Comment by Template Editor: Replace this generic military logo with the logo from your command.

DRAFT [Installation Name] Installation Energy and Water Plan

[Update Date]

Comment by Template Editor: Add your site-specific logo here.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DRAFT [Installation Name] Installation Energy and Water Plan

[Update Date]

Prepared with support from [Name of Laboratory and/or Contractor Producing this Report] under contract with the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Energy & Sustainability. [Report number] Comment by Template Editor: This statement is optional as it depends on if the report is completed in house or with support from another agency.

Garrison Commander’s Signature Page

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HQ, [Installation Name]

[ADDRESS]

[DATE]

Unclassified / For Official Use Only

Unclassified / For Official Use Only

History: N/A – First Release Summary: This is the initial release of the JBLM Installation Energy and Water Plan, as required per DoD Memorandum, 31 March 2016 (“Installation Energy Plans”) & OACSIM “Guidance for Installation Energy and Water Plans (IEWPs)” 26 July 2018 Applicability: This plan applies to all Active Army, U.S. Air Force, Army National Guard organizations, and DA Civilians assigned or attached to JBLM. It further applies to all Department of Defense organizations, other Federal organizations, state and local, and privatively owned organizations resident at JBLM.

Proponent and exception authority: The proponent for this publication and planning activity is the JBLM Directorate of Public Works.

Army management control process: This publication does not contain management control provisions.

Supplementation: Supplementation of this publication is prohibited without prior approval from the Records Management Division, Publications and Forms Manager (FMO) Suggested Improvements: Users are invited to send comments and suggested improvements on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to DPW, JBLM (IMNW-LEW-PW)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

SKYE D. DUNCAN

COL, AR

Commanding

[OTHER signatories as needed -e.g., CSM Timothy Marble, Deputy DPW, Chief of Staff?]

STEVEN T. PERRENOT

Director of Public Works

Distribution:

For Official Use Only (FOUO). This publication is only available in electronic media.

Acronyms and Abbreviations [Template Note: The acronyms included are those that will be used in all IEWPs. Site specific acronyms may need to be added.]

vii

Contents

Figures

Tables

Introduction The [Installation Name] Installation Energy and Water Plan (IEWP) provides a roadmap for achieving increased security, resilience, readiness, and mission assurance, while also meeting federal and Department of Defense (DoD) requirements. This IEWP provides the goals, strategies, tasks, timeline, and responsible parties for the next 5 years of energy and water (E&W) management at [Installation Name]. The planning process and resulting roadmap follow Army and DoD guidance.

The primary goals of the [Installation Name] IEWP are as follows:

Ensure the ability of [Installation Name] to sustain critical missions in the event of an energy and/or water service disruption.

Reduce the risk to all critical missions from E&W (including wastewater) disruptions, with priority given to the [Insert missions with priority, if any].

Reduce use of E&W resources across the installation.

Increase installation operational efficiency.

In pursuing these goals, [Installation Name] leadership has stated the importance of strategies that consider the following:

[Template Note: The list below is included as an example. Each site may place different priority on implementation strategies.] Provide cost-effective alternatives to generators (e.g., storage, photovoltaics [PV], demand-response).

Help to manage responses from the electric utility to reduce load under an interruptible tariff notice.

Leverage alternative funding to support project implementation.

Leverage Privatized Utility Capital Improvement Plan projects for smart modernization.

Consider the operations and maintenance (O&M) requirements of recommended solutions.

This document is organized to concisely present the installation’s plan. The plan provides an overview of the critical mission facilities at [Installation Name] (Section 2.0), the E&W security baseline and deficiencies identified (Section 3.0), and strategies for achieving installation goals and addressing those deficiencies. Priority tasks aligned with these strategies are summarized in an installation implementation plan (Section 4.0). The assessment process is described in Appendix A; facilities supporting critical missions are found in Appendix B; findings from the assessment of baseline conditions and deficiencies are found in Appendix C; and detailed courses of action considered are summarized in Appendix D. Appendix E contains implementation plan development background and details. Appendix F, which will be transmitted to [Installation Name] separately via SIPRNet, contains classified findings from the assessment, and must be maintained on a computer system with appropriate information security controls.

