2026.02.06 Q&A.pdf.pdf

For the "separate remote locations": (a) Will the Government provide SHORE POWER and NETWORK BACKHAUL at designated sensor sites? (b) If not, what power sources are available at candidate sites (utility, generator, solar)? (c) What power resiliency/backup duration is required for 24/7 operations?

The Government can provide shore power at specific locations that are jointly agreed upon by the Government and Offeror, but not at every possible site location. Shore power capabilities vary based on location, but can be assumed to provide standard power. The Government will not provide network accces, hence the independant requirement. Power is not expected to be backed up by offeror, but offeror still must meet availabiltly requriements.

How will NASA control requirement changes (e.g., formal change process, Government approval thresholds, equitable adjustment provisions) in the eventual contract given the PWS is "subject to revision"?

This is not the PWS, which will be released later if the Government choses to implement a contract for services.

Would the Government confirm a rough-order-of-magnitude (ROM) is not requested nor required at this time, with responses limited solely to technical/management capabilities.

Not Requested

For the 20-page capability statement limit: (a) Are KEY PERSONNEL RESUMES included in the page count or excluded as an appendix? (b) Is a STAFFING MATRIX included in the page count? (c) Are PAST PERFORMANCE citations/references included or excluded? (d) Are corporate capability brochures, org charts, or certifications (e.g., ISO, CMMI) counted or excluded?

Key personnel Resumes as an appendix are excluded Staffing Matrix, Paster performance, certs, brochures are excluded if they are submitted as an attachment

Regarding scope and operational procedures:

(a) Is the requirement limited to detection, identification, alerting, and analysis, or does NASA expect mitigation/defeat support beyond information sharing?

(b) Is the contractor required to SUPPLY mitigation (defeat) systems, or solely provide DATA INTERFACE to Government-furnished assets?

(c) What are the defined procedures for THREAT ASSESSMENT and RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) for confirmed hostile UAS?; and

(d) What ESCALATION PROTOCOLS exist for hostile UAV incidents—who has authority to authorize neutralization actions?

This effort is for detection and tracking only, not mitigation. There are no requriments for any actions related to active or passive mitigation beyond data sharing with other agencies.

What criteria or workflow determines a "Target of Interest (TOI)" and the required analytic depth for weekly reporting?

In this instance, a TOI is a contact that is operating within a restricted area, over NASA-KSC property, or in such a manner that could be construded as intent to fly over NASA-KSC property

Beyond weekly summary reports: (a) How will INCIDENT REPORTS be documented for significant UAS events (format, timeline, distribution)? (b) Are PERFORMANCE AUDITS required, and if so, what frequency and scope? (c) What metrics/KPIs will be tracked for contract performance evaluation? (d) Is there a formal lessons-learned or after-action reporting requirement?

a) Incident reports will be of a nature and format agreed upon by the Government and Offeror b)performance audits are not anticipated c)Contract metrics are to be determined d)There will be a lesson-learned process for various activities the Government deems necessary

How will incident reports and performance audits be documented?

In a manner acceptable to both the Gevernment and offeror.

Regarding data handling and protection: (a) What are the required DATA RETENTION PERIODS for logs, alerts, and reports? (b) What is the CLASSIFICATION LEVEL of collected data products (alerts, reports, raw tracking)—what is Secret vs. unclassified, and where must each data class be stored? (c) What guidelines exist for

SAFEGUARDING TELEMETRY AND SENSOR

DATA—encryption at rest, encryption in transit, access logging requirements?

a) Data should be retained for the duration of the contract b)Data should be considered CUI c)Standard Government requriements for the processing and storage of CUI data will apply

For staffing and cost planning, approximately how many special/high-interest events per year should contractors plan for on-site presence (e.g., 10, 25, 50+)? What is the typical duration of such events?

Estimate 6 on-site events per year at this time.

