REVISED_RFP_72012118R00006.pdf

REVISED VERSION OF THE RFP NO. 72012118R00006 DATED MAY 11, 2018

Issuance Date: April 18, 2018 Questions Due Date and Time: May 2, 2018, 16:00 Kyiv Local Time Closing Date and Time: June 4, 2018, 16:00 Kyiv Local Time

SUBJECT: Request for Proposal (RFP) No.: 72012118R00006

USAID Democratic Governance East Activity

The United States Government, represented by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Regional Mission for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, is seeking proposals from qualified and eligible organizations to implement the USAID Democratic Governance East Activity as fully described in the attached RFP. USAID/Ukraine anticipates awarding one five (5) year, cost plus fixed fee, completion type contract as a result of this solicitation. The estimated range for the required services detailed in Section C of this RFP is between $57 and $60 million.

Proposals will be accepted from eligible organizations. The geographic codes for this procurement are 110 and 937. USAID will conduct this procurement through full and open competition under which any type of organization (including large or small commercial [for profit] firm, educational institutions or non-profit organization) is eligible to compete. The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code for this acquisition is 541990 (All Other Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services).

Offerors are encouraged to read the entire solicitation. Special attention must be paid to Section L - Instructions, Conditions, and Notices to Offerors or Respondents, and Section M -Evaluation Criteria. Any questions related to this RFP must be submitted in writing via email to Ms. Marina Orlova at morlova@usaid.gov and me at dharter@usaid.gov by the time and date specified above. No questions will be accepted after the specified date. If questions are received, the responses to which affect the solicitation, or if any changes are made to the RFP, this solicitation will be amended. This RFP and any amendments to this solicitation will be issued and posted on the Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps) website at https://www.fbo.gov. Offerors are encouraged to check this website periodically. USAID bears no responsibility for data errors resulting from transmission or conversion processes.

Only electronic proposals will be accepted. Proposals must be sent to morlova@usaid.gov and dharter@usaid.gov by the due date and time specified above. No other forms of submission will be accepted.

For detailed submittal instructions, please refer to Section L.

The Government reserves the right to award a contract without discussions or the submittal of the final proposal revision, based upon evaluation of the Offeror's submitted technical and cost information.

Accordingly, the Offeror's initial offer should contain its best terms for both cost and technical proposal.

mailto:morlova@usaid.gov mailto:dharter@usaid.gov https://www.fbo.gov/ mailto:modlova@usaid.gov mailto:dharter@usaid.gov

1. THIS CONTRACT IS A RATED ORDER RATING PAGE OF PAGES

UNDER DPAS (15 CFR 700)

2. CONTRACT NUMBER 3. SOLICITATION NUMBER 4. TYPE OF SOLICITATION 5. DATE ISSUED 6. REQUISITION/PURCHASE NUMBER

SEALED BID (IFB)

NEGOTIATED (RFP)

7. ISSUED BY CODE 8. ADDRESS OFFER TO (If other than Item 7)

NOTE: In sealed bid solicitations "offer" and "Offeror" mean "bid" and "bidder".

9. Sealed offers in original and _____________________________ copies for furnishing the supplies or services in the Schedule will be received at the place specified in Item 8, or if hand carried, in the depository located in until local time _______________________ (Hour) (Date)

CAUTION - LATE Submissions, Modifications, and Withdrawals: See Section L, Provision No. 52.214-7 or 52.215-1. All Offers are subject to all terms and conditions contained in this solicitation.

A. NAME B. TELEPHONE (NO COLLECT CALLS) C. E-MAIL ADDRESS

AREA CODE NUMBER EXT.

(X) SEC. DESCRIPTION PAGE(S) (X) SEC. DESCRIPTION PAGE(S)

PART I - THE SCHEDULE PART II - CONTRACT CLAUSES

A SOLICITATION/CONTRACT FORM I CONTRACT CLAUSES

B SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICES/COSTS PART III - LIST OF DOCUMENTS, EXHIBITS AND OTHER ATTACH.

C DESCRIPTION/SPECS./WORK STATEMENT J LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

D PACKAGING AND MARKING PART IV - REPRESENTATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS

E INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE

F DELIVERIES OR PERFORMANCE

G CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION DATA L INSTR., CONDS., AND NOTICES TO OFFERORS

H SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS M EVALUATION FACOTRRS FOR AWARD

K REPRESENTATIONS, CERTIFICATIONS AND OTHER

STATEMENTS OF OFFERORS

NOTE: Item 12 does not apply if the solicitation includes the provisions at 52.214-16, Minimum Bid Acceptance Period.

12. In compliance with the above, the undersigned agrees, if this offer is accepted within _210_ calendar days (60 calendar days unless a different period is inserted by the Offeror) from the date for receipt of offers specified above, to furnish any or all items upon which prices are offered at the price set opposite each item, delivered at the designated point(s), within the time specified in the schedule.

