Attachment J.1b_Rapid Youth Assessment.docx

LEBANON RAPID YOUTH ASSESSMENT

DRAFT REPORT

Performance Management and Support Program for Lebanon II (PMSPL II)

October 2019 This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It was prepared by Social Impact, Inc. in collaboration with Laurie Zivetz, Julie Younes, Ghina Tabish, and Rana Taher.

LEBANON RAPID YOUTH ASSESSMENT

DRAFT REPORT

Performance Management and Support Program for Lebanon II (PMSPL II) Prepared by Social Impact, Inc.for the United States Agency for International Development under USAID Contract/Order No. AID-268-C-15-00001.

This document is not available in print. Documents of this nature are made available to the public through the Development Experience Clearinghouse repository (dec.usaid.gov). For additional information, please contact:

Social Impact, Inc. Corporate Office 2300 Clarendon Boulevard Arlington, VA 22201 Tel: (703) 465-1884 Fax: (703) 465-1888 info@socialimpact.com Or Social Impact, Inc. Lebanon Office Arz Street Librex Bldg. Bloc B – 3rd Floor Zalka, Metn, Lebanon Tel: +961-1-879260

DISCLAIMER

The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

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CONTENTS

FIGURES

TABLES

Acronyms

Executive Summary The United States Agency for International Development’s Mission in Lebanon (USAID/L) is in the process of developing a new Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) for the period of 2020-2024 and invited Social Impact to undertake a youth assessment as part of this process. The rapid youth assessment included recommendations for sharpening the focus on youth engagement at the Intermediate Result (IR), and sub-Intermediate Result (sub IR) levels of the CDCS results framework (RF). Based on a literature review and some two dozen key informant interviews (KIIs), it also offers examples of how youth could be more proactively engaged within USAID/L’s current portfolio. Youth are defined as ages 10 to 29 years.

The rapid youth assessment was undertaken over a six-week period (October 1-November 15, 2019). Fieldwork lasted one week before it was curtailed during nationwide protests that both interrupted and inspired the work. A major limitation of this assessment was the limited ability of the team to gather data directly from youth. Consultation with youth on subjects vital to the program and to their participation is an essential next step.

The assessment sought to answer the following questions:

1. How can USAID/L most strategically engage youth as development actors and beneficiaries in each of the CDCS 2020-2024 Development Objectives (DOs)? Which strata of youth are most likely to participate? To benefit?

2. What approaches could be adopted to ensure youth’s perspective is included in the design of programmatic options under the CDCS DOs?

The assessment questions are addressed in a cross-cutting way in this report, which is organized for accessibility purposes around the three DOs and one Special Objective (SO) in the CDCS 2020-2024.

USAID/L’s focus on economic opportunities, education, public service delivery, and humanitarian concerns implicates young people aged 10-29 in many ways. Youth are both important actors in, and oftentimes also beneficiaries of, every activity in USAID/L’s current portfolio. However, with the exception of education activities, the particular needs and priorities of youth have not been assessed or considered separately until now.

This rapid youth assessment suggests that there are opportunities within USAID/L’s current portfolio to achieve positive outcomes for youth, particularly in terms of employment, education, and civic engagement—all development priorities in the current political context and are well aligned to the current focus of USAID/L’s portfolio.

Findings and Opportunities DO 1: INCLUSIVE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES ENHANCED THROUGH PRIVATE SECTOR ENGAGEMENT

· Youth unemployment is estimated at between 20-23%, nearly quadruple the rate for the working age population at large (6%). While the overall economic slump is largely responsible for these striking statistics, studies identify myriad obstacles to youth employment and entrepreneurship. These barriers include: the legal labor policy framework and weak oversight; nepotistic hiring practices, which young people see as prevalent in both the public and private sectors; a lack of soft and other skills for in-demand jobs; and unrealistic expectations of salary packages especially amongst new graduates. (2;13; 33)

· Students receive little guidance on employment options in school, and access to information about jobs outside of school is haphazard.

· Opportunities for work-based learning (WBL) are not part of the current curriculum of most academic institutions, and there is no national framework to enable internships, mentorships, or on-the-job training (13).

· Cultural issues also contribute. Respondents to the 2019 Citizen Perception Survey (CPS) indicated broad disinterest in working in the seven occupations identified in an earlier study as having the highest employment opportunities (carpentry, plumbing, electrician, mechanic, tailor, beautician, industrial)–overall distaste for these jobs was more pronounced amongst respondents under 29. (44)

· The Lebanese economy and culture have a long history of entrepreneurship, and there are a range of business support and entrepreneurship development programs in the country. Bureaucratic requirements related to registration and access to formal credit and other forms of support present barriers for youth. Cultural attitudes towards their inexperience and the cloistered nature of academia also constitute barriers to youth.

