05_FA880723R0005_Attachment 05 - MUOS SLE MA STG.pdf

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

UNITED STATES SPACE FORCE

SPACE SYSTEMS COMMAND

DOMINARI ET VINCERE

10 April 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR SSC/CPN PK

FROM: SSC/CGN

MilComm & PNT 4301 Pacific HWY San Diego, CA 92110-3127

SUBJECT: MUOS SLE Mission Assurance Standards Tailoring Guide

Reference: (a) AEROSPACE REPORT NO. TOR-2017-01412 dtd 24 March 2017

(b) AEROSPACE REPORT NO. TOR-2010(8591)-6 dtd 18 January 2010

(c) AEROSPACE REPORT NO. TOR-2014-02537 dtd 28 July 2014

1. To adequately define the Mission Assurance (MA) standards for efficient and effective MUOS Service Life Extension (SLE) contracts, the MUOS Program is providing a list of specific standards along with relevant sections and/or areas with modified tailoring. This is provided in the table below to establish an initial set of standards, references, and tailoring for SLE acquisition.

2. In addition to the tailoring instructions for compliance standards, references (a) through (c) will be provided by the MUOS program as supplemental references.

3. If you have any questions or concerns, please contact my POC, Lt Commander Luke Ozeck at

(619) 221-7750 or via e-mail at Luke.Ozeck@spaceforce.mil

BRIAN.H. HARRINGTON, CDR, USN

Deputy Chief Engineer, Narrowband SATCOM Acquisition Delta MilComm & PNT Directorate mailto:Luke.Ozeck@spaceforce.mil

Tailoring Details for Applicable Documents & References:

Functional Area Document Identifier

Document Title Date Applicability Tailoring Instructions

Engineering Specialties;

Environmental

NAS 411 Hazardous Materials Management Program 2013 Compliance

SOW

Tailoring through CDDRL DIDs

DI-MGMT-9831398B & DI-MISC-

81397B

Engineering Specialties; Mass Properties

AIAA-S-120A-2015

(2019)

Mass Properties Control for Space Systems

2016 Compliance

TRD & SOW

The derivation and verification of detailed SV mass specifications shall be as per AIAA S-120A-2015 Mass Properties Control for Space Systems (Reference 2-6) as tailored by SMC-T-002 (2018) Tailoring for ANSI/AIAA S- 120A-2015 and consistent with the selected Launch vehicle and mission requirements

Engineering Specialties; Mass Properties

SMC-T-002

Tailoring of ANSI/AIAA- S-120A-2015, Mass Properties Control for Space Systems

2018 Compliance

TRD & SOW

The derivation and verification of detailed SV mass specifications shall be as per AIAA S-120A-2015 Mass Properties Control for Space Systems (Reference 2-6) as tailored by SMC-T-002 (2018) Tailoring for ANSI/AIAA S- 120A-2015 and consistent with the selected Launch vehicle and mission requirements

Engineering Specialties;

Reliability, Maintainability & Survivability

SMC-S-013 Reliability Program for Space Systems 2008 Compliance

TRD & SOW

See (1) SMC-S-013 Tailoring Instructions

Engineering Specialties;

Reliability, Maintainability & Survivability

SMC-S-014 Survivability Program for Space Systems 2010 Compliance

TRD & SOW

Contractor shall tailor SMC-S- 014 to remove weapons requirements, testing.

See (2) SMC-S-014 Tailoring Instructions

Identifier

Document Title Date Applicability Tailoring Instructions

Test SMC-S-016 Test Requirements for Launch, Upper-Stage & Space vehicles

2014 Compliance

TRD

Tailor through SMC-T-011 &

SSC-T-014

Engineering Specialties;

System Safety

MIL-STD-882E System Safety Program Requirements 2019 Compliance

SOW

Delete 4.3.8, Delete Sect 100 (except 101 & 102), Sect 201- 210, Section 401-403, Sect 302-

Information Technology;

Software

SMC-S-012 Software Development 2015 Compliance

TRD

Exclude sections for system requirements analysis, system architecture & design, implementation, security, interface w/IV&V agents, and associate developer coordination. Exclude non-deliverable software

Program Execution;

Program Management

SAE EIA 649-1A

Configuration Management Requirements for Defense Contracts

2020 Compliance

SOW

Delete sections referring to ASR, CDR, TRR, FCA, SVR, PRR, PCA

Program Execution;

Systems Engineering

SMC-T-006

Specialty Engineering Supplement to IEEE 15288.1

2017 Compliance

SOW

Contractor shall comply with SMC-T-006 through the SEMP

CDRL

Program Execution;

Systems Engineering

SMC-T-005

SMC Risk Management Supplement to IEEE 15288.1

2017 Compliance

SOW

Contractor shall comply with SMC-T-006 through the SEMP

CDRL

Vehicle/Ground Design; Electrical Power

SMC-T-012 Tailoring for AIAA S- 122-2007 EPS 2020 Compliance

TRD

See (3) SMC-T-012 (AIAA S-122) Tailoring Instructions

Vehicle/Ground Design; Electrical Power

AIAA-S-122-2007

Electrical Power Systems for Unmanned Spacecraft

2014 Compliance

TRD

See (3) SMC-T-012 (AIAA S-122) Tailoring Instructions

Vehicle/Ground Design; Electrical Power

AIAA S-111A-2014

Qualification & Quality Requirements for Space Solar Cells

2014 Compliance

TRD

See (4) AIAA S-111A-2014 Tailoring Instructions

Identifier

Document Title Date Applicability Tailoring Instructions

Vehicle/Ground Design; Electrical Power

AIAA S-112A-2013

Qualification & Quality Requirements for Electrical Components on Space Solar Panels

2013 Compliance

TRD

See (5) AIAA S-112A-2013 Tailoring Instructions

Vehicle/Ground Design; Electrical Power

MIL-STD-461F

Requirements for the Control of Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics of Subsystems and Equipment

2007 Compliance

TRD

See (6) SMC-S-008 Tailoring Instructions Also, may tailor based on specific bus/payload implementation

Vehicle/Ground Design; Electrical Power

SMC-S-008

Electromagnetic Compatibility Requirements for Space Equipment & Systems

2008 Compliance

TRD

See (6) SMC-S-008 Tailoring Instructions

Also, may tailor based on specific bus/payload implementation

Vehicle/Ground Design;

Pressurized Hardware

SMC-S-005 Space Systems – Flight Pressurized Systems 2015 Compliance

TRD

See (7) SMC-S-005 Tailoring Instructions

(1) SMC-S-013 Tailoring Instructions:

Paragraph/ section

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

Sec 2.2 Y R Sec 4.1 Y C

Sec 4.1.1 Y C T Quantitative vehicle contractual reliability requirements in TRD.

