Attachment J.1 - DRC CDCS.pdf

COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT

COOPERATION STRATEGY

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

2014 – 2021 Approved 5/20/2014

Table of Contents

Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................ i

Acronyms and Abbreviations ................................................................................................................ iii

Development Context and Country Overview Stakeholder Priorities

Results Framework Graphic

Development Hypothesis Goal Assumptions and Risks

Development Objective 1: Selected national-level institutions more effectively implementing their mandates Background and Rationale Description of Development Objective One Intermediate Results

Approach and Illustrative Activities Other Actors What’s Different?

Development Objective 2: Lives improved through coordinated development approaches in select regions Background and Rationale Description of Development Objective Two Intermediate Results

Approach and Illustrative Activities Other Actors What’s Different?

Transitional Objective 3: Foundation for durable peace strengthened in eastern DRC Background and Rationale Description of Transition Objective Three Intermediate Results IR 3.1: Practical solutions to specific drivers of conflict identified and accepted

IR 3.3: Humanitarian and protection services provided Approach and Illustrative Activities

IR 3.2: Promising interventions to establish or solidify peace implemented

Other Actors What’s Different

Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Coordinating and Collaborating Learning

Adapting Illustrative Questions Opportunities for Impact Evaluation

Illustrative Indicators

Annex 1: Guiding Principles

Annex 2: Statutory and Other Analysis

Annex 3: Alignment with USAID Corporate Policies

Annex 4: Pre-CDCS Map

Annex 5: CDCS Map

Annex 6: What it would take to increase impact upon extreme poverty in the DRC?

Annex 7: Eastern DRC Programming Possibilities

Annex 8: Works Cited

Executive Summary

Many people are accustomed to thinking about the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as a problem that will be fixed by addressing specific development challenges in isolation. This train of thought fails to take into account both the incredible potential of the country and the need to address the root causes of extreme poverty and violence throughout the country. As Congo scholar, Raymond Gilpin, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 2014, “With the right approach, the DRC could be an opportunity for substantial gains not only in the country, but across the sub-region.” In order for this to happen, development actors must implement a coordinated strategy that improves political and economic governance while increasing human capacity and wellbeing. Eradicating extreme poverty and decreasing the fragility of the country cannot occur without addressing questions of legitimacy, weak and corrupt institutions, and entrenched power dynamics.1 Strengthening Congolese institutions’ ability to transparently respond to citizen needs will be critical to establishing legitimacy. Responsive institutions will further stability and thereby attract the investment needed by this country for growth.

USAID, and the U.S. Government writ large, recognize that transformational change in the DRC will require long-term investment and focus. USAID’s 20-year vision is of a country where the Congolese take charge of their future to manage and sustain growth with their own human, natural, and financial resources. There are currently key opportunities to accelerate achieving this vision. USAID will capitalize upon these opportunities, while working towards the vision, through the five year goal of a long-term transition to more effective and empowering development in the DRC supported. In order to achieve this, USAID will support three Objectives under this Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS):

Development Objective (DO) 1: Selected national level institutions more effectively implement their mandates.

Development Objective (DO) 2: Lives improved through coordinated development approaches in select regions.

Transition Objective (TO) 3: Foundation for durable peace strengthened in eastern DRC.

There is increasing recognition that development in the country will only be sustainable if the Congolese leaders and people demonstrate an active interest in and ability to take a leadership role in advancing the public good versus private gain. Reformers are in place that are improving the governance of the country.

By assisting these reform efforts, USAID is in a position to strengthen the institutions whose very weakness has contributed to, the country’s fragility and that ultimately leads to poor social wellbeing and extreme poverty. Therefore, USAID will invest in a strategy to strengthen Congolese institutions, at both the national and sub-national levels, that strengthen the social compact between citizens and the state. Under DO 1, USAID will support national-level public and private institutions in identifying development challenges as well as addressing those challenges by assisting Congolese organizations to create policies and procedures, implement solutions, and source funding. DO 2 will conduct similar work with provincial and local institutions, while also emphasizing the linkages between citizens and the state. Focused on the supply and demand side of service provision, DO 2 will ensure quality services are available to the population while increasing citizen’s knowledge and affordability of the services. Lastly, under the TO 3, USAID will strengthen the foundation for peace in eastern DRC by identifying root causes of violence and implementing programs to address them, while ensuring that citizen’s basic needs are being met. The promotion of gender equality through national and local leadership, civil society, improved governance, and gender-sensitive institutions is integral to the larger success and sustainability of USAID’s efforts on these fronts.