· USAID/Lactivities mirror these barriers, and to date youth participation in USG funded activities has been minimal. The portfolio offers opportunities to address this, including through synergies amongst activities:

· A number of current activities offer entryfor youth to on-the-job learning opportunities. Examples include: LED, LINQ, MENA II[footnoteRef:1]—for business-based, work-based internship or other exposure opportunities; and Commuity Support Program (CSP) TO2/3 for local government work-based opportunities. [1: Refer to Acronym list on page ii for project name abbreviations. ]

· CSP TO4 targets vocational training. Given the disappointing outcome of many vocational training initiatives in Lebanon, the focus of this initiative on specific value chain employment requirements and the proactive engagement with companies offers potentially better opportunities for youth to find employment. Links with other projects (LED, MENA II,LINQ) may also be reciprocally beneficial to trainees and businesses at the internship stage.

· Elements of the USP, HECD, and LRI programs may provide insights into viable models for WBL in the Lebanon context.

· The emphasis under QITABI II for primary schools and HECD for universities on soft skills offers appropriate in-school workforce readiness skills that could be studied and extended to secondary and out-of-school youth as well as university students from public universities.

· Financial literacy, already part of LIFE, is a key workforce and life skill that could be extended through school-based projects and to refugee youth (under SO4)

· The career guidance curriculum (Grades 1-12) developed by QITABI I awaits piloting and offers an important foundational platform for youth.

· Credit guarantee mechanisms for youth have had success in Lebanon and are built into LIFE. Earmarks for youth could be explored.

· More attention to child labor—a growing issue in Lebanon—especially in terms of value chain projects is merited, relevant to LINQ, LED, MENA II, CSP TO4.

· Programmatic targets and budget earmarks for youth in economic growth programming are important contractual elements.

DO 2: EFFECTIVENESS OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IMPROVED

The education system in Lebanon is highly fragmented with private for-profit and non-profit basic, secondary and tertiary institutions—many of them run by sectarian groups, catering for more than half of the students. Quality in public schools is lower, as reflected in national exam scores. The influx of refugees has put additionalstrain on the public-school system (which has opened a second shift to cater for refugee students). There is significant drop-out between basic and secondary levels, as fees are introduced. USAID/L’s education programming seeks to redress unequal access to quality education, thus relieving barriers to education for the least privileged children in basic education and for older, university age students.

Opportunities within the program to prepare students for the workforce and for citizenship include:

· Partner with the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) to update the civic education curriculum, including experiential elements, for instance community service.

· Linking a pilot of the career counseling curriculum with internship, mentoring, guest speaker, and other types of exposure opportunities for students may help address the widely recognized mismatch between graduates and available jobs.

Inclusion of work-focused experiential learning in school curricula including piloting mechanisms for creating internship opportunities that could be scaled and mainstreamed in the education system. Initiatives under USP, CSP TO4 and HECD could inform a rapid assessment of scalable models in cooperation with MEHE via QITABI II.

DO3: EFFECTIVENESS FOR PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY TO LEBANESE COMMUNITIES ENHANCED

· Over the last 10 years, Lebanon has been muddling through in a state of systematic paralysis, plagued by endemic corruption with an ineffective central government unable to provide basic services and address core socio-economic challenges (USAID/L PEA 2019). This has been exacerbated by the influx of more than 1.5 million Syrian refugees since the eruption of Syrian crises in 2011(UNHCR 2018). According to the CPS conducted by Social Impact for USAID/L in May 2019, satisfaction with public services was low overall at less than 51% for all services with substantive variations in satisfaction for various public services at the governorate level.

· Although there are numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that serve the needs of youth, there are few that represent youth perspectives or provide a space for the plurality of youth voices, particularly compared to the number of organizations promoting women’s issues.

· The adoption of the Youth Policy (2014) by the Ministry of Youth and Sport is a milestone in the government’s recognition of a more nuanced and sectionally broad view of youth priorities. (2). The Youth Forum for Youth Policy is empowered to monitor implementation of the youth policy and recommend actions. However, studies and KIIs suggest a high level of frustration in terms of the realization of these priorities, whichhave been sidelined by a government overwhelmed with the refugee crisis and other government “deadlocks” (2)

· Civic engagement was raised repeatedly by key informants as a priority for youth. References ran the gamut from the need for an updated and stronger emphasis on citizenship rights and responsibilities in the curriculum; community service opportunities; and strengthening mechanisms for youth input at local and national levels.

