STSS Class JA -SureScan Daifuku Clean Redacted.pdf

Justification and Approval FAR Part 6 authority

The threat to transportation security evolves constantly while the systems and solutions TSA deploys to counter terrorist and other security threats may remain in service for many years. In order to maintain effectiveness while maximizing return on fielded technology solutions, TSA requires flexible solutions that can adapt to maintain a high level of effectiveness as threats and adversaries change. If the subject Class Justification were not approved, and consequently, if contracts are not available to provide the needed maintenance, technical and engineering services, TSE may not continue to meet updated sec urity and safety requirements, could fail to operate due to hardware or software obsolescence or cyber vulnerability, may not be able to address unknown deficiencies experienced after deployment, or may not be able to upgrade TSE to meet new evolving threats, all of which would negatively impact the success of screening operations and TSA’s mission.

The OEMs of TSE have proprietary rights in the technology. This consists of the software, firmware, design and hardware associated with the TSE and may include networking configuration for applicable TSE. TSA generally does not own the intellectual property or data rights for TSE equipment. As a result, usually only the equipment manufacturer is capable of fulfilling specialized technical and engineering support requirements at the level of expertise required to ensure that the work is completed to the TSA specifications and other (e.g., Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency) guidance. System engineering services are especially critical to improving the detection capabilities and cybersecurity of TSE in the field and necessary to meet TSA security technology mission and objectives. As such, the OEMs are the only responsible source capable of satisfying TSA’s requirements at the level of expertise needed.

Further, checkpoint security technology requires customized electrical, mechanical, and networking component configurations in order to conduct high volume automated screening and movement of baggage, people, and commerce. Because of these unique configurations, the costs involved to subs titute presently-available TSE are prohibitive. Factors such as system redesign, reprogramming, removal of existing systems and mechanical components, disposal, equipment movement, additional electrical requirements and operational testing all must be considered when evaluating the potential cost of switching or substitution. TSA would also suffer the loss of operational capability. Thus, dec reasing the TSA’s ability to screen commerce accurately and efficiently while redesign and technology substitution is ongoing. These factors represent substantial duplication of cost to the Government that is not expected to be recovered through competition.

As TSA does not own adequate technical data or data rights, the OEM is the only source responsible to meet TSA’s configuration management requirements. This includes management of all configurable and adjustable parameters and adaptation data used to tailor the system, as well as their settings and values and inventory of hardware Configuration Items (CIs), software CIs, and firmware CIs with configuration identification data. Configuration management is also integral to implementing TSA’s changing security posture. As security technology systems are re-located, the OEM must perform site acceptance tests (SAT) to verify the system has been properly installed and integrated in the operational environment and verify the configuration baseline is consistent. Due to proprietary restrictions, the OEM is the only sourc e that can install the changes to the fielded systems. Such services are critical in order to ensure that there will not be a negative impact on airport operations due to inoperable or malfunctioning security technology or ancillary equipment.

Without this support, TSE deployed by TSA may not continue to meet updated security and safety requirements, could fail to operate due to hardware or software obsolescence, may not be able to address known deficiencies experienced after deployment, or may not be able to be upgraded to meet new evolving threats, all of which would negatively impact the success of screening operations and TSA’s mission.

Justification and Approval FAR Part 6 authority

6. Description of Efforts Made to Ensure that Offers are Solicited from as Many Potential Sources as is Practicable.

A Notice of Intent will be issued prior to the release of the solicitation.

Further information regarding the market research that was conducted is described in Section 8.

7. Determination by the Contracting Officer that the Anticipated Cost to the Government will be

Fair and Reasonable.

The Contracting Officer will ensure that the anticipated cost to the Government is fair and reasonable through price analysis techniques in accordance with FAR 15.404-1 prior to award. In order to determine fair and reasonable pricing, the Contracting Officer anticipates using the IGCE for comparison, historic al contract pricing, and actual cost data for comparison purposes.

8. Description of Market Research.

Market research has shown that while other commercial providers of similar services exist, the OEMs of TSE have proprietary rights in the technology which preclude these services from being provided by a third party. These proprietary rights consist of software, firmware, design and hardware associated with the TSE and may also include proprietary networking configuration for applicable TSE.

9. Any Other Facts Supporting the Use of Other Than Full and Open Competition.

The intended IDIQ contracts will be awarded on a sole source basis to each OEM as they are the only source able to upgrade, test, and change their systems due to proprietary restrictions. TSE are sophisticated electronic screening devices, and all of TSA’s deployed TSE for which TSA requires engineering services has proprietary information that is specific to the OEM. The proprietary information of the security technology consists of the software, firmware, design and hardware associated w ith the security technology and networking configuration. TSA does not own the intellectual property or data rights for the security technology to support a third party providing engineering services. Therefore, the OEM is the only source capable of providing services for the system it manufacturers. Efficiencies will be gained as one single contract for security technology support services will be in place for each OEM vendor, rather than separate contracts by technology.

10. A Listing of the Sources, if Any That Expressed, in Writing, an Interest in the Acquisition.

None.

11. A Statement of the Actions, if Any, the Agency May Take to Remove or Overcome Any Barriers to Competition Before Any Subsequent Acquisition for Supplies or Services Required.

APM is actively seeking out opportunities that will improve the interoperability of TSE through standardized interfaces for security system components and establishing standard image and data formats for certain technology systems. The standardization of component interfaces will allow accelerated independent development of critical component technologies as well as the establishment of modular security system platforms. Standardized image and data formats will reduce barriers to integration that exist because of the technical differences between vendor proprietary systems. It will also provide flexibility to acquire capabilities that have the potential to be integrated with independently developed detection algorithms, imaging programs, and operating platforms. Efforts such as development of common graphical user interfaces (CGUI) are ongoing to support common system platforms as well.

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