13. DISCOUNT FOR PROMPT PAYMENT 10 CALENDAR DAYS (%) 20 CALENDAR DAYS (%) 30 CALENDAR DAYS (%) CALENDAR DAYS (%) (See Section I, Clause No. 52-232-8)

14. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF AMENDMENTS AMENDMENT NO. DATE AMENDMENT NO. DATE

(The offeror acknowledges receipt of amendments to the SOLICITATION for offerors and related documents numbered and dated:

CODE FACILITY 16. NAME AND TITLE OF PERSON AUTHORIZED TO SIGN OFFER 15A. NAME AND

ADDRESS OF

OFFEROR

(Type or print)

15B. TELEPHONE NUMBER 17. SIGNATURE 18. OFFER DATE

AREA CODE NUMBER EXT. 15C. CHECK IF REMITTANCE ADDRESS IS DIFFERENT FROM

ABOVE - ENTER SUCH ADDRESS IN SCHEDULE

19. ACCEPTED AS TO ITEMS NUMBERED 20. AMOUNT 21. ACCOUNTING AND APPROPRIATION

22. AUTHORITY FOR USING OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION: 23. SUBMIT INVOICES TO ADDRESS SHOWN IN ITEM (4 copies unless otherwise specified)

10 U.S.C. 2304(a) ( ) 41 U.S.C. 253(c) ( )

24. ADMINISTERED BY (If other than Item 7) 25. PAYMENT WILL BE MADE BY CODE CODE

26. NAME OF CONTRACTING OFFICER (Type or print)

Daniel Harter

27. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 28. AWARD DATE

IMPORTANT - Award will be made on this Form, or on Standard Form 26, or by other authorized official written notice.

(Signature of Contracting Officer)

(REV. 9-97)

10. FOR INFORMATION CALL:

11. TABLE OF CONTENTS

STANDARD FORM 33

SOLICITATION, OFFER AND AWARD N/A

SOLICITATION

OFFER (Must be fully completed by Offeror)

AWARD (To be completed by Government)

72012118R00006 X

04/18/2018 REQ-121-18-000040

USAID/Ukraine/Regional Contract Office Department of State 5850 Kyiv Pl.

Washington D.C. 20521-5850

16:00 (Kyiv LT) 06/04/2018

Ms. Marina Orlova Sr. Acquisition Specialist morlova@usaid.gov

See Attached Table of Contents

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X 7-35

X 36-37

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USAID/Ukraine/Regional Contract Office

USAID/Ukraine/Office of Financial Management

Request for Proposal 72012118R00006 USAID Democratic Governance East

PART I - THE SCHEDULE

SECTION B - SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICE/COSTS

B.1 PURPOSE

The purpose of this contract is to strengthen the connection and trust between citizens and their government in Eastern Ukraine through the activity entitled the “USAID Democratic Governance East” in Ukraine as described in detail in Section C. STATEMENT OF WORK.

B.2 CONTRACT TYPE

This is a cost plus fixed fee (CPFF) completion contract. For the consideration set forth in the contract, the Contractor must provide the results and deliverables described in Section C and Section F of this contract.

The Contractor must also comply with all other contract requirements.

B.3 ESTIMATED COST, CEILING PRICE, FIXED FEE, AND OBLIGATED AMOUNT

(a) The estimated cost for the performance of the work required hereunder, exclusive of fixed fee, if any, is __________ [ TBD ]. The fixed fee, if any, is _________ [ TBD ]. The estimated cost plus fixed fee, if any, is ___________ [ TBD ].

(b) Within the estimated cost plus fixed fee (if any) specified in paragraph (a) above, the amount currently obligated and available for reimbursement of allowable costs incurred by the Contractor (and payment of fee, if any) for performance hereunder is _________ [ TBD ]. The Contractor shall not exceed the aforesaid obligated amount.

(c) Funds obligated hereunder are anticipated to be sufficient through _________ [ TBD ].

B.4 CONTRACT BUDGET

(a) Cost Category Amount Total Estimated Cost TBD GUC Fund TBD Fixed Fee TBD

Total Estimated Cost Plus Fixed-Fee TBD

(b) The inclusion of any costs in the above cost categories does not obviate the requirement for prior approval by the Contracting Officer of cost items designated as requiring prior approval by any of the terms and conditions of this contract, including the applicable cost principles (see FAR § 52.216-07, “Allowable Cost and Payment”); nor does it constitute a determination of allowability by the Contracting Officer of any item of cost, unless specifically stated elsewhere in this contract.

Also, these amounts may not be adjusted without a written modification signed by the Contracting Officer. The Contractor must not bill any amounts against this contract in excess of the amounts specified for each line item.

B.5 INDIRECT COSTS

(a) Pending establishment of revised provisional or final indirect costs, USAID will reimburse allowable indirect costs on the basis of the following negotiated provisional or predetermined rates and the appropriate bases pursuant to the Contractor’s current executed Negotiated Indirect Cost Rate Agreement:

Description Rate Base Type Period % 1/ 1/ 1/

1/Base of Application:

Type of Rate:

Period:

(b) The Contractor will make no change in its established method of classifying or allocating indirect costs without the prior written approval of the Contracting Officer.

B.6 CEILING ON INDIRECT COSTS (if applicable) [determination to include this clause in the contract will be made at the time of award in accordance with FAR 42.707(b)(i) ]

(a) Reimbursement for indirect costs shall be at the lower of the negotiated final (or predetermined) or the following ceiling rates:

Description Rate Base Type Period

% 1/ 1/ 1/

1/Base of Application:

Type of Rate:

Period:

(b) The Government will not be obligated to pay any additional amount should the final indirect cost rates exceed the negotiated ceiling rates. If the final indirect cost rates are less than the negotiated ceiling rates, the negotiated rates will be reduced to conform to the lower rates.