Opportunities for contributing to this under USAID/L’scurrent portfolio include:

· Learning assessment of the LRI experience in terms of how youth were mobilized to address an environmental issue. The study should focus on mechanisms for public sector-youth dialogue and considerations of sustainability and scale.

· Discussions about internships for USP scholarship students in municipalities are underway. While the opportunity could be reciprocally beneficial and offer another model for providing youth with hands on exposure to the workplace—in this case in the public sector—observerssuggest that municipalities would need to be carefully vetted, prepared, and incentivized in order to make such internships useful for municipalities and meaningful for interns.

· Linkages between municipalities and basic school classrooms could also contribute to student understanding of the day-to-day workings of local government.

SO 4: BASIC HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OF VULNERABLE POPULATIONS MET

Since the start of the Syrian conflict, approximately 1.5 million Syrians have taken refuge in Lebanon (12). Over 475,000 Palestinian refugees also currently reside in the country, in addition to 21,761 registered refugees and asylum seekers from other countries (primarily Iraq, Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt) (24). Among Syrian refugees, 69% of households are below the poverty line(34).

The Syrian refugee population in Lebanon is disproportionally young and female. Approximately 55% of the Syrian refugee population is under the age of 18, and 81% of registered Syrian refugees are women and children (16;34). Child labor, child marriage, and violence are on the rise and contribute to vulnerability amongst youth. Only 68% of Syrian children 6-14 are in school, and only 7% of youth aged15-18 (20;10). Language, registration requirements, and poverty are significant barriers to enrollment and completion.

A number of studies note rising social tensions between Lebanese host populations and Syrian refugees, though this tends to vary by location. Economic factors are cited as the principle source of tensions, although access to services is also important.

This is a new area for USAID/L. Opportunities for youth for consideration include:

· Youth participation in public works can build skills and leadership and contribute to social cohesion. Out-of-school refugee youth could participate in community service initiatives described above under DO2 and DO3. Remuneration is important.

· Consultation with youth in the planning and during implementation of any initiatives under this SO will be particularly important to ensure it is filling a real need.

Conclusion This youth assessment encourages a focus on quality, relevant education; jobs; and civic engagement/youth voice—areas that came up repeatedly in the interviews conducted by the team. The analysis points to a portfolio rich in opportunities to effectively engage youth in meaningful ways, enabling them to gain the skills, experience, and confidence in the classroom, the workplace, and the civic space to equip them for work and productive citizenship.

Suggested next steps:

1. Consultations amongst USAID/L’s implementing partners to identify viable youth-specific synergy points across projects.

2. Project and cross-project consultation with youth to ensure their perspective is elevated in design and revisions to projects and activities. Importantly, care should be taken not to homogenize the views of youth, but to seek the uniqueperspectives of youth of different ages, sex, location, employment status, religious affiliation, and nationality.

3. Refinement of contractual mechanisms to ensure resourcing and indicators are well aligned to the youthfocus. Youth input should be integral to the project cycle.

4. Attention to learning loops within the portfolio to surface models and mechanisms that can contribute to the CDCS goals and current issues in the country.

USAID LEBANON -RAPID YOUTH ASSESSMENT |

I. Introduction The United States Agency for International Development’s Mission to Lebanon (USAID/L) invited Social Impact to undertake a youth assessment in October 2019.USAID/L is in the process of developing a new Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) for the period of 2020-2024. The rapid youth assessment focused on informing a youth strategy for the Development Objectives (DO) in the forthcoming CDCS. This included recommendations for sharpening the focus on youth engagement at the Intermediate Result (IR) and sub-Intermediate Result (sub IR) levels of the CDCS’s results framework (RF).The rapid assessment also offers examples of how youth could be more proactively engaged within USAID/L’scurrent portfolio.Youth are defined by USAID as ages 10 to 29 years.

This youth assessment coincided with nationwide protests thatboth interrupted and inspired the work. In mid-October 2019,Lebanon faced a transformational moment. Unhappy with the declining economy and the sectarian divisions that have paralyzed the government and covered up corruption, people from all walks of life took to the streets in an outpouring that demonstrated frustration and resilience. Young people were very much part of these demonstrations—the outcomes will shape their future.

