ATTACHMENT_J_10__VISTAS_TPM_Assessment_Report.pdf

APRIL 2017

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Daniel Deng, Dr. Geoffrey Olupot, Christie Sunwoo and Prof. Leben Nelson Moro for Management Systems International.

ASSESSMENT OF USAID/ SOUTH

SUDAN’S VIABLE SUPPORT TO

TRANSITION AND STABILITY

(VISTAS) REPORT

ATTACHMENT J.10: TPM VISTAS Assessment Report ii

ASSESSMENT OF USAID/ SOUTH

SUDAN’S VIABLE SUPPORT TO

TRANSITION AND STABILITY

(VISTAS)

Management Systems International

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Monitoring and Evaluation Support Project

DISCLAIMER

This assessment is made possible by the support of the American people through the United States Agency for

International Development (USAID). The contents are the sole responsibility of Management Systems International and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government.

CONTENTS

Acronyms 5

Executive Summary 6

Recommendations for USAID 10

Recommendations for VISTAS 11

INTRODUCTION 12

Background 12

Assessment Purpose and Audience 13

Assessment Questions (See Annex for Details) 13

CONTEXT ANALYSIS 13

Political Trends 13

Economic Trends 15

THE VISTAS ASSESSMENT 16

Scope of the Assessment 16

Methodology 16

Sampling 16

Data collection 16

Data analysis 17

Strengths and Limitations 17

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 18

Question 1: Is the current program strategy relevant and appropriate in the South Sudan context and the context of USAID/South Sudan’s strategy? 18

Strategic Relevance 18

1. Relevance of VISTAS to communities 18

2. Impact of USG policy on VISTAS 19

3. Relevance of VISTAS to the Operational Framework (OF) 21

4. Relevance of VISTAS to the new context of civil war since December 2013. 22

5. Relevance of local government to VISTAS strategy 23

Question 2: Program Effectiveness 26

CONCLUSIONS 32

LESSONS LEARNED & RECOMMENDATIONS 34

Lessons learned 34

Issues, trends, approaches, and Theories of Change that were successful 34

Issues, trends, approaches, and Theories of Change that were not successful 34

Recommendations for USAID 35

Recommendations for VISTAS 35

Scenarios 36

General 37

Annex I 39

2. Assessment Purpose 39

5. Methodology 40

Annex II 43

Annex III 46

Annex IV 49

Annex V 52

Annex VI 54

Annex VII 56

ACRONYMS

AECOM AECOM International Development

ARCISS Agreement on Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan

AU African Union

CBOs Community-Based Organizations

CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement

CSOs Civil Society Organizations

CSV Comma-separated Values

DPs Development Partners

FAAs Fixed Amount Awards

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FGDs Focus Group Discussions

GMs Group Meetings

HOM Heads of Mission

HOC Heads of Cooperation

HQ Headquarters

JBPDA Joint Border Peace Development Agency

JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency

KIIs Key Informant Interviews

M&E Monitoring and Evaluation

MESP Monitoring and Evaluation Support Project

OF Operational Framework

OTCM Office of Transition and Conflict Mitigation

OTI Office of Transition Initiatives

POC Protection of Civilians

RAs Rolling Assessments

RPM Regional Program Manager

SPLM Sudan People's Liberation Movement

SRS Strategic Review Session

TO Task Order

TOC Theory of Change

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USG US Government

VISTAS Viable Support to Transition and Stability

WFP World Food Programme

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Implemented by AECOM International Development (AECOM) since July 2013, the goal of the Viable

Support to Transition and Stability Project (VISTAS) was initially “to strengthen South Sudanese confidence and capacity to address the causes and consequences of political conflict, violence, and instability.” In 2013, a power struggle originated at the pinnacle of state power and reverberated across

South Sudan — changing the field for VISTAS activities as USAID shifted focus from building capacity of state institutions to community building. The VISTAS goal was changed and became “to prevent the further spread of communal violence and tensions in critical areas where conflict may have national implications.” In the states, VISTAS pivoted from supporting local government to mitigating communal violence and rising tensions through non-state actors. Managed by USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives

(OTI) as of June 2014, the Project returned to USAID/South Sudan management under its Office of

Transition and Conflict Mitigation (OTCM) in January 2016. This assessment documents the Project’s s strategic relevance, effectiveness, and lessons learned to make recommendations about VISTAS’s direction during the final two years of the Project and beyond.

The study focused on VISTAS staff at the headquarters (HQ) in Juba (who were in Nairobi at the time of the study) and field offices in Aweil, Yirol, Bor, Bentiu, and Akobo. Interviews were also conducted with

USAID and AECOM staff in Washington, DC. Primary data collection involved key informant interviews

(KIIs), group meetings (GMs), and focus group discussions (FGDs) with staff of USAID, VISTAS, and grantees as well as beneficiaries and community members. Secondary data collection involved review of the activity databases and document review.