The DRC is both at a crossroad and under the spotlight with a U.S. and United Nations Special Envoy focusing on bringing peace and security in the region. The essential remaining question is the commitment of

1 See United States, Agency for International Development, “Ending Extreme Poverty in Fragile Contexts.”

i the Government of DRC and its people to peace, security, and prosperity. This strategy is predicated on a positive engagement of the Congolese government and people on development goals.

Differences from Past Strategies:

o Country ownership of development solutions, particularly through institution strengthening, is a key component of the strategy across all objectives. Not only will this involve public institutions, but civil society and the private sector will also play critical roles in defining development challenges and implementing solutions.

o Strengthening the social compact between citizens and the state, so that the state is seen as responsive to citizen needs, is a renewed focus in this strategy. In particular, it will be critical for women and youth to have a voice in directing this process.

o Interventions are focused geographically. DO 1 focuses on national level institutions; DO 2 focuses on three provinces: Kasai Occidental, Kasai Oriental, and Katanga; and, TO 3 focuses on conflict-affected areas of eastern DRC: North and South Kivu, northern Katanga, and parts of Maniema and Orientale. Finally, under DO 2, programs will address the large urban centers of Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, and Kisangani.

o As a cross-cutting strategy, USAID’s 2015-2019 CDCS increases collaboration among technical sectors. For example, democracy and governance work will support gains in health and education. Public-private partnerships will support a holistic development approach that addresses multiple technical areas. USAID/DRC will not only demonstrate cross-sector coordination in project design and implementation but will also seek opportunities for Mission-wide learning so that challenges faced by one sector inform programming in other sectors.

o Also as a cross-cutting strategy, USAID will pay special attention to development conditions which affect the success of programming, regardless of sector – gender, youth, and extreme poverty.

o USAID staff will increasingly influence and coordinate development actors- including other donors, the private sector, and the Government of the DRC.

o USAID/DRC will invest in strategic learning approaches, such as the Collaborating, Learning, and Adapting (CLA), and correct course as appropriate.

ii

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Acronym Name AfDB African Development Bank AIDS Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome ASRAMES Regional Association for the Supply of Essential Medicines CAADP Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program CARPE Central Africa Regional Program for the Environment CBFP Congo Basin Forest Partnership CDCS Country Development Cooperation Strategy CEJP Episcopal Conference for Peace and Justice CENI Independent National Electoral Commission CLA Collaborating, Learning, and Adapting CODESA Health Committee CPRDC Permanent Commission for Legal Reform in the Congo CSM High Council of Magistrates CSO Civil Society Organization DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration DEP Department of Studies and Planning DFID Department for International Development DG Democracy and Governance DHS Demographic and Health Survey DIPROMAD School Programs and Materials Directorate DO Development Objective DPS Provincial Health District DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo DRG Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance DSCRP 2 Second Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy ECTO Eastern Congo Transition Office EFM Eligible Family Member ESF Economic Support Fund ETD Decentralized Territorial Entity EU European Union EXO Executive Office FARDC Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo FDLR Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda FEDECAME Federation of Essential Medicine Procurement Agencies FFP Food for Peace FSN Foreign Service National FtF Feed the Future FY Fiscal Year GCP Donor Coordination Group GCC Global Climate Change GDP Gross Domestic Product GDRC Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo GIS Geographic Information System iii

GT Sectorial and Thematic Groups HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus IDP Internally Displaced Person IHP Integrated Health Project IMF International Monetary Fund INERA National Agricultural Research Institute IR Intermediate Result ISSSS International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy KSPH Kinshasa School of Public Health LIFCE Congolese Women’s Election League M23 March 23 Movement M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MDG Millennium Development Goal MIS Management Information System MOH Ministry of Health MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the

Congo NGO Non-Governmental Organization OAA Office of Acquisition and Assistance OE Operating Expense OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance OFM Office of Financial Management OR Operations Research PAP Priority Action Plan PEPFAR President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief PMI President's Malaria Initiative PMO Prime Minister's Office PMP Performance Management Plan PPP Public-Private Partnership PSC Personal Services Contractor PSCF Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework PTA Parent-Teacher Association SECOPE Teacher Payroll Service SERNAFOR National Teacher Training Service SGBV Sexual and Gender-Based Violence SNEL National Electricity Company SSR Security Sector Reform TCN Third-Country National TIP Trafficking in Persons TO Transition Objective UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Program UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund USAID United States Agency for International Development USAID/DRC United States Agency for International Development Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo USDH United States Direct Hire iv

USG United States Government WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene WB World Bank YALI President’s Young African Leaders Initiative v