NASA's Q&A dated Jan. 14, 2026 indicates no mandated protocols for FBI/USAF/USSF compatibility and places responsibility on the offeror. (a) Can NASA provide points of contact at FBI, USAF, USSF, FAA, or DHS for interface coordination? (b) Are there INTEROPERABILITY STANDARDS required for coordination with FAA (airspace management) or DHS (CISA threat sharing)? (c) Will NASA facilitate a classified or controlled industry day to discuss integration requirements with these federal partners?

a) NASA can possibly upply contact, but the assumption is that the offeror will be versed in the protocols of the above listed agencies b)No c)There are no plans for an Industry Day at this time

How will cUAS detection data INTEGRATE WITH EXISTING NASA AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS at KSC? Is there a requirement to feed UAS tracks into NASA's airspace management tools, or is the cUAS system fully standalone? If integration is required, what interface specifications apply?

There is no requriement to feed into any existing ATM system. The system is estimated to be stand alone.

What security controls are required for browser/mobile access (MFA, CAC/PIV, approved devices/MDM, geo-fencing, audit logging)?

There are no standards identified for this at this time, but for planning purposes expect

MFA.

Given proximity to massive vertical metal structures (VAB, Launch Gantries, Lightning Towers) that generate significant radar multipath, does the Government require specific CLUTTER REJECTION CAPABILITIES (e.g., simultaneous dual-beam radar, AI-based micro-Doppler classification, or track correlation algorithms) to prevent 'ghost' targets caused by reflections?

The Government makes no assumptions for clutter rejection.

KSC launch operations utilize high-power telemetry and tracking radars (megawatt-class S-Band/C-Band) that may desensitize or damage sensitive cUAS passive RF receivers. Will the Government provide a hardware BLANKING SIGNAL (trigger) to the cUAS system to mute receiver inputs during launch events, or must contractors provide high-power limiters/filters to survive independently?

System operations during launch events is a crifitcal requriement and the Government expects the system to be fully active during launch events.

Does the system require FULL HEMISPHERICAL COVERAGE (0° to 90° elevation) to detect threats diving vertically onto a launch pad, or is standard low-angle surveillance (e.g., 0°-30° elevation) sufficient? Standard rotating radars have a 'cone of silence' directly overhead.

The Government will expect full hemispherical coverage.

To mitigate line-of-sight obstructions and radar horizon limitations in flat coastal terrain, will the Contractor be permitted to install sensors on EXISTING HIGH-ELEVATION INFRASTRUCTURE (e.g., Vehicle Assembly Building roof ~525ft, Launch Pad Lightning Towers, water towers), or is the solution restricted to ground-deployed masts? Access to the VAB roof would significantly extend detection range without airborne assets.

The Government is open to considering elevated installations.

Are there required performance differences between fixed and portable detectors (range, outputs, features)? Who maintains, stores, and is trained/authorized to operate the portable detector?

It is anticipated there will be performance differences between fixed and portable systems which will be determined in the future. The portable aspect is intended to augment the fixed system when necessary at a specific location. The offeror would maintain a portable component, the Government could store and operate the portable component.

Can the Government confirm that "System detection libraries" (PWS 2.B.d) remain the intellectual property of the vendor, with the Government receiving usage rights only for the duration of the service? What data rights does NASA expect for weekly reports, alert logs, and configuration artifacts?

The system detection libraries are assumed to remain IP of the offeror. The Government retains all rights to the weekly reports, analysis, logs, etc

Are there known PROHIBITED frequency bands or power levels for cUAS radar sensors at KSC that offerors should avoid (e.g., L-band restrictions due to launch telemetry, specific exclusion zones near pads)?

yes. Will require consultation with the KSC Radio Frequency Manager.

Given proximity to Launch Complex 39B and flight hardware, are there specific HAZARDS OF

ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION TO ORDNANCE (HERO)

exclusion zones or power density limits (W/m²) that restrict the use of active X-Band/S-Band radars near loaded launch pads? If active radar is prohibited in certain sectors, must the solution rely on passive RF/optical sensors in those areas?