Delete software and piece part numerical allocations

Sec 4.1.2 Y C Delete software Sec 4.2 Y C Sec 4.3 Y C Sec 5.1.1 – Sec 5.1.8 Y C

Sec 5.2 Y C S Reliability Engineering & Evaluation

Sec 5.2.1 Y C Delete software reliability predictions

Sec 5.2.2 Y C Delete Sneak Circuit Analysis (SCA) – Not typically done by contractors. WCA and part stress analysis covers all likely issues.

Sec 5.2.3 Y C Replace reliability group with contractor

Sec 5.2.4 Y C

Sec 5.2.5 Y C Limit to new manufacturing processes

Sec 5.2.6 Y R Manufacturing Reliability Sec 5.2.7.1 Y C

Sec 5.2.7.2 N Human reliability analysis tasks not typically done by contractors.

FMECA’s are adequate

Sec 5.2.7.3 Y C Most contractors use fish bone diagram for failure investigation and can be used rather than FTA

Sec 5.3.7.4 Y C

Sec 5.3 Y R Delete software from 5.3e

Sec 5.3.1 Y C

Sec 5.3.2 Y R This is primarily done by I&T organization with QA, not the reliability group.

Sec 5.3.3 Y R This is primarily done by I&T organization with QA, not the reliability group.

Sec 5.3.4 Y C Typically do 2X testing

Sec 5.3.5 Y C

(2) SMC-S-014 Tailoring Instructions:

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

P. iii, para 2, sub-bullet 1 Y C T Delete “all man-made threats…in addition to”

P. 1, para 1.2 Y C T Delete “and/or hostile threats… as a minimum” P.3 Y C T Delete “MIL-HDBK-1766” and descriptor

P.3 Y C T Delete “Program Management Handbook… DNA-H-93-52 Jul 1999”

P.3 Y C T Delete “MIL-HDBK-815” and descriptor

P.5, 3.1, Hardening Y C T Delete “or hostile”

P.5, 3.1, Hardness Y C T Delete “or hostile”

P.5, 3.1 Hardness Assurance Lot Acceptance Testing

Y C T Delete “and/or nuclear”

P.6, 3.1, Man-made Space Threats/Enviro nments

Y C T Delete para

P.6, 3.1 Survivability Y C T Delete “and/or hostile”

P.7, 3.1, Susceptibility Y C T Delete para

P.7, 3.1 Threat Y C T Delete “or manmade” P.8, 3.1 Vulnerability Y C T Delete para

P.13, 4.1.5 System Life Cycle Survivability Requirements, sequence 13

Y C T In row 13, replace “verify survival and operate-thru capabilities” with “verify survival capabilities in the natural environment”

P.14, 4.1.5 System Life Cycle Survivability Requirements, sequence 13

Y C T

In row 13, replace “Testing shall also be done at the highest possible level of integration. Example: Box-level flash X-Ray test, box, level current injection test (CIT).” with “Verification shall also be done at higher levels of integration, based on lower-level test results.

P.14, 4.1.5 System Life Cycle Survivability Requirements, sequence 14

Y C T In row 14, replace “validate margins for operate-thru and survival capabilities” with “validate margins for survival capabilities in the natural environment”

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

P.14, 4.1.5 System Life Cycle Survivability Requirements, sequence 14

Y C T

In row 14, replace “(Examples: SEU analysis, systems operate-thru, circumvention, recovery analyses, system’s EMP/SGEMP analysis)” with “(Examples: SEU, TID, displacement damage analyses)”

P.15, 5.1.2 Y C T Replace “weapon effects” with “threats” P.16, 5.2.2.2, (2)

Y C T Delete “Mission-critical… (HEMP)”

P.17, 5.2.4 Y C T Delete “and/or hostile”

P.17, 5.2.7a Y C T Delete lines (ii) and (iv) P.17, 5.2.7a (iii)

Y C T Delete “upset/survive”

P.18, 5.3.1 Contractor Responsibilitie s

Y C T Delete “Additionally, during the design phase, the needs for box-level I flash x-ray testing… (see Para 5.2.7).”

P.19, 5.3.2.4.1 Y C T Delete “(nuclear, non-nuclear, etc.)”

P.19, 5.3.2.4.2 Y C T Delete “transient ionizing radiation,”

(3) SMC-T-012 (AIAA S-122) Tailoring Instructions:

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

5 Purpose of

EPS Y R T

5.1 Functional

Description Y R T

5.1.2 Energy

Storage Y R T

Replace the first paragraph of AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.1.2 with the following:

Energy storage devices store some of the energy generated by the power generation element for use in powering the loads during eclipse periods and during sunlight operation when the output of the power generation element is insufficient to meet the overall load demand.

Replace the last paragraph of AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.1.2 with the following:

Batteries should be sized based on predicted worst-case mission requirements and expected capacity degradation over mission life.

Batteries are designed to support the spacecraft through the launch sequence, including all anticipated contingencies and through all foreseen losses of solar energy during the mission, including those resulting from failures. Where system requirements dictate a battery tolerate a single fault, the battery is designed to operate with one cell either failed shorted or open. Provisions for monitoring the critical battery performance parameters are also included in the design. Battery thermal design should take into account maximum and minimum temperature of operation under all intended operating conditions and maximum allowed temperature gradients between different parts of the same cell, between cells or groups of cells within a battery, between batteries, and as a result of any failure modes. The charging technique is designed to ensure that the depth of discharge and the recharge ratio applied are appropriate for the particular cell technology, temperature of operation, and mission life requirements. For Lithium-Ion batteries, the charging technique is also designed to ensure max and min cell voltages stay within values that support mission life of the battery cells during normal operations.

