Attachment 0022c - IFCN Relay NEA Rev 4.docx

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Attached to
RFP for Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) LRIP/FRP Federal contract opportunity
Solicitation number
W31P4Q-20-R-0015
Issued by
Department of the Army Materiel Command Contracting Command Redstone Arsenal

About this file

This federal contract opportunity solicitation requests proposals for the Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) Low Rate Initial Production/Full Rate Production hardware segment. The U.S. Army Materiel Command Contracting Command at Redstone Arsenal seeks to procure IBCS hardware end items that were developed under previous Technical Data Packages and the Critical Item Development Specification. The solicitation also requires maintaining approved software and firmware updates, cybersecurity, authority to operate, and engineering changes for obsolescence, new capabilities, and export considerations. Questions are due by December 10, 2020 at 4pm Central Standard Time. The opportunity is only open to contractors who met entrance criteria through the Beta SAM portal and were approved by the Integrated Fires Mission Command Project Office.

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Attachment 0019 - Section L - Instructions Conditions and Notices to Offerors - 7DEC2020.docx DOCX document
Attachment 0023 - IBCS LRIP FRP DO 0001 Pricing Template_22Oct2020.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0003 - GFP LRIP FRP - 3SEP2020.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0007 - AIAMD Requirements Prioritization 1-n table.docx DOCX document
Attachment 0010 - FMECA.docx DOCX document
Attachment 0010a.16 – R034 Media Converter Power Supply-FMECA.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0010b.3 – E005 Blower Assembly-FMECA.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0010b.8 – E032 R112 Shelter – Server Stack – 02-FMECA.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0010b.9 – E033 R112 Shelter – Server Stack – 03-FMECA.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0010c.1 – E043 Firewall Red-FMECA.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0010c.4 – E049 BPU-FMECA.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0010c.7 – E052 SCIM-FMECA.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0010c.14 – E064 Shelter Router Black – FMECA.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0010d.2 – E144 RWS Bkup Batteries-FMECA.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0010d.5 – E152 – Media Converter 05-FMECA.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0010d.9 - E156 UPS - FMECA.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0010e.2 – E082 thru E091 Wkstn Laptop-FMECA.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0010e.4 – E102d thru E111 Vid Extender-FMECA.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0010e.8 – E146 – Table 2 Assembly-FMECA.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0013 - Training Documentation.docx DOCX document
Attachment 0013e - IBCS-A301-003 Vol IV Slide Package_redacted.pdf PDF
Attachment 0020 - Section M - Evaluation Factors for Award - 23NOV2020.docx DOCX document
Attachment 0022a.1.b - ALH-209032 00 CABLE ASSEMBLY CASS.pdf PDF
Attachment 0022a.1.d - ALH-213030 00 CABLE ASSEMBLY CASS.pdf PDF
Attachment 0022a.1.j - PL-ALH-215333 00 S-280 CASS INSTA.pdf PDF
Attachment 0022a.3 - S280_System Power Analysis_12-5-2017.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0024 - Quality Assurance Surveilance Plan (QASP) - 24NOV2020.pdf PDF
Attachment 0028 - HWSW Baseline Inventory Template.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0029 - System Security Plan (SSP) Template.doc DOC document
Attachment 0010g - IBCS - 243-003 HW FMECA Results redacted.pdf PDF
Attachment 0004a - EOC Acceptance Test Procedures_FINAL.docx DOCX document
Attachment 0010d.10 – E157 KVM Switch 2 Shelter-FMECA.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0010h - SWFMEA Results.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0010a.10 – R016 thru R025 Media Converter Module-FMECA.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
EXHIBIT A - CONTRACT DATA ITEM REQUIREMENTS LIST (CDRL) - 24NOV2020.pdf PDF
Exhibit C- IBCS DSL - 24NOV2020.docx DOCX document
Attachment 0002 - AIAMD System of Systems (SoS)(MIS-PRF-56500).pdf PDF
Attachment 0004b - Relay Acceptance Test Procedures_FINAL.docx DOCX document
Attachment 0004d - Operator Procedures For IFMC GSIL.docx DOCX document
Attachment 0005 - Software Installation Instructions.docx DOCX document
Attachment 0008 - AIAMD IUID Plan Appendix A - IUID Candidates List Data Items.pdf PDF
Attachment 0009 - R and M Prediction Report.docx DOCX document
Attachment 0010a.3 – R003 KG-250X-FMECA.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0010a.7 – R007 Relay Network Switch-Parvus Switch-FMECA.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0010a.9 – R015 PDU Assembly-FMECA.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0010a.13 – R031 Black Router--FMECA.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0010c.3 – E048 HRFU-FMECA.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0010c.8 – E053 Shelter Time Server-FMECA.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0010c.9 – E059 Shelter Switch – 01-FMECA.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
Attachment 0010d.7 – E153 RS112 Server -06 Shelter with PT-FMECA.xlsx XLSX spreadsheet
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W31P4Q-20-R-0015 ATTACHMENT 0022c

Objective:

The Integrated Fire Mission Command (IFMC), formerly the Integrated Air & Missile Defense (IAMD) Project Office, is the lead materiel developer of the Army’s Integrated Air & Missile Defense (AIAMD) Battle Command System (IBCS). IBCS will combine multiple cross-domain sensors into a single integrated air picture for Air & Missile Defense (AMD) engagement planning and execution.

One of the IBCS Major End Items (MEI) is the Integrated Fire Control Network (IFCN) Relay, which provides a mobile communications node that extends connectivity to remote launcher and sensor deployments by expanding the range of Line-of-Sight (LOS) communications over the horizon and around intervening terrain features. A major component of the IFCN Relay is a Network Enclosure Assembly (NEA). The NEA houses many of the critical components that enable IAMD data transmissions. The IFMC is seeking proposals for an updated non-proprietary NEA solution. The objective of this ECP submission is for the USG to obtain innovative insights focused Size, Weight, Power, and Cost (SWAP-C) improvements to the current NEA design. In addition to potential SWaP-C improvements, the USG seeks to see recommendations that will improve the reliability and availability of internal components so that they work in the harsh environments and conditions experienced by the NEA, and improving maintainability of the NEA by providing Soldier access to the LRUs perform maintenance. Concept drawing of NEA included as Figure 1-1 Network Enclosure Assembly

The natural and inducted environments that the NEA must operate and maintain an internal temperature during exposure to are listed in the embedded excel file:

Description:

The NEA, which contains design information that is proprietary to Northrop Grumman Corporation. Given the proprietary nature of the item and several of the components, the intent of this ECP is to evaluate the NEA architectural concept as a whole by:

(1) Determine internal components that could be improved so that they operate in the harsh environment experienced by the NEA,

(2) Assess and reduce the cooling system requirements based on improvement of the NEA architectural concept.