There are areas where radio frequencies are limited/prohibited based on frequency and power level. Details wil lhave to be coordinated and approved by the KSC Frequency Manager.

What is the required CONFIDENCE/UNCERTAINTY REPRESENTATION for identity and operator-location estimates (e.g., confidence bands, 'unknown' indicator, error radius in meters)? Without a standard, two vendors can claim compliance while outputting incomparable 'operator location' quality.

In the Sources Sought posting there is no specific confidence band for operator location. It is anticipated that if a solicitation is released, a possible confidence band would be in the 200 yard radius range

NASA's Q&A dated Jan. 14, 2026 confirms that any UAS (regardless of size) must be detected at 40NMI, and that serial number/operator location must be available at this range. RF-based identification systems have effective ranges of ~10km due to signal propagation. Radar detection at 40NMI is constrained by Earth curvature for low-altitude (<400ft AGL) targets—a ground sensor at 30- 50ft has a geometric radar horizon of ~14NM for a 200ft AGL target.

Would NASA accept a PHASED DETECTION ARCHITECTURE where: (a) Long-range detection (40+ NMI) is achieved via radar for higher-altitude or larger targets, and (b) Full identification data is provided at closer ranges where RF decode is technically feasible? Alternatively, does NASA envision contractor-provided AIRBORNE SENSOR PLATFORMS (e.g., tethered aerostats) to achieve 40NMI detection for low-altitude Group 1 sUAS?

NASA does not envision an airborne sensor platform, but is not opposed to the concept if the offeror feels it is technically and operationally possible. NASA would consider a phased detection architecture.

How should we interpret "at least two fixed sensors separated by at least 1km" in the context of overall 40NMI coverage—does NASA expect ADDITIONAL fixed sites beyond two to achieve full azimuthal coverage, or is two the complete fixed sensor requirement with gaps acceptable?

NASA expects full azimuthal coverage and does not prescribe how many sensors above 2 are utilized. The overall system's capability is expected to be 40nmi, not each sensor. Gaps are not desirable in coverage.

What are the required ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN CRITERIA for fixed sensor installations: (a) Wind loading (Cat 3+ hurricane in place, or rapid teardown acceptable)? (b) Lightning protection requirements? (c) Flood elevation minimums? (d) Does the Government require adherence to NASA-STD-5008 (Protective Coating of Carbon Steel, Stainless Steel, and Aluminum on Launch Structures) for corrosion protection given salt fog + acidic solid rocket exhaust?

a) Capable of withstanding nominal Florida weather, but operation in hurricane conditions is not anticipated. Rapid teardown/stowage is acceptable. B) NASA does not expect adherence to NASA-STD- 5008, but would expect the offeror to maintain the hardware in a workable and safe condition.

What exact SITING CONSTRAINTS apply to the fixed sensors: (a) Permitted parcels/rooftops/towers? (b) Maximum allowable installation height? (c) Minimum setback distances from launch pads or other restricted areas? (d) Will NASA provide a list of pre-approved candidate sites?

A) Rooftop and tower installation is allowable within limits and would be considered based on specific hardware configuration B) Maximum installation height would be dependant on the restrictions of a FAA Obstruction Analysis for installations about 200' in height. A goal would be to remain below 200' but not a requirement.

C) No specificed minimum setback distances in general. Specific hardware and RF configurations could drive a specific distance.

D) All sites are open to consideration

How should vendors reconcile the requirement for "compatibility/integration" with FBI/USAF/USSF systems with the constraint that the system "must not require access to NASA-KSC data systems or networks"? What network boundary is permitted to support required integrations with these partner agencies?

The no-access to NASA-KSC data systems means that NASA IT infrastructure cannot be utilized to transmit. It does not mean that NASA data itself cannot be shared with the offeror where appropriate.