The assessment found that VISTAS’s strategic relevance and effectiveness depend primarily on: having a smart Theory of Change, careful layering of Project activities, solid partnerships, operational capabilities, purposeful geographic targeting, and a solid approach to including gender. The study found that VISTAS performs well in these areas and—with minor adjustments and support—will continue to improve performance. The recommendations in this study highlight areas where strong performance can be maintained and improved.

Regarding the first assessment question on the strategic relevance of the VISTAS Project to South Sudan and to US Government (USG) policies for humanitarian and development assistance, the study produced concrete findings based in evidence. Although the question was revised to focus more on the USAID

Operational Framework (OF) than on USG policy writ large, the Team found no way to look at the OF without also considering USG policy.

Relevance of VISTAS to communities

VISTAS grantees and beneficiaries appreciate the Project for its meaningful impact within their communities and cite tangible benefits that they associate directly with the VISTAS Project. Moreover, community members request that USAID expand and deepen its presence. VISTAS is a strategic resource for the USG in South Sudan that has maintained goodwill and an operational footprint in some of the most remote areas of the country, even at the height of the recent conflict, with national and international staff working in solidarity. This point concerns both strategic relevance and Project effectiveness.

Impact of USG policy shift to VISTAS programming

The USG 2014 policy shift away from state institutions and towards communities has been interpreted and implemented differently across VISTAS activities, but is generally understood to restrict VISTAS cooperation with the Government of South Sudan (GOSS), even at the local level. If possible VISTAS staff would opt to continue supporting local governments to accomplish more durable results and believe their managers can follow a nuanced approach in identifying partnerships. To resume support for local governments, VISTAS programming would benefit from USAID’s guidance regarding the nuances of applying the Operational Framework at the local level.

Relevance of VISTAS to USAID Theory of Change (TOC)

The VISTAS Theory of Change (TOC) is aligned to the Operational Framework (OF), particularly TOs 2.2

(Strengthen inter- and intra-communal relations and reconciliation); 2.3 (Increase space for conflict mediation); and 1.1 (Facilitate community-led response), in that order of significance; and, to a lesser extent to 1.3 (Strengthen Livelihoods and Resilience to Shock); with further possible alignment with 2.1 (Support inclusive peace process), clearly establishing the strategic value of VISTAS. However, there is little understanding of the OF within the VISTAS teams.

VISTAS’ community work has the potential to serve as an incubator for pilot activities, which other USAID implementing partners could upscale successful activities over time, particularly in the areas of livelihoods and youth work. To increase understanding and collaboration in this regard, USAID could host occasional

VISTAS presentations at quarterly meetings of Implementing Partners, Heads of Mission-, Heads of

Cooperation, Donor Working Groups, and USAID team meetings. The results of such collaboration could benefit both VISTAS and the Projects of other USAID Implementing Partners.

Relevance of VISTAS to the context of civil war

Many VISTAS staff members question the continued relevance of VISTAS’ strategy since the country descended into civil war in 2013. VISTAS’ dynamic innovation platform currently aggregates activities into regional plans, which are then intended to cohere into the overall Project plan. The continued relevance of the VISTAS Project to the context of civil war requires examining the connection between the Project goal (the starting point to strategy) and how it connects to or reflects regional objectives and activity sets.

It also requires maintaining technical capacity with strong knowledge of South Sudan’s conflict dynamics at the Project level to ensure continued success.

Relevance of local government to VISTAS strategy

As mentioned, most respondents reported that cooperation with local government is necessary for Project effectiveness because of the influence of local government officials and due to the military orientation and kinship structures of South Sudan. Even if activities are not directly supporting the strengthening of local government managers cannot ignore the local government and still accomplish project objectives. It is important for USAID to clarify the parameters under which VISTAS should and should not engage with local government institutions and/or officials.

Relevance of information management to VISTAS strategy execution

There is more of a bottom-up flow of information within VISTAS in the form of atmospherics, lessons, and ideas, but with less emphasis on processing information (analytics) or to support learning and adaptive management.

VISTAS has planning, management, and review mechanisms such as Deep Dives, Strategy Review

Sessions (SRSs), and Rolling Assessments (RAs) that are valuable programmatically and operationally for aligning strategy and operations. These provide platforms for learning and adaptive management, which support strategy planning and execution to align strategy and operations. With some adjustments, executive direction, and technical and management support, the Project has the potential to consolidate a more strategic approach to conflict mitigation, with greater coherence across regional, national, and local levels.

“VISTAS should define its information needs at different levels of the program and improve the analytics capacity of the database to meet the identified information needs. Currently, the database is mainly used for activity approvals. This database can be redesigned to improve its analytics capabilities to generate monitoring information that supports organizational learning and spur performance improvements.”

VISTAS may consider a mapping of stakeholder information needs and designing/improving the reporting capacity of the database to produce reports that respond to those information needs with predefined “push button” reports and “a query” facility to produce reports that respond to the unforeseen information needs.