The [Installation Name] IEWP is a living document, structured around a prioritized list of tasks over a 5-year planning horizon (Section 5.0). The [Installation Name] DPW has primary ownership of this plan, but requires the assistance of other [Installation Name] directorates and mission owners to ensure tasks are completed. [Installation Name] will review the IEWP each year and adjust it as needed. A full plan update will occur every 5 years.

Critical Mission Overview [Template Note: The first two paragraphs are provided as an example of the level of detail. Key information to include is a brief overview of the site, as indicated in the first paragraph, and then a summary of the site’s mission.] [Replace paragraph—sample of detail only] Site, State, is the second-largest U.S. Army installation in land area. It is the home to the 1st Armored Division (1 AD)…and other units. The post has xxx million acres of land that stretches from the western tip of xxx north into xxxx. The main cantonment area is in city, state. It is home to xxx military personnel and another xxx family members, and employs xxx civilians.

[Replace paragraph with information on the installations mission(s)—sample of detail only] XXX’s mission is to ensure the readiness of the power projection platform and provide training, mobilization, deployment, and sustainment support in support of the world’s best trained war fighters. XXX provides state-of-the-art facilities to support the full spectrum of training requirements of today’s modern armed forces. Installation lands and ranges provide excellent training opportunities for mechanized maneuver and small unit exercises, combined arms training, and live-fire training.

To establish the garrison’s ability to sustain its critical missions with E&W resources, and to manage risk of E&W utility disruptions, critical mission areas are mapped to facilities and infrastructure. For this mapping, key facility definitions are as follows:

Critical – A facility that is directly tied to a critical mission and requires energy and/or water to support that mission. Critical facilities can be of two types: Comment by Template Editor: Per IEWP guidance document, installations are only required to identify critical facilities. However, installations may choose to prioritize their critical facilities to aid in COA development and project implementation. If your installation prioritizes critical facilities, describe the criteria for each priority level here.

Non-critical – A facility that is important to overall installation operations, but utility interruption would not have a significant impact on critical missions.

A total of [Insert number of critical facilities] facilities comprise the critical facilities list at [Installation Name] (Table 1). To focus the assessment, [Insert number of facilities evaluated] of these critical facilities were targeted for detailed facility-level reviews for deficiencies and opportunities during the development of this IEWP. This included those most dependent on E&W resources (the biggest users) and excluded some redundant facility types (e.g., dining facilities, access control points) with relatively predictable/consistent E&W demand and use patterns, and functions that can be easily moved during an outage. [If applicable, include information on specific facilities that were excluded from evaluation and why.]

Risk Assessment

Critical mission risk reduction (CMRR) – Identify deficiencies related to infrastructure condition, lack of redundancy, and infrastructure exposure specifically in, or directly connected to, critical facilities.

Installation risk reduction (IRR) – Establish general risk to the installation from inadequate operational procedures and plans, overall E&W infrastructure condition, and availability/access to E&W resources to support installation-wide needs. The installation risk assessment used Installation Status Report–Mission Capacity (ISR-MC) ratings as a proxy. It also identified inefficient use of E&W resources in all installation facilities as deficiencies.

The specifics of each risk assessment are described, in the order listed above, in the following subsections (3.1, 3.2, and 3.3) and are organized by utility. Note that all counts of critical facilities with deficiencies represent the minimum number of facilities affected, since only a subset [Insert number of facilities assessed and total number of critical facilities] of the critical facilities were assessed for deficiencies.

Critical Mission Sustainment The CMS risk analysis was conducted to evaluate the installation’s onsite resource availability to sustain critical missions for a long-term disruption. The [CMS duration]-day CMS target (validated by mission owners) is only applicable to the critical facilities at an installation. The assessment team conducted the CMS risk analysis for [#] critical facilities identified at [Installation Name]. CMS risk analysis results are summarized in this section, details on the risk assessment process are provided in Appendix A, and detailed results are provided in Appendix C.