Development Context and Country Overview

Progress and Potential For the first time since the Industrial Revolution, developing economies are forecast to contribute more to global economic growth than developed economies. Africa, whose average annual growth rate over the last ten years is five percent, is emerging as a major player in a new global economic order and renaissance, while also decreasing its extreme poverty rate for the first time.2 Strategically located at the crossroads of the African continent and sharing borders with nine countries, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has the potential to be a top African contributor to such an economic renaissance because of its size, potential, and geo-political importance. This makes it a key political anchor and U.S. foreign policy priority in the turbulent Central Africa region and well placed to lead regional economic integration efforts. It is the second largest country in Africa in terms of area and the fourth largest in terms of population. It has unparalleled natural resource wealth, including cobalt, copper, gold, tantalum, tin, diamonds, and petroleum. Fifty percent of the world’s cobalt production is controlled by the DRC. It has abundant water resources, sufficient for consumption, agriculture, and environmental protection, but also enough to power all of Africa. It has the second highest agriculture potential on the continent, over 60 percent of the second largest forest basin and carbon stocks in the world, and substantial fish and livestock resources. In short, what happens in the DRC matters to Africa’s future. It is in the world’s interest to have a stable and prosperous DRC that is capable of helping Africa fulfill its economic potential in the 21st century.

Yet, the DRC evokes images of a country plagued by chronic conflict, violence against women and children, disease, famine, corruption, and extreme poverty. Despite all its extraordinary resource endowments, DRC’s development progress continues to be elusive. Unbelievably, today it is at the bottom of International Food Policy Research Institute’s Worldwide Hunger Index making it the hungriest country in the world, with only 10 percent of its agriculture potential exploited. Despite having large carbon stocks, the DRC is the 8th most vulnerable country in the world to climate change and the 13th least ready to respond to climate impacts.3 It is tied for last on the United Nations (UN) Human Development Index, and at the bottom of the Gender Inequality Index. DRC is also one of the world’s top five contributors to child mortality and out-of-school children, hampering worldwide success on achieving key Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Over the last decade, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita has risen from $120/year to $165/year,4 but is still the lowest in the world according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB). DRC is home to the second largest number of extreme poor in Africa, and threatens to derail global efforts to reduce extreme poverty to less than three percent of the global population by 2030. On its current trajectory is could easily be the home to the second largest number of extreme poor in the world (second to Nigeria).5

One of the most telling portraits of DRC’s economic struggles is the graphic below plotting the decline in real GDP per capita.

2 See Barton, Dominic.

3 See Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index.

4 These figures are in 2005 constant US dollars. In purchasing power terms, income rose from $264 to $364. Purchasing power is used throughout the rest of the document.

5 See World Bank, Development Research Group and see United Nations.

The decline is both remarkable and tragic. The average Congolese person is only one-third as wealthy as he was forty years ago. Over 85 percent of the population lives in extreme poverty and 80 percent of households report an inability to meet basic needs.6 Though population estimates vary, this means that approximately 50 million Congolese people live in extreme poverty, a figure that will only grow exponentially as population growth quickens over the coming decades.7 Women are disproportionately affected, earning only about half that of men, a much lower figure than in other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.8 In his keynote address at the recent Brookings Institution event on ending extreme poverty, Administrator Rajiv Shah highlighted the DRC as being one of the four countries most likely to contribute the largest absolute number of impoverished citizens in the coming decades (p. 7).9

The reasons for the poor performance of the DRC are well known. Most agree that abysmal governance, as represented by Mobuto’s 40 years of rule by kleptocracy, is at the root. An article in the July 2013 issue of Foreign Policy calls the DRC “The Invisible State” – not only a failed state, but also a non-state because of its lack of sovereignty outside of its urban centers, leaving two thirds of the population beyond the purview of the central government. The International Crisis Group has labeled the same phenomenon “government by substitution,” with multilateral and bilateral actors taking on increasing levels of responsibility for governance.10 USAID’s extensive strategic consultation process revealed that Congolese stakeholders from a wide variety of sectors consistently cited governance as the biggest impediment to the DRC’s development.11

USAID defines governance as “the ability of government to develop an efficient and effective public management process,” (p. 18) with a particular emphasis on legitimate democratic governance that reflects democratic principles such as equity, transparency, inclusive citizen involvement and representation, and accountability.12 Because the DRC has never had effective governance, the challenges for development are immense, including addressing the decrepit state of infrastructure and lack of basic social services across the

6 See Herderschee, Johannes, Kai-Alexander Kaiser, and Daniel Mukoko Samba.

7 Estimates of annual growth range from 2.6 to 3.1 percent, which would result in a net population growth of about 10 million by 2020. Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 See Shah, Rajiv.