5.1.3 Power

Management and Distribution

(PMAD)

Y R T

Replace AIAA S-122-2007 fifth sentence of section 5.1.3, “Telemetry generally includes…”, with the following:

Telemetry generally includes bus and battery voltage, power source and load currents, battery charge and discharge currents and cell voltages, power electronics operating temperatures, and status of fault detection and protection electronics.

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

5.1.4 Flight

Software Y R T

Append the following sentences to the end of AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.1.4:

Note: For Lithium-Ion Batteries, generally a taper charge algorithm of either pseudo ideal or step reduction in applied charge current as a function of voltage (and temperature) should be incorporated.

Taper charging is required to ensure maximum energy into the cells for the mission design needs. Individual over and under charge, cell voltage detection should also be incorporated into flight software to preclude overcharging or under-charging any individual cell to preclude cell damage or safety concerns.

5.1.5 Harness Y R T

5.2.1 Orbital

Profile Y C T

5.2.1.1 Worst

Eclipse and Off-Sun Pointing

Y C T

Append to title “and Off-Sun Pointing”.

Append the following to the end of AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.2.1.1:

In addition, the worst-case off-sun pointing shall be considered in the analysis coupled with the worst-case eclipse period for a normal Day in the Life (DITL) or required series of DITL operations or orbits.

5.2.1.2 Maximum Sun-outage Time

Y C T

5.2.1.3.1 Battery Recharge

Y C T

Append the following to the end of AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.2.1.3.1:

NOTE: The worst case off pointing from the sun should be considered by analysis coupled with the worst case eclipse period with reduced operations below normal operations allowed.

5.2.1.3.2 Relocation (with electric propulsion)

N T Only applies to electrical propulsion systems

5.2.1.4.1 Thermal Cycles N T

Only applies to LEO Orbits

Append the following to the end of AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.2.1.4.1:

c) For power electronics, the Combined Damage Index (CDI) life expectancy analysis shall include impacts of electrical current flowing through the unit or system to ensure that the thermal analysis is bounded and accounts for stress.

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

5.2.1.4.2 Energy Balance

N T Only applies to LEO Orbits

5.2.1.5 Lunar

Eclipses Y C T

5.2.1.6 Re-

entry disposal N T

5.2.1.7.1 Radiation Y C T

5.2.1.7.2 Total

Dose Y C T

5.2.1.7.3 Single Event Effects (SEE)

Y C T

5.2.2 Mission

Life Y C T

5.2.3 Mission

Phases Y C T

5.2.4 EPS

Architecture Y C T

5.2.4.1 Voltage

Choice Y C T

5.2.5 Power

Generation Y C T

5.2.5.1 Array

Configuration Y C T

5.2.5.2.1 Sizing

for Load Margin

Y C T

5.2.5.2.2 Contingent Source Power

Y C T

5.2.5.2.3 Failed Cells and Strings

Y C T

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

5.2.5.3 Array

Max Power and Voltage

Y C T

5.2.5.4 Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) Control

Y C T

5.2.5.5 Environments Y C T

Append the following to the end of AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.2.5.5:

NOTE: Load demand may exceed the array power during operations if it is shown that overall EPS power balance with margin is maintained.

5.2.6.1 Battery

Cell Technology

Y C T

5.2.6.2 Battery

Loads Y C T

Replace AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.2.6.2 c) with the following:

c) failed cell(s) per battery or failed battery per 5.2.6.2.2 or 5.2.6.8 b).

5.2.6.2.1 Battery Redundancy

Y C T

5.2.6.2.2 Failed Batteries

Y C T

5.2.6.3 Depth

of Discharge Calculation

Y C T

5.2.6.4 Maximum

DOD

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

5.2.6.5 Energy

Reserve Y C T

Replace AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.2.6.5 b) with the following:

b) The calculation of energy reserve shall be based on the discharge voltage curve of the selected cell technology including applicable mission degradation estimates at the expected operating conditions.

Append the following to the end of AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.2.6.5:

c) a) and b) above shall be met starting at the lowest expected state of charge (e.g., voltage for lithium-ion) just prior to the worst-case off-nominal event requiring energy reserve (e.g., safe hold event or other).

5.2.6.6 Thermal Control

Y C T

Replace AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.2.6.6 with the following:

Battery temperatures throughout the orbital lifetime shall be maintained within a temperature range previously established from vehicle, battery, cell bank (virtual cell), cell development, and life testing. Control and contingency procedures to maintain battery temperature within the required range shall be the basis for battery operations and control, while at the launch site and on orbit.

The battery shall be designed with redundant heater circuits to prevent under temperature of the battery or a battery cell during operation.

5.2.6.7 Battery

Reconditioning N T Delete AIAA S-122-2007 - Reconditioning not required for Lithium-ion battery cells 5.2.6.7.1 Single-Battery Systems

N T Delete AIAA S-122-2007 - Reconditioning not required for Lithium-ion battery cells

5.2.6.7.2 Recharge of partial batteries

N T Delete AIAA S-122-2007 - Reconditioning not required for Lithium-ion battery cells

5.2.6.7.3 Multiple- Battery Systems

N T Delete AIAA S-122-2007 - Reconditioning not required for Lithium-ion battery cells

5.2.6.7.4 Reconditioning Plan

N T Delete AIAA S-122-2007 - Reconditioning not required for Lithium-ion battery cells

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

5.2.6.8 Battery

Cell Fault Management

Y C T

Replace AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.2.6.8 with the following:

a) Battery cell bypass shall be provided on each cell or parallel group of cells in the battery or batteries unless it can be shown that the mission reliability requirement can be met without cell bypass devices.

b) In all cases the power budget and energy balance analysis shall account for the maximum number of failed cells or batteries and shall include the dissipation of the bypass devices or failed cells (i.e.

high resistive shorts for non-bypassed cells).

5.2.6.8.1 Autonomy of Bypass Devices

Y C T

Replace AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.2.6.8.1 with the following:

Manual (i.e. commandable) as well as autonomous bypass techniques (e.g., diode and/or heat activated devices) are acceptable; however, where manual techniques are employed, sufficient cell telemetry shall be provided to ground personnel to allow proper system diagnosis and commanding of bypass devices.