Electricity Key risk factors for meeting the CMS requirement for electricity include 1) the availability of a backup or continuous power source to the critical facilities, and 2) the availability of adequate fuel or energy storage to supply the power source for the [CMS duration]-day CMS period. To meet the fuel storage requirement when generators are used, the fuel must be available onsite or firm plans for refueling the generator must be in place for the facility.

At [Installation Name], [#] of [#] of the critical facilities assessed (#%) have generators in place, and none have an alternative source providing continuous long-term power. Of those with generators, most will run just [#] to [#] days before available onsite fuel stores are depleted. Currently, only [#] of the [#] critical facilities assessed can meet the long-term CMS requirement with onsite fuel storage. None of those facilities without adequate onsite storage had firm plans in place for refueling to ensure [CMS duration] days of continuous runtime.

An estimated [Insert gallons of fuel needed to meet CMS requirement] gallons of diesel fuel are required to meet the CMS requirement for all [#] critical facilities assessed. Currently, there [is no/is] bulk diesel storage dedicated to generators at [Installation Name]. It should be noted that [Insert number of generators that run on natural gas – if none, delete this and the next sentence. Also edit the last sentence as applicable] of the generators on critical facilities run on natural gas. While these have the potential to sustain operations with a continuous flow of gas, they do not meet the CMS requirement as defined in the policy due to the lack of onsite gas storage. See Appendix C, Section C.3.5, for details.

Natural Gas [This is an example. Revise as needed.] The key risk factor for meeting the CMS requirement is the lack of natural gas storage onsite at [Installation Name]. Natural gas is used for backup power in [#] critical facilities, which would require gas storage for [CMS duration] days or dual fuel capable equipment to meet the CMS requirement. Natural gas is also used for backup generators at [#] critical facilities, and for building heat and hot water in both critical and non-critical facilities.

[This is an example. Revise as needed.] While the probability of occurrence is low, in the event of a concurrent power and natural gas outage at the installation, the critical—interruptible buildings that rely on natural gas backup generators would also experience power outages. As a result, this is considered a CMS deficiency. (See Appendix C, Section C.4.5 for details on this analysis.)

Other Utilities, as needed Comment by Template Editor: In addition to electricity and natural gas listed in the subsections previously, here are other sources of energy that may apply to specific sites and consequently require a subheading and summary:

Steam Central Plants Biomass Etc., as needed (Note that several utility types like solar and wind are covered under electricity)

Water and Wastewater Key risk factors for meeting the CMS requirement for water include the availability of the following:

Sufficient onsite water to support critical facilities Onsite supplies, equipment, and staff to treat the water to ensure that water is potable at critical facilities Backup power or a continuous power source (e.g., PV with energy storage) at all water supply, distribution, and treatment facilities and wastewater pumping facilities to run for [CMS duration] days Fuel and fueling capabilities onsite to refuel any backup power sources that serve water supply, distribution, and treatment equipment, and wastewater pumping facilities; refueling plans that aren’t documented and exercised annually are considered a deficiency.

Water systems are heavily dependent on power for supply, distribution, and treatment of drinking water and pumping wastewater. Lack of power to water system equipment can result in lack of water and wastewater services to critical facilities. Subsequent lack of water to any facility at the installation can result in mandatory building closures in as little as 2 hours, based on interviews with environmental health professionals. In addition, sewer backups or overflows in buildings due to inoperable lift stations can also result in immediate mandatory building closures. Mandatory building closures are the result of unsanitary and unsafe working conditions due to lack of drinking water and/or restroom facilities and are determined regardless of building criticality.

[Template Note: The water and wastewater should include the number of facilities assessed, any issues identified in the assessment that could result in water unavailability, to what extent water/wastewater is impacted during a power outage, and the effectiveness of backup power to resolve water issues during an outage. The paragraphs below are provided as examples. Write and revise as needed.] Critical Mission Risk The critical mission risk analyses were conducted for the [Insert number of critical facilities] critical facilities identified at [Installation Name] for inclusion in this analysis. Key risks for E&W disruptions to critical missions come from deficiencies in infrastructure condition, lack of redundancy, and exposure when that infrastructure directly supports a critical facility. When coupled with the prevalent natural hazards described in Appendix C, Section C.2, and other threats or hazards that may be identified through the critical infrastructure risk management process, these deficiencies create critical mission risk.