(c) This understanding will not change any monetary ceiling, obligation, or specific cost allowance or disallowance. Any changes in classifying or allocating indirect costs require the prior written approval of the Contracting Officer.

B.7 COST REIMBURSABLE

The U.S. dollar costs allowable will be limited to reasonable, allocable, and necessary costs determined in accordance with FAR § 52.216-7, “Allowable Cost and Payment,” FAR § 52.216-8, “Fixed Fee,” FAR § 52.232-20, “Limitation of Cost,” and FAR § 52-232-22, “Limitation of Funds,” if applicable, and AIDAR 752.7003, “Documentation for Payment.”

B.8 PAYMENT OF FIXED FEE

Pursuant to FAR 16.306 (d) “Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Contracts”, payment of fixed fee under this contract will be tied to the completion of deliverables specified in Section F.5 of this contract and in accordance with the final approved Fee Schedule.

Upon successful achievement of the deliverable, the Contractor must provide evidence of its achievement to the COR and the Contracting Officer. Upon acceptance and approval by USAID, the Contractor must submit an invoice for the amount of the fee associated with the deliverable. Further, payment of fixed fee, subject to FAR 52.216-8, will be made upon receipt of a proper invoice by the Office Financial Management (OFM) located in USAID/Ukraine.

B.9 MULTI-YEAR CONTRACT AND CANCELLATION CEILING

This contract is considered non-severable, and is therefore a multi-year contract as defined in FAR 17.103.

Therefore, this contract is subject to the requirements of FAR 17.106.

a. Performance under this contract during the second and subsequent program years is contingent upon the appropriation of funds. All program years except the first are subject to cancellation. Cancellation shall occur by the dates specified below if the Contracting Officer:

1. Notifies the Contractor that funds are not available for contract performance for any subsequent program year; or

2. Fails to notify the Contractor that funds are available for performance of the succeeding program year.

b. Cancellation Ceiling:

This is a CPFF type contract where the Contractor is authorized to be reimbursed for all costs which are allowable in accordance with FAR 52.216-7, “Allowable Costs and Payment.” Therefore, the Contractor will not incur any costs which would have been amortized over the life of the contract should the contract be cancelled in accordance with FAR 52.217-2.

The Government's liability for cancellation charges shall not exceed $0. This amount will be reduced in accordance with FAR 17.106-1(c)(1) at the conclusion of each program year, as follows:

Program Year Cancellation Date Cancellation Ceiling Year 1: 2018/2019 N/A N/A Year 2: 2019/2020 MONTH TBD, 2019 TBD Year 3: 2020/2021 MONTH TBD, 2020 TBD Year 4: 2021/2022 MONTH TBD, 2021 TBD Year 5: 2022/2023 MONTH TBD, 2022 TBD

[END OF SECTION B]

SECTION C – DESCRIPTION/SPECIFICATIONS/STATEMENT OF WORK

C.1.0 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

USAID’s goals in Ukraine are, inter alia, to promote good governance, accelerate economic growth, advance anti-corruption efforts, and strengthen an inclusive civic identity in the country. The purpose of this contract is to support USAID’s objectives of promoting inclusive civic identity, common civic values, and a unified Ukraine by addressing the divisive impacts of Russia’s aggression, cases of far-right Ukrainian nationalism, and the consequences of ongoing armed conflict through increased citizen participation, improved service delivery and more responsive governance. USAID envisions a fast, flexible, and adaptive mechanism in this flagship program to effectively promote civic awareness, social entrepreneurship, citizen engagement, and the benefits of reforms and broad integration into the Euro-Atlantic community through community-level improvements in services and more responsive local governance in areas most affected by conflict and divisive influences.

C.2.0 CONTEXT/BACKGROUND

Several momentous events have followed in the wake of the 2013 “Euro-Maidan” protests and the 2014 Revolution of Dignity that led to the removal of President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014. These include referenda in Crimea and Sevastopol in March 2014; the outbreak of armed conflict in eastern Ukraine;

and Presidential, Parliamentary and local elections in 2014-2015. The Government that took office in December 2014 carried a mandate for reforms yet faced formidable political, security, and economic challenges that included containing the conflict and restoring peace in the east; ensuring macroeconomic stability; containing a major banking crisis; reducing the fiscal deficit in the midst of a recession; and reducing deep-seated corruption while contending with powerful vested interests that continue to oppose reforms. The pace of reform has been uneven as a result of these constraints and increasing political uncertainty over the future of armed conflict in the east and other threats to Ukraine’s prospects for recovery and development. Reforms continued to lag behind expectations as a new government took office in April 2016, despite the passage of an action plan identifying key reform initiatives in May 2016.

C.2.1 Current Ukraine Context While the impacts of Russia’s aggression are manifest throughout Ukraine, they are particularly visible throughout the Donbas and surrounding oblasts, and in Crimea. Since the onset of conflict in spring 2014 up to November 2017, over 10,000 Ukrainians have been killed according to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. According to USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), as of January 2018, 3.4 million are in need of humanitarian assistance and 1.6 million are considered as internally displaced persons (IDPs) as a result of the ongoing conflict. Additionally, widespread and systematic human rights abuses committed by the Russian Federation and Russia-led forces in Donbas and Crimea have only accelerated with impunity. Credible reports by Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission (SMM), and watchdog groups show that despite efforts to achieve peace in Donbas, the parties have failed to comply with the Minsk II peace agreements, with grave human rights consequences for the conflict-affected population, especially those living near the contact line and in non-government controlled areas (NGCAs).