For single battery systems or where the analysis indicates manual activation of a cell bypass device cannot be timely, autonomous bypass shall be incorporated.

5.2.6.8.2 Short

Circuit of Energized Cells

Y C T

5.2.6.9.1 Ground Storage

Y C T

5.2.6.9.2.1 Battery Charging Battery Charging

Y C T

Append the following to the end of AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.2.6.9.2.1:

Battery contingency plans shall be written for pre-launch activities in the event of a launch scrub or abort, pre or post transfer to internal power or demating and extended storage at the launch site.

Prior to launch, voltage variations between all cells or cell banks (virtual cells) shall be within the appropriate technology and mission required limits.

Note: It is recommended that the voltage variations between all cells or cell banks (virtual cells) be within 0.030 V.

5.2.6.9.2.2 Battery Safing Y C T There are no changes to this section – Use AIAA S-122-2007 verbatim.

5.2.6.9.3 Launch, Ascent, Transfer Orbit

Y C T There are no changes to this section – Use AIAA S-122-2007 verbatim.

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

5.2.6.9.3.1 Maximum

DOD

Y C T There are no changes to this section – Use AIAA S-122-2007 verbatim.

5.2.6.9.4 On-

Station and Safe-Hold Modes

Y C T There are no changes to this section – Use AIAA S-122-2007 verbatim.

5.2.6.9.5 On-

Orbit Storage Y C T There are no changes to this section – Use AIAA S-122-2007 verbatim.

5.2.6.9.6 On-

Orbit Disposal Y C T There are no changes to this section – Use AIAA S-122-2007 verbatim.

5.2.6.10 Battery Life Y C T There are no changes to this section – Use AIAA S-122-2007 verbatim.

5.2.7 Power

Management Y R T There are no changes to this section – Use AIAA S-122-2007 verbatim.

5.2.7.1.2.1 Feedback Stability

Y C T There are no changes to this section – Use AIAA S-122-2007 verbatim.

5.2.7.1.2.2 Load Interface Stability

Y C T

Append the following to the end of AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.2.7.1.2.2:

The power interface loop gain at the main bus, and at other distribution points between the EPS and the loads shall be stable over the full range of operating conditions with the following EOL stability margins (refer to section 7.2.3):

Case 1: source load impedance non-interacting case

The interface loop gain margin (Tm=Zs/ZL, refer to section 7.2.3) shall be greater than 6 dB at the frequency of phase crossing of minus 180 degrees.

Case 2: source load impedance interacting case The minimum phase margin shall be greater than 45 degrees at the frequencies of two zero dB crossings

5.2.7.2 Battery

Management Y C T

Append the following to the end of AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.2.7.2.

Battery charging control and contingency procedures shall be developed based upon battery test data. Battery or individual cell voltages and charge currents shall not exceed manufacturer’s recommended limits unless validated by test and impact to mission life.

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

5.2.7.2.1 Battery Charge Management Autonomy

Y C T

Append the following to the end of AIAA S-122-2007 section

5.2.7.2.1 c):

Space vehicle battery voltage, cell or cell bank (virtual cell) voltages, current, and cell temperatures shall be monitored by spacecraft processor at least every 15 seconds during launch and during all sun and eclipse operations unless longer periods for battery management, safety and health can be technically justified.

In the event of an under-temperature condition, charge current shall be limited to mitigate lithium plating of electrode surfaces.

5.2.7.2.2 Ampere Hour Integration

Y C T

Append the following to the end of AIAA S-122-2007 the end of section 5.2.7.2.2:

Further, for lithium-ion (or technologies where voltage is a function of percent state of charge) systems incorporating Ampere Hour Integration, the charge system shall be reset periodically to a known state of charge to remove propagation error from the integrator to preclude inadvertent under or overcharge.

NOTE: Propagation reset is generally most accurate when the battery is neither charging nor discharging (i.e. open circuit).

5.2.7.3 Under-

Voltage Management

Y C T

5.2.8.1 Load

Groups Y R T

5.1.8.2 Essential Loads

Y R T

5.2.8.2.1 Essential Load Operate Through

Y C T

5.2.8.3 Wire

Harnesses and Connectors

Y R T SMC-S-020 can be used for wire harness requirements

5.2.8.4 Wire

Temperatures Y C T

5.2.8.5 Overcurrent Protection

Y C T

5.2.8.5.1 Fuses Y C T

Replace AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.2.8.5.1 c) with the following:

c) to disconnect any overloaded circuit before distribution wiring or trace reaches over-temperature.

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

5.2.8.5.2 Circuit Breakers and Current Limiting Devices (Other Than Fuses)

Y R T

5.2.8.5.3 Electronic Switches

Y C T

5.2.8.5.4 Fault

Coordination Y C T

5.2.8.6 Protection Against Insulation Failure

Y R T

5.2.8.7 Protection against plasma arcs

Y C T

5.2.9.1 Grounding Y C T

5.2.9.2 Bonding Y R T

5.2.10.1 Power Margin Y C T

5.2.10.2 Power Budget Y C T

5.2.10.3 Adjusted Load Estimate

Y C T

5.2.10.3.1 Heater Loads Y C T

5.2.10.4 Contingent Load Power

Y C T

5.2.10.5 Load

Margin Y C T

5.2.10.6 Parasitic Power Loss

Y C T

5.2.11 Telemet

ry and Command

Y R T

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

5.2.11.1 Telemetry Y C T

Replace AIAA S-122-2007 EPS Status/Performance subitem b) with the following:

b) Data to infer the State-of-Charge of the energy storage element:

- battery energy storage: the individual battery virtual cell voltages

- flywheel energy storage: the flywheel angular velocities

- fuel cell energy storage: reactant levels

Replace AIAA S-122-2007 EPS Health Monitoring subitems a) and b) with the following:

a) Every battery cell (or cell bank – virtual cell) shall have cell or bank voltage and temperature telemetry that is monitored and available via ground telemetry.