Electricity Risks to critical missions from electricity infrastructure deficiencies at [Installation Name] are summarized in Table 2. The count of critical facilities with each deficiency and missions affected by these deficiencies provides some indication of the extent of the risk. The association of specific critical facilities and deficiencies is treated as classified and is detailed in Appendix F, CLASSIFIED Findings.

[Template Note: The paragraph below provides examples of deficiencies that may be present at an installation. Information specific to the installation the IEWP is being written for should be provided.] As shown in Table 2, a significant number of facilities have unknown electrical system redundancy. Circuit maps and one-line diagrams were not available to verify where redundancy of circuits and feeders currently exists, and whether transformer sizes are adequate for interconnection. Power quality issues were verified with utility reports and are a concern as power spikes and sags can place sensitive mission equipment at risk for damage. The lack of backup power to critical facilities, including to critical water infrastructure that requires power for chlorination to meet portability requirements, is a deficiency affecting a significant number of facilities. For facilities with backup generators, refueling plans are lacking. Finally, the main substation is near capacity with connected loads, posing a risk to a number of critical facilities. Comment by Template Editor: Formatting Note: a section break follows this text to enable the following table to be formatted in landscape form. This is just an FYI to be aware of this when adding text around this area.

Table 2. Electricity System Deficiencies and Estimated Count of Facilities and Critical Missions Affected

Missions Affected Comment by Template Editor: Formatting Note: this table is set up in landscape form (not the usual portrait form) and is offset by section breaks to enable this format switch.

X

X

Natural Gas Risks to critical missions from natural gas infrastructure deficiencies at [Installation Name] are summarized in Table 3. The count of critical facilities with each deficiency and missions affected by these deficiencies provides some indication of the extent of the risk. The association of specific critical facilities and deficiencies is treated as classified and is detailed in Appendix F, CLASSIFIED Findings.

[Template Note: The paragraph below provides example description of deficiencies that may be present. Information specific to the installation the IEWP is being written for should be provided.] The most critical function that natural gas supports on the installation is backup generation at [##] facilities, including backup for water pumps. While the probability of a simultaneous gas and electric outage may be low, the lack of onsite gas storage to supply these generators is considered a deficiency. Other deficiencies include single gas mains, dead-end gas distribution lines, and distribution lines that are both in poor condition and exposed to the elements. These risks to critical missions from natural gas infrastructure deficiencies and lack of natural gas backup sources are summarized in Table 3. Specific facilities affected are treated as classified information and can be found in Appendix F, CLASSIFIED Findings. Comment by Template Editor: Formatting Note: a section break follows this text to enable the following table to be formatted in landscape form. This is just an FYI to be aware of this when adding text around this area.

Formatting Note: that if these sections have little text, then consider placing the headings and text for electricity and gas with their callouts before the two tables (instead of separating these two tables).

Table 3. Natural Gas System Deficiencies and Estimated Count of Facilities and Critical Missions Affected

Missions Affected Comment by Template Editor: Formatting Note: this table is set up in landscape form (not the usual portrait form) and is offset by section breaks to enable this format switch.

X

X

Other Utilities, as needed Comment by Template Editor: In addition to electricity and natural gas listed in the subsections previously, here are other sources of energy that may apply to specific sites and consequently require a subheading and summary:

Steam Central Plants Central Plants Biomass Etc., as needed (Note that several utility types like solar and wind are covered under electricity)

Water and Wastewater Risks to critical missions from a lack of backup power for water and wastewater infrastructure and other infrastructure deficiencies at [Installation Name] are summarized in Table 4. Specific facilities affected are treated as classified information and can be found in Appendix F, CLASSIFIED Findings.

