Estimate

- No corrective actions are required to convert the system from manual to automatic mode $ 0

Table 3-4: Corrective Actions to Reduce Inadvertent Discharges

Assessment ID Corrective Action RSMeans

Estimate

FS-15

FS-16

Provide lock on hangar inspectors test connection

FS-16 Relocate hangar sprinkler system drain and test lines to areas not subject to freezing

FS-17 Provide tamper seals and signage on foam/water riser trim valve

FA-1 Cross-zone the foam system releasing mechanisms such that no single initiating device or zone can initiate foam release

FA-1 Revise the conduit such that it does not enter the top of the foam/water releasing panel

FA-2 Provide NEMA 4 foam system pull stations and backboxes with conduit looped into bottom of backbox with drain

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Table 3-5: Corrective Actions to Reduce the Impact of Inadvertent Discharges

Assessment ID Corrective Action RSMeans

Estimate

Provide a complete foam stop system that can halt the release of foam. At a minimum, the following components are required:

FA-3 Provide NEMA 4 dead-man stop stations and backboxes, conduit loop into bottom of backbox with drain, and dedicated distinct signage

FS-17

Provide flow control valve for foam/water riser with brass trim package for electric releasing, remote resetting, and adjustable opening/closing speed control Upon final design, The following components may also be required:

FS-17 Provide new fire pumps to account for pressure loss caused by adding flow control valves

FS-13

FS-15

FS-17

Provide new PRV on all risers due to the addition of new pumps

Table 3-6: Corrective Actions to Increase System Reliability and Aircraft Protection

Assessment ID Corrective Action RSMeans

Estimate

FS-15

FS-17

Provide a 10 gallon hydraulic surge arrestors on hangar bay wet-pipe sprinkler riser or foam/water

FS-18 Re-pipe bladder tanks to the dry side of the foam system deluge valve to remove pressure from the bladders

FS-19 Remove or supervise the unsupervised valve on hydraulic ball valve line

FS-19 Replace the existing foam concentrate piping with approved piping connections

FA-1

FA-4

Provide Det-Tronics Eagle Quantum Premier releasing panel and optical flame detection such that no single initiating device or zone can initiate foam release

Table 3-7: Summary of Corrective Action ROM Cost Estimates for Building 304

Sub-Total RSMeans Location Modifier

Adjusted Sub-Total Increase for Sub-Contractor Design Documents

Increase for General Contractor Overhead and Profit Increase for Architecture/Engineering Services and Commissioning

Increase for Additional Contingency Increase for Anticipated Escalation

Total ROM Estimate

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3.5 Corrective Actions to Obtain Code Compliance

The ROM cost estimates for code compliance are summarized in Table 3-8. These costs estimates include the corrective actions indicated in section 3.4, and the additional requirements to obtain conformance with current and forthcoming codes. For a list of all deficiencies and recommended corrective actions, refer to assessment points in Appendix B.

Table 3-8: Summary of ROM Cost Estimate for Code Compliance for Building 304

Reliability Score

Summary of Corrective Actions RSMeans Estimate

83 Fire Suppression Systems 61 Fire Alarm Systems 81 Life Safety Systems

Sub-Total RSMeans Location Modifier

Adjusted Sub-Total Increase for Sub-Contractor Design Documents

Increase for General Contractor Overhead and Profit Increase for Architecture/Engineering Services and Commissioning

Increase for Additional Contingency Increase for Anticipated Escalation

Total ROM Estimate

3.6 Corrective Actions Not Included in the Cost Estimate

For many of the assessment points, the corrective actions are straight forward (e.g. Pull station has an incorrect NEMA rating; replace manual foam/water releasing stations with NEMA 4 rated device.)

However, in some cases there is more than one solution (e.g. Releasing panel is operating outside it’s recommend temperature; provide an A/C split system, duct A/C into the room to provide cooling, or relocate the panel to a conditioned room.) In these cases, only one of the possible corrective actions is included in the cost estimates.

