Attachment 2. Q and A C-UAS.pdf
PDF 75 KB Posted
- Attached to
- C-UAS Device
- Solicitation number
- FA480326Q0054
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This document is a Contractor Questions and Government Responses record for Air Force solicitation FA480326Q0054 regarding a Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (C-UAS) Device. The Q&A clarifies technical requirements for the solicited capability, specifically addressing spoofing functionality against autonomous, waypoint-controlled UAS.
The government's responses establish that GNSS spoofing is a mandatory requirement for the C-UAS system. When responding to a contractor question about whether the spoofing requirement targets effectiveness against autonomous UAS operating without active RF command-and-control links, the government confirmed that spoofing is required because autonomous UAS still rely on GNSS navigation to reach their destinations. Additionally, the government explicitly stated that systems providing operationally equivalent effects against both command-and-control-controlled and autonomous UAS through non-traditional spoofing techniques will not be considered acceptable. This clarification indicates that contractors must incorporate traditional GNSS spoofing techniques as a core technical requirement rather than offering alternative methods that achieve similar operational outcomes.
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Other files
| File | Type | Posted |
|---|---|---|
| Solicitation Amendment FA480326Q00540001 SF 30.pdf | ||
| Solicitation - FA480326Q0054.pdf | ||
| Attachment 1 - Salient Characteristics.pdf |
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Text version
Solicitation: FA480326Q0054
Contractor Questions and Government Responses
C-UAS Device
Question 1: Regarding the requirement for spoofing to interdict waypoint-controlled (“dark”) UAS, we seek clarification on the Government’s intended operational outcome. Specifically, is the requirement for spoofing meant to ensure effectiveness against autonomous UAS operating without active RF command-and-control links, or is a specific spoofing technique required? For handheld, dismounted systems, precision GNSS spoofing is typically limited due to power, size, and control constraints. However, directional GNSS disruption and other non-kinetic effects can achieve mission defeat of autonomous UAS by degrading navigation reliability and inducing loss of mission execution.
Government Response:
UAS operating without active RF command-and-control links would still be operating on GNSS to get to their destination, so spoofing is required.
Question 2: Will systems that provide operationally equivalent effects against both C2-controlled and autonomous UAS, without employing traditional spoofing techniques, be considered acceptable?
Government Response:
NO
File details come from the government source that posted it. Updated .