[Template Note: The paragraph below provides example description of deficiencies that may be present. Information specific to the installation the IEWP is being written for should be provided.] General deficiencies affecting most missions include the lack of backup power to critical pieces of water infrastructure that supply potable water to facilities, and a lack of plans to provide potable water and portable toilets to critical facilities should a water or wastewater outage occur. The condition of wells and booster stations supporting numerous critical facilities has been identified as poor and fair, and distribution line condition for portions of the installation is not known, representing a risk. Key wastewater system deficiencies include several lift stations without bypasses to prevent sewer overflows, backups, and subsequent building closures. Comment by Template Editor: Format Note: a section break follows this text to enable the following table to be formatted in landscape form. This is just an FYI to be aware of this when adding text around this area.

Table 4. Water and Wastewater System Deficiencies and Estimated Count of Facilities and Critical Missions Affected

Missions Affected Comment by Template Editor: Format Note: this table is set up in landscape form (not the usual portrait form) and is offset by section breaks to enable this format switch.

X

X

Installation Risk The ISR-MC indicates an installation’s level of risk exposure to an energy or water disruption, as well as the capability of an installation to sustain critical mission activities during a disruption. The report is categorized across four attributes defined in Army Directive 2017-07. Each attribute has multiple measures, which can be rated as green+ or green (best), amber, red, or black (worst).

ISR-MC measures rated as amber, red, or black are considered an installation risk. A complete list of ISR-MC measures, possible measure responses, [Installation Name] responses, and a more detailed explanation of deficiencies can be found in Appendix C, Section C.3.4, C.4.4, and C.5.4.

A second indictor of installation risk for E&W resilience is E&W use efficiency in all installation facilities. Performance against historical installation-level E&W reduction targets and utility cost trends are also presented below.

A third aspect of installation risk involves the resiliency of information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) systems. These complex systems are vulnerable to both physical and computer-based attacks. To address cyber risk, the individual systems and the supporting network infrastructure must be assessed. Reducing cybersecurity risk is paramount to improving installation resiliency. Cyber installation risk is addressed in Appendix C, Section C.6.

Energy Of the total ISR-MC energy metrics reported in [Insert FY of most recent ISR-MC], [Installation Name] had deficiencies in [Insert number of ISR-MC deficiencies] areas, shown in Table 5.

Table 5. Deficiencies Defined by [Insert FY of most recent ISR-MC] ISR-MC Energy Measures Energy

Assured Access

Infrastructure Condition

System Operation

Critical Mission Sustainment

Red Black

Energy efficiency performance is measured in terms of energy use intensity (EUI), or kBtu of energy consumed per square foot of building space. Current and past executive orders (e.g., 13834, 13693, 13514) have specified EUI reduction targets or requirements to implement measures that reduce costs. Figure 1 shows progress toward historical reduction targets of [#]% per year from FY[year range] and future targets of [#]% per year from FY[year range]. While the current executive order does not specify annual targets, [Installation Name] continues to strive toward these aggressive goals to improve its operational and resource efficiency. Figure 2 shows progress toward energy cost reduction goals. [Installation Name] is on track with EUI reduction, but utility cost reduction is shown to be a risk.

[Template Note: The information in Figures 1 and 2 is provided as an example. Similar information for each installation can be determined from historical AEWRS data.] Comment by Template Editor: These figures should be updated to reflect CURRENT Army and/or DOD baseline/goals and/or current statutory requirements. Note that these are updated regularly. Therefore, the figures should be modified to reflect the most current guidance.

Figure 1. [Installation Name] Energy Use Intensity Performance

Figure 2. [Installation Name] Energy Utility Costs Water Of the total ISR-MC water measures reported in [Insert FY of most recent ISR-MC] [Installation Name] had deficiencies in [Insert number of ISR-MC deficiencies] areas as shown in Table 6.

Table 6. Deficiencies Defined by [Insert FY ISR-MC metrics are from] ISR-MC Water Measures Water

Assured Access

Infrastructure Condition

System Operation

Critical Mission Sustainment

Red Black

The water resilience posture at [Installation Name] is also measured by the operational efficiency with which water is used. Past executive orders have specified potable and non-potable water use intensity (WUI) reduction targets (measured in thousands of gallons [kgal] per square foot of building area). While the current executive order does not specify annual targets, [Installation Name] continues to strive toward these aggressive goals to improve its operational and resource efficiency. Figure 3 and Figure 4 show progress toward reduction targets of [#]% per year from FY[year range]; WUI targets are exceeded but costs have increased, representing a risk.