Then there are corrective actions which are not provided within the cost estimates because of the large degree unknown, or additional design required to establish an acceptable solution. This level of exploratory service and design is outside the scope of this evaluation.

Items which are technically not correct per the current or forthcoming codes, but have little impact on the overall system operation were not included.

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• Replacement of stranded wire with solid wire for all fire alarm circuits. This corrective action for code compliance does not provide a benefit, where crimped connections have been installed.

• Replacement of 18 AWG or smaller wiring with 16 AWG wiring. This corrective action for code compliance does not provide a benefit, where voltage drop calculations can support a small gauge conductor.

3.7 Humidity and Temperature Requirements

Fire alarm systems are required to comply with the humidity and temperature limitations of NFPA 72, UL 864, or FM 3010 requirements as shown in Table 3-9. Where fire alarm panels or devices have been installed in locations that exceed these limitations, the effect of a malfunctioning device is typically only a nuisance alarm.

However, for releasing systems this is not the case. Where these devices have malfunctioned, the result has varied from a nuisance alarm to the inadvertent release of a foam/water system. Since the potential for damage is greater from a malfunctioning releasing system, as part of this evaluation the releasing systems have been assessed for compliance with NFPA 72, UL 864, FM 3010, the current draft version of

UFC 4-211-01, and the recommendations of AFCEC.

Table 3-9: Temperature and Humidity Limitations

Reference Applicable System Temperature Limitation Humidity Limitation

NFPA 72 Both 32 to 120°F 85% RH at 86°F (159 gr/lb) UL 864 Both 32 to 120°F 93% RH at 90°F (200 gr/lb)

FM 3010 Both 32 to 120°F 90% RH at 100°F (260 gr/lb) UFC 4-211-01 Releasing Only 60 to 80°F 85% RH at 86°F (159 gr/lb)

AFCEC Releasing Only Design – 60 to 80°F

Equipment - 32 to 120°F Design – Less than 85% RH

Equipment – Less than 93% RH

3.7.1 Humidity and Temperature Results and Recommendations

For this location the fire alarm panel is required to be located in a heated area, and the releasing panel and addressable releasing devices are required to be located in a heated and conditioned area to comply with

Table 3-9. Refer to the Base Report for additional information regarding Air Force Engineering Weather

Data and the humidity and temperature analysis. For specific equipment evaluations and recommendations, refer to section 3.4 and the assessment points in Appendix B.

3.8 Seismic Protection Requirements

The current draft of the UFC 4-211-01 requires foam/water systems to be seismically braced per NFPA

13 regardless of geographical location. UFC 3-600-01 requires seismic bracing of non-foam systems in

Tulsa International Airport 3-7 Burns & McDonnell accordance with NFPA 13 when required by ASCE 7-10. Only locations with a Seismic Design Category of C or higher require seismic bracing of the non-foam systems.

3.8.1 Seismic Protection Results and Recommendations

For this location the most restrictive Seismic Design Category is B and therefore seismic bracing installed in accordance with NFPA 13 is not required on non-foam fire suppression systems. Refer to the Base

Report for additional information regarding the seismic protection analysis. Refer assessment points in

Appendix B for specific equipment evaluations and recommendations.

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Building 304 - Maintenance Hangar Fire Protection System Testing and Maintenance

Tulsa International Airport 4-1 Burns & McDonnell

4.0 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM TESTING AND MAINTENANCE

4.1 Testing and Maintenance Overview

The testing and maintenance systems and subsystems reviewed at this facility are provided in Table 4-1.

For a more detailed list, refer to Assessment Points FS-22, FA-10, and LS-8 in Appendix B.

Table 4-1: Systems and Components Reviewed

Systems Subsystems Fire Suppression Hydrants, Wet-pipe Sprinklers, and Foam/Water Systems

Fire Alarm Fire Alarm Control Panel, Foam/Water Releasing Panel, and Associated Devices

Life Safety Exit Signage, Emergency Lighting, Passive Fire Protection Integrity, and Portable Fire Extinguishers

As part of the testing and maintenance evaluation, the following were assessed for fire suppression, fire alarm, and life safety systems.