Populations in Donbas and neighboring regions harbor perceptions of being left out, marginalized, or rebuked for being perceived as Russian-leaning. They are also the most unaware and/or skeptical of the reform process and, as a result, less accepting of the national government’s proclamations and policies than any other parts of the country. While early progress has been made in implementing reforms in the east and south since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, enduring governance and service delivery challenges, along with the impact of Kremlin-led attempts to propagate divisive narratives and exploit existing social divisions, are undermining greater support for Ukraine’s democratic transition and European future in these regions. Furthermore, Ukraine has long-standing problems attracting foreign investment due to rampant corruption, an ineffective system of property and investment protections, and an unpredictable and ad hoc policy environment. These realities have been made worse through Russian trade and transit bans, and using other economic measures to further decrease investor confidence, increase balance of payments problems, and inhibit needed energy sector modernization and transformation.

Ukraine today remains at a crossroads. The economy has stabilized but economic prospects remain weak.

Addressing longstanding governance challenges, a need for economic growth, and civic participation bottlenecks on multiple fronts will be essential to strengthening the stability and unity of the country.

Populations that harbor perceptions of being left out, marginalized, or punished for their historical or contemporary place in Ukrainian society must be included in efforts to develop a vibrant, unified state.

By mid-2017, modest economic gains and key reforms had advanced. Polling by organizations such as the International Republican Institute (IRI)1 in July 2017 found the first improvements in “national mood”2 since the onset of war. However, that mood is not shared evenly throughout the country. Majorities of citizens in Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Odesa oblasts are far more skeptical of Ukraine’s progress; the most unaware of the reform process; and as a result are less accepting of national Government of Ukraine (GOU) reform progress and proclamations than the rest of the country. The frustration and anxiety felt by many residents in the east and south is rooted in divisive myths about nationalism, an entrenched culture of corruption—an issue across all of Ukraine—and poor governance that pre-dates the conflict; modern-day fears about these regions’ economic decline; service delivery deficits; and rhetoric and policies in Kyiv strengthened by Russian media and pro-Russia local elite narratives that portray these regions as being apart from the rest of Ukraine and disloyal. They are also more likely to attribute malign intentions to Kyiv and to assign blame for a lack of reform or the poor economy on mismanagement by national institutions or western influence rather than direct them to Russia.

USAID’s Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index (SCORE)3 revealed that the Donbas, along with regions such as Kharkiv, Kherson, and Odesa, have strong social, cultural, and, in spite of the conflict, political leanings toward Russia; are exposed to media originating from Russia; remains skeptical of closer relations with the West due to social, cultural, and economic ties to the Russia. Indeed, one of the most striking differences in perceptions held by residents of Donbas and the rest of the country is the degree to which residents are skeptical of a European future, Ukrainian patriotism, culture and language, and still hold strong ties to Russia and nostalgia for the Soviet Union. Other studies reveal that fewer residents of the Donbas are likely to blame Russia for the conflict, with most feeling that sanctions against Russia should end and over 30 percent maintaining that Ukraine should join the Eurasian Customs Union.

In many ways, the future of Ukraine will be decided in regions such as Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Kharkiv, where uncertainty about the future drives skepticism over Ukraine’s European-oriented trajectory. In addition, presidential and parliamentary elections loom on the horizon in 2019 and populist politics are resonating across the country, particularly in the east and south, sowing mistrust and skepticism in the reform process.

The frustration and anxiety felt by many residents in the east and south is rooted in an entrenched culture of corruption and poor governance that pre-dates the conflict; modern-day fears about these regions’ economic decline; service delivery deficits; and rhetoric and policies in Kyiv that portray these regions as being separatist-minded and disloyal. This disaffection is stoked by malign Kremlin-backed narratives and by the nationalist views expressed by political parties and political actors in the center and west of the country.

While early progress has been made in implementing reforms in the east and south of the country after the 2013 Euro-Maidan protests and 2014 Revolution of Dignity, enduring economic and service delivery challenges along with the impact of divisive narratives and social identities4 are undermining greater support for Ukraine’s democratic transition and European future in these regions.

1 See http://www.iri.org/resource/ukraine-poll-slight-improvement-national-outlook-strong-support-europe.

2 “National mood” here refers to Ukrainians expressing both an awareness of reforms and general appreciation of progress against those reforms.

3 See http://scoreforpeace.org/eng/?country=25. Also, note that the 2017 results will be available soon.

4 “Divisive social identities” is a reference to citizens’ political and social orientations that are alternatively aligned with the Russian Federation, Kyiv, or Donbas, and western versions of events and prospects for the country. There are also http://www.iri.org/resource/ukraine-poll-slight-improvement-national-outlook-strong-support-europe http://scoreforpeace.org/eng/?country=25

C.2.2 Donbas Context As described briefly above and mentioned in detail in USAID’s 2017 Donbas Assessment5, a combination of pre-crisis political, economic, and social challenges rooted in the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Ukrainian independence precipitated the violence that erupted in 2014. Shocks over the four years of the ensuing crisis have now deepened political disillusionment, weakened economic performance, slowed reforms, and increased poverty. The chronic nature of these challenges and a widening gap among citizens over the future of the country could yet fuel additional political and social crises in Ukraine.