10 See Lagrange, Marc-Andre.

11 Over the last year, USAID conducted extensive consultations. Through the Gender Assessment, Youth Assessment, and Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Assessment, USAID engaged with over 1300 people. USAID also organized round tables and listening sessions with close to 120 religious leaders, youth, private sector representatives, and subject matter experts. The Ministers of Education and Health have also endorsed the framework. For more information see Annex 2: Statutory and other Analyses.

12 See United States, Agency for International Development, “Democracy and Governance: A Conceptual Framework.”

http:accountability.12 http:development.11 http:governance.10 country. Seventeen years of conflict in eastern DRC continues to drain resources and divert attention from development priorities for the country as a whole.

Yet, there are hopeful signs that the DRC is at a turning point. A generational change is underway, and there are a growing number of Congolese leaders across the country who are focused on increased government transparency, institutional reform, and improved service provision. Key ministries important to USAID, such as health and education, among others, are demonstrating leadership not seen for a long time within the government. Initial reforms are showing success. For the first time in over 20 years, the budget formation process has been open to public scrutiny. Significant numbers of public servants, police, and military are beginning to receive their salaries through electronic funds transfers, culling payroll lists of fictitious employees. This reform has saved the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (GDRC) over $12 million each month since 2012.13 The Ministry of Health (MOH) is restructuring to streamline functions, reduce stove-piping, and increase access to quality services; the Ministry of Education has adopted and begun implementation of critical policy reforms to increase student access and improve teacher performance, efforts for which the Ministry received significant budget increases14; and the Ministry of Gender is working with the Women’s Caucus in Parliament to foster the adoption of engendered laws and codes and thus advance a gender equality agenda. DRC has made strides in improving macroeconomic management, resulting in annual GDP growth rates of over six percent, a decline in inflation rates, an increase in foreign exchange reserves, and forecasted growth rates averaging 7.7 percent over the next five years.15 DRC has also been demonstrating slow but steady progress in the areas where development resources have been invested. In the last twenty years, population growth rates have declined, maternal mortality is lower, and a greater percentage of children (especially girls) are completing primary school. In addition, the victory of the Congolese military over the rebel group, March 23 Movement (M23), in November 2013 has renewed hope that with continued United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) assistance, the GDRC will be able to establish peace in the East.

USAID carefully examined the challenges to achieving development gains in the DRC and will shift its investments and business practices over the coming years to focus on accelerating progress on reducing extreme poverty and improving social indicators, while ensuring lasting development results.16 It will concentrate on improving governance in all sectors, which Congolese, scholars, and all major donors agree has been the largest roadblock to achieving development progress. The Mission will invest in institutional support and capacity building to targeted national institutions that in turn will stimulate an improved enabling environment to facilitate stronger governance and service delivery at local levels. This “institutional value chain” approach, which supports activities and sectors that have a positive causal effect from top to bottom, will provide the coherence to foster achievement of USAID's goal of more effective and empowering development through activities that improve the quality of life of the Congolese population. Ultimately, stronger government institutions and better service delivery, responding to the differential needs of both female and male citizens, will result in increased economic growth and fewer Congolese living below the extreme poverty line.17 USAID will also take a new approach to the conflict in eastern DRC by supporting operations research that will delve into the conflict's root causes, then implement activities to mitigate these while maintaining humanitarian assistance as needed. In addition, USAID will explore transitioning to development programming where feasible. Closer collaboration with other donors, expanding private-public alliances, and increasing equitable participation and involvement of women and youth are central to USAID’s new strategy in order to maximize development outcomes.

13 Discussions with Michel Losembe, CEO of BIAC Bank and head of the Banking Committee implementing the direct salary payment process for the GDRC.

14 The percentage of the budget going to education during the past three years increased from 8 percent to 13.5 percent.

15 See International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: Recovery Strengthens, Remains Uneven.

16 For more information on the challenges of doing development in the DRC as well as proposed changes to USAID’s business process, see Annex 1: Guiding Principles.

17 See United States, Agency for International Development, “Ending Extreme Poverty in Fragile Contexts.”

http:results.16 http:years.15

The country’s resources, if well managed, will be the primary drivers for economic growth, extreme poverty reduction, and development success. The mining sector, especially in Katanga, has dramatically grown, with the highest ever levels of copper and cobalt production, largely due to the impact of improved legal frameworks that promote more responsible investment. The oil sector promises huge windfalls over the next decade if the new hydro-carbon law meets international standards. The GDRC is also exploring partnerships with private and public donors for significant investment in new hydro projects. The country's natural resources represent both a huge opportunity and a critical asset. This is especially true in regards to female empowerment and gender equality. Women’s roles, needs, barriers and opportunities are typically left out of natural resource management and investments, and gender neutral policies and frameworks can harm women inadvertently. Should the GDRC, the private sector, civil society, and citizens not correctly oversee investment and the public management of all natural resources including forests, the country's huge potential will never be realized and the opportunities effectively squandered.18 There are still significant vulnerabilities in policy and legislative frameworks and oversight mechanisms. Given its role in providing government income through taxes, improving natural resource governance is essential to ensuring that tax income is transparently managed, in order to use the funds to foster equitable development across the country.