• Reviewed testing procedures and maintenance records at each facility.

• Interviewed Base personnel responsible for performing or supervising testing and maintenance for each system. Refer to the Base Report for a list of personnel interviewed during the evaluation.

• Assessed the qualifications of the personnel testing and maintaining the systems at each facility.

• Reviewed the preventative maintenance programs in place to verify conformance with the requirements of UFC 3-601-02.

4.2 Reliability of Testing and Maintenance and Records Obtained The reliability scores for testing and maintenance at this facility are provided in Table 4-2. Further explanation on how these rankings are calculated can be found in the Base Report. In general, the scores in Table 4-2 should be interpreted as follows:

• 100 to 99 – In general, the system and subsystems are provided with regular testing and maintenance in conformance with UFC 3-601-02.

• 98 to 51 – The systems and subsystems are provided with infrequent testing and maintenance, or the procedures do not align with the requirements of UFC 3-601-02.

• 50 to 0 – The system is currently not tested or maintained.

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Where testing and maintenance records were available, the systems were assessed against the requirements of UFC 3-601-02. Maintenance records for the fire suppression, fire alarm, and life safety systems are compiled and Maintenance records for the fire suppression, fire alarm, and life safety systems are compiled and stored in AEIS.

Table 4-2: Reliability of Testing and Maintenance and Records Obtained

System Reliability Scored Testing and Maintenance Records

Obtained and Reviewed Fire Suppression 93 No Records Available (system is one year old)

Fire Alarm 93 No Records Available (system is one year old) Life Safety 93 Partial Set of Records Obtained

4.3 Testing Personnel and Qualifications

A summary of the testing personnel for each system and their qualifications are provided in Table 4-3.

Table 4-3: Testing Personnel and Qualifications

System Testing Personnel Personnel Qualifications

Fire Suppression Fire Suppression Contractor Simplex/Grinnell

Testing personnel have acquired a minimum NICET Level III in Inspection and Testing of

Water-Based Systems

Fire Alarm Fire Suppression Contractor Simplex/Grinnell

Testing personnel have acquired a minimum NICET Level III in Inpection and testing of

Fire Alarm Systems

Life Safety Base Fire Department The qualifications of the testing personnel could not be verified

4.4 Testing and Maintenance Results and Recommendations

The fire suppression, fire alarm, and life safety systems were inspected for signs of routine maintenance.

When available, maintenance records were reviewed for conformance with UFC 3-601-02 regarding testing procedures and frequency. Base personnel were interviewed regarding general knowledge of the system’s operation, testing procedures and qualifications of testing personnel, and preventative maintenance programs.

In general, there is room for improvement regarding the testing and maintenance at the Base. The fire systems are one year old and therefore have not been through a full maintenance cycle. The existing testing procedures and frequency should be expanded to align better with the requirements of UFC 3-601-

02. Base personnel would benefit from additional training regarding the specifics of the system operation, testing procedures, and periodic maintenance requirements.

Tulsa International Airport 4-3 Burns & McDonnell

Since most foam/water releasing systems have a degree of complexity and often the personnel who maintain these systems are not familiar with the specifics of the system, it would be advantageous to post instructions next to each foam/water riser explaining: How the system operates; how to disable the releasing function when testing; how to manually release the system in emergency situations; and how to shut the system down after an event.

It should be noted proper maintenance of the fire suppression, fire alarm, and life safety systems also contribute to increasing the operational reliability. Routine inspections and testing of the systems will create familiarity with the systems as well as allow for the detection of system deficiencies as they arise.