(3) Enhancing maintenance and Soldier access to the NEA.

The components that comprise the NEA: (Components highlighted in yellow are obsolete)

1. Integrated Fire Control Network Relay (IFCN) Mission Case (Proprietary) - Bare bone case with Environmental Control Unit (ECU), Quantity: 1

2. Environmental Control Unit (ECU) Controller Assembly (Proprietary) - ECU control logic, Quantity: 1

3. Power Distribution Unit (Proprietary) - Internal Power Distribution (DC Edge Attachment), Quantity: 1

4. Northrop Grumman (NG) Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) High- Band Radio Frequency Unit (HRFU) control/status protector (Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) / Lightning protection) (Proprietary) - EMI/Lightning Protection, Quantity: 1

5. IBCS NG 100A 28 Volts Direct Current (VDC) Protector (Proprietary) - Circuit Breaker with EMI/Lightning Protection, Quantity: 1

6. Status & Coordinate Input Module (Proprietary) - Soldier input / display device to Initialization Global Positioning System Receiver Module (IGRM), Quantity: 1

7. Breaker Box, Electromagnetic Interference (EMI), 100 amp (A) (Proprietary) - Circuit Breaker with EMI/Lightning Protection, Quantity: 1

8. Initialization Global Positioning System (GPS) Receiver Module (IGRM) - The IGRM provides location information and 1 PPS signal to the HNR for initialization and continuous operation, Quantity: 1

9. PARVUS DURANET 18-Port Switch - Parvus Duranet 3000 Ethernet switch. The Parvus Duranet 3000 Ethernet switch routes classified data traffic between the Network Equipment and the B-Side Processor, Quantity: 1

10. HAIPE, AltaSec KG250X, Ruggedized - HAIPE 3.0 encryption device (ViaSat AltaSec KG-250X). The KG-250X HAIPE 3.0 encryption device maintains the red / black communication boundary for all IFCN communication, Quantity: 1

11. Harris Baseband Processing Unit (BPU) - The BPU includes the control processor that hosts the HNW version 2 data link control layer, an OFDM burst modem that provides the HNW version 2 physical layer and an embedded mobile access switch router, Quantity: 1

12. Spectracom SecureSync Timing Unit Direct Current (DC) Power - The Spectracom SecureSync network timing unit provides critical system timing information, ensuring end-to-end synchronization with all IFCN nodes by means of a GPS-based NTP server, Quantity: 1

13. Telecommunication Systems (TCS) Tactical Router, MIL SPEC - Alt-Media Router, Quantity: 1

14. Media Converter Chassis - Fiber optic media converter chassis with Omnitron 1119-0-W-KNG media converters, Quantity: 12

15. NTN, Remote Global Positioning System (GPS) Antenna - GPS antenna, Quantity: 1

16. Integrated Fire Control Server (IFCS) – 1U Rackmount Mercury Systems RESTrust Server (AC Power), Quantity: 1 Shock Mounts (all corners of rack)

Figure 1-1 Network Enclosure Assembly

Line Num
IFCN Relay
Part Number
Note
1
NETWORK ENCLOSURE ASSEMBLY (13U Mission Case Housing)
ALH-210433-005
2
HNR Baseband Processing Unit (BPU)
3158010-102
Obsolete, Part of Harris Radio
3
Status and Coordinate Input Module (SCIM)
ALH-212863-001
Obsolete
4
IGRM Assembly
ALH-212804-001
5
KG-250X
1101000
6
SecureSync Timing Unit
1200-437
7
TCS TACTICAL ROUTER, MIL SPEC
40-2796-01
8
Media Converter, miConverter 18
1119-0-W-KNG
9
Alt Media Power
MIL-VIC-15-5V
10
Power Distribution Unit (PDU)
1101-1101-C
Obsolete, Part of Mission Case
11
Switch, 18 Port, Parvus
NET-3000-11
Obsolete, to be replace by 1U COTS Switch
12
ECU Watt in 13 RU Case, Zarges (NGC)
ALH-210433-005
Obsolete, Part of Mission Case
14
HRFU (Heater on -40o C to -46o C)
2019480-103
Obsolete, Part of Harris Radio
15
IFCS
701764-01
GFE

Table 1-1, NEA Component List image2.png image1.emf

HWCIDS 16 dec 2019.xlsx Draft Enclosure CIDS

1 Index CIDS ID Requirement Text Safety Significant Verification Method

2 456 SH70 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall provide a classified LAN for classified information distribution within the NEA . <SH70> Inspection

3 457 SH71 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall provide an unclassified LAN for unclassified information distribution within the NEA . <SH71> Analysis

4 460 SH1655 (FOUO) The B-Side Processor shall have an automatic Power-on Self Test (POST) feature that activates with the application of power. <SH1655> Demonstration

6 461 SH1657 (FOUO) The B-Side Processor (collectively) shall provide sufficient processing capacity to process at least 96 concurrent threads. <SH1657> Inspection

7 462 SH1658 (FOUO) The B-Side Processor shall provide sufficient processing capacity to simultaneously execute all allocated IBCS common software modules, including NDI required for operation of the Staff and Planning Cells. <SH1658> Analysis

8 464 SH1661 (FOUO) The B-Side Processor shall provide sufficient removable media to contain 4 hours of recorded data. <SH1661> Analysis

9 467 SH1668 (FOUO) The B-Side Processor (collectively) shall provide 100% reserve processing capacity. <SH1668> Analysis

10 468 SH1669 (FOUO) The B-Side Processor (collectively) shall provide 100% reserve memory capacity. <SH1669> Analysis

11 469 SH2092 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure Server shall provide a minimum of 256 GB onboard storage. <SH2092> Inspection

14 470 SH2093 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure B-Side Processor shall provide sufficient processing capacity to process at least 28 concurrent threads. <SH2093> Inspection

17 471 SH2094 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure B-Side Processor shall provide a total of no less than 64 GB random access memory. <SH2094> Inspection

20 472 SH2095 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure B-Side Processor total random access memory shall be upgradable to at least 32 GB. <SH2095> Inspection