Relevance of VISTAS geographic focus

The overall geographic focus is a remnant of the period of stabilization under the Comprehensive Peace

Agreement (CPA); however, now there is an evolving orientation towards Equatoria and an increased national focus. Based on the above findings, the Team concluded that overall the USG is succeeding in building solidarity with communities on behalf of the American people (although USAID branding could be improved) through VISTAS, which is the product of a generally successful geographic focus.

The geographic shifts represent an expansion rather than a strategic re-orientation and include the Protection of Civilian camps (POCs). On occasion, activities targeting the national level conflict have been undertaken directly, but these are comparatively few. VISTAS staff are considering to what extent VISTAS needs to leave areas where the Project has worked for a long time with some success to address new hotspots.

Respondents had differences of opinion, but it was obvious that it is hard to determine geographic focus without a more comprehensive mapping of how the national conflict intersects with local conflicts, and whether (and where) that nexus is conducive to VISTAS intervention. For example, if VISTAS was to prioritize areas where two tribes intersect over water and grazing, and where these tribes have leaders in

Juba who are competing for political advantage, then we could assess a conflict map from that standpoint, even identifying how patronage may operate and what the chances are for building peace coalitions through dialogue. These are issues that could be teased out in a strategic planning process, which would include more concerted conflict analysis. USAID guidance is required to assist with these decisions.

Effectiveness of division of roles and responsibilities

In line with the OTI division of roles and responsibilities, VISTAS senior managers are generally strong on operations and look to USAID for overall strategic direction and oversight.

The highly decentralized and small grant-making system provides significant space for local decision-making by Regional Program Managers (RPMs) and allows VISTAS to be both sensitive to the local context and responsive to emergent issues. The challenge remains for VISTAS to fit more seamlessly into the Mission’s Operational Framework (OF) without losing the strength of its bottom-up character. USAID could use VISTAS to fully carry out the OF, but this requires a more systematic approach with deeper engagement of USAID in Juba regarding policy, operational guidance, and coordination.

In response to operational challenges, VISTAS pivots and adapts based on local developments, drawing upon the flexibility of the decentralized, in-kind grant-making mechanism, the determination of field staff, and the trust they have built with local partners. High turnover in key management positions within both

VISTAS and USAID as well as the 2013 and 2016 evacuations have made it difficult to operate with a consistent vision and oversight. VISTAS staff, however, have strived to do their best under these conditions and in the face of short durations of assignment.

Effectiveness of activity selection and layering

VISTAS’ most commonly cited activities with regards to effectiveness deal with traditional chiefs, women, and/or cattle-related issues (especially migrations) of both moral (compensation under customary law/restorative justice) and market (trade) natures. However, even activities focusing on women and traditional chiefs need the support or at least the acquiescence of local officials. VISTAS is just beginning to layer activities; however, the concept and its application are only partially understood.1 For example, Northern Bahr el Ghazal is regarded as a flagship program that evidenced “layering.” In many areas activities can be related in principle, but are not designed with the intent to build synergies. Hence, layering appears to be both de facto and intentional--VISTAS can always become more intentional in this regard.

Based on these findings, the Team concluded that VISTAS does best when it supports community initiatives aimed at peace, recovery, and stability, supporting collective actions that unite communities. Successful

VISTAS activity examples include pre-migration and post-migration peace conferences, dissemination of agreements on grazing rights, cattle vaccinations and dipping pens, livestock markets, and hand-dug well construction. These activities are best evidenced in Northern Bahr el Ghazal where the VISTAS team has used layering to create innovative synergies around migration-centered issues. Part of the success seems to be the centrality of cattle to livelihoods and culture, given that key stakeholders in VISTAS activities are agro-pastoral communities.

Effectiveness of the VISTAS approach to partnerships

Respondents generally indicated that they believe there would be benefits to a robust partnership strategy within VISTAS, particularly with other USAID implementing partners, which would be led and encouraged by the USAID mission.

Northern Bahr el Ghazal is a model to be replicated and improved upon. VISTAS has explained the model in generic terms with a Power Point presentation to the Mission. Even within the NBEG model, VISTAS’ main challenge is identifying reliable partners, building trusting relationships with them, and getting resources to them efficiently while preserving accountability.

VISTAS performs best when it builds relationships spanning at least two years, evidenced by VISTAS along the North-South border. Resources, however, are spread thin across loosely connected activities and regions. As of March 31, 2017, VISTAS had cleared 378 grants (completed and closed) worth

$33,951,274 (the average grant size is $89,818). These figures indicate that VISTAS has undertaken many small activities, and when triangulated against data from the respondents, seems to indicate that the

Project has spread resources thin. However, it is also true that small projects used strategically can have big impact. The assessment Team believes that this calls for more strategic targeting of resources into the activities with the greatest potential to contribute to local conflict mitigation, and with consideration to layering activities to achieve greater coherence.