Tulsa International Airport 4-4 Burns & McDonnell

Building 304 - Maintenance Hangar BUILDER Direct Condition Ratings

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5.0 BUILDER DIRECT CONDITIONAL RATINGS

5.1 Direct Conditional Rating Overview

As part of the report of findings, each assessment point is given a direct conditional rating and added to the Builder database. This rating is an assessment of the system and subcomponents current condition in regards to wear and tear or the ability for the system to perform as required. A general overview of each direct conditional rating is shown below in Table 5-1. The direct conditional rating for each assessment point is indicated in Appendix B. For more information regarding direct conditional ratings refer to the

Base Report.

Table 5-1: Direct Conditional Ratings Scale

When comparing Direct Conditional Ratings with Reliability Scores some components may be scored with a low direct conditional rating while scoring a high reliability score or vice versa. This is due to the different criteria used to assign the scores. As an example, a foam/water releasing panel may receive a direct conditional rating of green, but score a low reliability score because of the probability and magnitude of the system operating inadvertently. Additionally, a foam/water riser may score a relatively high reliability score but a red direct conditional rating because of the full system modification required to upgrade the system to comply with current codes and standards.

Rating Deterioration Maintenance and Repair Requirements

Green Fully Operational - Minimal wear or system defects Routine maintenance or minor repair

Amber Reduced Operation - Moderate wear or system defects which may impair the system from operating effectively.

Significant repair, modification, or replacement of one or more subcomponents of the system

Red

Loss of Operation - Significant wear, system component failure, or missing component which impairs the system from operating effectively.

Major repair, full system modification, or system replacement

APPENDIX A – APPLICABLE CODES AND STANDARDS

UFC 3-230-02 Operation and Maintenance: Water Supply Systems, 10-Jul-2001

UFC 3-400-02 Design: Engineering Weather Data, 28-Feb- 2003

UFC 3-600-01 Fire Protection Engineering for Facilities, 90% Draft 06-Oct-2014

UFC 3-601-02 Operations and Maintenance: Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Fire Protection systems, 8-Sep-2010

UFC 4-021-01 Design and O&M: Mass Notification Systems, Change 1, Jan-2010

UFC 4-211-01 Unified Facilities Criteria 95% Draft copy 09-Oct-2014

UFC 3-520-01 Interior Electrical Systems, Change 2, 01-Jul-2012

UFC 3-550-01 Exterior Power Distribution Systems, Change 1, 01-Jul-2012

UFC 3-501-01 Electrical Engineering Preliminary Considerations, Change 2, 01-Jul-2012

UFC 3-560-01 Electrical Safety, O & M, 6 December 2006, Change 4, 01-May-2012

ETL 01-1-1 Air National Guard Design Policy, Mar-2004

ETL 02-15 Fire Protection Engineering Criteria – New Aircraft Facilities, 03-Dec-2002

ETL 98-8 Fire Protection Engineering Criteria – Existing Aircraft Facilities, 25-Jun-1998

AFCEC Department of the Air Force Memorandum for ALMAJCOM/A7, FOAs, DRUs, Subject: Protecting Aircraft Hangars – Reducing Inappropriate Fire System Activations, 2010

AFCEC Department of the Air Force Memorandum for ALMAJCOM/A70s, Subject: Preventing Inappropriate Aircraft Hangar Fire Protection System Activations, 2011

AFCEC Department of the Air Force Memorandum, Inadvertent Foam Lessons Learned Attachments 1-5, 2012

AFCEC Process for Location Fire System Control Panels in Accordance and Humidity Limits

AFCEC Hangar Foam Fire Suppression System Manual Start Stop Control Locations

NFPA 11 Standard for Low-, Medium-, and High-Expansion Foam – 2010

NFPA 13 Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, 2013

NFPA 16 Standard for the Installation of Foam-Water Sprinkler and Foam-Water Spray Systems – 2015

NFPA 20 Standard for the Installation of Stationary Fire Pumps, 2013

NFPA 24 Standard for the Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and Their Appurtenances – 2013

NFPA 70 National Electrical Code – 2014

NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code – 2013

NFPA 101 Life Safety Code – 2015

NFPA 409 Standard on Aircraft Hangars – 2011

ASCE 7-10 Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures, 2010

NEMA 250 Enclosures for Electrical Equipment, 2014

BUILDER Data Collection Guide for Air Force Aircraft Hangar Evaluation and Assessment (Appendix B), UL 864 Standard for Control Units and Accessories for Fire Alarm Systems, 01-Dec-

AWWA American Water Works Association Standards for Water Distribution and Storage Systems for Potable and Non-potable Applications.