[Template Note: The information in Figures 3 and 4 is provided as an example. Similar information for each installation can be determined from historical AEWRS data.] Comment by Template Editor: These figures should be updated to reflect current Army and/or DOD baseline/goals and/or current statutory requirements. Note that these are updated regularly. Therefore, the figures should be modified to reflect the most current guidance.

Figure 3. [Installation Name] Water Use Intensity Performance

Figure 4. [Installation Name] Water Utility Costs

Implementation Plan To achieve the E&W security goals outlined in Section 1 and address the specific deficiencies identified in Section 3, an implementation plan has been defined around the following broad strategies:

1. Enhance operations and plans (OP) – Actions that reduce overall installation risk from E&W service disruptions through preparedness and improved data quality

2. Reduce demand (RD) – Actions that reduce overall installation risk from E&W disruptions and increase the efficiency with which E&W resources are used

3. Improve infrastructure (INF) – Actions that reduce risk of disruption at critical facilities through improvements to reliability, redundancy, and exposure

4. Increase capacity (CAP) – Actions that enable longer-term sustainment of critical facilities and that reduce risk of disruption at all critical facilities through onsite generation and/or increased supply of E&W utilities Specific tasks and subtasks have been defined for each strategy and range from low/no-cost to capital‑intensive activities. These tasks have been prioritized for implementation based on their contribution to risk reduction, demand reduction, operational efficiency, and specific criteria of importance to installation leadership (e.g., ability to leverage utilities privatization [UP] contracts), as outlined in Section 1. Details of this prioritization and planning effort, including 1) level of impact of each COA to various scoring factors based on installation goals, 2) COA priority rankings, and 3) potential funding and execution mechanisms for each COA are summarized in Appendix E.

Table 7 presents the full list of tasks, accountable parties, potential funding types, and a timeline for implementation over the next 5 years. The tasks address the highest priority deficiencies for the installation and relate to specific COAs considered during the analysis. Many of these tasks relate to specific courses of action considered during the analysis. Appendix D provides project descriptions, identifies the deficiencies addressed, offers funding and execution options, and lists next steps for project implementation for the COAs considered for [Installation Name].

Within this report, COAs are categorized by the four strategies listed above (i.e., OP, RD, INF, and CAP) as well as by utility: electricity (E), natural gas (N), and water (W). These symbols with their corresponding numbers referenced in the table below (e.g., OP-1, CAP-E-1) help direct the reader to the corresponding COA described in more detail in Appendix D. For example, CAP-E-1 refers to the strategy of increase capacity for energy measure #1.

UP Contract

Tracking Progress The DPW will maintain overall responsibility for the Implementation Plan and tracking progress. Existing planning and performance review forums will be leveraged when possible to facilitate reviews and revisions to this plan. Several aspects of this IEWP will be reviewed and updated annually with different stakeholders, including the following:

Overall implementation plan progress will be reviewed with the Garrison Commander.

Planned changes in land uses or buildings that could impact E&W demands will be reviewed with master planning.

Critical facility lists as well as planned changes in the location of critical mission operations will be reviewed with the Institutional Review Board (see Appendix B). The critical facilities list requires the Senior Commander approval.

ISR-MC ratings for the current fiscal year will be reviewed for ongoing deficiencies and updated in the appendix.

The comprehensive review of site conditions and the plan shall be conducted at least every 5 years. It is recommended that updates to this plan consider other courses of action identified but not prioritized in this initial implementation plan.

The Excel-based Task Management Tracker, provided as part of the IEWP Template tools, will be maintained by the DPW and used to facilitate tracking progress toward the implementation plan as outlined in Section 4.0.

References Comment by Template Editor: If you site sources in your report or in the appendixes, please use the Chicago Manual of Style author/date system (for example, DoD 2019, Smith 2018, etc.), and then list the complete references here. Below are some sample references provided to show specific formatting in the reference list.