21 473 SH2096 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure B-Side Processor shall provide sufficient processing capacity to simultaneously execute CWMI and B-Side Processor allocated NDIs required to perform any IBCS operator role. <SH2096> Inspection

22 475 SH2103 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure B-Side Processor shall have a SpecMark PASSMARK rating of no less than 16,000. <SH2103> Inspection

25 476 SH2098 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure B-Side Processor shall have an automatic Power-on Self Test (POST) feature that activates with the application of power. <SH2098> Inspection

26 477 SH2089 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure COTS equipment shall implement SNMPv3 if SNMP compatible. <SH2089> Analysis

29 478 SH2090 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall provide tie-down provisions internal to the RWS to ensure secure cargo transport during mobile operations and emplacement. <SH2090> Inspection

30 419 SH46 (FOUO) Network Enclosure design shall provide the capability to conduct modified preventive maintenance action while in Short-Term Storage. <SH46> Analysis

31 Demonstration

32 420 SH818 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure protective covers shall allow for access to equipment for any required PMCS activities. <SH818> Inspection

34 421 SH819 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure design shall provide protective covers for equipment exposed to the elements during Long Term Storage. <SH819> Inspection

36 422 SH47 (FOUO) Network Enclosure components shall be restorable within 1 hour to an operational condition from a Short-Term Storage, inclusive of an allowance for PMCS. <SH47> Analysis

37 Demonstration

38 423 SH48 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall meet its reliability requirement after being in the Short-Term Storage configuration for up to 179 days. <SH48> Analysis

40 424 SH821 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall allow PMCS actions during Long Term Storage as defined in the IBCS Technical Manuals. <SH821> Inspection

42 425 SH822 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure pre-conditioning procedures shall not inhibit inspection of each of the components during long term storage. <SH822> Inspection

44 426 SH42 (FOUO) Network Enclosure components shall be restorable within 24 hours to an operationally available condition from Long Term Storage. <SH42> Analysis

46 428 SH43 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall meet its reliability requirement after being restored from Long Term Storage configuration. <SH43> Analysis

48 429 SH44 (FOUO) Network Enclosure components shall allow for periods of Short-Term Storage lasting up to 179 consecutive days without allowance for special pre-conditioning. <SH44> Inspection

49 Demonstration

50 430 SH45 (FOUO) Network Enclosure while in Short-Term Storage shall allow for scheduled PMCS intervals of greater than 30 days. <SH45> Analysis

52 431 SH790 (FOUO) Network Enclosure while in Long Term Storage shall allow for scheduled PMCS intervals of greater than 30 days. <SH790> Analysis

54 432 SH40 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall allow for periods of Long Term Storage lasting from 180 consecutive days to the remaining service life with an allowance for special pre-conditioning IAW TM 38-470 and minimum maintenance. <SH40> Analysis

56 433 SH49 (FOUO) Network Enclosure classified COMSEC, sensitive, pilferable, and data storage devices shall be removable and replaceable using standard tools. <SH49> Demonstration

58 440 SH795 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall provide the operator with the capability to input data via input devices. <SH795> Demonstration

59 463 SH1660 (FOUO) The B-Side Processor shall provide onboard diagnostics compatible with the IPMI 2.0 interface. <SH1660> Analysis

60 465 SH1662 (FOUO) The B-Side Processor shall operate at a SpecMark PASSMARK rating no less than 11,000. <SH1662> Analysis

61 486 SH1242 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall maintain time in the event of GPS failure. <SH1242> Analysis

62 487 SH1244 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall maintain position and orientation in the event of GPS failure. <SH1244> Analysis

63 491 SH879 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure network LRU device(s) shall be IPv6 compliant IAW Table 3-1. <SH879> Inspection

64 492 SH1337 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure network LRU device(s) shall be IPv4 compliant IAW Table 3-1. <SH1337> Inspection

65 493 SH843 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure network LRU device(s) shall comply with multicast IP communication IAW Table 3-1. <SH843> Inspection

66 494 SH834 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure network LRU device(s) shall comply with unicast IP communication IAW Table 3-1. <SH834> Inspection

67 496 SH893 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure network LRU device(s) shall automatically establish data link communication with applicable LAN devices during initialization. <SH893> Demonstration

68 497 SH928 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure network LRU device(s) shall support providing SNMPv3 health and status information to support Network Management System status reporting. <SH928> Inspection

69 498 SH1068 (FOUO) The Network Enclosurenetwork LRU device(s) shall support SNMPv3 configuration settings for Network Management System initialization. <SH1068> Inspection

70 499 SH929 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure network LRU device(s) shall support providing SNMPv3 traps for informational status changes for Network Management System status reporting. <SH929> Inspection

71 500 SH888 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure network LRU device(s) shall support Stateless Addressing Auto Configuration (SLAAC) IAW Table 3-1. <SH888> Inspection

72 501 SH1022 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure network LRU device(s) shall support, as a minimum, 50 VLANs simultaneously to hosts. <SH1022> Analysis

73 503 SH1093 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure network LRU device(s) shall each have an average latency of 1 millisecond or less. <SH1093> Inspection

75 504 SH1342 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure network LRU device(s) shall comply with IPv6 Traffic Class (TC) header field policy IAW Table 3-1. <SH1342> Inspection

76 505 SH1341 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure network LRU device(s) shall comply with IPv4 Type of Service (ToS) header field policy IAW Table 3-1. <SH1341> Inspection

77 536 SH918 (FOUO) The Classified Core Router shall support connection to the IFCN Encryption device. <SH918> Inspection

78 540 SH2055 (FOUO) The Unclassified Ethernet Switch shall support an Ethernet connection in support of the Unclassified Network Management System. <SH2055> Inspection

79 559 SH2068 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure classified network shall support a minimum of 4 fiber optic connections (one connection consists of a Transmit and a Receive connection) in support of Patriot Data and Voice connectivity to IBCS. <SH2068> Inspection

80 706 SH105 (FOUO) Network Enclosure moving or rotating equipment shall preclude pinching or trapping personnel or equipment. <SH105> Analysis

81 Inspection

82 708 SH107 (FOUO) Labels or placards using MIL-HDBK-1473 as guidance for color and marking shall be placed on, or adjacent to, any Network Enclosure equipment that presents a safety hazard to personnel. <SH107> Analysis