RSMeans Site Work & Landscape Cost Data – 2013

RSMeans Plumbing Cost Data – 2013

RSMeans Electrical Cost Data – 2013

RSMeans Mechanical Cost Data – 2013

RSMeans Square Foot Costs – 2013

APPENDIX B – ASSESSMENT POINTS

Air National Guard Fire Protection

Systems Assessment Report

Burns & McDonnell

Fire Protection Engineering Group

Aviation & Federal Global Practice

8201 Norman Center Drive

Suite 300

Bloomington, MN 55437

Tulsa International Airport

Maintenance Hangar

Assessment Performed by:

Al Moore

13 August 2015

Operational Reliability Scores by System

Code Compliance Cost Estimates by System

Building

Fire Alarm

Fire Suppression

Life Safety

Fire Alarm Fire Suppression Life Safety

Hangar - Overhead Hangar - Airside

Hangar - Landside Hangar - Landside

Burns & McDonnell - Fire Protection Engineering Group

Air National Guard Facility Assessment Report

Tulsa International Airport

Notes

Building 304

Maintenance Hangar

FS-1

Area: Exterior

D40 - FIRE PROTECTION

D4020 - FIRE SUPP WATER SUPPLY/ EQUIP

D402001 - FIRE PROTECTION WATER PIPING AND EQUIPMENT

Fire Hydrants

Reliability Score

BUILDER Rating

Red

Equipment Details

Three fire hydrants located at each corner of the hangar fed from the domestic water service.

Hydrants have two 2-1/2 inch hose connections and one 4 inch pumper connection.

Observations

A hydrant flow test was performed [undetermined] for hydrant [Undetermined]. The resulting static pressure was 115 psi with a residual pressure of 110 psi at 1,590 gpm. NFPA 291

Fire hydrants are fed from the domestic water service and are generally in good condition and meets the requirements except as follows:

- Hydrants are not accessible to fire department apparatus (a landside hydrant is on the other side of a fence). UFC 3-600-01 para 3-7.3.2

- The tops of the airfield side hydrants are located more than 30 inches above the surface of the airfield pavement. UFC 3-600-01 para 3-7.3.2

Total:

Lower Wet-Barrel Fire Hydrant

Provide Access Gate in Fence

Items

Items

Per Item

Per Item

Item QTY Rate

1265330424N Highlight

1265330424N Highlight

FS-5

Area: Exterior

D40 - FIRE PROTECTION

D4020 - FIRE SUPP WATER SUPPLY/ EQUIP

D402001 - FIRE PROTECTION WATER PIPING AND EQUIPMENT

Underground Fire Water Main

Reliability Score

BUILDER Rating

Red

Equipment Details

8 inch underground fire main with PIV. Enters the building below grade through the slab.

Observations

The underground piping and control valve are generally in good condition and meets the requirements except as noted below:

- PIV supervision is not provided with a lock or tamper seal. UFC 3-600-01 para 3-7.2.2

- The PIV is not located more than 40 ft from building or is not at least as far from the building as the height of the wall facing the post indicator valve (collapse zone) per NFPA 24 para 6.2.11. UFC 3-600-

01 para 3-7.1.5

- Fire water piping does not enter the building through a pit. UFC 4-211-01 para 3-5.4.3

Total:

Entrance Pit with Grating

Thrust Restraints in Pit

8" PIV

Remove Elec Supervision, add Lock

8" Underground Ductile Pipe w/excavation

Demolition at Floor Slab and Foundation

Items

Items

Items

Items

LF

Items

Per Item

Per Item

Per Item

Per Item

Per LF

Per Item

Item QTY Rate

FS-6

Area: Fire Protection Equipment Room

D40 - FIRE PROTECTION

D4090 - OTHER FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

D409090 - OTHER SPECIAL FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

Fire Protection Room

Reliability Score

BUILDER Rating

Red

Equipment Details

Fire protection room housing two wet-pipe risers, one foam/water riser, foam concentrate tank and proportioner.