For sensor sites within MINWR: (a) Are there NEPA compliance requirements or seasonal constraints affecting installation? (b) Are EARTH-PENETRATING FOUNDATIONS (concrete pads, driven piles) permitted, or must the solution utilize non-penetrating/ballasted mounts (e.g., mobile solar trailers) to avoid environmental impact? (c) What permitting timeline should contractors assume?

a) for permanent installations, NASA construction and environmental regulations shall be followed and there are no seasonal constraints.

B)Yes, would be allowed within the limits of NASA building regulations

c) Dependent on the type and impact of proposed structures

What is the approval process and required lead time for:

(a) Planned maintenance downtime, and (b) Extreme-weather stow events? Who declares a stow condition, how much notice is provided, and what uptime is still expected during hurricane season? What maximum downtime is acceptable per event?

A) Planned down time would be coordinated with NASA Protective Services.

B) same as above C) A stow condition is dependent on the type and installation of hardware and would be coordinated with the NASA Protective Services Office. NASA-KSC Center Leadership decalares extreme weather operations for the Center. notice varies based on the specific event and natual timing. Typically 72-48 hours notice is given for hurricane related events, but this is for reference only. The acceptable downtime is dependent on the actual event and does not have a specific requirement. The offeror would not be held responsible for weather evernts beyond their control.

What UPTIME/AVAILABILITY target is required (e.g., 99.9%, 99.5%)? How will downtime be measured given allowed Government-approved maintenance windows and weather stow events—are those excluded from availability calculations?

System planned downtime for maintenance would be excluded as long as it is not excessive in the Government's estimation.

Weather events and downtime realted to them would be excluded from unplanned system downtime requirements

Are contingency plans required for operational disruptions?

Yes

What are the required detection zone definitions (geofences, altitude bands), approximately how many zones are anticipated, and how frequently will zone configurations change?

The type and number of zones will be developed thought offeror and NASA discussions and definitions. NASA assumes no pre-determined zones at this time.

Per recent reporting, Space Launch Delta 45 is installing a multi-million dollar counter-UAS system at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station that includes RF effectors (jamming) with spectrum deconfliction. How does the KSC requirement COORDINATE with the USSF cUAS system? Is data sharing/integration expected, or are these independent systems? Are there spectrum deconfliction requirements between the two systems?

System level data sharing between the systems is not planned or anticipated as these are independent systems. It is anticipated that the ability to provide a feed of the NASA system data to Space Launch Delta 45 would be a capability. Information and data sharing is expected to be at the meeting and general coordination level. The proposed SLD 45 systems specifications have not been released at this time so no answer can be given as to deconfliction requirements.

To ensure compatibility with USAF and FBI systems, must the system natively output tracks in ASTERIX format (Cat 048/034—standard for air traffic/military radar) or CURSOR-ON-TARGET (CoT) format (standard for tactical TAK integration), or is a proprietary API acceptable?

Developing a certified ASTERIX parser is significant software effort compared to simple XML APIs.

NASA makes no assumption as to the output track format. A proprietary API would be acceptable.

What DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES are mandated, permitted, or preferred for this requirement: (a) Active RADAR? (b) Passive RF/protocol detection? (c) Electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR)? (d) Acoustic sensors? Note: RF detection of commercial drones (2.4/5.8 GHz protocols) maxes out at 5-10km under ideal conditions—insufficient for 40NMI. If radar is required, bird clutter mitigation becomes the primary technical challenge at MINWR. If a multi-modal sensor fusion approach is expected, please confirm.

NASA makes no assumptions as to the offerors selection of detection systems and all listed are open for consideration. NASA understands the capabilities and its requirements.

NASA's Q&A dated Jan. 14, 2026 lists required data elements including serial number and operator position.

When RF decode is unavailable (e.g., radar-only track of a non-cooperative UAS, or UAS beyond RF range), what minimum identification data is acceptable? Should such tracks be displayed with a "partial ID" or "radar-only" indicator?