A reduction in temperature telemetry can be considered based on battery configuration where at a minimum a primary and redundant temperature sensor is available for each of the following functions: heater zone control, charge control and dead bus recovery, as long as the response time to any cell overtemperature is at an acceptable risk level for the program.

b) Battery Cell-voltage accuracy at the on-board computer and for ground telemetry shall be within ±0.010 V.

c) Battery Cell temperature accuracy at the on-board computer and for ground telemetry shall be within ±3°C.

d) Spacecraft cell-level balancing and cell-level voltage circuitry shall be redundant.

5.2.11.2 Command Y C T

5.2.11.3 Solar

Array I/V Curve Measurement

Y R T

5.2.11.4 Battery Trend Data

Y C T

Replace AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.2.11.4 a) with the following:

a) Space vehicle battery voltage, cell or cell bank (virtual cell) voltages, current, cell temperatures, together with depth-of-discharge performance, shall be summarized, trended, and evaluated to provide performance trends and a basis for on-orbit operations. The update rate for this data shall be not less than once every minute for voltage, current, and temperature.

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

5.2.11.5 Telemetry During Ground- and Launch- Support

Y C T

Append the following sentences to the end of AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.2.11.5:

Battery voltage, cell or cell bank (virtual cell) voltage, current, and cell temperatures shall be measured periodically after battery installation on the vehicle, up to the final terminal countdown, to verify state-of-health of the electrical systems prior to launch. The data shall be evaluated to provide state-of-health verification of the electrical systems prior to launch.

5.2.12 Power

Quality Y R T

5.2.12.1 Under-Voltage Y C T

5.2.12.2 Over-

Voltage Y C T

5.2.12.3 Ripple Y C T

5.2.12.4.1 Step

Load Transients

Y R T

5.2.12.4.1.1 Overshoot Surges

Y C T

5.2.12.4.2 Undershoot Surges

Y C T

5.2.12.4.2.1 Fault-Voltage Transients

Y R T

5.2.12.4.2.1 Over-Voltage Surges

Y C T

5.2.12.4.2.1 Under-Voltage Surges

Y C T

5.2.12.4.3.1 Positive-Going Spikes

Y C T

5.2.12.4.3.2 Negative- Going Spikes

Y C T

5.2.12.5 Structure Spikes

Y C T

5.2.13

EMI/EMC Y R T

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

5.2.13.1 Lightning Protection

Y C T

5.2.14.1 Fault

Protection Y C T

5.2.14.2Fault Autonomy Y C T

Append the following sentences to the end of AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.2.14.2:

Battery, cell bank (virtual cell) and cell voltages, charge and discharge currents, and temperatures that violate the established yellow and red limits shall result in an alert to the spacecraft operators. All battery, cell bank (virtual cell) and cell voltages, current and temperature telemetry shall be individually assessed by flight software and autonomous action taken when yellow and/or red limits are exceeded.

Individual telemetry points shall not be eliminated and/or filtered by fault detection software unless it is determined to be an incorrect reading based on engineering logic agreed upon ahead of time, or upon review.

5.2.14.3 Fault

Tolerance Y C T

Append the following sentences to the end of AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.2.14.3:

c. The spacecraft shall autonomously reduce charge current or disable charging in the event of an overvoltage detected at the cell as well as independently at the battery level.

d. The spacecraft shall autonomously respond to a high-charge current by switching to a redundant charge circuit or disabling charge within two minutes of violation.

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

5.2.14.4 Spacecraft Autonomy

Y C T

Append the following sentences to the end of AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.2.14.4:

The spacecraft shall be capable of autonomously responding to a battery-cell short (i.e., cell voltage deviates from average cell voltage by 20 percent state-of-charge) or other high-temperature scenario (i.e., exceeds acceptance temperature by 10°C and no greater than 45°C) with a response criteria as follows:

1. The on-board computer shall initiate a response within two minutes of a voltage, temperature or current violation to limit battery state-of-charge to a level that mitigates potential for cell venting and propagation.

2. The on-board computer shall maintain the battery at a state-of-charge that precludes thermal runway until the cell or battery has been deemed safe.

3. For a battery-redundant design, the battery shall be capable of being removed from the charge discharge path via a relay or switch.

4. For a cell or cell bank (virtual cell)-redundant battery design, the battery shall be capable of removing a cell from the electrical circuit such as by an autonomous or commanded-cell bypass or isolation switch.

Alternative designs can be considered if battery management, safety, and health can be validated.

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

5.2.14.4.1 Dead Bus Recovery

Y C T

Replace AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.2.14.4.1 with the following:

In the event of depleted batteries, potentially from loss of sun on the solar arrays, provision shall be made for recovery of EPS functionality if sun is restored. The Aerospace Corporation report Dead Bus Recovery Requirements for Earth Orbiting Spacecraft defines power subsystem requirements to allow for recovery from a dead bus. The following requirements protect battery cells that are susceptible to permanent degradation or damage due to over discharge (e.g., Lithium-Ion battery cells):

1. If the satellite experiences an abnormally low battery SOC that drops below a predetermined minimum threshold, the satellite shall be capable of autonomously enabling Depleted Battery Prevention (DBP). DBP is a means whereby the satellite can protect a battery from over discharge by completely blocking its discharge path.

Note: The minimum SOC threshold will be determined based upon the specific battery cell technology, power system architecture, and fault management approach. Once determined, the specific minimum SOC threshold will be documented in the applicable system and unit specifications.

2. The state of health of the battery shall be considered when recharging the battery during dead bus recovery including the following:

a. Battery cell temperature is within applicable limits to safely charge the battery

b. Maximum charge rate is not exceeded

c. Battery charge is terminated if overcharge limit is reached

3. The satellite shall be capable of autonomously re-enabling battery discharge when sufficient charge has been returned to the battery to initiate recovery operations.

Note: The system would have already reached thresholds resulting in shedding non-critical unit and heater loads prior to reaching the DBP threshold.