Observations

The fire protection room is generally in good condition and meets the requirements except as noted below:

- The fire protection room is not separated from the remainder of the building by a 1 hour fire rated enclosure. (The walls are masonry, but the roof is sheetrock and does not appear to be rated). UFC 4-

211-01 para 3-5.5.1

- Valving located more than 8 ft above the floor is not provided with chain operators. UFC 4-211-

01 para 3-5.5.1

- All the piping in the fire protection room is not adequately labeled (e.g. Fire protection water, FDC, Bypass, Test Header, fire sprinkler, foam system). UFC 4-211-01 para 3-5.5.2

- A floor drain is provided which could capture spilled concentrate, and discharge is directly to sanitary. UFC 4-211-01 para 3-5.5.6

Total:

Painting and Labeling, Labor & Mat.

Rated Deck & Fire Proofed Structure

OS&Y with Chain Operator, Revise Piping

SF

SF

Items

Per SF

Per SF

FS-13.1

Area: Fire Protection Equipment Room

D40 - FIRE PROTECTION

D4040 - SPRINKLERS

D404001 - SPRINKLER AND RELEASING DEVICES

Support Area Wet-Pipe Sprinkler Riser

Reliability Score

BUILDER Rating

Red

Equipment Details

2-1/2 inch wet-pipe sprinkler riser for administrative & shops. Riser is designed for [undetermined] for a total demand of [undetermined] serving a total 1044 sf. Flow switch manufacturer: Potter, model: VSR.

Observations

The wet-pipe sprinkler riser is generally in good condition and meets the requirements except as noted below:

- Missing hydraulic nameplate information. NFPA 13 para 23.1.3(31)

- Spare sprinklers are missing for system. NFPA 13 para 6.2.9

- Side outlet tees using rubber gasket fittings are provided. UFC 3-600-01 para 4-2.4.7

- A pressure relief valve is not provided downstream of the check valve. NFPA 13 para 7.1.2.1

- 10 gal surge arrestor is not provided. UFC 4-211-01 para 3-5.4.4

- Add pressure regulating valve in riser due to fire pump addition to support foam inductor. See

Assessment Point FS-17.1

Total:

Replace Side Outlet Mechanical Tee

Pressure Relief Valve with Drain Pipe

10 Gallon Surge Tank, Valve, Tamp

Signage, Labor and Mat'ls

12 Spare Sprinklers and Cabinet

EMT Conduit with Circuit

Riser PRV due to Fire Pump Addition

Hydraulic Design Criteria Determination

Items

Items

Items

Hrs

Items

LF

Items

Items

$ Per Item

Per Item

Per Item

Per Hr

Per Item

Per LF

Per Item

FS-15.1

Area: Fire Protection Equipment Room

D40 - FIRE PROTECTION

D4040 - SPRINKLERS

D404001 - SPRINKLER AND RELEASING DEVICES

Hangar Bay Wet-Pipe Sprinkler Riser

Reliability Score

BUILDER Rating

Red

Equipment Details

6 inch wet-pipe sprinkler riser for the hangar bay. Riser is designed for [undetermined] for a total demand of [undetermined] serving a total 9,460 sf. Flow switch manufacturer: Potter, model: VSR.

Mechanical clapper check valve manufacturer; Tyco, model: AV-1.