It is always possible that VISTAS support can be misinterpreted or politicized in South Sudan because dialogue may address political issues and involve actors with known political positions and interests. In an environment of civil war and extreme distrust, security personnel, whether working for government or opposition, are always looking for people and organizations that may be considered politically disagreeable.

Therefore, all staff should remain vigilant and engaged as they build partnerships in the local community, maintaining a careful approach that is mindful of political sensitivities.

1 This study has interpreted “layering” to mean, “when separate activities contribute to common outputs and outcomes and/or build other synergies that multiply or increase impact.”

Effectiveness of VISTAS grant-making mechanism

The small in-kind grant mechanism is fast and effective for work with local and even informal organizations. However, the mechanism should not limit VISTAS from working with other innovative and capable organizations through other grant mechanisms such as simplified grants and Fixed Amount Awards

(FAAs) to achieve the desired strategic impacts.

Effectiveness of Morning Star

Morning Star is a unique initiative within VISTAS that seems to be appreciated at all levels, but, according to respondents, its tangible results are yet to be evidenced. VISTAS is preparing to launch trauma awareness and resilience training and support as a crosscutting element of the Project. This is timely as trauma is a compounding dimension, not only of conflict but of other social issues, such as productivity, motivation, and problem-solving ability. For optimal learning and communication to take place, Morning Star should be mindful that there is a concern, expressed by one respondent that trauma work may bring to the surface psycho-social pain in individuals and communities which would need to be managed professionally by personnel with deep trauma training which exceeds the capacity of Morning Star staff.

Recommendations for USAID

1. Communicate the Operational Framework (OF) or the most current Mission strategy document to

VISTAS and other implementing partners and train them regarding the substance of the OF for IP staff to better address the OF in implementation of their projects.

2. Clarify and disseminate the broader USG policy regarding South Sudan to VISTAS leadership and staff, particularly the USG position on:

● Support to local governments and local government officials

● Cooperation with and support to change agents2

The aim should be a nuanced do-no-harm approach with due diligence and a long-term view. This should also apply to other USAID implementing partners in South Sudan on an ongoing basis, as policies and operating environments are fluid.

3. Use a “less extensive or simplified strategic planning” process that optimizes the Project elements

(RA’s, SRS’s, Deep Dives, etc.) to facilitate a strategic planning process for VISTAS that coordinates staff efforts by:

● Clarifying the Project’s goal and Theory of Change (TOC)

● Reviewing and harmonizing the Project’s execution mechanisms and how they are being used (including RA’s, SRS’s, Deep Dives, etc.)

● Creating a common understanding among stakeholders of layering and consistent implementation

● Codifying principles for activity selection, including due consideration to the role of:

sequencing, clustering, scaling-up, and coordination

● Redefining “critical areas” and “flashpoints” based on an understanding of structural factors that cause conflict across South Sudan and yield cooperation, especially aimed at linking livelihoods with conflict mitigation and recovery

● Continue reviewing geographic targeting

● Defining the classification and coding system for activities that could render the database more conducive to analytics i.e., to provide feedback and make project adjustments

2 Change agents are cited as important for Project effectiveness because of their influence on local communities and local government officials.

3. Pay close attention to the border areas among communities that have been supported by political actors with influence in Juba. In such cases, competition for vital resources may connect local areas to Juba-based power struggles. VISTAS should be able to identify the approach to layering that best addresses such local conflicts and the concerns of local communities, while also remaining conscious of how these local impacts interact with the actors in Juba who wield extraordinary influences.

4. Invite presentations to Heads of Mission (HOM) meetings, Heads of Cooperation meetings

(HOCs), donor working groups, quarterly implementing partner meetings, USAID “Our Hour,” and USAID technical teams to build synergies and explore opportunities for VISTAS activities to fully support the OF.

Recommendations for VISTAS

1. Use Deep Dives, Rolling Assessments (RAs), and Strategy Review Sessions (SRSs) to execute strategy while harnessing lessons learned from activity flow. VISTAS should further refine these mechanisms with a view toward applying new information and knowledge to current and future activities. Develop a management response to recommendations and monitor actions taken to ensure that these recommendations are utilized.

2. Develop guidance for partnerships with grantees with an emphasis on how VISTAS enters a community, the ongoing communication and learning system, and a do-no-harm approach.

3. Determine core competencies and comparative advantages around the activities that VISTAS does best and the capacity to implement them as a package approach, with attention to timing and layering dialogue, trade, and small-scale infrastructure with migration-related issues across borders.

4. Plan for and invest in long-term partnerships, especially in new flashpoint areas. Include local implementing partners to help develop capacities across regions, codify gains, and increase institutional memory at the national level while setting up partners for eventual handover of activities.

5. Consider activities that integrate vertically into conflict mitigation and nation-building programs such as the Olympics and the National Dialogue.

6. Continuously seek clarity from USAID on policy matters and ensure both the sharing of information and consistency in implementation of the strategy.