26 U.S.C. § 168. 2018. Title 26. “Income Taxes: Accelerated Cost Recovery System.” Internal Revenue Code, U.S. Internal Revenue Service.

DSIRE – Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency. 2018. “Modified Accelerated Cost-Recovery System (MACRS).” Last updated August, 21, 2018. http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/676 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). 2018. Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Version 1.1. NIST, Gaithersburg, Maryland. https://www.nist.gov/publications/framework-improving-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity-version-11 National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). 2018. Federal Tax Incentives for Energy Storage Systems. NREL/FS-7A40-70384. https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy18osti/70384.pdf Public Law 115–97. December 22, 2017. Individual Tax Reform and Alternative Minimum Tax. 115th Congress. Accessed September 23, 2018. https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ97/PLAW-115publ97.pdf Solana AE, WM Warwick, AC Orrell, BJ Russo, KR Parker, MR Weimar, JA Horner, and A Manning. 2011. Renewable Energy Opportunities at Fort Hood, Texas. PNNL-20928, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, WA.

U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Secretary of the Army. February 23, 2017. Memorandum for See Distribution: Army Directive 2017-07. (Installation Energy and Water Security Policy.) https://www.asaie.army.mil/Public/ES/doc/Army_Directive_2017-07.pdf U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). December 2016. Smart Grid Investment Grant (SGIG) Program Final Report. DOE, Office of Electricity Delivery & Energy Reliability, Washington, D.C. https://www.smartgrid.gov/document/us_doe_office_electricity_delivery_and_energy_reliability_sgig_final_report.html U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2012. “Data Trends. Water Use Tracking.” Energy Star Portfolio Manager. Available at https://www.energystar.gov/sites/default/files/buildings/tools/DataTrends_Water_20121002.pdf.

Planning Process This appendix provides a detailed description of the planning process that resulted in the [Installation Name] Installation Energy and Water Plan (IEWP). The IEWP provides a roadmap for supporting increased security, resilience, readiness, and mission assurance. It is driven by Army energy and water (E&W) security goals outlined in Army Directive 2017-07, Installation Energy and Water Security Policy, and other federal, Department of Defense (DoD), and Army policies and regulations. The [Installation Name] IEWP is a standalone document for E&W planning but is designed to be coordinated with the installation’s master plan as well as resource management plans and emergency response plans. Its purpose is to address requirements for E&W security and resilience, including energy and water-use efficiency. The [Installation Name] IEWP also meets the following DoD requirements:

Installation Energy Plan outlined in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Energy, Installations, and Environment 31 March 2016 Memorandum Energy Security Plan outlined in DoD Instruction 4170.11, Installation Energy Management, dated 2016 Energy and Water Security Plan outlined in the Defense Energy Program Policy Memorandum 92-1, dated 1992 The key elements of the [Installation Name] IEWP planning process are depicted in Figure A.1 in accordance with the Guidance for Installation Energy and Water Plans Memorandum issued by the Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM) 26 July 2018. Steps 1–4 were performed as part of the current effort and resulting IEWP. The risk assessment portion of the process followed the October 2018 draft Energy and Water Security Guide, developed by the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy and Environmental (ASA IE&E) as a supplement to the IEWP guidance to standardized risk assessment procedures across the Army. Step 5 represents ongoing updates to the plan as [Installation Name] moves forward with implementation.

Figure A.1. IEWP Development Process Identify Requirements The first step of the [Installation Name] IEWP process was to identify E&W requirements and document the installation’s current baseline. The assessment team performed the steps described in the following subsections.

Identify Stakeholders and Outline Work Plan [Revise this paragraph as needed per your site-specific approach.] An IEWP kickoff discussion was held with Directorate of Public Works (DPW) personnel on [Insert date]. In this meeting, the assessment team outlined the purpose of the assessment, including how it supports the IEWP, and the approach to conducting the assessment. The team reviewed information needed to prepare for the stakeholder workshop and onsite assessment. A timeline and work plan for executing the assessment was agreed upon. This included establishing weekly status meetings with the Energy Manager at [Installation Name]. The team began working with DPW to identify a list of key stakeholders from within and outside the installation community to engage. Key among these stakeholders are mission owners who will help establish mission needs for E&W resources and the criticality of supporting facilities and infrastructure. Table A.1 contains all stakeholders identified during the IEWP process.