Outside of these general challenges to the unity and resilience of the country’s institutions, there are particular features (and challenges) that distinguish the Donbas region. These factors range from those that are unique to the region to those that are distinct by a matter of degree from the rest of the country. These characteristics frame a development context that is unlike assistance environments found in most other oblasts.

Moreover, the Donbas region requires more than humanitarian response after four years of conflict. Timely recovery and development support is vital to the stability of the region and the unity of the country. The distinctiveness of the Donbas requires that any development strategy that promotes the unity and stability of the state should regard the Donbas region as a specific problem set, requiring a focus on the particular factors that drive ongoing instability in the region – even as violent conflict continues.

As a region, the Donbas is less accepting of a European future than any other part of the country. On most questions of popular opinion regarding the government in Kyiv, the economy, and the general trajectory of Ukraine, the Donbas (and in fact much of southeastern Ukraine) trends away from the rest of the country.

Ukrainians in the Donbas are also the most unaware of (and skeptical toward) the reform process.

Many of these perceptions predate the current conflict, including low regard for political authorities in Kyiv and a more eastward-looking orientation as part of a regional and national identity. Differences like these contributed to the events that would come to divide the Donbas into separate areas of control in 2014.

Messages and policies by the national government easily play into the perceptions and narratives that Kyiv is punishing the region. Moreover, the inversion of status from when the rest of the country depended a great deal on the Donbas to a situation where newly disadvantaged government-controlled areas (GCAs) of the Donbas are dependent on the central and western parts of the country is deeply unsettling to residents.

There are significant differences in social cohesion between GCAs and NGCAs of the Donbas as well as diverse perspectives on the economy and perceptions of quality of life between areas of control. There is also a growing gap in how residents of government-controlled and occupied Donbas view their political identity.

While studies suggest strong, polarized “Pro-Ukrainian/Europe” and “Pro-Russian” camps in the region, there is also a large, undecided segment of the population. This nascent pluralism, born of disenchantment with existing political options, is a new phenomenon within the Donbas – and one that presents new opportunities to engage.

The conflict in the Donbas has created significant challenges to civilian governance in the government-controlled areas of the region. Large numbers of displaced Ukrainians as well as 8,000 to 10,000 residents a day traveling from NGCAs place significant burdens on service delivery in the region that are felt by host residents, the displaced, and residents coming from separatist areas.

large segments of the population in these regions that identify with neither perspective. “Divisive narratives” refer to news and other information streams that reinforce the differences between these orientations and identities.

5 Available on USAID’s Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC) at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pa00mpjs.pdf.

Offerors are strongly advised to review this assessment and similar analyses, as described throughout this statement of work, of the particular political dimensions of Donbas. Offerors may want to consider reviewing, inter alia, the following scholarly works for additional background on the political dynamics of Donbas: Taras Kuzio, Putin’s War Against Ukraine: Revolution, Nationalism, and Crime, 2017, University of Toronto Press: Toronto, CA; Tracey German and Emmanuel Karagiannis (eds.), The Ukrainian Crisis: The Role of, and Implications for, Sub-State and Non-State Actors, 2017, Routledge: Oxford, UK; and Nicolai Petro (ed.), Ukraine in Crisis, 2017, Routledge: Oxford, UK. .

http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pa00mpjs.pdf

Civil-military administrations have also contributed to feelings of marginalization and disenfranchisement in some areas. A number of key cities, including large towns like Bakhmut near a crossing between areas of control, and smaller transit towns like Kurakhove, were deemed too insecure to hold local elections in 2015.

Both Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts are the slowest to implement territorial decentralization. The two administrations have managed to amalgamate only five territories, compared to nearby Dnipropetrovsk oblast that has merged 34 hromadas. Moreover, local city governments have been slow to take advantage of opportunities presented by fiscal decentralization. Factors like these are consequences of a history of poor governance in the region (and in much of Ukraine) and have contributed to high levels of dissatisfaction with government authorities in the Donbas.

In addition to the worrying public opinion trends that reveal significant social cohesion challenges in the Donbas, the region had extraordinarily low voter turnout in 2015 and the results of those elections tended to place antagonists to Kyiv in power. Perception surveys also suggest that a majority of residents in the Donbas believe that democracy in Ukraine is on the decline, that corruption is not being addressed at the national level, and that service delivery is deteriorating in their community.

Today, somewhat counter-intuitively, there are several windows of opportunity for reform and democratic transition in the region. Perhaps the most promising indication of long-term changes to governance in the Donbas is the emergence of a reform-minded, professionalized civil society. More recent attempts to improve service delivery through administrative service centers have also shown promise. Recent polling in key population centers in the Donbas also suggests that significant percentages of respondents are ready to attend public meetings and would like local media to focus more intently on the affairs of local government.

Contrary to expectations that the citizenry is apathetic, there is a strong sense that changes are coming to the Donbas, although anticipated changes are not always regarded as positive.