7. As appropriate and when applicable, VISTAS should consider other grant-making mechanisms

(such as simplified grants and Fixed Amount Awards) to achieve desired strategic impacts and attract innovative and capable organizations that require cash assistance as well. The primary objective is for VISTAS to have as many available tools as possible to exercise its activities and strengthen its partnerships.

8. VISTAS should delineate its information needs at different levels of the Project and improve the analytic capacity of the database to meet the information needs. Currently, the database is mainly used for activity approvals. It can be adjusted, however, to improve analytics to generate monitoring information that supports organizational learning and encourage improvements in performance.

INTRODUCTION

Background

The U.S. Agency for International Development/South Sudan launched the Viable Support to Transition and Stability (VISTAS) Project in July 2013 as the U.S. Government’s flexible response to the needs in the world’s newest country. Implemented by AECOM International Development (AECOM), VISTAS is a five-year conflict mitigation program that seeks to prevent the further spread of communal violence and tensions in critical areas where conflict may have national implications. The initial Project objectives were to: 1) build capacity of civilian state authority to prevent, respond to, and mitigate conflict in key flashpoint areas; 2) promote increased access to information and engagement of citizenry in support of political and peace processes at the local level; and 3) engage at-risk youth and other vulnerable groups in productive social and economic activities.

As a result of the conflict in December 2013, USAID/South Sudan personnel were evacuated, and almost all USG programming was suspended. During this time, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) assisted the Mission by providing management support on a temporary basis (from June 2014 to January

2016) and helping shape a strategic shift of the Project in light of the violence and new political realities.

The VISTAS team returned to Juba in July 2014 and restarted programming with newly defined objectives under the co-management of OTI, the USAID/South Sudan Mission, and USAID’s Africa Bureau. The

VISTAS Project shifted from predominantly working with the local government in the states to working through community-based and non-governmental actors to mitigate communal violence and rising tensions in critical areas where conflict could have national implications.

VISTAS currently has four overarching Project objectives: 1) to increase space and tools to manage conflict and tensions; 2) to build cross-line interdependency to promote peaceful coexistence; 3) to promote a more informed community; and 4) to engage communities in trauma awareness so to lay the foundation for healing and reconciliation. Based on these objectives, each geographic region has its own strategy. These are revised annually through a series of in-depth discussions (or Deep Dives).

VISTAS currently operates in six regions (Central Equatoria, Jonglei, Unity, Upper Nile, Northern Bahr el

Ghazal, and Lakes) that are considered critical to the political stability and security of the country. The July

2016 Rolling Assessment notes that “previous interventions focused mostly on inter-communal dynamics but this may no longer be sufficient and therefore VISTAS is considering more engagement on national level issues including Track 2/2.5 level peace-building activities.”

As of March 31, 2017 VISTAS had cleared 378 grants (includes completed and closed) worth $33,951,274

(Average grant size $89,818). These figures indicate that VISTAS has undertaken a significant number of small activities, which call for strategic targeting of resources to progress towards the goal of national stabilization through local conflict mitigation.

Assessment Purpose and Audience

Due to violence and Project disruptions in the country and in lieu of the planned mid-term evaluation, USAID decided to undertake an assessment the Project’s ongoing strategic relevance and effectiveness, as well as its ability to respond to changes in a fluid context, and to document lessons learned. Assessment findings, conclusions, and recommendations will inform VISTAS’s direction during the remaining time of

Project implementation (the contract is scheduled to end in July 2018) and provide recommendations for future programming.

Organization of the report

The executive summary presents an overview of key findings and recommendations. In the body of the report, findings are presented first, conclusions are presented second, and recommendations and lessons learned are presented last.

Assessment Questions (See Annex for Details)

1. Is the current program strategy relevant and appropriate in the South Sudan context and the context of USAID/South Sudan’s strategy?

2. What are the most effective elements of the program to date and what challenges has the program faced in meeting the stated objectives? How has the program responded to those challenges?

3. What key issues, trends, approaches, and Theories of Change were particularly successful and should be marked for other USAID programs operating in South Sudan? Which were not? What are the lessons learned and recommendations for USAID South Sudan related to VISTAS’ methodology and approach to programming?

CONTEXT ANALYSIS

Political Trends

South Sudan signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 after decades of war. The country then emerged into a period of stabilization supported by humanitarian and development assistance from the

United States and other donors. The Government of South Sudan undertook a “big tent” stabilization strategy through which other armed groups (OAGs) that had fought against the SPLM for years joined the army but remained loyal to their tribal commanders. Stabilization proceeded, and Juba went from being

Khartoum’s southern garrison to a boom town in the lead up to independence of the country in 2011. Rapid, urban-centered growth continued alongside a general neglect of the rural areas. USAID designed the predecessor project to VISTAS in recognition that stabilization required support to institutions of local government that had been marginalized for years. The current VISTAS Project began in 2013 with a concerted focus on supporting local government.