Enormous, Inaccessible Country Development programs must consider the scale of the country. The DRC is the size of the U.S. east of the Mississippi River, with fewer miles of paved roads than Maryland. The logistics of moving people, supplies, and resources around the country are mindboggling. With a large population, much located in very remote areas, the costs of implementing nationwide activities such as elections, the census, and demographic health surveys are exorbitant. A census has not occurred since the mid-1980s, making it difficult to base strategic decisions on evidence. A quick internet search produces estimates of the country's population ranging from 65-75 million people. Conducting evaluations using randomized sampling is also costly given the distances that must be travelled, as USAID learned during the evaluation of its largest health program.19 A public-private partnership with Vodacom to install cell phone towers for rapid response and early warning of Lord’s Resistance Army attacks has been expensive and delayed for purely logistical reasons, with all of the cell phone tower infrastructure flown in by UN aircraft. The poor infrastructure also increases costs of delivering medical commodities. In most countries the cost of transporting insecticide-treated bed nets is about 30-50 percent the cost of the net, but in DRC, it is as much as 100 percent. Other international donors, including the multilateral development banks, are investing in major infrastructure programs over the next five years.

Overarching Weak Governance The DRC has resources to support progress toward achievement of development outcomes. However, many of those resources are neither effectively managed nor directed toward the public good. The country’s national political elite seems adept at securing public resources for private gain through predatory, rent-seeking corruption, but unwilling or ineffective at enabling broad-based development, implementing pro-growth policies, or delivering even the most basic services to the population. The culture of impunity where abhorrent behavior is rarely punished could take at least a generation to change. This poor governance seriously undermines state legitimacy and contributes to DRC’s status as the second most failed state in the world.20 The declines in educational standards over the last 20 years and minimal donor focus on strengthening public administration until recently has also exacerbated governance failures. Ultimately, the state’s fragility is reflected in the lives of the majority of Congolese who live in extreme poverty, lack access to healthcare, are unable to respond to climate change, and struggle to provide a quality education for their children.

18 See Gilpin, Raymond.

19 For example, high rental car costs in some areas given the limited availability of cars; lack of phone coverage meant data collection had to be conducted and transmitted manually; and it could take up to four days to reach a randomly selected health zone increasing staff costs and time to complete the survey; while a larger than usual cadre of enumerators had to be trained given the language variance around the country.

20 See “The 2012 Failed States Index.”

http:world.20 http:program.19 http:squandered.18

A crisis of confidence has simmered in the DRC for a long time. The population generally regards the state, and political actors more broadly, as self-interested. There are few venues for citizen needs to be considered by the state. As a result, few Congolese citizens are in the position to advocate for policies that would benefit them, perpetuating extreme poverty and dismal social conditions. Only limited progress has been made on decentralization, including the controversial “decoupage”—the creation of 26 new provinces out of the current 11. The perception of the state’s overriding self-interest was reinforced by the flawed November 2011 presidential and parliamentary elections, when President Joseph Kabila’s re-election lacked credibility.

Provincial and local elections have been delayed repeatedly, though these are now very tentatively scheduled to occur in 2015. There are widespread concerns that the President or his loyalists will try to amend the Constitution so that he can serve a third term.

For a number of years, the opposition has been calling for a national dialogue. A large-scale dialogue was attempted, however the three main opposition parties boycotted it, claiming that the ruling coalition had too much control over the structure and representation. The result of this month-long meeting (September – October 2013) is a set of almost 700 recommendations of actions for the President to take. These recommendations range from reinforcing the army, repatriating Mobutu’s remains, to calls for the establishment of a national unity government. The national dialogue also recommended implementing “progressive parity” with a quota of 30 percent of all elected officials being women. If effectively implemented, meaning that it promotes equality in terms of roles and opportunities, this pledge will greatly further gender equality and could lead to more gender-responsive policies and programs. In October 2013, in a rare public appearance, President Kabila committed to implementing all of the recommendations.

However, it remains unclear what reforms will actually take place, as reforms promised in the past having often never been realized. As of March 2014, the cabinet reshuffle promised then has still not occurred.

Given the uncertainly in the political sphere, USAID has conducted scenario planning to ensure that its strategy is sufficiently flexible to fit both change and non-change scenarios.