The assessment sought to answer the following questions:

1. How can USAID/L most strategically engage youth as development actors and beneficiaries in each of the CDCS 2020-2024 DOs? Which strata of youth are most likely to participate? To benefit?

2. What approaches could be adopted to ensure youth’s perspective is included in the design of programmatic options under the CDCS DOs?

The assessment team addresses these questions in a cross-cutting way in this report, which is organized for accessibility purposes around the CDCS 2020-2024’s three DOs and one Special Objective (SO):

· DO1: Inclusive Economic Opportunities Enhanced through Private Sector Engagement

· DO2: Effectiveness of Educational Institutions Improved

· DO3: Effectiveness of Public Service Delivery to Lebanese Communities Enhanced

· SO4: Basic Humanitarian Needs of Vulnerable Populations Met

Findings are based on a literature review and some two dozen key informant interviews (KIIs). This rapid youth assessment was undertaken over a six-week period (October 1-November15, 2019) with fieldwork lasting one week. A major limitation of the assessment was the absence of youth voice. Consultation with youth on subjects vital to the program and to their participation is an essential next step.

Youth in Lebanon make up about 33% of the population. Approximately 71% are Lebanese, 24% Syrian, 5% Palestinian and other nationalities. As birth rates have begun to drop, there is an urgent need to take advantage of this period of high productivity sincedependency rates are expected to begin increasing again in 2025.Youth have about four times the level of unemployment than the population at large (6% compared to 23%). Low income youth in particular have limited access to quality education, and many young people feel marginalized from the political process, disappointed in public services, and inclined to emigrate for better opportunities (31).

The recent economic downturn and dissatisfaction with the political situation in the country havecontributed to an uptick in emigration, and a third of youth express the desire to leave in search of better opportunities (19).

USAID/L’s focus on economic opportunities, education, public service delivery, and humanitarian concerns implicates young people aged 10-29 in many ways. Youth are both important actors and oftentimes also beneficiaries in every project in USAID/L’s current portfolio. However, with the exception of education programs, youth are not explicitly or intentionally engaged asa distinct group, including in program, project, and activity design; workplans;implementation; learning; monitoring; or evaluation. Their particular needs and priorities have not been assessed or considered separately until now.

The CDCSplanning process offers the opportunity to adjust the strategy to redress this. This rapid youth assessment suggests that there are opportunities within USAID/L’scurrent portfolio of projects to achieve positive outcomes for youth, particularlyin terms of employment, education, and civic engagement—all development priorities in the current political context.The following sections provide evidence gathered to support the revised and new sub-IRs and indicators put forward in the draft CDCS 2020-2024 during the week of October 28, 2019.

At USAID/L’s request, this rapid youth assessment has not considered a stand-alone youth project. Building, a genuine youth focus across the portfolio will require modifications to current programs and new resource streams or reallocation of resources.Creating synergies amongst currently siloed projects would realize particular benefits for youth.

Design of activities and on-going monitoring and learning need to include substantial consultation with youth. This is particularly the case given the complex social tapestry that defines Lebanon. Youth from different economic, employment, age, gender, location, nationality and religious affiliation groups bring distinct perspectives based on their unique lived experiences. A genuinely youth-responsive program needs to reflect those perspectives.

II. Methodology The original scope of work for this assessment was quite broad and consistent with USAID’s typical cross-sector youth assessment approach. However, the final scope of work narrowed the focus substantially, based on a limited timetable in which to contribute to CDCS 2020-2024 planning.Guidance from the Mission during the in-brief (October 15, 2019) focused the assessment further to providing informed input with which USAID/L could incorporate youth engagement into the CDCS 2020-2024. Priority was placed on interviews with USAID/L’s technical staff and implementing partners (IPs) in order to maximize the relevance of recommendations’ to the portfolio. Face-to-face interviews, conducted by the Team Leader and a member of the PMPSL II’s technical team, were nearly completed when protests began the evening of October 17, 2019. Most of the remaining ones were conducted remotely[footnoteRef:2].Interviews with local and international non-governmental organizations(NGOs)were carried out by a Beirut-based team member, who was able to meet some, but not all, informants in person. Interviews with donors and academics were carried out by the expat team members by Skype and phone. [2: Interviews with senior team members from all projects referenced in this report were held with the exception of LINQ, LWP and Baladi RMF—the latter was with an activity-specific expert.]