Hope for stabilization were shattered in December 2013 when the country relapsed into civil war due to a power struggle in Juba for succession to the presidency. Violence erupted in Juba after months of worsening conditions in the SPLM and spread through regimented pastoral age-sets (traditional age groups that are initiated together through rites of passage) to remote areas on the Ethiopian border from whose cattle camps tens of thousands of Nuer herders—the White Army—launched an insurrection. Fighting spread and threatened Juba, which was defended by Ugandan forces and a state-led counter-insurgency of Dinka cattle herders (Gelweng), mostly from Aweil and Warrap. Poorly trained and largely uneducated, they became part and parcel of the army (Pendle 2014) as other ethnic groups steadily fell in numbers. What had started as an elite conflict devolved into a tribal war.

As military factions divided along political lines, civil war enveloped the country. Millions have since been displaced or become refugees. A massive challenge of national integration faces the nation, no less severe than during the times of the North-South civil war (1983-2005).

The African Union (AU) established that the conflict was triggered by a political dispute in the center

(AUCISS 2014). The international community disengaged from direct support to the state and maintained development activities through non-governmental channels, including substantial humanitarian assistance and continued support to the peace process. Despite the Agreement on Resolution of the Conflict in the

Republic of South Sudan (ARCISS) signed in August 2015, civil war erupted again in July 2016 starting in

Juba and spreading with terrible consequences for the civilian population.

Federalism has been the dominant political trend since at least 1947 (Johnson 2014). Constitutionalism was born with the CPA but now focuses on how power is shared at the center and decentralized down to local government. The creation of the 28 states introduced boundary disputes along ethnic lines. Most of these have national implications. The call for an inclusive constitutionalism leading to federalism continues, but war makes such aspirations far-fetched.

President Kiir announced a National Dialogue to begin in March 2017. His stated concept is that independent, inclusive local dialogues to address community grievances will feed into regional dialogues and then cascade upward into national dialogue to inform the future of the nation. Many see this as the only solution, but wonder whether a truly inclusive and transparent process is possible under current conditions.

Others warn it could become tribal monologue. The benefit of feeding into this process would be if VISTAS provides an independent channel through which well-organized local dialogues could inform national processes in a systematic way. The downside would be if the National Dialogue lacks the necessary political will to support it, and therefore does not benefit from the VISTAS initiative.

Government is isolated from many people, civil society is constrained, and institutions linking communities to the government are weak. Hundreds of thousands of war-affected South Sudanese are now bunkered in

Protection of Civilians (POCs) sites, scared to return home. Many displaced peoples have sought refuge in neighboring countries. A divided region operates largely on the basis of national self-interest, yet maintains nominal cooperation behind the ARCISS.

A point of political focus is needed. It can only come through dialogue in the common search for peace locally, nationally, and internationally.

Economic Trends

As the first quarter of 2017 ended, almost half of South Sudan’s population was food insecure with 4.9 million (about 42% of population) estimated to be severely food insecure (IPC Phases 3, 4, and 5) from

February to April 2017. This is projected to increase to 5.5 million people (47% of the national population) at the height of the 2017 lean season in July. The magnitude of these food insecure populations is unprecedented across all periods. Hunger walked hand-in-hand with conflict. The primary cause of local conflicts was access to water, grazing, and agriculture lands. However, these conflicts were embroiled in the political and military dynamics of the civil war.

South Sudan’s extensive river network is the principal integrating factor across all agro-pastoral groups where VISTAS operates. Its ebbs and flows modulate the seasonal cattle migrations around which patterns of life are organized. Communities contest and share these waters, mostly for their cows, which are considered sacred, used primarily for marriage and compensation, and often raided. Cattle raiding evidences a martial capacity that has long been instrumentalized in war in South Sudan.

Oil and cattle continue to bind the two Sudans in an uneasy alliance, while the same resources create conflicts locally and nationally. Trade connects communities in South Sudan and maintains relationships across identity lines where potential conflicts may threaten communities. Some resist conflict due to the mutual benefit of trade, which preserves a connection between communities, including those across borders.

From 2014, the role of livestock started to receive increasing recognition by the development partners

(DPs), with recent studies establishing the role of livestock in resilience (WFP), recovery (FAO), development (USAID), and conflict mitigation (JICA).

South Sudan has the highest per capita livestock in Africa (FAO 2015). Regional cattle trade remains robust, while raiding increases. High dowries in South Sudan has increased social pressures on men to raid in an environment where there are a few other options for acquisition of cattle. Militias increasingly provide avenues towards marriage.

South Sudan's expansive informal economy consists mostly of subsistence farmers, including 950,000 livestock farmers, 350,000 herders (mostly children below 18 years), some 4,500 live animal traders, 1,500-

2,000 slaughterers, between 2,000 and 4,000 butchery owners, and some 500 holding ground owners, which are facilities for temporarily housing cattle that are to be sold or slaughtered (FAO 2016: p. 38). Despite promises, oil revenues have not been used to fuel agriculture.

Shifting cattle migrations cause conflict, while negotiating these routes has been the source of cooperation.