5.2.14.4.2 Failure Propagation

5.2.14.4.3 Power Output Following a Failure

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

5.3.1 Parts, Materials and Processes

(PMP)

Y R T

5.3.1.1 Materials and Parts Selection

Y C T

5.3.1.1.1 Dissimilar Metals

Y C T

5.3.1.1.2 Magnetic Materials

Y C T

5.3.1.2 Limited

Life Items Y C T

5.3.1.3 Forbidden Materials

Y C T

5.3.2 Product

Markings Y R T

5.3.3 Manufac

turing Management

Y C T

5.3.4 Intercha

ngeability Replaceability

Y R T

5.3.5 Testabilit

y Y C T

5.3.6 Maintain

ability Y R T

5.3.6.1 Accessibility Y C T

5.3.7 Safety Y C T

5.3.8.1 Connector Mis-Mating

N T Addressed in SMC S-020

5.3.8.2 Connector Protection

Y R T

5.3.8.3 Non-

flight Test Connectors

Y R T

5.3.8.4 Test

Access Y R T

5.3.8.5 Contamination Control

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

5.4.1.1 Protection Devices

Y R T

5.4.1.2 Telemetry Lines

Y R T

5.4.1.3 Testing

of Redundant Paths

Y R T

5.4.1.4 Loss of

Launch Vehicle Power During Ascent

Y C T Only applies to SVs that receive power from the launch vehicle during launch and ascent

5.4.1.5 Space

Vehicle Battery Protection

Y C T

5.4.2 Launch

Complex Y C T

Replace AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.4.2 h) with the following:

h. The cell temperatures and voltages for a lithium-ion battery shall be monitored as an additional safety check.

5.4.3.1 Protection Devices

Y C T

Append the following sentences to the end of AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.4.3.1:

Check-out of all maintenance equipment, software, and safety inhibits, shall be performed before connecting flight hardware.

5.4.3.1.2/Curr ent Protection to Spacecraft

Y C T

5.4.3.1.3/AC

Voltage Transient Surge Suppression

Y C T

5.4.3.1.4/Reve rse Polarity Protection Diode

Y C T

5.4.3.1.5/Emer gency Shutdown

Y C T

5.4.3.1.6/Batt ery Safing Y C T

5.4.3.2 Failure

Modes and Effects Analysis

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

5.4.3.3 Stability with

GSE

Y C T

5.4.4 Inter-

subsystem Interface Requirements

Y C T

5.4.4.1 Load

Interface Requirements

Y C T

5.4.4.1.1 Conducted Susceptibility Requirements

Y C T

5.4.4.1.1.1 Tailoring of CS Limits

Y R T

5.4.4.1.2 Load

Input Filter Damping

Y C T

5.5.1 Power

Consumption Y C T

5.5.1.1 Power

Distribution Losses

Y C T

5.5.1.2 Efficiency Y C T

5.5.2.1 EPS

Mass Contributors

Y C T

5.5.2.2 EPS

Mass Values Y C T

5.5.3.1.1 Power Generation Source Volume – Stowed

Y C T

5.5.3.1.2 Power Generation Source Volume – Deployed

Y C T

5.5.3.2 Energy

Storage System volume

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

5.5.3.3 Power

Management and Distribution

(PMAD)

Y C T

5.5.4 Handling Y R T

5.5.4.1 Battery

Storage and Handling

Y C T

Append the following sentence to the end of AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.5.4.1:

Storage, handling and maintenance for the battery, battery cell bank (virtual cell), and battery cell shall conform to the handling, storage, and maintenance requirements.

5.5.4.1.1 Storage Y C T

Replace AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.5.4.1.1 a) with the following:

a) When not in use for greater than three months, the batteries, cell banks (virtual cells), or cells shall be placed in appropriate temperature-controlled conditions at a state-of-charge for the storage conditions and planned storage duration unless validated by qualification life test data/analysis to show the battery meets intended service life.

Replace AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.5.4.1.1 c) with the following:

c) Batteries shall not be used for flight, if the time between battery cell formation and launch exceeds the specified shelf-life limit for the battery under the specified temperature conditions unless verified by the qualification life-test data/analysis, recent battery performance data and approved by a waiver/deviation.

Append the following to the end of AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.5.4.1.1.:

d) During storage and handling, voltage monitoring and periodic recharge, or cell rebalancing, shall be required to minimize degradation, in accordance with the battery handling and storage procedure.

e) The voltage decay rate for cells, cell banks (virtual cells) and batteries shall be periodically monitored pre- and post-shipping, during storage and battery-level manufacturing, and documented to be within specification for each cell, cell bank (virtual cell) and battery following completion of cell acceptance through launch.

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

5.5.4.1.2 Discharge with a Battery Conditioning Module (BCM)

Y C T

Replace AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.5.4.1.2 a) and b) with the following:

a) Any discharge of batteries (cell banks – virtual cells or cells) shall be accomplished with a battery conditioning-module that will discharge the battery or individual cells at controlled currents to a specified voltage level instead of being allowed to self-discharge.

b) As a safety feature, devices shall be incorporated in the design of battery conditioning modules to accommodate the discharge of the battery at any state-of-charge without causing any damage to the battery or vehicle, including the prevention of undervoltage.

Redundant safety devices and inhibits shall be incorporated in the battery conditioning module to prevent damage to the battery or vehicle, and prevent any battery-cell voltage from exceeding upper-or lower-voltage limits for all battery states-of-charge, and prevent maximum-charge, or discharge currents and temperatures from exceeding specification limits.

5.5.4.1.3 Shorting Plugs N T

Delete AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.5.4.1.3.

NOTE: shorting plugs are not to be used for Lithium Ion batteries.

5.5.4.1.4 Handling Fixture

Y C T

5.5.4.1.5 Terminal Cover

Y C T

5.5.4.1.6 Conditioning Prior to Installation on the Vehicle

Y C T

Append the following sentences to the end of AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.5.4.1.6:

When electrically connecting the battery to the spacecraft bus, the difference between the spacecraft bus voltage and the battery voltage shall be within specification values that are sufficiently small to limit surge currents to levels that will not result in damage to components or connector pins.

Battery voltage and cell and/or cell bank (virtual cell) voltage, current, and temperature, shall be measured after battery installation on the vehicle at a frequency and resolution to detect a cell-level anomaly, such as premature discharge.

5.5.4.1.7 Minimum Use of Flight Batteries for Testing of Vehicle

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

5.5.4.1.8 Transportation to Launch Site

Y C T

Append the following sentence to the end of AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.5.4.1.8:

e) When accessible, the batteries and/or cells shall be inspected following transportation to verify the inspection criteria.

