Call 01 - TAAP-DEW - Attachment 2 TO1 SOO.pdf

General DIME Activities – Task Order 01 (TAAP-DEW IDIQ) Statement of Objectives (SOO)

13 July 2020

1 Background

The nature of U.S. Air Force (AF) missions is increasingly requiring operations in environments heavily defended with advanced integrated air-defense systems (IADS). In these scenarios, AF aircraft are facing advanced missiles, including those utilizing guided electro-optical (EO) sensors and digital signal and image processing. An ongoing problem is the relevancy of countermeasure (CM) techniques as air and ground launched anti-aircraft missile threat capabilities advance and evolve. This requires continual design of best supplies for CM systems to address this evolving missile threat landscape. With introduction of each new threat, technical evaluation and experimentation must occur to design improved and novel countermeasure techniques through signal corruption via directed-energy and/or expendable ordnance measures.

The Air Force must continually design techniques necessary for technical evaluation and exploitation assessment of advanced threats in order to keep pace with the adversary. The information gained is required to design high-fidelity modeling to support engagement simulations for countermeasure design, evaluation and assessment to maintain and improve our national defense capability. Furthermore, design of countermeasure techniques requires knowledge derived from this threat evaluation and assessment. This hardware evaluation and assessment requires work in all three main test areas: hardware-in-the-loop and digital modeling and simulation; representative-environment laboratory testing; and field relevant-environment testing.

2 Objective

The objective of this Task Order is to conduct activities funded by AFRL/RY as well as other non-recurring funding partners for the design of expendable (ordinance) and directed-energy (signal) countermeasure concepts, in electro-optical (EO) and multi-spectrum electro-optical/radio-frequency (EO/RF) domains, in response to an ever-changing missile threat landscape using threat exploitation; modeling and simulation evaluation; and hardware and field testing. These concepts, together with enabling tools and hardware test assessment, will drive improved aeronautical subsystem and CM flare ordnance to develop best supplies for increased protection of aircraft. Design of multi-spectrum countermeasure concepts and technologies will require collaboration with RF countermeasure experts within the Department of Defense (DoD) and the nation’s allies around the world. The countermeasure concepts designed will benefit the airborne platforms throughout the DoD and the airborne armed forces of U.S. allies. The primary focus, however, will be on the protection of U.S. Air Force’s Air Mobility aircraft, Air Combat aircraft, special operations aircraft, and unmanned air vehicles (UAVs).

3 Tasks and Technical Requirements To accomplish the objectives, the anticipated tasks are as follows:

• Threat exploitation and assessment;

• Modeling, simulation, and analysis (MS&A);

• Hardware testing/Experimentation;

• Countermeasure technique and technology design; and

• Field testing

3.1 Threat Exploitation, Characterization and Assessment

Creation and refinement of countermeasures that continue to protect airborne platforms against the evolving missile threats depends greatly on technical evaluation, exploitation, characterization, assessment of threat systems. The Government has high interest in missile threat characteristics and performance obtained through reverse engineering, exploitation testing, and analysis of available intelligence data. This effort may include reverse engineering of both hardware and software components as threats become available to supplement data available from the intelligence community. This task requires coordination with other agencies within the DoD and/or international allies and may include developing digital and hardware-in-the loop models of the threat systems using available threat data.

In support of this subtask, creating, modifying, and maintaining state-of-the-art laboratory capabilities will be required. Such capabilities may include data acquisition, data repository with data integrity, and imaging & point-source scene generation in the ultraviolet through long-wave infrared bands.

3.2 Modeling, Simulation, and Analysis (MS&A)

MS&A is essential component in designing new and improved CM subsystems and a crucial enabling technology in the development of best supplies for countermeasure systems. The Government desires design, utilization, and evaluation of digital and hardware-in-the-loop MS&A tools to conduct analysis of CM system performance assessment. These MS&A tools may include, but are not limited to, the Government-provided MOSAIC, FLITES, SPIRITS, hybrid threat simulators, and HPC resources. This effort shall include design and implementation of improved simulations as well as additional missile, CM system, and aircraft models.