Urban areas remain poor and without employment opportunities, while the large rural subsistence economy is unable to feed the people, although it is resilient enough that they still survive – except in the most severe conditions of food insecurity – famine, which was evidenced in 2017, and threatens to affect more and more people if the crisis continues. In their hunger, communities are prone to fight in the belief that their benefit is being withheld from them in the capital. The young men comprise the most difficult demographic to track, not least because they stay on the move with their families’ cattle. It is in this context that the profound connection between cattle and war on the one hand, and dialogues and trade on the other should be understood.

THE VISTAS ASSESSMENT

Scope of the Assessment

Geographically, data collection gathering and learning sessions were held in Nairobi, Kenya; Washington, D.C.; and in the VISTAS field offices of Aweil, Yirol, Bor, Bentiu, and Akobo, providing information on the VISTAS effectiveness to its catchment population. The study also examined the spread VISTAS activities in different geographic areas.

Technically, the assessment covered the current Project strategy’s relevance and appropriateness in the

South Sudan context and the context of USAID/South Sudan’s strategy. It examined the Project’s ability to pivot and adapt to changes in the political and security context; the continued overall correctness of the geographic focus; and whether VISTAS is working in areas where communal violence has national implications. It also assessed the Project’s focus on key strategic issues in South Sudan from the perspective of U.S. foreign policy and USAID strategy. And it assessed the most effective elements of the Project to date and what challenges the Project faced in meeting the stated objectives. It also documented key issues, trends, lessons learned, approaches, and Theories of Change (TOCs) that were particularly successful and should be marked for other USAID Projects operating in South Sudan.

Methodology

MSI assigned a four-person team of experts to carry out this USAID assessment. The study analyzed Project performance with an emphasis on shifts in strategy and operations due to impacts of the 2013 conflict and its aftermath. The MSI Team considered the Congressional Appropriations Act, the USAID South Sudan

Operational Framework (OF), and the VISTAS design as key points of reference regarding U.S. foreign policy.

Sampling

MSI employed multistage-purposive sampling to select activity clusters and geographic priorities in collaboration with VISTAS, OTCM, and respondents (Yin, 1994). Due to being information rich, the field sites of Aweil, Yirol, Bor, Bentiu, and Akobo were purposively selected (Creswell, 2007). The bulk of primary data collection was conducted through interviews with USAID and AECOM staff as well as with key informants familiar with VISTAS’s work. A wealth of practical information and strategic wisdom was tapped from USAID and AECOM staff to help understand the past and plan for the future.

Thus, the qualitative study targeted VISTAS headquarters (HQ) staff and field offices. Purposive sampling was also used to select respondents from USAID, VISTAS, and grantees as well as beneficiaries/community members to assess the project’s effectiveness and lessons learned.

Data collection

The conduct of this assessment was qualitative in nature and included Key Informant Interviews (KII), Group Meetings (GM), and Focus Group Discussions (FGD). This approach was directly aligned with the evaluation questions as was the assessment team’s document review. The desk review findings helped shape questionnaires for KIIs and focus groups. The assessment team triangulated data from all sources to generate evidence that addressed the assessment questions.

The assessment utilized a mixed method approach, relying on quantitative and qualitative data from both primary and secondary sources. Data stemmed from Project documents (VISTAS Award Agreement AID-

668-LA-12-00001 and relevant modifications, VISTAS Activity Database, VISTAS Work Plans, VISTAS

Monitoring Plans, VISTAS Quarterly and Annual Reports, VISTAS internal portfolio and cluster reviews, reports from Deep Dives, Rolling Assessments and SRSs).

The qualitative study targeted VISTAS headquarters (HQ) staff in Juba (at the time of the study were based in Nairobi) and field offices. It utilized the activity database, KIIs, group meetings (GMs), and focus group discussions (FGD). It targeted staff from USAID, VISTAS, and grantees as well as beneficiaries/community members. Secondary data was based on VISTAS performance monitoring and reporting.

Data analysis

The assessment team triangulated data from these sources to generate evidence that addressed the assessment questions. Data analysis methods depended upon the nature of the data to be analyzed and included some of the following:

● Secondary data: Document review and activity database mining

● Key informant interviews and pattern analysis of content produced by focus groups that were compared

● Comparison of case studies

● Analysis of reports to produce a narrative that identifies recurrent themes and activities

● Interviews enriched the narrative and data at hand. Post-interview discussions within the team helped integrate hand-written notes The processing of information gave rise to themes. .

The interpretation was based on recurrence analysis, triangulation, and pattern identification in transcripts.

The analyzed data from all sources was triangulated to provide a thorough answer to each study question.

Strengths and Limitations

The main strength of the assessment’s approach was the use of multiple data sources and methods to develop findings for each question. The triangulation strengthened the validity and reliability of the findings. The overall approach is flexible and was tailored to the needs and operating conditions at the time of the assessment.