The analysis and conclusions in this report are based on two main sources: review of grey and published literature, and key informant interviews. The literature more than 70 studies, evaluations, and project briefs about youth in Lebanon. Literature was drawn from sources available at Social Impact and from the web (including the USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse repository). A full bibliography is presented in Annex A. A full list of KII respondents is presented in Annex B.

TABLE 1: INTERVIEWS BY STAKEHOLDER GROUP

USAID Implementing Mechanism

(LIFE, LED, LRI, USP, CSP, HECD, QITABI, BALADI RMF)

8 (18 ppl.)

The study also benefited from a recent national Citizen Perception Survey (CPS) carried out by Social Impact in May/June2019. While youth issues were not a particular focus of this study, the sample was large enough (n=8091) that the youth strata (18-29 years old; n = 2543) is sufficient to surface some interesting findings about their unique perspective of youth across a variety of issues. Some additional analysis was done on the CPS data set for this purpose.

Limitations Time. This assessment was carried out in a very abbreviated timeframe (Oct 1-Nov 15 inclusive of report writing). Even before the protests curtailed fieldwork, the time allotted for primary data collection was only a week. This significantly limited the extent to which consultation with youth was possible. With the advent of the protests and school and road closures, the focus groups that had been planned with university students had to be cancelled. An important recommendation in this assessment is that consultation with youth be prioritized as part of Project Appraisal Document (PAD) preparation.

Time constraintsalsolimited the number of key informants and the extent to which follow up with key informants was possible. The DO and project-specific recommendations are based on single-session briefings withUSAID/L’s staff andmost IPs’ teams andproject documentation that was readily available.

In addition, although a large number of documents were reviewed, these factors also contributed to limitations on the literature that was available forreview. Key informants are often valuable sources of references to studies and grey literature reports that can add value to this kind of assessment. There was not enough time to incorporate additional literature, particularly as KIIs were conducted just ahead of the debrief with USAID/L and report writing.

Availability of key informants. This was also curtailed by time limitations and the protests. While a number of valuable informants made time to talk to the team from home or from outside of the country, input from a cross section of donor and INGO agencies in particular fell short of the desired breadth of perspective.

Access.The defining CDCS documents were not available to the assessment team until fieldwork began, which limited the extent to which the team was able to plan data collection and required a rapid adjustment of the assessment questions following the in-brief with the Mission on October 15.

Data. Data on national key indicators arenot available for some key indicators. Lebanon has not conducted a census since 1932.

III.

Findings USAID/L’s 2020-2024 CDCS is organized around three DOs and one SO. This section mirrors that framework in order to make the analysis and presentation of opportunities most accessible to readers interested in a specific sector. The illustrative recommendations for youth mainstreaming put forward in the Opportunities and Challenges discussion at the end of each section takes the current portfolio as a starting point. Many opportunities point to cross programmatic approaches to maximize impact for youth. Annex C provides a detailed matrix of all of these suggestions, by DO, IR, and subIR.

As shown in Figure 1, youth participation is quite uneven at the moment, with greater youth participation in education and municipality level programming than in private sector development. The reasons are explored in the following sections.

FIGURE : PERCENTAGE OF YOUTH ENGAGEMENT BY ACTIVITY, SEPTEMBER 2019

Source: PMSPL II data gathered from IMs, November, 2019

DO 1: Inclusive Economic Opportunities Enhanced Through Private Sector Engagement IR 1.1 Private Sector competitiveness increased particularly for youth and women-led M-SMEs[footnoteRef:3] [3: A number of the youth-specific SubIRs in this report were recommended during the period of the Youth Assessment and are being reviewed by USAID.]

· SubIR 1.1.1 Market access and sales increased

· SubIR 1.1.2 Private-sector driven workforce readiness proved with wider opportunities for youth and women

· SubIR 1.1.3 Identified BEE challenges addressed with involvement and active leadership of youth and women in public-private dialogues IR 1.2. Livelihoods improved particularly for the vulnerable (poor, women, youth)

· Sub IR 1.2.1 Increased financial inclusion particularly for vulnerable women and youth

· Sub IR 1.2.2 Improved resource management DO1 focuses on creating a more dynamic private sector economy through technical assistance, training, access to market, access to productive resources, and access to finance, grants, andtraining for medium, small, and micro enterprises (MSMEs), including startups. Employment generation is a priority across this DO as well. While there has traditionally been a gender focus to these activities, an explicit focus on youth is a new feature of this CDCS and offers opportunities to address the biggest challenges facing youth, albeit at a time when the economy itself is contracting(28; 44).