83 Inspection

84 709 SH108 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall comply with MIL-STD-882 for the safety and protection of personnel and equipment during operations, sustainment, maintenance, training and test for all system states. [Note: This includes Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS), Government-Off-the-Shelf (GOTS), Government-Furnished Equipment (GFE) and Non-Developmental Items (NDI) with a safety-critical impact] <SH108> Y Analysis

86 710 SH824 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall minimize damage to power sources, controls, and critical equipment, IAW MIL-STD-882, during operations, sustainment, maintenance, training and test for all system states. <SH824> Analysis

87 Inspection

88 711 SH825 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall provide access to equipment that minimizes personnel exposure to hazards and equipment damage, IAW MIL-STD-882, during operations, sustainment, maintenance, training and test for all system states. <SH825> Analysis

89 Inspection

90 712 SH826 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall incorporate personnel protection measures to minimize hazard risk for personnel, IAW MIL-STD-882. <SH826> Analysis

92 713 SH791 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure fixed equipment shall be at least 3 in from swept area of hinged doors IAW MIL-STD-1472. <SH791> Demonstration

94 714 SH110 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall use non-flammable, fire resistant, and/or self-extinguishing materials wherever practicable. <SH110> Analysis

96 715 SH111 (FOUO) Network Enclosure electrical systems shall be designed to protect personnel from electrical shock and electrocution hazards using MIL-HDBK-454 Guideline 1 Paragraph and Subparagraphs within 4.5 and 5.2 as guidance. <SH111> Analysis

98 716 SH112 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall protect the operators from system noise and emanations IAW MIL-STD-1474 Requirement 1. <SH112> Test

99 Analysis

100 717 SH113 (FOUO) Network Enclosure design and operation shall protect personnel from the effects of lasers and other high intensity optical sources IAW MIL-STD-1425. <SH113> Analysis

102 718 SH114 (FOUO) Network Enclosure equipment shall protect the operators from the effects of electrostatic discharge. <SH114> Test

103 Analysis

104 719 SH116 (FOUO) Network Enclosure hazards identified as Category I or Category II, as defined in MIL-STD-882, shall be eliminated or reduced to an acceptable level of residual risk. <SH116> Analysis

106 720 SH117 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall not introduce any uncontrolled safety hazards. <SH117> Analysis

108 721 SH118 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure components shall limit personnel RF exposure levels IAW DoDI 6055.11. <SH118> Test

109 Analysis

110 722 SH119 (FOUO) Network Enclosure components shall not introduce hazardous levels of toxic gases from material off-gassing when heated. <SH119> Analysis

111 Inspection

112 723 SH120 (FOUO) Network Enclosure hardware shall be designed to minimize the probability of implosions. <SH120> Analysis

113 Inspection

114 724 SH121 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall utilize materials that minimize the hazards associated with an implosion or catastrophic failure. <SH121> Analysis

115 Inspection

116 725 SH122 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall not introduce any uncontrolled health hazards that may adversely impact on the health of operators, maintainers, trainers or handlers. <SH122> Analysis

118 726 SH830 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall provide fire suppression devices. <SH830> Inspection

120 730 SH2040 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall utilize access control lists for use in data exchanges between the External IP interface and the IBCS Unclassified network. <SH2040> Inspection

121 734 SH1266 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure information assurance (IA) component products (hardware, software, firmware) shall comply with Army IA product acquisition regulations. <SH1266> Inspection

123 736 SH1269 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall apply National Security Agency (NSA) type-1 cryptography to classified data being transmitted outside the trusted security enclave. <SH1269> Test

125 737 SH126 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall protect its COMSEC material IAW AR 380-40 via safe. <SH126> Demonstration

127 738 SH127 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall protect against compromising emanations IAW National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Advisory Memorandum (NSTISSAM) Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Surveillance Technology (TEMPEST) 2-95. <SH127> Inspection

129 739 SH128 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall protect against compromising emanations IAW AR 381-14. <SH128> Inspection

131 740 SH1581 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall protect against compromising emanations IAW DoDD S-5200.19. <SH1581> Inspection

133 741 SH827 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall provide the most restrictive classification markings to hardware components. <SH827> Inspection

135 742 SH1245 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall secure mobile devices to the highest level of classified information processed. <SH1245> Inspection

137 743 SH829 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall employ a National Security Agency (NSA) approved key management process. <SH829> Inspection

139 744 SH798 (FOUO) When utilizing Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) components to implement security functions, the Network Enclosure shall comply with the Committee on National Security Systems Policy (CNSSP) No. 11. <SH798> Analysis

141 745 SH799 (FOUO) When utilizing Government Off The Shelf (GOTS) components to implement security functions, the Network Enclosure shall comply with the CNSSP Policy No. 11. <SH799> Analysis

143 746 SH129 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall utilize LandWarNet Information Assurance (IA) services to the maximum extent possible. <SH129> Test

145 748 SH131 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall restrict data access to allies IAW AR 25-2 Section 4-15. <SH131> Analysis

147 749 SH133 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall support processing information at the Secret and below level including Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), Secret, No Foreign (NOFORN), and Secret/Coalition as primary classification/releasability combinations. <SH133> Inspection

149 750 SH134 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall be capable of distributing information at the Secret and below level including Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), Secret, No Foreign (NOFORN), and Secret/Coalition as primary classification/releasability combinations. <SH134> Inspection

151 751 SH142 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall provide physical protection of restoration (back-up) hardware. <SH142> Inspection

153 752 SH143 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall facilitate handling, storage and destruction of all classified information IAW AR 380-5. <SH143> Inspection

155 753 SH144 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall provide removable media storage devices, on which all classified software is stored, to ensure that no classified software is permanently installed on a computing environment asset. <SH144> Inspection

156 Demonstration

157 754 SH145 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall utilize volatile memory for storage of classified information as the main memory that is not readily removable. <SH145> Analysis

159 755 SH146 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall have the ability to mechanically zeroize all COMSEC keys. <SH146> Inspection

161 756 SH147 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure mechanical zeroize function shall require an overt operator action. <SH147> Inspection

163 757 SH148 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure mechanical zeroize shall complete all COMSEC key erasure with or without power. <SH148> Inspection

165 758 SH1039 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall utilize access control lists for use in data exchanges between the External IP interface and the IBCS Classified network. <SH1039> Inspection

168 759 SH1588 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure network LRU device(s) shall be configured with a password for a deployed tactical system IAW AR 25-2. <SH1588> Demonstration