The assessment was conducted under challenging political, security and economic conditions with data collectors working from South Sudan states and the MESP office in Juba and international evaluators working from Nairobi and Washington, DC. Communication with the data collection team in South Sudan and Juba was primarily by phone and electronic means, including daily Skype calls. Debriefing of data collectors took place in Juba. South Sudan continues to face serious security challenges in several regions of the country where data collection took place and at the national level. The security situation affected sampling of communities and data collection areas as well as access to respondents.

The findings may have also been restricted to certain areas. There may have been an incentive for certain informants to disclose limited or false information. Thus, triangulation of data was a central tactic for obtaining valid findings. The local assessment team members have the appropriate language skills and were people who originated from the states where they collected data. The overall approach was flexible and adaptable to the conditions of the operating environment. The assessment team remained flexible and open to last-minute changes whenever security or weather conditions precluded a visit to one or more selected communities.

The assessment was not designed to be statistically significant, and therefore some findings may not be generalizable. It demonstrates how important the presence of VISTAS could be in community life.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Question 1: Is the current program strategy relevant and appropriate in the South Sudan context and the context of USAID/South Sudan’s strategy?

In addressing this question the assessment team conducted analysis of USG priorities identified/reflected in the OF, the South Sudan political, security, social, and economic context, the VISTAS Project Theory of

Change (TOC), small and in-kind grants, and Project execution mechanisms. The Assessment Team’s overall conclusion is the VISTAS Project has adapted well to the changing political and security context and demonstrates strategic relevance and appropriateness with the context of both South Sudan and

USAID/South Sudan’s strategy. Its continued relevance could be further strengthened with some adjustments.

Strategic Relevance

1. Relevance of VISTAS to communities

Available evidence suggests that VISTAS grantees and beneficiaries appreciate the Project for its meaningful impact within their communities and they can cite tangible benefits that they associate directly with the VISTAS Project. Community members request USAID to expand and deepen its presence through

VISTAS.

Generally, national staff, grantees, and beneficiaries share a positive view of VISTAS’s impact on the everyday lives of common people. For example, one respondent said, “we are bordering three communities…we are supporting inter-communal markets (Grant # WUN005 Amokpiny Border Market

Office Construction and WUN0008 Amokpiny Peace Market Office PV and Furnishing) so that these communities can reinforce what has already been there, like the intermarriages” which have built bridges between communities. Another respondent said, “we have empowered the Chief with reconstructing the traditional laws and put it in a booklet which is helping them work effectively and apply laws that the community respects and have been used to settle several cases that could have resulted in revenge killings;

so it has had an impact (Grant #JON057 Customary Law Refresher Training for Traditional Chiefs in the

Greater Bor Area and JON068 Akobo East Chiefs Training).” Another respondent said “we give training to Akobo women association (Grant #JON079 Capacity Building for Peace Workshop for Women of

Akobo East County), which has produced impact and signaled that their voice is stronger than the men’s voice in promoting peace.” For example, the women have could respond to youth involved in revenge killings, who were unwilling to talk to the elder men, but, after the inclusion of women, agreed to the dialogue. In Lakes, revenge killings are reportedly reduced. There are many examples of positive localized impacts such as these from across all regions and areas where VISTAS supports activities.

In one case, a beneficiary said, “VISTAS is more trusted than the local government.” This shows how important the presence of VISTAS could be in community life.

2. Impact of USG policy on VISTAS

The 2013 USG policy shift away from state institutions and towards communities has unfolded in two levels of policy dialogue: the general level and the operational level. At the operational level, this dialogue has focused on whether or not VISTAS can work with local governments. The policy has been interpreted and implemented differently across VISTAS activities, but is generally understood to restrict VISTAS cooperation with government at all levels.

This change represented a paradigm shift for VISTAS, which was designed to work with the government, building offices for local administrations during the CPA Interim period, and only more recently diversified into a variety of different activity sets. While respondents were under a strict interpretation of the presumed policy, there is no written USAID South Sudan policy restricting VISTAS engagement with local government.

The policy ensures that no USG funding is used to subsidize war or reward human rights abusers, and out of due caution, the Mission instructed VISTAS to restrict all work with local governments. This decision may not promote the relevance and impact of Project activities and should be revisited. VISTAS staff would rather support local government through a nuanced approach that engages entire communities in identifying partnership opportunities.

USAID’s intention in creating VISTAS was to help extend the reach of local governments at a time when the USG policy prioritized support to CPA implementation by building the capacity of state institutions. It targeted “flashpoints” to mitigate local conflicts that could escalate with national significance. After the

2013 conflict, the USG policy shifted from building the capacity of state institutions towards assisting communities through non-state actors (community-based organizations, traditional authorities, civil society and private sector). This had a major impact on VISTAS, and the types of activities the Project could support; mostly it stopped material support to local government, but it also formed an impetus for other forms of partnership.

VISTAS originally had a “hardware” component, and one respondent noted, “The relationships with local authorities and communities was predicated on VISTAS giving stuff.” It also had a software component, “the material provisions were not the point, although…