1. Contextfor Youth

· Although numbers vary,[footnoteRef:4]youth unemployment is estimated at between 20-23%, nearly quadruple the rate for the working age population at large (6%)(31;44).A 2016 report from the International Labor Organization(ILO) suggests that 47% of unemployed youth have been unemployed for longer than a year and 25% for more than two years. [4: After many years, the ministry of Labor has conducted a labor force survey, which is reportedly scheduled to be released in November. This will contribute to an understanding of the workforce. Source: KII]

· Although young women in higher-income strata who have access to education predominate in some higher-skill sectors, such as healthcare and education, in service sectors such as tourism, studies suggest employers prefer to hire men (32; 33). Young women overall are more likely to be unemployed than men (Dimovo et al, 2016 in 4). Youth in rural areas also find it more difficult to find jobs(44).

· While the overall economic slump is largely responsible for these striking statistics, other studies identify myriad obstacles to youth employment and entrepreneurship. Thesebarriers include: the legal labor policy framework and weak oversight; nepotistic hiring practices, which young people see as prevalent in both the public and private sectors; a lack of soft and other skills for demand jobs; and unrealistic expectations of salary packages especially amongst new graduates. (2;13; 33)

· At the same time, studies suggest that many micro- and small-scale businesses in the large informal sector may be unsustainable and offer limited employment scope (32).The economy is locked in a low-productivity and low-wage equilibrium due to macroeconomic uncertainty, poor governance including corruption, weak public infrastructure, and the significant presence of migrant workers. (29) A high degree of informality in the labor market contributes to poor working conditions, which are further exacerbated by the unsustainable nature of many MSMEs. Ultimately, the increased demand for a low-skilled workforce drives an oversaturation of less productive sectors. (32)

The economy is locked in a low productivity and low-wage equilibrium due to macroeconomic uncertainty, poor governance including corruption, weak public infrastructure and the significant presence of migrant workers (29).

A high degree of informality in the labor market contributes to poor working conditions, which are further exacerbated by the unsustainable nature of many MSMEs. Ultimately, the increased demand for a low-skilled workforce drives an oversaturation of less productive sectors. (32)

· Young people—particularly in the informal sector—suffer from the uncertainty of steady employment, fair remuneration, and protection from exploitation. (30) Women who face challenges of movement are more likely to get work in the informal sector where they are also more vulnerable to sexual abuse.Palestinian and Syrian refugee youth are legally restricted to work in three sectors (construction, farming and environmental hygiene)[footnoteRef:5]. [5: These are also sectors where Syrians have long held jobs as either resident or seasonal laborers.]

· Lebanese culture has historically elevated entrepreneurship, and an estimated 85% of the Lebanese economy is based in the private sector. Young people face particular barriers to entry into business, including access to financing based on limited experience and collateral, and challenges in terms of rigid labor regulations. (33)Chronic structural issues in the economy, the economic downturn, and the refugee crisis have exacerbated these realities, contributing to the protests of October 2019 and stoking the desire of qualified youth to emigrate. (33; 44)

Information about Jobs

· As discussed in the next section, students receive little guidance on employment options in school. Career counseling is particularly limited and arguably more important for students in public and non-elite schools. Observers note that career aspirations are largely informed by parental views of “desirable” professions rather than what is available in the marketplace. This pattern is reflected in the orientation of the education system. The result is an oversupply of lawyers, doctors, and engineers. At the same time, the demand for academically qualified individuals in the Gulf countries may also fuel this trend.

· Access to information about jobs is haphazard. Online job-matching websites target mostly university graduates seeking management positions and appear to be underutilized by would-be employers[footnoteRef:6]. [6: Bayt.com, one of the largest online employment portals in the region, had only 339 positions posted for Lebanon at the time of the 2017 study (40). A new platform called Ta3mal Lebanon was rolled out to 14 universities, donors, chambers of commerce, local development agencies, and NGOs by USAID/L’s Asia and Middle East Economic Growth Best Practices(AMEG) project with private sector partner, Netways, but no information is available about use (40).

· Jobs in the informal sector are most often identified via word of mouth, and the influence of corruption (wasta) in hiring practices is widely acknowledged.

School-to-Work

· A recent report from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) points to a mismatch between education and employment in Lebanon—a fact noted by employers and young people alike.This relates to the largely theoretical and academic emphasis of the education system, as well as the lack of career counseling and experiential learning opportunities. Limited exposure to soft skills and uneven exposure to information technology(IT) skills are also contributors. These challenges vary, with private for-profit schools and universities providing more job-readiness skills as well as career counseling.(19)

· Many agencies are trying to redress the mismatch between education and employment with programs that provide soft skills, on-the-job experiential learning, IT, language, and other in-demand skills training. These programs are mostly outside of the education system and the field seems crowded and uncoordinated.