It is desirable for the track to delienate if it is a radar only data point. Location, speed, heading, altitude are desirable data points

NASA's Q&A dated Jan. 14, 2026 confirms an acceptance process will exist. Can NASA provide the draft acceptance test outline, evaluation criteria, or test scenarios? What objective pass/fail thresholds will be applied (e.g., detection probability, alert latency, uptime percentage)?

Not at this time

What are the risk-of-loss/liability expectations for vendor-owned equipment installed on KSC property (e.g., hurricane damage, vandalism, launch-related incidents)?

Who is responsible for physical security?

NASA-KSC Protective services is responsible for the physical security of Kennedy Space Center. For weather and launch-related incidents, the offeror would be expected to be responsible for their hardware

Which FAA and NASA regulations govern cUAS deployment under this PWS?

This system falls under all applicable regulations regarding the employment of UAS detection systems. NASA has no specific regulation for UAS detections systems

What risks (e.g., false positives, system failure) have been identified as most critical for mitigation? System failure is the most critical

What training requirements exist for cUAS operators and support staff?

Training on system operation is anticipated for approximately 10 NASA/contractor employees

How many independent data paths are required, and which specific user groups/locations must each path serve?

NASA makes no assumption s or requirements on the number of data paths and it is anticipated that 5 different locations must be able to monitor the data

What export formats/APIs are required for data sharing downstream (e.g., CSV, JSON, STANAG-like formats, real-time streaming protocols)?

NASA makes no assumption as to the file formats

What Facility Clearance (FCL) and personnel clearance levels are required at (a) proposal submission, (b) award, and (c) start of performance? Will NASA sponsor clearances for the successful offeror if needed, or is existing FCL/PCL required?

Clearances are not required for this effort and NASA does not anticipating sponsoring any clearances

What CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK applies to the cUAS system (e.g., NIST SP 800-171 for CUI, NIST 800-53 for federal systems)? Specifically: (a) Is an Authority to Operate (ATO) required for any system components? (b) What cybersecurity measures are required for the COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) systems—encryption standards, access controls, intrusion detection? (c) Are there penetration testing or security assessment requirements prior to deployment?

NASA makes no determination of the cybersecurity framework.

A) no B)Command and control is assumed to consist of server monitoring and commanding only c)no

What operating rules apply in PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE AREAS within KSC (e.g., privacy constraints on sensors capturing public visitors, data minimization requirements, retention limits for incidental collection)? Does the system require any privacy impact assessment?

There are none at this time and no privacy impact is required at this time

What FAA AND NASA REGULATIONS govern cUAS deployment under this PWS? Specifically: (a) What authorizations are required for RF-based detection that may intercept drone communications? (b) Are there FAA coordination requirements for the detection system itself (e.g., if using radar that could affect aircraft)? (c) What legal framework governs any mitigation/interdiction activities referenced in the PWS?

a) normal FCC authorizations would be required b)there are no FAA coordination requirements

c) NASA is not authorized to mitigate/interdict

Has the Government considered the contract mechanism it intends to use to procure the solution? Would the Government consider a CSO?

NASA prefers firm fixed price contracts in this instance, but is open to discussion other options.

What PHYSICAL ACCESS CONSTRAINTS apply at KSC for installation and maintenance: (a) Escort requirements for uncleared personnel? (b) Standard access hours? (c) Blackout periods during launch operations when site access is prohibited? (d) Typical lead time to schedule site access?

Personnel accessing KSC shall be able to obtain a NASA Agency Badge for access to the Center.

A) properly badge personnel do not require escort B) No restrictions on hours, 24/7 C)not for general access D)badged personnel can access anytime without notice Personnel utilizing temporary badges must coordinate at least 48 hours prior to access.

It is assumed that the personnel requried top operate the system will have NASA Agency Badges