Enhancements to models and simulations to increase accuracy, based on field and laboratory experimentation results, and/or analysis capabilities, such as increased throughput, is highly desirable. Information generated under this task shall be documented for use in other tasks under this effort and other DoD users. The analysis conducted will guide efforts in the design of countermeasure systems for both existing and planned airborne platforms.

To facilitate the above, supporting tasks for creating, modifying, and maintaining of MS&A tools as well as high-performance computational and data repository resources with data integrity may be required.

3.3 Hardware Testing/Experimentation

The Government desires hardware experimental testing to verify threat exploitation results, collect data for model design and to investigate new countermeasure techniques and technologies. This hardware testing shall be conducted using the capabilities of the DIME Facilities and may include participation in field trials remote from WPAFB, as required. Technical reports documenting hardware testing procedures and results shall be generated.

The above may require designing and maintaining experimental test capabilities, including custom test apparatuses, electrical & mechanical interfaces for hardware-under-test, data acquisition systems and data integrity systems.

3.4 Countermeasure Technique and Technology Design

The Government has high interest in using data from threat exploitation and assessment; hardware testing;

and MS&A to design improved countermeasure techniques and technologies. Countermeasure technologies designed will include expendables (e.g., flare ordnance), directed-energy (laser) sources, as well as novel techniques designed specifically to address emerging threats, including imaging and multi-spectral threats.

Existing and developmental countermeasure technologies shall be used to design countermeasure techniques that are effective against the ever-evolving missile threat landscape to develop best sources for countermeasures that are needed for the national defense.

3.5 Field Testing

The Government desires to further evaluate and assess experimental test results of live-fire, field or other relevant environments. These experimental test results are often vital in developing best sources for countermeasure technologies that transition to operational use. These tests often take place in remote locations such as the ASTE / LAIRCM test site at Eglin AFB, the Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC) test range in California and the White Sands Missile Test Range in New Mexico. Testing desired under this task can include operation of Government-provided threat-surrogate systems, instrumented threat sensors and seekers, search/track sensors and other EOCM equipment. This task involves pre-test preparations, including but not limited to test planning, system upgrades and modifications, and test asset instrumentation. Information generated under this task shall be documented as part of the overall reporting requirements. Technical reports documenting test procedures in addition to the results shall be generated. This task does not include any flight test activities requiring flight crew or presence on an active runway or taxiway.

In support of this subtask, designing and maintaining of mobile test capabilities will be required. Such capabilities may include data acquisition with data integrity and the AFRL/RYWW DIME Mobile Laboratory (DML) trailer.

4 Management

The contractor shall exercise program, administrative, and financial management functions during this TO including establishing activities and milestones; tracking performance, cost, and schedule; overseeing quality performance; planning, forecasting, and reporting funding and funding changes; and preparing appropriate documentation.

5 Deliverables

The contractor shall deliver data items in accordance with the Contracts Data Requirements Lists (CDRLs) as attached to the basic IDIQ (and listed below). Specific hardware/software (to include source code) deliverables, as well as residual hardware that are procured or developed under this effort shall be delivered as applicable.

Number Title Authority Frequency

A001 Scientific and Technical Reports Dl-MlSC-80711A/T End of Tech Effort

A002 Funds and Man-Hour Expenditure Report Dl-FNCL-80331A/T Monthly

A003 Contract Funds Status Report (CFSR) Dl-MGMT-81468/T Quarterly

A004 Status Report Dl-MGMT-80368A/T Monthly

A005 Presentation Material Dl-ADMN-81373/T As Required

A006 Computer Software Product DI-IPSC-81488/T As Generated

A007 Digital Imaging DI-MISC-81579/T As Generated

A008 Software User Manual (SUM) Dl-lPSC-81443A/T As Generated

A009 Test Plan Dl-NDTl-80566A/T As Required

A010 Technical Report – Study/Services Dl-MlSC-80508B/T As Generated

6 Security

6.1 Program Security Requirements

Individuals must be US citizens and may be required to have SCI DCID 6/4 Top Secret Eligibility based on a SSBI/SBPR to work classified efforts. Any/all SCI and/or SAP work will be required to be conducted within an accredited Special Access Program Facility (SAPF) and/or a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF). Specific security details and requirements will be outlined within future task orders. All classified efforts must be in compliance with National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM). Other regulations/policies that may apply to this contract are JAFAN 6/0 (Revision 1); DoD Directive 5205.07 (Vol 1- 4); AFMAN 16-703 V3; SAF/AAZ Memorandum” Air Force Special Access Programs Nomination Process (SAPNP)” (30 Sep 2013); USD(I) Memorandum, Special Access Programs Nomination Process (20 May 2013);