Work-BasedLearning

· Most private-sector companies hesitate to hire youth with no practical experience, an issue which precludes young peoplefrom gaining a foothold in the workforce.(42)

· At the same time, opportunities for work-based learning (WBL) are not part of most academic institutions’ current curricula, and there is no national framework to enable internships, mentorships, or on-the- job training (13).Indeed, youth in basic- and higher-education settings are reportedly discouraged from working (though many reportedly rely on jobs unrelated to their academic aspirations to keep themselves in school and provide for their families).

· A recent study notes that on-the-job training experiences (essentially informal apprenticeships) are most common in sectors such as crafts, construction, retail, tailoring, and automobile maintenance.(13)

· Nonetheless, project-specific initiatives suggest that with the right incentives, companies are willing to employ WBL approaches.Deutsche Gesellschaft fürInternationaleZusammenarbeit(GIZ) is piloting an approach in the construction sector that incentivizes companies to participate in the formal and on-the-job training of young people,ultimately offering certification and the possibility of a job.A number of NGOs also offer incentives to businesses to provide on-the-job training, including agreements that participating companies will hire the most promising interns.NGOs using this approach have reportedly faced some challenges, with some resorting to artificially underwriting businesses in order to generate employment. Furthermore, the ratio of trainees to jobs is high.(42;30)

Vocational Training

· There are many agencies offering vocationaltraining programs in what has become a crowded and largely uncoordinated sector. Within the Government of Lebanon, the Technical and Vocational Education and Training(TVET) system—boasting 170 vocational schools nationwide—falls under the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE), while the Ministry of Social Welfare offers vocational and skills training through itsnational network of centers.The Ministry of Agriculture is also looking to set up an apprenticeship program through the National Employment Office.A significant number of development and humanitarian agencies have focused on vocational training as a rapid response to the sizable number of unemployed, out-of-school youth. These NGOs are mostly community-based, with regional and religious ties. (33;13)

· Mechanisms that offer youth on-the-job experience feature in some vocational training settings.

· There has been a significant push for vocational training under the Lebanon Support Program for Refugees (LRSP), which offered trainingto around 12,000 youth. However, fewer than 1,000 of those trainedwere able to find jobs afterwards. USAID/L programs, Lebanon Enterprise Development(LED) andLivelihoods and Inclusive Finance Expansion Project(LIFE), report similar target shortfalls based on technical assistance and training to SMEs (anecdotally, they have created only 3,000 created so far compared to a target of 23,000 jobs;).These results are not only disappointing to funders and trainers but also to the young people who invested 2-3 months of their timeto attend the training.

· Although a new Government framework for the TVET sector was released in 2018, the TVET system still faces a number of challenges including lack of diploma recognition; gender restrictions; legal, economic, and access barriers; and teachers with outdated skills.(33;13)

· The UNDP, which oversees the LRSP response, is recommending a focus on value chain analysis to more precisely target in-demand skills requirements.

· There is now broad agreement that the issue is more on the demand side; no matter how successful training may be, there are simply not enough jobs. Structural change is needed.

Entrepreneurship

· The Lebanese economy and culture have a long history of entrepreneurship. One in four respondents in the CPS report having a business, the majority of which were micro enterprises[footnoteRef:7]. (44) [7: The majority in this sample were urban, male, and over 29 with the majority based in Beqqa (35%) and North (32%) and the lowest in Nabatiah (5%). (44)

· There are a range of business support and entrepreneurship development programs. Business schools within private universities are active in promoting entrepreneurship, and some have partnerships with private firms, corporations, and banks (2).

· Accelerators at a number of universities offer another popular format for youth to incubate new enterprise ideas (2).

· Youth note that bureaucratic requirements related to registration and the lack of transparency and information are key barriers to launching an enterprise. (29).

Access to Credit

· Access to credit is a particular challenge for youth who lack collateral and a business track record. (42) Youth respondents (18-29 years old) in the CPS were twice as likely to receive financing from family and friends than non-youth (36% vs. 16%). (44) This may put a ceiling on how much their business can grow.

· Youth are slightlymore likely to borrow from microfinance institutions than older borrowers (15% vs. 13%).(44)

· In 2013, under government circular 331, the Central Bank put in place a $400m credit guarantee mechanism for youth (KAFALAT) to promote startups in the IT sector. It was so successful that another $200m was later added. However, because of the economic downturn, these facilities have stopped, for now.