After the start of the armed conflict, both Kyiv and separatist authorities banned popular Russian and Ukrainian media outlets in their respective territories. The results have been a narrowing of the media space, a growing divergence in public narratives of events on both sides of the contact line, and a decline in trust of media in general. Aside from trusted person-to-person contact, television remains the main source of information for most residents in GCAs within the Donbas. Yet while broadcast television captures the largest share of the media consumption market, both empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that the internet and social media are becoming more popular. Trust in media of all types in the Donbas is extremely low, however, and messages about reform and the direction of the country do not resonate in the region. This has created a situation where word of mouth, rumor, and other informal information sources are disproportionately influential.

One promising trend is the diversification of the media environment. Several new online outlets have emerged or have gained popularity in the past two years, filling the information gap. While the market for these outlets is underdeveloped and they often are the pet projects of local businesses, they typically cover reform-oriented issues in ways mainstream media do not – and they do so with accuracy and journalistic integrity.

Despite the growing number of media sources, both Ukrainian and Russian outlets struggle to overcome a trust deficit. Trust in national Ukrainian broadcasters that have supplanted Russian outlets in GCAs is dismally low at approximately 22 percent – half the national figure. This lack of trust in television news, in particular, is likely due to both the rapid change in available content (at least in GCAs) and the less-than-subtle agendas and terminology used by media outlets on each side of the conflict. As a consequence, despite high viewership, respondents to surveys claim neither Ukrainian nor Russian media sources shape their “political outlook”.

Evidence suggests this claim “to not be influenced” by media outlets may not be true. Significant numbers of Donbas residents that consume Russian media believe common Russian narratives and over 50 percent of the same respondents believe that the 2014 Revolution of Dignity was a military coup rather than a popular demonstration. This may represent the influence of media sources or the self-selection process that draws these residents to certain media sources in the first place. The larger questions are just how trusted information and opinions are shared in the Donbas and what the vectors of influence on word of mouth communications and social media networks. Before any large scale, or specific media program for the Donbas is implemented, additional analyses of these issues is warranted.

The GOU has outlined plans for the integration of GCAs and NGCAs in the Donbas but the controversial nature of these initiatives and divisive politics in Kyiv have resulted in mixed messages over the future of the region. Earlier this year, the recently established Ministry for Temporarily Occupied Territories (MTOT) released an updated fifteen point point agenda in support of reintegration of the Donbas region while also sponsoring the adoption of a State Target Program for the Recovery of Eastern Regions of Ukraine (STP)6.

These plans broadly call for changes in economic policies, addressing corruption and inefficiencies at crossing points between areas of control, and improving access to social services for Ukrainians on both sides of the line of contact. Locally, the Donetsk and Luhansk regional governments have seen large increases to their development budgets but are unable to effectively implement projects in their jurisdictions.

Trends in the Donbas threaten Ukraine’s democratic transition, the integrity of the state, and progress toward European integration. The region is fragmented internally and alienated from much of the rest of the country -yet the situation is more nuanced than simple political polarization between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian communities in the east.

As a region, the Donbas is more skeptical of Ukraine’s transformation and less accepting of a European future than any other part of the country. This mistrust and skepticism drives internal tension and gives geopolitical actors and political forces the ability to veto moves that do not serve their interests. While GCAs of the Donbas share the rest of the country’s disappointment and frustration with the slow pace of reform, studies suggest a strong pessimism associated with a deep-rooted mistrust in the current direction of the country and of the processes that have led to the transition.

On most questions of popular opinion about government, the economy, and the trajectory of Ukraine, the Donbas (and much of southeastern Ukraine) trends away from the rest of the country. The Donbas is the only region where more adults think their children will be worse off than the last generation. Perceptions about the economy are worse than in other regions as well, with 76 percent of people in Donbas believing that the economy will continue to get worse and 46 percent believing that the economy will continue to decline over the next five years, compared to more optimistic views of 64 percent and 23 percent respectively at the national level.

Ukrainians in the Donbas are also the most unaware and skeptical of the reform process. Only 30 percent of citizens in the Donbas can name a reform, compared to 51 percent in Central Ukraine. Moreover, very few residents feel that decentralization will improve governance, with only 23 percent of people willing to endure financial hardships for the reform process compared to 56 percent in the West and Central regions of the country.26 All polls cited in this study point to a deep dissatisfaction within the region toward the current political leadership in Kyiv, giving Parliament and the President “very bad” rankings at twice the rate of Ukrainians in other regions.

But one of the most striking differences in perceptions held by residents of Donbas and the rest of the country is the degree to which residents are skeptical of a European future, and still hold strong ties to Russia and nostalgia for the Soviet Union. As mentioned, USAID’s SCORE revealed that the Donbas, along with regions such as Kharkiv, Kherson, and Odesa, have strong social, cultural, and (in spite of the conflict) political leanings toward Russia. Other studies reveal that fewer residents of the Donbas are likely to blame Russia for the conflict, with most feeling that sanctions against Russia should end and over 30 percent maintaining that Ukraine should join the Eurasian Customs Union. SCORE index data and these other sources suggest that these feelings are largely rooted in Soviet nostalgia; political isolation from the rest of the country; a sense of being victimized by inattentive or malign political forces in Kyiv; and a frustration with the reform effort.