169 760 SH1589 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure network LRU device(s) shall issue a password prompt during Secure Shell Version 2 (SSHv2) login. <SH1589> Inspection

174 762 SH1582 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure network equipment shall provide protection from attempts to circumvent system access controls. <SH1582> Inspection

175 763 SH1583 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure network LRU device(s) shall provide SNMPv3 notification of the following events: Demonstration

176 a. (FOUO) Unsuccessful logons are attempted

177 b. (FOUO) Port state change

178 c. (FOUO) Link state change. <SH1583>

179 764 SH1615 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure network LRU device(s) shall be capable of initializing from a configurable initialization data stored in non-volatile memory. <SH1615> Inspection

180 765 SH1032 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure network equipment shall provide for system administrator secure user access. <SH1032> Inspection

181 766 SH1587 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure network LRU device(s) shall employ user authentication for system administration user access. <SH1587> Inspection

184 767 SH1034 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure network equipment shall be capable of disabling non-secure protocols which are not constrained by the COTS product. <SH1034> Inspection

185 768 SH1020 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure network equipment shall be capable of disabling unused ports. <SH1020> Analysis

186 771 SH1605 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure network equipment shall be capable of enforcing an access control mechanism to ensure that only authorized users are allowed to modify controlled files as specified in DoDI 8500.2 Control Number ECCD-2. <SH1605> Analysis

187 Inspection

188 775 SH1646 (FOUO) The Classified Firewall shall prohibit the use of Virtual Private Networks (VPN) that traverse outside the security enclave boundary. <SH1646> Inspection

189 777 SH1644 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall comply with Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Security Technical Implementation Guidelines (STIGs) and National Security Agency (NSA) Security Configuration Guides (SCGs) with non-compliance documented in the Information Assurance Vulnerability Management Report. <SH1644> Analysis

190 780 SH2042 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure network routers shall support simultaneously IPv4 and IPv6 communications (dual-stack). <SH2042> Inspection

191 783 SH152 (FOUO) Network Enclosure equipment shall be operable by soldiers wearing body armor and equipped with their individual assigned weapons. The body armor is defined to be the Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) Outer Tactical Vest (OTV). The individual assigned weapons include: Analysis

192 a. (FOUO) M-7 bayonet-knife or M-9 multi-purpose bayonet system

193 b. (FOUO) M-4 carbine or M-16 rifle

194 c. (FOUO) M-9 pistol <SH152>

195 785 SH154 (FOUO) The thermal signature of Network Enclosure peculiar components shall be comparable to other US Army equipment so as to preclude an ASoS distinctive signature. <SH154> Analysis

197 786 SH155 (FOUO) The optical signature of Network Enclosure peculiar components shall be comparable to other US Army equipment so as to preclude an ASoS distinctive signature. <SH155> Analysis

199 787 SH156 (FOUO) The magnetic signature of Network Enclosure peculiar components shall be comparable to other US Army equipment so as to preclude an ASoS distinctive signature. <SH156> Analysis

201 788 SH157 (FOUO) The seismic signature of Network Enclosure peculiar components shall be comparable to other US Army equipment so as to preclude an ASoS distinctive signature. <SH157> Analysis

203 789 SH158 (FOUO) The acoustic signature of Network Enclosure peculiar components shall be comparable to other US Army equipment so as to preclude an ASoS distinctive signature. <SH158> Analysis

205 790 SH159 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall not inhibit the operation of physical security Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) for battalion operations. <SH159> Analysis

207 791 SH160 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall not inhibit the operation of physical security TTP for battery operations. <SH160> Analysis

209 792 SH161 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall not inhibit the operation of physical security TTP for platoon operations. <SH161> Analysis

211 793 SH360 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall detect (to discover or determine the existence, presence, or fact of) unauthorized physical access to all protected system resources. <SH360> Demonstration

213 794 SH162 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall meet the performance requirements in both natural and induced environment conditions. <SH162> Analysis

215 795 SH792 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall maintain an ambient internal temperature above 10° C (50° F) using an environmental control unit. <SH792> Test

217 796 SH2104 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall operate during exposure to low ambient air temperature of -46° C (-50° F°) IAW MIL-STD-810 Method 502.4 Procedure II. Kits and procedures are allowed below -30° C (-22° F) to ensure that components with lesser environmental specifications (Non-Developmental Item (NDI)/Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS)) survive ASoS environments. <SH2104> Test

218 797 SH163 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall operate after exposure to low ambient air temperature of -46° C (-50° F) IAW MIL-STD-810 Method 502.4 Procedure I. <SH163> Test

220 798 SH1332 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall maintain an internal temperature of 50˚ to 85˚ F while the Network Enclosure door is closed. <SH1332> Test

222 799 SH793 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall maintain an ambient internal temperature below 29.5° C (85° F) using an environmental control unit. <SH793> Test

224 800 SH2105 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall operate during exposure to high ambient air temperatures up to 49° C (120° F) IAW MIL-STD-810F Method 501.4 Procedure II. <SH2105> Test

225 801 SH165 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall operate after exposure to high ambient air temperatures up to 71° C (160° F) IAW MIL-STD-810 Method 501.4 Procedure I. <SH165> Test

227 802 SH168 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall operate after exposure to temperature shocks from 21° C to -46° C (Air delivery - arctic) IAW MIL-STD-810 Method 503.4 Procedure I. The rate of change is 10° C per minute. <SH168> Test

229 803 SH167 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall operate after exposure to temperature shocks from 10° C to 49° C (Air delivery - desert) IAW MIL-STD-810 Method 503.4 Procedure I. The rate of change is 10° C per minute. <SH167> Test

231 804 SH170 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall operate during exposure to particle concentrations of 6.61 × 10-5 lb/ft3 (106 × 10-3 kg/m3) with windspeeds up to 59 fps (18 mps) at a height of 10 feet (3 in). Particle sizes will range from less than 74 micrometers (2.91 × 10-3 inches) in diameter to 1,000 micrometers (3.94 × 10-2 inches), with the bulk of the particles ranging in size from 74 to 350 micrometers (13.8 × 10-3 inches) IAW MIL-STD-810 Method 510.4 Procedure II tailored. <SH170> Test

233 805 SH169 (FOUO) Network Enclosure equipment shall operate during exposure to steady windspeed of 73 fps (22 mps) and a gust of 95 fps (29 mps). The above operational windspeeds are for a height of 10 feet (3 m). The multiplication factor at 30 m is 1.334 for steady state winds and 1.202 for gusts. Hold downs may be used for steady winds and gusts above 73 fps (22 mps). <SH169> Test