Table A.1. [Installation Name] Stakeholders

Gather Existing Data [Revise these paragraphs as needed per your site-specific approach.] The assessment team submitted a data call spreadsheet to the DPW personnel to gather and forward (electronically) existing data on installation missions, facilities, infrastructure, and utility use. The team reviewed this spreadsheet with the Energy Manager during weekly status calls as data were received.

The data call spreadsheet submitted also included requests for existing data on the installation’s IT/OT infrastructure, policies, plans and previous assessments. Additionally, the questionnaire was used to determine the status of the installation’s risk management framework (RMF) security controls.

Establish Preliminary Energy and Water Security Baseline The assessment team reviewed the data provided by [Installation Name] and the most recent ISR-MC measures to establish the installation’s current E&W security posture. ISR-MC measures scored as black, red, and amber—as well as any measures with incomplete responses—were used as the preliminary E&W security baseline. The intent of this data review was to establish the E&W security attributes that required onsite investigation.

Identify Critical Missions and Establish Preliminary Assessment Scope Using the information provided (electronically), the assessment team began assembling a list of critical facilities to be used as a starting point for the [Installation Name] critical mission list and the extent of the assessment. The preliminary list of real property facilities and backup generators was used to create a map, which was also used in stakeholder engagement. Critical mission areas are mapped to facilities and infrastructure. For this mapping, key facility definitions are as follows:

Critical – A facility that is directly tied to a critical mission and requires energy and/or water to support that mission. Comment by Template Editor: If the installation prioritizes critical facilities, sub-bullets should be added to this bullet that describe how your facility prioritizes these.

Non-critical – A facility that is important to overall installation operations, but utility interruption would not have a significant impact on critical missions.

Conduct Stakeholder Engagement The Stakeholder Engagement Workshop was held at [Installation Name] on [Insert date]. Through this workshop, the assessment team worked to 1) secure the participation of stakeholders in the E&W security planning process, 2) refine and validate the facilities to assess, and 3) establish any installation-specific E&W planning goals. Table A.2 lists the stakeholders who participated in the Stakeholder Engagement Workshop. Comment by Template Editor: This paragraph is an example. Stakeholder engagement may be accomplished via a single workshop, or via separate interviews with each stakeholder POC. Summarize how stakeholder engagement was accomplished for the site and list the stakeholder information in Table A.1.

Table A.2. Engagement Workshop Stakeholder Participants

Identify Demand-Reduction Audit Priorities Comment by Template Editor: The text in this section is an example of information gathered to identify audit priorities for utility demand reduction. Write and revise as necessary.

While onsite for stakeholder engagement, the assessment team met individually with DPW representatives to obtain information on facility E&W use, in order to prepare a list of buildings for demand reduction analysis. The collected information, including proposed conservation or efficiency efforts, was used to identify facilities with either 1) poor E&W efficiency performance or 2) no recent assessment for demand-reduction opportunities. In addition to the interviews, buildings with demand reduction opportunity potential were identified by reviewing the following: 1) installation-level utility use data and Annual Energy and Water Reporting System reporting; 2) building-level E&W use data; 3) real property data; 4) past E&W demand-reduction assessments; 5) energy savings performance contract (ESPC) project lists; and 6) master plans for E&W projects, building demolitions, and major construction efforts.

Define Assessment Goals The stakeholder engagement was used to define installation-specific goals for the IEWP. Army defined goals are shown in Table A.3. Installation goals, which were approved by the Garrison Commander, are shown in Table A.4. These goals were established early in the planning process to guide the assessment activities as well as for prioritizing solutions and final IEWP drafting purposes.

Table A.3. Army-defined IEWP Goals

Table A.4. [Installation Name]-defined IEWP Goals

[Installation Name] Garrison Command presented their definition of a “critical mission” as [insert criteria used to determine critical missions].

Prepare for Onsite Data Collection Once the footprint of the assessment and goals were established, the team completed preliminary analysis and assembly of…