Ongoing Conflict which Captures International Attention The history of DRC has been fraught with crisis, beginning with the especially brutal Belgian colonial legacy.21 Multiple peace accords have been signed, which have not endured, including Lusaka (1999); Sun City, South Africa (2002); Ituri (2006); Goma (2008), Ihusi Accord (commonly known as the 23 March 2009 peace agreement - from which the latest rebel group, M23, took its name), and most recently the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) Agreement for the DRC and the region in February 2013. It is estimated that the Congo wars and their aftermath have resulted in over 5.4 million "excess deaths" by 2007 through displacement, lack of services, and actual violence.22 Paul Collier has called conflict “development in reverse”,23 a description fitting for DRC. He notes that crises lasting decades leave economies in a very deep hole from which it can take years to escape.

The ongoing conflict has pushed DRC in the wrong direction both by directly placing people in vulnerable positions causing extreme poverty, and by drawing attention and resources to ending the conflict rather than pushing programs to benefit the poor.

21 The history of conflict in eastern DRC starts with colonial brutality to the post-independence violence and chaos of competing powers and separatist movements, the nationalization of commercial trade (the "Zairianization of 1973-74"), the Katangan rebellions of the late 1970s, the army mutinies and pillages of the early 1990s, the influx of millions of refugees from Rwanda after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the invasion of the country by its neighbors to oust Mobutu in 1996, and the occupation of one half of the country's territory by Uganda and Rwanda in 1998, and all the ethnically-based rebellions and insurgencies that have followed the end of the "official" war in 2003. See Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson, see Gerard Prunier, and see Jan Vansina.

22 See Brennan, Richard, et al.

23 See Collier, Paul, “Development in Conflict.”

Kimya ya mayi ya ebale ebombaka ngando (the calmness of the waters of the river may hide the crocodiles).

-Lingala saying http:violence.22 http:legacy.21

These agreements have had limited success since they had tended to focus on stopping the fighting and not on addressing fundamental political and economic issues which underlie the conflict. The agreements have not generally been developed by the grassroots or reflected the needs of marginalized populations, including women, youth, and the extreme poor. In this context, it is encouraging that there is now a greater acknowledgement by Congolese organizations and international observers (e.g. Rift Valley Institute’s Usalama Project) of the need to address local, national, and regional root causes. Furthermore, post-conflict reconstruction has not been accompanied by essential governance reforms, political dialogue, reconciliation, or economic recovery.24 Finally, due to an apparent lack of will, real reform of the security sector has been largely ineffective.

The creation of the UN Force Intervention Brigade, and the naming of Special Envoys for the UN, U.S., European Union (EU), and African Union, are all indications that the international community is reprioritizing the protracted conflicts in eastern DRC.25 Progress toward GDRC, regional, and international benchmarks included in the PSCF Agreement would represent significant steps in the right direction, but there is a concern among many observers that both the

Table 1: Achievement towards GDRC and the international community will continue Millennium Challenge Goals by Province business as usual, repackaging current activities rather than engaging in the essential political dialogue and creating new programs which will address the underlying causes of conflict.

In spite of being home to the world's largest (and most expensive) peacekeeping force, MONUSCO, the country is still widely categorized as one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world.26 Conflict-related displacement, human rights violations, and other humanitarian crises have increased, not declined, particularly in North and South Kivu and northern Katanga. In August 2013, the UN identified

6.4 million people in need of food assistance and emergency agricultural interventions. Approximately 2.6 million people remain internally displaced, most in North and South Kivu Provinces. USAID has provided continuous humanitarian assistance in the DRC since 1997, with over $103.5 million in FY 2013 alone.

While the situation in eastern DRC is dire, it must be considered within the broader context of challenges faced by Congolese around the country. There is close scrutiny of the plight of the 10 percent of the landmass and 15 percent of the population in the East, while the needs of the other 85 percent of the population are often ignored, making them question what price they are paying for being peaceful. As

DRC Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, 2011 seen in Table 1, basic social indicators are as bad or worse elsewhere than in the Kivus. Yet, the attention of the American public, Congress, advocacy groups, and therefore, the U.S. Government (USG), has hitherto been focused primarily on eastern DRC, and especially

Percent Primary Education Enrollment Province Rank Rate South Kivu 7 73% North Kivu 8 72% Equateur 9 68% Kasai Occidental 10 67% Katanga 11 66% National Average Child Mortality per 1000 Province Rank

75%

Rate North Kivu 2 131 South Kivu 8 166 Equateur 9 171 Katanga 10 184 Maniema 11 210 National Average Percent without Access to Water

Province Rank Rate North Kivu 2 23 South Kivu 3 39 Bandundu 10 81 Equateur 11 88 Kasai Occidental 11 88 National Average 53

24 See Gilpin, Raymond.

25 While much international attention is focused on the fighting between the M23 armed group and the FARDC (Congolese Army), in reality there are multiple local conflicts in eastern DRC. With over 40 armed groups with diverse agendas, the conflicts in the Ueles, Ituri, Rutshuru, Ruzizi Plain are all different and must be differentiated when looking for solutions.