Child Labor

· Child labor is an issue particularly (but not only) amongst refugee children and represents a coping strategy amongst families living at the margin. (10, citing VASyR, 2018; 14)Syrians have been a cheap source of labor in the informal economy since the 1990s, and child labor has been an issue in agriculture and the informal sector for years. However, despite the fact that the country has adopted a National Action Plan to Eliminate the Worst forms of Child Labor, rates of child labor are on the rise. (LCRP, 2018)

· Children and young refugees are particularly vulnerable to employer exploitation. Children and youth report instances of withheld wages, sudden termination, and even physical harm, with no contractual protection and fearful of legal recourse (32;33). Such low-paid work does not contribute to personal or professional growth. (32)

Sociocultural issues

· Respondents to the CPS indicated broad disinterest in working in the seven industries identified in an earlier study as having highest employment opportunities (carpentry, plumbing, electrician, mechanic, tailor, beautician, industrial). (44)

· Cultural framing contributes to this. One expert notes that the Soviet influence in Syria elevated manual trades and encouraged skills training through the education and employment systems. This contrasts with the Lebanese cultural predisposition for academic qualifications. Recent studies suggest that Lebanese males in particular perceive Syrian refugees as taking their jobs (Government of Lebanon in 4; 3; 19) though observers suggest these are undesirable jobs to Lebanese youth (and Syrian workers may bring more experience and work for less money).

· At the same time, some observers note that Lebanese youth may have unrealistic salary expectations and are unwilling to take entry level jobs, even jobs with growth potential. And, as shown in Figure 2, Lebanese youth are largely disinclined to work in jobs that are perceived to be manual, even compared to older members of the population.

· While there remain gendered preferences for types of employment, this seems to be less pronounced in the younger generation. (44)

· This overview suggests that youth face multiple barriers to entry in the labor and business markets. A weak policy environment and the declining economic situation exacerbate this and contribute to social tensions, the desire to emigrate, and the consequent loss of segments of Lebanon’s productive workforce.

Carpentry Plumbing Electrician Mechanic Beautician Industrial Manufacturing Tailor

FIGURE : WILLINGNESS TO WORK IN OCCUPATIONS, YOUTH VS NON-YOUTH

Source: CPS 2019

2. Development Hypothesis for Youth The broad development hypothesis for DO1 emphasizes the important role and potential of youth and women in all segments of the economy in achieving the IRs and subIRs. Inclusive economic opportunities for youth will rely on:

i) Consultation with youth from different strata about perceived and experienced barriers and aspirations for employment and entrepreneurship.

ii) Targeted responsiveness to particular barriers that keepyouth from different strata from fully participating in the economy.

The risks of not including youth in a proactive way include more unrest, a growing brain drain, and ultimately an economy that does not maximize its workforce potential.

3. Opportunities and Barriersin the Current CDCS Portfolio for Youth USAID/L has significant experience in the economic sectors and many of its current activites are extensions of past activities or adaptations that respond to new realities and build on partnerships. Brief descriptions of the actvities under DO1 expected to continue into the CDCS 2020-2024 period include:

While youth are participants in, and beneficiaries of,some of these initiatives, they also face some real barriers similar to the barriers to entry outlined above. There are also opportunities within individual activities and in particular in conjunction with other activities under the CDCS.

Barriers Interviews with program teams suggest that youth face a number of barriers to participation in many of these activities, as indicated in Figure I above.

Barriers to credit:MSMEs with an existing, on-going business are more likely to qualify for loans and grants under the LIFE and LINQ programs. Microfinance institutions(MFIs) and banks prefer borrowers with a credit history, an existing business, and/or collateral. Youth may not be eligible without a guarantor. This situation not only limits the abilityof youth to launch and assume ownership of a micro enterprise, it also precludes themfrom establishing a credit history.At the same time, youth are reportedly more inclined to move to the city than take over a family micro enterprise in a rural or peri urban area (the focus of LIFE).Parents may not favor a handover of the family business if their sons or daughterscan get into higher education.

Barriers to investment:MENA II provides matching investment, equity guarantee, and technical assistance to support the start-up ecosystem in Lebanon. It pairs angel investors with startups and other businesses considered to have good growth potential. Although the estimated average age of investors and beneficiary entrepreneurs is about 35, fewer than 10% were estimated to be below 29.