Moreover, exposure to media flows originating from Russia as well as social, cultural, and economic ties to the Russian Federation continue to play a role in the enduring skepticism toward closer relations with the West.

6 See http://www.ua.undp.org/content/ukraine/en/home/presscenter/articles/2016/08/31/recovery-and-peacebuilding-policy-breakthrough.html.

http://www.ua.undp.org/content/ukraine/en/home/presscenter/articles/2016/08/31/recovery-and-peacebuilding-policy-breakthrough.html http://www.ua.undp.org/content/ukraine/en/home/presscenter/articles/2016/08/31/recovery-and-peacebuilding-policy-breakthrough.html

C.2.3 Relation to USAID’s Strategy Failure to address the growing divide among these regions within Ukraine will undermine the sustainability and impact of USAID’s objectives across the country and in all elements of its draft five-year Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) for the 2018-2023 period. The CDCS will reflect U.S.

Government (USG) strategic priorities to tackle corruption, mitigate the impacts of Russia’s aggression, strengthen democracy, and improve Ukraine’s economic prospects. This activity will contribute to USAID/Ukraine’s draft Development Objective 2 (DO2): Impacts of Russian Aggression Mitigated, and Intermediate Result (IR) 2.1: Conditions Improved for Reintegration, and IR 2.3: Common civic values increasingly embraced across Ukraine. IR 2.1 refers generally to improving the governance and economic conditions of eastern Ukraine in order to align the region with the democratic, European trajectory of the rest of the country. IR 2.3 includes efforts to build a Ukrainian identity based on pluralistic civic values such as social responsibility, innovation, and tolerance, in order to disrupt entry points for malign actors to accentuate regional differences in ways that undermine Ukraine’s cohesion and stability.

Furthermore, the four broad priorities described in USAID’s draft CDCS Results Framework (RF) are consistent with GOU strategic plans for the same period. The draft CDCS RF reflects USAID priorities as follows:

If progress is made towards these interdependent parts of the draft RF, then USAID’s vision for Ukraine -- a democratic, prosperous, stable and united country -- will be achievable. USAID assistance to Ukraine from 2018-2023 will be based on the Development Hypothesis that the country’s European aspirations, democratic trajectory, and future prosperity and sovereignty will only be achievable if corruption is meaningfully addressed; the impacts of Russian aggression are deliberately mitigated, citizens are engaged in good, participatory governance; and inclusive economic growth is accelerated. Each DO depicted above represents a pillar undergirding Ukraine’s European future; remove one, and the entire structure is weakened.

This activity will contribute to DO 2: Impacts of Russia's Aggression Mitigated by improving conditions for reintegration and ensuring that common civic values are increasingly embraced across Ukraine. Under DO2, DRAFT VERSION an early focus of activity within government-controlled areas (GCAs) of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (the “Donbas”) is expected, and when conditions permit, in the NGCAs This activity will contribute to draft IR 2.1 by improving governance and participatory practices in the Donbas and further demonstrating that the region can implement (and in some cases, lead) the post-Maidan reform agenda. While many of the region’s governance challenges -- entrenched corruption, oligarch capture of politics and the economy, and poor connections between society and institutions – are similar to those in other parts of Ukraine, they are particularly acute in the Donbas. As a result, the Contractor will identify targets of opportunity – be they processes, actors, or larger institutions – at the sub-national level to model a more functional, mutually collaborative relationship between the government, citizens, and civil society and improve policy and service delivery outcomes. By demonstrating to Ukrainians both in the region and in the country as a whole that the Donbas can and is reforming, these interventions will put the region on an integrated trajectory with the rest of Ukraine, towards a more democratically governed, prosperous member of the European community.

This activity will contribute to draft IR 2.4 by enhancing eastern and southern Ukrainians’ understanding and acceptance of democratic civic values such as social responsibility, innovation, and tolerance exemplified by the post-Maidan surge of civic energy. These values, emphasized by young reformers entering local politics and local volunteer movements, are increasingly resonating across the country, creating constituencies of Ukrainians that are now advocating for and advancing Ukraine’s democratic reform and broad integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. Studies, including USAID’s SCORE Index, indicate that these segments of society are growing and are among the best counterparts to address social and political divisions in the country, but still weakest precisely where these divisions are most pronounced: in the Donbas and in southern oblasts such as Kherson and Odesa. A moderate, progressive civil society is the vehicle through which these values have been embraced in the Donbas and in the south; this activity will increase the number and effectiveness of these groups, promote increased community engagement in these regions, advance citizen interaction with government institutions based on reform-oriented civic values.