235 807 SH800 (FOUO) Network Enclosure equipment shall operate after exposure to the 12 hour rain conditions, as given in Table 3-2, with a 64.7 km/hr (40.2 mph) wind IAW MIL-STD-810 Method 506.4 Procedure I. <SH800> Test

237 808 SH171 (FOUO) Network Enclosure equipment shall operate during exposure to the 12 hour rain conditions given in Table 3-3 with a 64.7 km/hr (40.2 mph) wind IAW MIL-STD-810 Method 506.4 Procedure I. <SH171> Test

239 809 SH182 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall be resistant to the fungus growth environment specified in MIL-STD-810 Method 508.5. <SH182> Test

240 Analysis

241 810 SH172 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall operate at altitudes from -400 feet up to 15,000 feet mean sea level (MSL) IAW MIL-STD-810 Method 500.4 Procedure II. <SH172> Test

243 811 SH173 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall operate during the salt fog environment of MIL-STD 810 Method 509.4, 5 +/- 1% salt solution for seven continuous 24-hour days. <SH173> Test

245 812 SH174 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall operate with 0.5 inch (13 mm) of glaze ice with a specific gravity of 0.9 IAW MIL-STD-810 Method 521.2. <SH174> Test

247 813 SH175 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall operate with a snowload of 10 lbs/ft2 (48.9 kg/m2), which is equivalent to a depth of 20 inches (508 mm) of snow with a specific gravity of 0.1. <SH175> Test

249 814 SH176 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall operate during to humidity IAW MIL-STD-810 Method 507.4. <SH176> Test

251 815 SH177 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall operate after exposure to humidity IAW MIL-STD-810 Method 507.4. <SH177> Test

253 816 SH181 (FOUO) Network Enclosure equipment shall include the necessary protection devices to prevent a hazardous condition to personnel and equipment during an indirect lightning strike. <SH181> Inspection

255 817 SH180 (FOUO) Network Enclosure equipment shall include the necessary protection devices to prevent a hazardous condition to personnel and equipment during a direct lightning strike. <SH180> Inspection

257 818 SH179 (FOUO) Network Enclosure equipment shall survive and operate after an indirect lightning strike as defined in MIL-STD-464. <SH179> Test

259 819 SH178 (FOUO) Network Enclosure equipment shall survive and operate after a direct lightning strike as defined in MIL-STD-464. <SH178> Test

261 820 SH193 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall withstand the acceleration, shock, and vibration environments for the mobility exposure of Primary Roads at 32%, Secondary Roads at 15% and Off Road at 53%. <SH193> Test

263 821 SH187 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall withstand the vibration environment IAW MIL-STD-810 Method 514.5 Procedure III Large Assembly Transportation. <SH187> Test

265 822 SH188 (FOUO) Network Enclosure LRUs in a transport configuration shall be operable after exposure to transportation vibration IAW MIL-STD-810 Method 514.1 Procedure II. <SH188> Test

267 823 SH189 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall withstand bench handling shock per MIL-STD-810, Method 516.5 Procedure VI. <SH189> Test

269 824 SH190 (FOUO) Network Enclosure LRUs in a transport mode configuration shall meet performance requirements after exposure to drop shock per MIL-STD-810, Method 516.5 Procedure IV. <SH190> Test

271 825 SH192 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall meet its performance requirements after exposure to 40,000 feet altitude IAW MIL-STD 810 method 500.4, Procedure II. <SH192> Test

273 826 SH183 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall withstand the acceleration environment IAW MIL-STD-810 Method 513.5. <SH183> Analysis

275 828 SH186 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall withstand the shock environment IAW MIL-STD-810 Method 516.5 Procedure VII Rail Impact. <SH186> Test

277 830 SH201 (FOUO) The negligible risk level for unprotected personnel working inside, on, or one meter from the NEA for GD decontamination shall be: Analysis

278 (FOUO) 2.5 (mg min/m3) of vapor/aerosol

279 (FOUO) 30 (mg/70-kg man of liquid (Applies to skin dose, not absorption through the eyes.) <SH201>

280 831 SH202 (FOUO) The negligible risk level for unprotected personnel working inside, on, or one meter from the NEA for VX decontamination shall be: Analysis

281 (FOUO) 0.25 (mg min/m3) of vapor/aerosol

282 (FOUO) 1.4 (mg/70-kg man of liquid (Applies to skin dose, not absorption through the eyes.) <SH202>

283 832 SH203 (FOUO) The negligible risk level for unprotected personnel working inside, on, or one meter from the NEA for HD decontamination shall be: Analysis

284 (FOUO) 50 (mg min/m3) of vapor/aerosol

285 (FOUO) 180 (0.01 mg/cm2) of liquid (Applies to skin dose, not absorption through the eyes.) Since the effect of HD is localized, it is not appropriate to consider a threshold dose of liquid HD as applying to the entire 70-kg man. Use of mass/body surface area (mg/cm2) units to describe the dose for which negligible effects are observed is preferable with the provision that the location and surface area must be specified, since middle incapacitation depends on where the contamination exists and the extent of body surface involved. <SH203>

286 833 SH204 (FOUO) The negligible risk level for unprotected personnel working inside, on, or one meter from the NEA for biological decontamination shall be: Analysis

287 (FOUO) Maximum residue of 500 spores/m2. Negligible risk values for biological agents are not determinable with the present database. Since extremely minute quantities of some biological agents can cause incapacitation, equipment should be designed to allow a residue of no more than 500 spores/m2 of the specified initial contamination levels. <SH204>

288 834 SH205 (FOUO) The negligible risk level for unprotected personnel working inside, on, or one meter from the NEA for radiological decontamination shall be: Analysis

289 (FOUO) Contaminants: 25 cGy (rad)

290 (FOUO) Induced Activity: 25 cGy (rad)

291 (FOUO) Maximum 12-hr exposure <SH205>

292 835 SH206 (FOUO) The negligible risk level for unprotected personnel arriving at H+2 hours at the Network Enclosure shall be: Analysis

293 (FOUO) Contaminants: 25 cGy (rad)

294 (FOUO) Induced Activity: 25 cGy (rad)

295 (FOUO) Maximum 12-hr exposure <SH206>

296 836 SH207 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall have full operational capability within 30 minutes after completion of decontamination. <SH207> Analysis