26 See Government Accountability Office and see Brennan, Richard et al.

http:world.26 http:recovery.24 on topics such as conflict minerals and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). This has resulted in a disproportionate share of resources being allocated to the "consequences" of DRC's many problems rather than the "causes." Although, it is possible to view the conflict as having sources—the lack of a disciplined and effective national army, for example—it is the general context of weak governance that affects the entire country. While USAID will continue to address the consequences of conflict, such as SGBV, unless there is greater commitment to addressing root causes of the violence, the conflict and associated human rights violations will continue.

Demographic Shifts and Youth With 65 percent of the population under the age of 25, and almost half under age 15, the demographic shift in the country poses both opportunities and challenges. President Obama has noted: “… by understanding future population trends and acting today, we can work to improve education access and quality as well as employment opportunities for millions of youth around the world.”27 Given the challenges faced by youth ranging from widespread underemployment, millions of out-of-school youth, and high adolescent fertility, programs will need to target young Congolese to achieve long-term development gains and to escape extreme poverty.

According to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s Global Monitoring Report 2011, the DRC is listed as one of ten countries in the world that will experience continuous explosive population growth for youth between 15-30 years of age thru 2050. Estimates of annual growth range from

2.6 to 3.1 percent, which would result in a net population growth of about 10 million by 2020 (p. 13).28 The high growth rate puts increased pressure on public services (particularly education), the job market, and agriculture production—all already far from adequate for what is currently needed. In the short term, the DRC will be acutely challenged to achieve the economic benefits of a majority youth population unless birth rates drop considerably, as it will take time before the demographic transition will have any positive impact on economic growth and extreme poverty reduction.

Unemployment and underemployment are significant concerns, particularly for urban youth (ages 15-24).

The highest unemployment rates (32 percent) are for youth ages 15-35, with underemployment rates for the same group around 75 percent. As a solution, the GDRC proposes the creation of over 13 million jobs over the next seven years—a seemingly impossible goal. Even if the government were able to create a significant portion of those jobs, few young people today have the necessary training or basic skills that are required by the job market. Entrepreneurship is generally limited to earning sufficient funds for daily survival rather than the development of a formal business and, and it is significantly stifled by taxation, harassment, and a lack of access to credit. There are gender differentials present in the question of unemployment as well, with the lack of skills, training, opportunity, and credit more acute for women than men.

Despite an education system that is out of touch with the modern labor market, societal norms that disempower them, and a political system that largely excludes their voices, Congolese youth are characterized by a massive, tangible, enthusiasm for change. USAID/DRC’s Youth Assessment found that though young people generally eschew political engagement, they make up for it with participation in civil society, where they can “concretely contribute to social change” (p. 26).29 Of those surveyed, 65 percent reported some form of civic engagement. In spite of the many reasons for feeling discouraged, young Congolese reported eagerness to improve their basic and technical skills and an admiration for entrepreneurship (p. 19).30 USAID can capitalize on their clear desire for a better future and their willingness to act upon achieving it when given the opportunity.

27 See Basic Education Coalition.

28 See Herderschee, Johannes, Kai-Alexander Kaiser, and Daniel Mukoko Samba.

29 See International Youth Foundation and the Centre d’Études Pour l’Action Sociale.

30 Ibid.

Unfortunately, in North and South Kivu, and in parts of Maniema, Orientale, and Katanga, many young people, seeing no alternatives for obtaining any income, are joining armed groups rather than joining either the formal or informal economy. The Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Assessment quoted youth in other provinces speculating that it might be a "good idea" to take up arms.31 Criminality in urban centers is also increasing as young people see few prospects for their future.32

In addition to having a large, young population, the DRC is becoming increasingly urban– which will pose different challenges for males and females. While only a third of the population lives in urban centers, these cities lack basic infrastructure. For example, only 35 percent of urban dwellers have electricity. In Kinshasa alone over six million people are without power. There is limited access to potable water and virtually no waste disposal system. Kinshasa will become a mega city33 by 2015 and over half of the population will be in five major urban areas by 2030. With unemployment the highest in urban centers and few jobs likely to be created in the immediate future, basic survival will become the major preoccupation of the majority of the population.