C.2.4 Collaboration with Other USAID Programs USAID will build on the successes of a number of initial efforts in eastern Ukraine, particularly the Ukraine Confidence Building Initiative (UCBI), to continue to foster nascent good governance practices under this contract. More broadly, USAID/Ukraine maintains a complex portfolio of programs in economic growth, health, and democratic governance that contributes to the objectives described above. Additionally, a number of activities in USAID/Ukraine’s broader portfolio of economic growth, health, and democratic governance programs will increasingly work in the Donbas or be engaged in similar interventions to support reform and broad integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. Coordination of activities in southern and eastern Ukraine is critical, as USAID’s strategic approach presumes cross-activity leveraging to achieve intended development results. Current and/or planned activities requiring collaboration include:

• Ukraine Confidence Building Initiative (UCBI)7

• Ukraine Economic Resilience Activity (ERA)8

• Enhance Non-Governmental Actors and Grassroots Engagements (ENGAGE)

• Decentralization Offering Better Results and Efficiency (DOBRE)9

• Policy for Ukraine Local Self-Governance (PULSE)10

• Yedyna Hromada (IREX)11

• U-Media (Internews) and follow-on New Media Activity12 (TBD)

• Human Rights in Action

• Ukraine Responsive and Accountable Politics (U-RAP)

7 Further information is below. Additionally, a 2017 midterm evaluation is available at USAID’s DEC:

http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pa00n7qd.pdf 8 For further information, see USAID’s Request for Information (RFI, issued on January 18, 2018 and available at https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=09552c8e5da921a38edfb6d4cd77b0a0&tab=core&_cview=0 9 Further information is available at https://www.globalcommunities.org/dobre 10 Further information is available at https://www.irex.org/project/policy-ukraine-local-self-governance-pulse 11 Further information is available at https://www.irex.org/project/yedyna-hromada-united-community 12 Please note that the overarching purpose of the new media activity is to strengthen the civically relevant role of media in democratic processes in Ukraine, and expand citizens’ access to quality information in order to counter malign influence and support broad integration with the Euro-Atlantic community. It has been released and can be found on www.grants.gov http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pa00n7qd.pdf https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=09552c8e5da921a38edfb6d4cd77b0a0&tab=core&_cview=0 https://www.globalcommunities.org/dobre https://www.irex.org/project/policy-ukraine-local-self-governance-pulse https://www.irex.org/project/yedyna-hromada-united-community http://www.grants.gov/

• Support to Anti-Corruption Champion Institutions (SACCI)13

• USAID’s Global Labor Program efforts in Ukraine

• Counter-Trafficking in Persons (CTIP)14

• Health Reform Support (TBD)

• Economic Opportunities for Persons Affected by Conflict (EOPAC)15

• Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)-administered grants in eastern

Ukraine16

While the Contractor must coordinate with all of these activities to avoid duplication of efforts and maximize the potential for developmental impact, the Contractor must maintain situational awareness of all USAID and other donor efforts, particularly those in the east, and especially coordinate closely with UCBI, whose long-term and significant presence in the east will overlap with the start of this activity, and a new Ukraine Economic Resilience Activity (ERA) which is also focused on Ukraine’s east. Early activities under this SOW are expected to follow-on and leverage successful UCBI-established relationships, networks, and counterparts, and the community development and civic identity activities under this SOW must also coordinate closely with the new ERA activity. Most, if not all, of these activities will be active in Donbas during the life of the envisioned activities under this SOW. Work with civic actors, the private sector, local governments and community residents should be undertaken with an understanding of what these other programs may already have accomplished, have learned, or are planning, in geographic areas of engagement.

The Contractor must expand associated communication and coordination efforts as described below, especially in C.6.

C.2.4.1 Ukraine Confidence Building Initiative (UCBI) Overview The most important and direct relationship of the activities described in this Statement of Work (SOW) to USAID’s current engagements in Ukraine is with UCBI, overseen by USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). The program described herein is viewed as a successor to this well-regarded program.

In July 2014, USAID/OTI launched the UCBI with the goal of amplifying the GOU’s strategic communications, promoting national unity amongst youth, and supporting conflict mitigation efforts. Due to political and social volatility in the east, including low levels of political will to implement reforms and forced displacement, the UCBI prioritized local efforts to mitigate the effects of the crisis during its first phase of operations.

In the present phase of operations, the UCBI focuses on assisting emerging local counterparts in the east and south as they advance national reforms and hold events that promote an inclusive Ukrainian identity. The trends are promising. Today, the numbers of local partners working on such issues has increased and more citizens in eastern and southern Ukraine indicate they are willing to accept an inclusive civic identity aligned with Kyiv, although polling in these regions continues to reveal far greater resistance to a Ukrainian national identity oriented toward Europe than in the rest of the country.

The goal of the current program is to enable vulnerable eastern and southern communities to actively participate in, benefit from, and advocate for Ukraine’s transition to a prosperous, unified and democratic state. This goal is advanced through two program objectives to increase citizen:

1. Support for and participation in the development of a modern, inclusive Ukrainian identity, and

2. Confidence and engagement in the reform process at the local level.

The UCBI utilizes Grants Under Contract (GUCs), short-term technical assistance (STTA), training, and direct distribution of goods (DDGS) to work with civic actors, community representatives, and government counterparts to implement activities such as:

● Promoting arts and cultural festivals

13 Further information is available at http://www.tetratech.com/en/projects/support-to-anti-corruption-champion-institutions 14 Further information is available at https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/trafficking-persons 15 Further information is available at https://www.uwf.org.ua/en/project_activities/eopac 16 For further information on OFDA activities in Ukraine, see https://www.usaid.gov/crisis/ukraine http://www.tetratech.com/en/projects/support-to-anti-corruption-champion-institutions https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/trafficking-persons https://www.uwf.org.ua/en/project_activities/eopac https://www.usaid.gov/crisis/ukraine

● Reclaiming public spaces

● Promoting volunteerism

● Supporting an entrepreneurial mindset…