5.5.4.1.9 Records Y C T

Replace AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.5.4.1.9 b) with the following:

b) Time-correlated records shall be maintained throughout battery and spacecraft testing indicating battery, cell bank (virtual cell), cell charge and discharge currents, battery voltage, temperature and open circuit time to a sufficient accuracy to allow an assessment of potential degradation when discharging, recharging, cell-balancing, and electrical performance testing is completed.

Append the following to the end of AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.5.4.1.9:

c) Cell or cell bank (virtual cell) voltages shall be measured and recorded during cell, cell bank (virtual cell) and battery storage to identify low-voltage cells or cell banks (virtual cells) before they violate the minimum voltage threshold due to self-discharge.

d) Records shall be maintained and periodically verified to ensure the storage conditions.

e) For systems with no cell balancing, cell or cell bank (virtual cell) voltage divergence shall be measured and recorded and all cells maintained to a predetermined maximum cell voltage divergence prior to launch.

5.5.4.1.10 Not

for Flight Marking

Y C T

5.5.4.1.11 Battery Handling Plan

Y C T

Replace AIAA S-122-2007 the first paragraph of section 5.5.4.1.11 with the following:

A battery handling plan shall be developed and include the following items:

Append the following item to AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.5.4.1.11:

• Electrostatic Discharge Control (ESD)

Delete the following items and subitems from AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.5.4.1.11:

• Battery Wake-Up Cycle − Describe Wake-up Cycle procedure − Battery Parameter Monitoring

• Battery Reconditioning

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

− Describe Reconditioning procedures − Battery Parameter Monitoring

Delete the following sub-items from “Battery Charging while mounted on the Satellite”:

• Reconditioning capability

• Frequency of reconditioning

Delete the following sub-items from “Battery Charging while mounted on the Launch Vehicle”:

• Reconditioning capability

• Frequency of reconditioning

5.5.5 Preservat

ion Y C T There are no changes to this section – Use AIAA S-122-2007 verbatim.

5.5.6.1 Packaging Y C T

Append the following sentences to the end of AIAA S-122-2007 section 5.5.6.1.:

Specialty containers shall be used during extended storage and transportation to provide physical protection to prevent damage during handling, transportation, and storage.

Shipping containers shall contain sensors to measure temperature, humidity, and mechanical shock during shipping of cells, cell banks (virtual cells) and batteries.

5.5.6.2 Marking and Labeling

Y C T

5.5.6.3 Shipping Control

Y C T

5.5.6.4 Shipment Y C T

6 Verification Y R T Replace the word “addresses” with the word “addressed” in the second sentence of the last paragraph of AIAA S-122-2007 section 6.

6.1 Verificatio

n Responsibility

Y C T

6.2.1 Test Y R T

6.2.1.1 Test As

You Fly (TAYF) Y R T

6.2.2 Inspectio

n Y R T

6.2.3 Demonst

ration Y R T

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

6.2.4 Analysis Y R T

6.2.5 Similarity Y R T

6.3.1.1 Test As

You Fly Y C T

6.3.1.2 General EPS Testing

Y C T

6.3.1.3.1 General EMC Requirements

Y C T

6.3.1.3.2 Ripple Testing Y C T

6.3.1.3.3 Transient Testing

Y C T

6.3.1.4 Stability Testing

Y C T

Append the following sentence to the end of AIAA S-122-2007 section 6.3.1.4.:

d) The Bode plot test of the feedback control loop shall meet the stability margin requirement of section 5.2.7.1.2.1 c).

6.3.1.5 Battery

Life Test Y C T There are no changes to this section – Use AIAA S-122-2007 verbatim.

6.3.1.6.1 Solar

Cell Qualification

Y C T

6.3.1.6.2 Solar

Panel Qualification

Y C T

6.3.1.7 Engineering Model Tests

Y R T

6.3.1.8 EPS

Subsystem Test Bed

Y R T

6.3.1.9 Thermal Balance Test

(TBT)

Y C T

6.3.1.10 Flight

Battery Verification Tests

Y C T

Add the following requirements:

The flight battery shall go through electrical checkout as part of electric power subsystem checkout after vehicle installation to verify operation of electrical charge and discharge path, nominal telemetry readings, heater operation, operation of cell-balance circuit and any inhibit circuits as follows:

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

a) All battery charge and discharge circuitry shall be verified as operational at nominal current levels.

b) All battery temperature sensors shall be verified as operational.

c) All battery heater circuits shall be verified as operational.

d) Cell-balance circuitry shall be verified as operational at spacecraft level.

e) Supporting battery circuitry used for dead-bus recovery shall be verified as operational at spacecraft level. Note: The flight battery should not be taken to critically high or low voltages during the test to avoid damage.

f) All battery safety fault management responses shall be verified.

6.4.1 Power

Margin Analysis

Y C T

6.4.2 Voltage

Drop Y C T

6.4.3 Parts

Stress Y C T

6.4.4 Limited

Life Items Y C T

6.4.5.1 Harness Stress Y C T

6.4.5.2 Fault

Protection Y C T

6.4.6 FMECA Y C T

6.4.7.1 General Y C T

6.4.7.2 Feedback Stability

Y C T

6.4.7.3 Interface Stability

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

6.4.7.4 Bus

Transient Y C T

6.4.7.5 Fault

Protection Y C T

6.4.7.6 Wire

Heating Y C T

6.4.8 Solar

Array Statistical Damage Assessment

Y C T

6.4.9 Solar

Array Radiation Environment

Y C T

6.4.10 Battery

Leakage Current Analysis

Y C T

Add the following requirement:

An analysis shall be performed to determine the impact of leakage current due to parasitic unit loads on battery cell voltage divergence.

(4) AIAA S-111A-2014 Tailoring Instructions:

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

Sect 7.1 Solar Cell Weld or Solder Test

Y C T

Unqualified Solar Cell: Required. This test demonstrates the ability of solder and welds to survive a set amount of stress at BOL. Observed solar cell and diode weld failed during life testing.

Qualified Solar Cell: Not Required. Qualified Solar Cell has already passed this test.