JAFAN 6/3 Implementation Guide, Version 1 (Sep 2006); DoD SAPCO Memorandum, Transition to the Risk Management Framework (RMF) (18 Dec 2013); Joint Special Access Program Implementation Guide (JSIG) (9 Oct 2013); Intelligence Community Directives (ICD) 704 and 705; other applicable SCI regulations/policy; other applicable Security Classification Guides (SCG); and other applicable regulations/policy and subsequent revisions.

6.2 Operational Security (OPSEC)

General Operations Security (OPSEC) procedures, policies and awareness are required in an effort to reduce program vulnerability from successful adversary collection and exploitation of critical information. OPSEC will be applied throughout the life cycle of the contract. The Critical Information List (CIL) and the RY OPSEC Plan will be provided upon request by AFRL/ RYOY Information Protection Office. While working on the government installation, OPSEC guidance and OPSEC training will be provided by AFRL/RYOY Information Protection Office.

This training will ensure contractors are familiar with RY’s CIL and RY’s OPSEC Plan as it pertains to their contract. The contractor shall apply OPSEC in their management of their current program IAW AFI 10-701 Operations Security and WPAFB Supplement to AFI-10-701.

6.3 Information Security/Information Assurance (INFOSEC/IA)

The contractor shall apply subject matter expertise to manage the unique multi-level security information and networking requirements of the various System Engineering (SE) and System of Systems (SoS) Research & Analysis, Advanced Technology Demonstrations, and Integrated Technology Assessments task areas referenced above. This subject matter expertise should also include detailed knowledge and demonstrated applications of the Risk Management Framework (RMF) process.

6.4 Program Protection Plan

The Contractor shall participate with the Government in the development of a Program Protection Plan (PPP), to include the identification of Critical Program Information (CPI), and shall also participate with the Government in determining countermeasures needed to safeguard the CPI throughout the acquisition process.

The Contractor shall plan for and execute program protection in accordance with the PPP and program guidance.

7 Base Support

Base Support, available for proposal inclusion, includes the Dynamic Infrared Missile Evaluation (DIME) Facility.

This facility can be used for developing and testing new countermeasures concepts, techniques, and hardware.

The DIME Facility includes:

• DIME Lab, including a six degree-of-freedom semi-physical target simulator used to perform hardware-in-the-loop testing, a visible & infrared scene projector, a dual-source infrared threat characterization testbed, and various laboratory test apparatuses;

• Laser Infrared-countermeasure Development (LID) Range (including the Laser Countermeasure Test Bed (LCTB)), providing 1 and 2 kilometer paths for laser experiments and can be used to support advanced infrared countermeasures efforts;

• DIME Mobile Laboratory (DML) trailer for support of field tests;

• Phantom High Performance Computing (HPC) resources for classified processing;

• Modeling System for Advanced Investigation of Countermeasures (MOSAIC) software simulation system;

• Fast Line-of-Sight Imagery for Target and Exhaust Signatures (FLITES) software synthetic scene generator;

• Spectral and In-band Radiometric Imaging of Targets and Scenes (SPIRITS) software synthetic aircraft signature generator

• Open-Architecture Surrogate Imaging Sensor (OASIS) threat surrogate; and

• Access to JWICS and SIPRNet to facilitate execution of tasks.

8 Safety Plan

The contractor shall obtain an approved safety plan, Air Force Instruction 91-202 Air Force Research Laboratory Supplemental 1, before any experiment may be conducted outside of a laboratory environment.

9 Contract Holidays

The prices/costs in Section B of the contract include holiday observances; accordingly, the Government will not be billed for such holidays except when work is required by the Government and is actually performed on a holiday. The following days are contract holidays: ALL FEDERAL HOLIDAYS.

10 Travel

The contractor shall specify and provide a list of travel requirements associated with this TO including conferences to AFRL/RY. Any/all conference attendance requires AFRL/RY approval.