298 837 SH208 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall enable soldiers in MOPP 4 to perform mission essential operations, communications, maintenance, re-supply and decontamination tasks with no more than a 15% degradation in time excluding heat stress. <SH208> Demonstration

300 838 SH209 (FOUO) All Mission Critical/Mission Essential items of the Network Enclosure shall be NBC contamination survivable. <SH209> Analysis

302 839 SH213 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall operate during the nuclear environment defined in Table 3-VI -CT2-. <SH213> Analysis

303 840 SH214 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall be able to survive five cycles of external NBC contamination/decontamination within a 30-day period with no more than 20% degradation in selected quantifiable mission essential performance characteristics after the fifth cycle. Each contamination cycle shall use a suitable substitute for one or more contaminants of nuclear, biological or chemical type as follows: Analysis

305 CHEMICAL--

306 (FOUO) External surfaces initially are uniformly contaminated with 10 grams per square meter of thickened droplets of GD having a mass median diameter of 2 to 5 millimeters.

307 (FOUO) External surfaces initially are uniformly contaminated with 10 grams per square meter of unthickened VX having a mass median diameter of 2 to 5 millimeters.

308 (FOUO) External surfaces initially are uniformly contaminated with 10 grams per square meter of unthickened HD having a mass median diameter of 2 to 5 millimeters.

310 BIOLOGICAL--

311 (FOUO) External surfaces initially are uniformly contaminated with 10 E+5 spores per square meter of biological agent 1 to 5 micrometers in size.

313 NUCLEAR--

314 (FOUO) External surfaces initially are uniformly contaminated with 4 grams per square meter of insoluble radioactive contaminants of 37 to 200 micrometers in size and 185 gigabecquerels (GBq) per square meter gamma activity.

316 The decontamination conditions shall be:

317 (FOUO) Decontamination begins 1 hour after contamination

318 (FOUO) Decontamination uses standard field decontaminants or simulants

319 (FOUO) Decontamination uses standard equipment and procedures

320 (FOUO) Decontamination process time excludes time for monitoring

321 (FOUO) Surface temperature is 30 degrees C

322 (FOUO) Exterior wind speed no greater than 1 m/s (3.6 km/h)

323 (FOUO) Exposure of unprotected personnel to the decontaminated personnel is not to exceed 12 hours <SH214>

324 841 SH215 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall be able to survive five cycles of internal NBC contamination/decontamination within a 30-day period with no more than 20% degradation in selected quantifiable mission essential performance characteristics after the fifth cycle. Each contamination cycle shall use a suitable simulant for one or more contaminants of nuclear, biological or chemical type with type and levels as follows: Analysis

326 CHEMICAL--

327 (FOUO) GD Contamination levels, on interior surfaces subject to contamination, are 1 gram per square meter in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

328 (FOUO) VX Contamination levels, on interior surfaces subject to contamination, are 1 gram per square meter in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

329 (FOUO) HD Contamination levels, on interior surfaces subject to contamination, are 1 gram per square meter in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

331 BIOLOGICAL--

332 (FOUO) On interior surfaces subject to contamination, spore levels are 10 E+4 spores per square meter in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

334 NUCLEAR--

335 (FOUO) On interior surfaces subject to contamination, contamination levels are 0.4 grams per square meter of insoluble radioactive contaminants and 18.5 gigabecquerels (GBq) per square meter gamma activity in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

337 The decontamination conditions shall be:

338 (FOUO) Decontamination begins 1 hour after contamination

339 (FOUO) Decontamination uses standard field decontaminants or simulants

340 (FOUO) Decontamination uses standard equipment and procedures

341 (FOUO) Decontamination process time excludes time for monitoring

342 (FOUO) Surface temperature is 30 degrees C

343 (FOUO) Exterior wind speed no greater than 1 m/s (3.6 km/h)

344 (FOUO) Exposure of unprotected personnel to the decontaminated personnel is not to exceed 12 hours. <SH215>

345 842 SH216 (FOUO) For nuclear contamination, the decontamination procedure for the Network Enclosure shall be: Brush any loose material off surfaces and wash down with hot soapy water and soft bristle brush. <SH216> Analysis

347 843 SH217 (FOUO) For biological or chemical contamination, the decontamination procedure for the Network Enclosure shall be: Wash down using hot soapy water and Super Tropical Bleach (STB). <SH217> Analysis

349 844 SH218 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall be capable of being thoroughly decontaminated to negligible risk levels, using system specific procedures, in not greater than 75 minutes, after being contaminated with thickened droplets of GD (or suitable simulant). <SH218> Analysis

351 845 SH219 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall be capable of being thoroughly decontaminated to negligible risk levels, using system specific procedures, in not greater than 75 minutes, after being contaminated with unthickened VX (or suitable simulant). <SH219> Analysis

353 846 SH220 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall be capable of being thoroughly decontaminated to negligible risk levels, using system specific procedures, in not greater than 75 minutes, after being contaminated with unthickened HD (or suitable simulant). <SH220> Analysis

355 847 SH221 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall be capable of being thoroughly decontaminated to negligible risk levels, using system specific procedures, in not greater than 75 minutes, after being contaminated with biological agent (or suitable simulant). <SH221> Analysis

357 848 SH222 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall be capable of being thoroughly decontaminated to negligible risk levels, using system specific procedures, in not greater than 75 minutes, after being contaminated with radioactive contaminant (or suitable simulant). <SH222> Analysis

359 849 SH223 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall provide hazard controls for Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Personnel (HERP) for all accessible areas IAW MIL-STD-464 and DoD6055.11. <SH223> Analysis

361 850 SH224 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall provide hazard controls for Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Fuel (HERF) for fuel storage devices and containers as identified in MIL-STD-464, section 5.8.2 and A5.8.2. <SH224> Analysis

363 851 SH225 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall operate during and after exposure to electromagnetic radiation at the levels defined in MIL-STD-464, section 5.3, Table 1D. <SH225> Analysis

365 852 SH226 (FOUO) Network Enclosure equipment with an electrically conductive chassis subject to fault currents shall be electrically bonded to a ground system, as specified in MIL-STD-464, section 5.10.3., to allow for proper operation of protective devices. <SH226> Test

366 Inspection

367 853 SH227 (FOUO) Network Enclosure equipment with an electrically conductive chassis subject to fault currents shall be electrically bonded to a ground system, as specified in MIL-STD-464, section 5.10.3., to allow for proper dissipation of any electrostatic charge. <SH227> Test