Gender Save the Children’s 2013 World Mother Report named the DRC as the worst place in the world to be a mother, largely due to levels of maternal mortality that are amongst the highest globally.34 Almost a quarter of this mortality is due to pregnancy of young mothers age 15-19; DRC has the second-highest adolescent fertility in the world and only 6 percent coverage of contraceptives. Just over half of girls complete primary school, a rate much lower than that for boys and only 76.5 percent start school at all. Almost 60 percent of 15-24 year old females have experienced physical violence since the age of 15. Development activities for women throughout the country are hampered by deep-seated gender discrimination and their low social, economic, and legal status, and this is particularly challenging for women living in eastern DRC who face additional dangers associated with armed conflict. The government’s inability to provide the most basic services to its population particularly impacts women and children (pgs. 58, 60).35 Women’s participation in public service is low, and severe gender inequality under Congolese law persists despite ongoing efforts to revise the country’s legal framework and a constitution that “guarantees” equal participation (p. 24).36

Congolese culture is grounded in a set of interrelated forms of power; rigid notions of masculinity and femininity; communalism; exchanges of favors; informal, flexible contracts; and perceived otherworldly forces. In DRC, women are subjected to a wide range of discrimination, from demands for a high number of children and exploitation of their labor, to lack of access to land, to control over their income, and exclusion from decision-making roles in the family and in public life. The lack of control over household income translates into exaggerated symptoms of extreme poverty for women and economically disempowers half of Congo’s potential labor force. Effective and sustainable development impact will occur only if the cultural constraints that women (and men) face in both their domestic and public roles are addressed through changes in policy, legislation, and cultural norms.

Yet, on a daily basis, women and girls demonstrate resilience and the depth of potential of the Congolese people in general. Their enthusiasm and entrepreneurial spirit is a rich economic resource essential for a country working towards prosperity. Female faces are still rare as government leaders (6 of 36 Cabinet members), in politics (55 of 608 Parliamentarians in both chambers), and at the top echelons of the formal economy (3,122 female registered employers versus 17,624 males).37 Those who do have key positions

31 See Tetra Tech ARD.

32 See Kibangula, Trésor and see Alex Engwete, 33 A city of over 10 million people.

34 See Save the Children.

35 See Lombardo, Bridget, Fodié Maguiraga, Luisa Ryan, and Isabelle Turcotte.

36 See Democratic Republic of the Congo Constitution. Article 14.

37 A notable exception is that seven of the eleven provincial ministers of education are women.

http:males).37 http:globally.34 http:future.32 typically manifest noticeable energy and drive to improve their country. An example of an activist woman leader is Honorable Eve Bazaiba Masudi, the only female head of a Parliamentary Commission, who is pushing the elaboration and adoption of gender-responsive laws. These include adoption of both the labor and family code. She is also leading the Congolese Women’s Election League (LIFCE in French), a network of women in politics from all sides (the majority, opposition, and those from "non-aligned" parties) that is a strong advocacy network pushing for Congolese women's political participation. Furthermore, women account for about 70 percent of participants in the non-formal sectors, keeping the economy going while trying to make a better future for their children. Mindful of the exponential benefits of empowering women with education, access to reproductive health care, and assistance to rise out of extreme poverty, USAID is committed to addressing gender inequalities while recognizing that this needs to be accomplished in a culturally sensitive manner that enhances women’s status without disempowering men.38

Activities that focus on peoples’ needs will be vital to promote behavioral and attitudinal change.

Networking, information dissemination, and activities that stress community involvement in a participatory manner will also provide enhanced opportunities for women to participate in development and political processes.39

Stakeholder Priorities

Government of DRC USAID’s strategic focus outlined in the remainder of this document was largely informed through close collaboration with the GDRC, other donors, and stakeholders. In October 2011, the GDRC launched the Second Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (DSCRP 2). The DSCRP 2 and the associated Priority Action Plan (PAP), which provides a roadmap for implementing the strategy, establish ambitious development goals for the period 2012 - 2016. In addition to macro, crosscutting priorities highlighted in Table 2, the GDRC outlines specific goals for the following sectors: agriculture and food security, education, gender, health, water, HIV/AIDS, and environment and climate change.40 In addition to orienting the GDRC, the DSCRP 2 and PAP guide the many bilateral and multilateral donors working in the DRC.

The DRC has endorsed and is a pilot country for the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, which emerged from the forum on aid effectiveness in Busan. It sets out five goals — legitimate politics, justice, security, economic foundations, and revenues and services. The New Deal differs from other donor

38 See Farzaneh, Nassrin, Laurent Kopi, and Anne Sweetser. USAID/DRC’s Gender Assessment highlighted a cultural trend in DRC that power is a zero sum game. The findings of the study show that society’s understanding of women’s empowerment is directly linked to the assumption that men will be disempowered.