Observations

The wet-pipe sprinkler riser is generally in good condition and meets the requirements except as noted below:

- Undetermined if the sprinkler density and design area does not meet or exceed 0.2 gpm/sf over

5,000 sf. UFC 4-211-01 para 4-5.4

- Missing hydraulic nameplate information. NFPA 13 para 23.1.3(31)

- Piping riser is not adequately supported within 24 inches of the riser. NFPA 13 para 9.2

- A pressure relief valve is provided downstream of the check valve, but not piped to a drain. NFPA

13 para 7.1.2.1

- 10 gal surge arrestor is not provided. UFC 4-211-01 para 3-5.4.4

- The activation of the wet-pipe riser flow switch will release the foam system, and signage is not provided at the inspector test connection and remote drainage points indicating "Discharging water from this connection may release the foam system". AF Lessons Learned

- Add pressure regulating valve in riser due to fire puimp addition to support foam inductor. See

Assessment Point FS-17.1

Total:

Hydraulic Design Criteria Determination

6" Pre-action Riser, Surge Tank, Tamp

10 Gallon Surge Tank, Valve, Tamp

Pipe Stand or Hanger

Signage, Labor and Mat'ls

Pipe Relief Valve to Drain

EMT Conduit with Circuit

Riser PRV due to pump addition

Items

Items

Items

Items

Hrs

Items

LF

Items

Per Item

Per Item

Per Item

Per Item

Per HR

Per Item

Per LF

- Add preaction riser to support pre-action sprinkler system added in Assessment Point FS-16.

FS-16

Area: Hangar Bay

D40 - FIRE PROTECTION

D4040 - SPRINKLERS

D401001 - FIRE ALARM DISTRIBUTION

Hangar Bay Wet-Pipe Sprinkler System

Reliability Score

BUILDER Rating

Red

Equipment Details

Wet-pipe sprinkler system for hangar bay. Utilizing quick-response 175 degree F, K=5.6 upright sprinklers. Sprinkler Manufacturer: Tyco Model: TY313

Observations

The hangar bay wet-pipe sprinkler distribution system is generally in good condition and meets the requirements except as noted below:

- Automatic air vents are not provided at the high point(s) of the wet-pipe sprinkler system. UFC 4-

211-01 para 3-5.8

- 99.6% dry bulb temperature is less than 32 degrees F per UFC 3-400-02 Engineering Weather Data, and an inspectors test connection is located in the hangar bay. UFC 4-211-01 para 3-5.8

- A valve which when opened may discharge the foam/water system (inspector test connection, system drain valve) is not locked closed. UFC 4-211-01 para 3-5.11.14

- Sprinkler pattern development for the sprinklers appears to be obstructed. The insulation on the sprinkler branchline piping is greater than 3 inches in diameter and therefore the sprinklers are partially obstructed by the insulation. A pre-action system is not required in this area per UFC 4-211-

0-1 para 3-5.8, however, it is an option to remove the obstructions to the sprinklers caused by the insulation. NFPA 13 para 8.6.5.2.1.8.

- Heat tracing does not appear to be U.L. listed for use on fire protection systems. NFPA 13, A.7.6

- Piping is not adequately labeled (e.g. Hangar bay sprinkler system). UFC 4-211-01 para 3-5.5.2

Total:

Pre-action Sprinkler System

Pipe Labels, Labor and Materials

Lock for Valve

Automatic air vent

Inspectors Test at Wet Riser

Remove Wet Sprinkler System

Remove Insulation and Heat Trace

SF

Hrs

Items

Items

Items

SF

SF

Per SF

Per Hr

Per Item

Per Item

Per Item

Per SF

Per SF

- Undetermined if waterflow switch delay or retard chamber is equivalent to 60 seconds or greater.

UFC 4-211-01 para 3.5.11.12

FS-17.1

Area: Fire Protection Equipment Room

D40 - FIRE PROTECTION

D4090 - OTHER FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

D409002 - FOAM GENERATING EQUIPMENT

Hangar Bay Foam/Water Riser

Reliability Score

BUILDER Rating

Red

Equipment Details

4 inch foam/water riser for approximately 9,460 sq ft of the hangar bay.