368 Inspection

369 854 SH228 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall operate without degradation after exposure to a degaussing field with a maximum strength of 800 Amperes per meter (A/m) in any orientation with a maximum rate of change of 1600 Amperes per meter per second (A/m/s). <SH228> Analysis

371 855 SH230 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall provide an external ground interface as specified in MIL-STD-464, section 5.11. <SH230> Test

372 Analysis

373 856 SH801 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall operate after exposure to electromagnetic radiation at the levels defined in MIL-STD-464, section 5.3, Table 1D. <SH801> Analysis

375 857 SH1651 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall provide shielding as a design measure to aid in protection against EMP/HEMP events as specified in MIL-STD-2169. <SH1651> Analysis

377 858 SH357 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall be able to survive an externally induced RF field strength of -IBCSCV17- volts/meter at a frequency of -IBCSCV18- Hz. <SH357> Analysis

379 859 SH358 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall be able to operate while being subjected to an externally induced RF field strength of -IBCSCV17- volts/meter at a frequency of -IBCSCV18- Hz. <SH358> Analysis

381 860 SH359 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall maintain performance during electronic warfare attack as defined in the IAMD STAR. <SH359> Analysis

383 861 SH233 (FOUO) Newly developed Network Enclosure components in their configuration delivered at Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) shall have 100% memory storage reserve under maximum load. <SH233> Test

385 862 SH234 (FOUO) Newly developed Network Enclosure components in their configuration delivered at LRIP shall have 100% processing capability reserve under maximum load. <SH234> Test

387 868 SH240 (FOUO) An Network Enclosure shall have a Mean Time Between Critical Failure (MTBFc) of not less than 1433 hours. The MTBFc is inclusive of maintenance tasks performed on all Contractor Furnished Equipment and Government Furnished Equipment. The MTBFc is not inclusive of any software loaded in the Shelter. <SH240> Analysis

389 869 SH1275 (FOUO) An Network Enclosure shall have a Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) of not less than 445 hours. The MTBF is inclusive of maintenance tasks performed on all Contractor Furnished Equipment and Government Furnished Equipment. The MTBF is not inclusive of any software loaded in the Shelter. <SH1275> Analysis

391 870 SH241 (FOUO) NEA LRUs shall be removed and replaced at the field levels of maintenance without the use of special tools. <SH241> Analysis

392 Demonstration

393 872 SH243 (FOUO) An Network Enclosure shall have a Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) of not greater than 0.99 hour. The MTTR is not inclusive of maintenance tasks performed for any software loaded in the Network Enclosure <SH243> Demonstration

395 873 SH244 (FOUO) Network Enclosure tools and test equipment shall be selected from Army common tool and general-purpose test equipment lists. <SH244> Inspection

397 875 SH246 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall determine a hardware unit has crossed a utilization threshold where potential failure is possible. <SH246> Analysis

398 878 SH1287 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure equipment shall support continuous reporting of internal Built-In-Test / Built-In Test Equipment (BIT/BITE) status. <SH1287> Demonstration

399 879 SH1288 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure equipment shall provide sufficient BIT/BITE to fault isolate at least 97% (based on FMECA) of detectable operational failures internal to the Network Enclosure equipment to a single LRU. <SH1288> Analysis

400 Demonstration

401 880 SH1289 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure equipment shall support Power-on Self Test (POST) and/or Continuous Built-in Test (CBIT) to detect 98% (based on FMECA) of operational Network Enclosure equipment failures. <SH1289> Analysis

402 881 SH1291 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure equipment shall provide prognostics monitoring of Network Enclosure equipment mission critical functions. <SH1291> Analysis

403 882 SH1292 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure equipment shall support the ability for POST and/or CBIT to detect 99% (based on FMECA) of mission critical Network Enclosure equipment failures. <SH1292> Analysis

404 Demonstration

405 883 SH365 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall be designed to meet a nominal 20-year service life. <SH365> Analysis

407 884 SH276 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall be capable of unrestricted CONUS highway transport and movement IAW MIL-STD-1366 paragraph 5.1.2. <SH276> Analysis

408 Inspection

409 885 SH277 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall be capable of unrestricted foreign highway transport and movement IAW MIL-STD-1366 paragraph 5.1.3. <SH277> Analysis

410 Inspection

411 886 SH267 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure shall have a cross-country mobility that supports the IAMD Operations Mode Summary/Mission Profile (OMS/MP) in ASoS CDD. <SH267> Demonstration

413 889 SH1335 (FOUO) The Network Enclosure prime mover with Network Enclosure and any other cargo installed shall not exceed the overall weight capacity of the vehicle front and rear axles or cause the CG to be out of limits. <SH1335> Analysis

415 890 SH268 (FOUO) Network Enclosure equipment shall maneuver on level terrain. <SH268> Demonstration

417 891 SH269 (FOUO) Network Enclosure equipment shall stop on level terrain. <SH269> Demonstration

419 892 SH270 (FOUO) Network Enclosure equipment shall emplace on level terrain. <SH270> Demonstration

421 893 SH271 (FOUO) Network Enclosure equipment shall operate on level terrain. <SH271> Demonstration

423 894 SH272 (FOUO) Network Enclosure equipment shall maneuver on sloped terrain up to 10 degrees. <SH272> Demonstration

425 895 SH273 (FOUO) Network Enclosure equipment shall stop on sloped terrain up to 10 degrees. <SH273> Demonstration

427 896 SH274 (FOUO) Network Enclosure equipment shall emplace on sloped terrain up to 10 degrees. <SH274> Demonstration

429 897 SH275 (FOUO) Network Enclosure equipment shall operate on sloped terrain up to 10 degrees. <SH275> Demonstration

431 898 SH259 (FOUO) Network Enclosure components shall be capable of transport by Roll On - Roll Off (RORO) vessels of the Services fleet for LOTS operations. <SH259> Analysis

432 Inspection

433 899 SH260 (FOUO) Network Enclosure components shall be capable of transport by Light Amphibious Resupply Craft (LARC-LX) vessels of the Services fleet for LOTS operations. <SH260> Analysis

434 Inspection

435 900 SH261 (FOUO) Network Enclosure components shall be capable of transport by vessels of the Services fleet larger than LASH, SEABEE, RORO, and LARC-LX for LOTS operations. <SH261> Analysis

436…

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