Sect 7.2 Solar Cell Integration

Y C T

Unqualified Solar Cell: Required. This test is to determine if electrically active cells and components can survive a simulated space environment. A similar test will be performed again at the panel level in AIAA S-112 Section 7.1 Qualified Solar Cell: Not Required. Qualified Solar Cell has already passed this test.

Sect 7.3 Cell- Level Humidity Test

Y C T

Unqualified Solar Cell: Required. This test is used to ensure that parts of the cell (such as the anti-reflective coating and metallized contacts and gridlines) do not degrade significantly during the storage or CIC’ing process. Observed solar cell/panel experienced corrosion and discoloration during storage.

Qualified Solar Cell: Not Required. Qualified Solar Cell has already passed this test.

Sect 8.1 Electron Radiation Effects

Y C T

Unqualified Solar Cell: Required. Solar cell degradation due to electron radiation must be known so that solar array performance can be predicted and tracked throughout vehicle lifetime. Observed solar cell / panel experienced accelerated on orbit degradation due to incorrect electron radiation effect testing / prediction.

Qualified Solar Cell: Not Required. Test performed and results documented in the Qualification Report

Sect 8.2 Proton Radiation Effects

Y C T

Unqualified Solar Cell: Required. Solar cell degradation due to proton radiation must be known so that solar array performance can be predicted and tracked throughout vehicle lifetime. Observed solar cell / panel experienced accelerated on orbit degradation due to incorrect proton radiation effect testing / prediction.

Qualified Solar Cell: Not Required. Test performed and results documented in the Qualification Report

Sect 8.3 Bend Test Y C T

Unqualified Solar Cell: Required. Solar cells need to be able to endure bending at various points of array assembly, deployment, and flight. This test is needed to document the range of bending which the cells can reasonably and predictably handle without mechanical failure.

Qualified Solar Cell: Not Required. Test performed and results documented in the Qualification Report

Sect 8.4 Breaking Load Determination

Y C T

Unqualified Solar Cell: Required. Solar cells can experience bending forces at various points of array assembly, and flight.

This test determines the flexural strength of CIC’d solar cells.

Qualified Solar Cell: Not Required. Test performed and results documented in the Qualification Report

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes

Sect 8.5 Light I-V Characterizati on for Multiple Temperatures

Y C T

Unqualified Solar Cell: Required. Solar cells will function at extreme temperatures for most of their mission life (not ambient). Therefore, this test is necessary to help quantify the IV curves of illuminated cells on-orbit and create predictive models of cell performance. Data used to predict on-orbit solar cell/array power generation capability through mission life. On-orbit solar array operates at elevated temperature.

Qualified Solar Cell: Not Required. Test performed and results documented in the Qualification Report

Sect 8.6 Quantum Efficiency

Y C T

Unqualified Solar Cell: Required. Determining quantum efficiency is necessary for tuning solar simulators used to test BOL and irradiated cells. This will assist with formulating deterministic models for cell performance while on orbit.

Incorrect ground solar cell measurement will result in incorrect on-orbit solar array performance prediction through mission life.

Qualified Solar Cell: Not Required. Test performed and results documented in the Qualification Report

Sect 8.7 Dark I- V Y C T

Unqualified Solar Cell: Required. Dar I-V curves are used for diagnostic testing of solar cells. This information is also critical for understanding cell performance and degradation.

Qualified Solar Cell: Not Required. Test performed and results documented in the Qualification Report

Sect 8.8 Capacitance Effects

Y C T

Unqualified Solar Cell: Required. Knowing solar cell capacitance allows designers to make the spacecraft power control subsystem compatible with the solar array.

Qualified Solar Cell: Not Required. Test performed and results documented in the Qualification Report

Sect 8.9 Solar Cell Electrostatic Discharge Sensitivity (ES DS) Test

Y C T

Unqualified Solar Cell: Required. ESD is a potentially catastrophic failure mechanism for solar cells and arrays while on orbit. This test will improve confidence that this failure mechanism will be avoided on orbit. Ensure solar cell can survive on-orbit ESD events.

Qualified Solar Cell: Not Required. Test performed and results documented in the Qualification Report

Sect 8.10 Accelerated Life Test

T C T

Unqualified Solar Cell: Required. This test helps with the prediction of when cells will fail by accelerating the degradation mechanisms.

Qualified Solar Cell: Not Required. Test performed and results documented in the Qualification Report

(5) AIAA S-112A-2013 Tailoring Instructions:

Include?

(Y), (N)

Compliance (C), or Reference (R)

TRD (T) or SOW

(S) or Both (B) Notes (Unqualified Panel Design) and potential failure mode

Sect 7.1 Life- Cycle Coupon Test with Humidity Exposure

Y C T

Required. This a panel level follow-up to AIAA S-111 Section 7.2 and 7.3. It helps determine if the cell, parts, and components of the panel will survive the mission environment. Observed solar cell / panel experienced corrosion and discoloration during storage.

Sect 7.1.3.1 Humidity Exposure

Y C T Required. This a panel level follow-up to AIAA S-111 Section 7.2 and 7.3. It helps determine if the cell, parts, and components of the panel will survive the mission environment.

Sect 7.1.3.2 Thermal and Environmental Exposure

Y C T

Required. This a panel level follow-up to AIAA S-111 Section 7.2 and 7.3. It helps determine if the cell, parts, and components of the panel will survive the mission environment.

Sect 7.1.3.3 Thermal Vacuum Bake- Out and Thermal Vacuum Cycling

Y C T Required. This a panel level follow-up to AIAA S-111 Section 7.2 and 7.3. It helps determine if the cell, parts, and components of the panel will survive the mission environment.

Sect 7.1.3.4 Combined Effects Exposure

Y C T Required. This a panel level follow-up to AIAA S-111 Section 7.2 and 7.3. It helps determine if the cell, parts, and components of the panel will survive the mission environment.

Sect 7.2 Panel- Level Volatile Condensed Materials (VCM)/Acoustic Test

Y C T

Required. This test determines if a panel can survive launch conditions as well as identifies the amount of degassing of the parts and materials of a full-size flight panel. Degassing results in contamination which can significantly degrade cell performance. Evaluate amount of outgas from solar array as solar array utilize significant amount of silicone.