BAA Topics of Interest-Amend 008 R9.pdf

BAA FAA Aviation Research 2020 Solicitation Number: 692M15-20-R-00004 R9

Federal Aviation Administration William J. Hughes Technical Center Atlantic City International Airport

Atlantic City, NJ

BROAD AGENCY ANNOUNCEMENT

AVIATION RESEARCH 2020

TOPICS OF INTEREST

January 26, 2022

The following is a list of BAA Topics of Interest of Aviation Research required by the FAA Technical Center. This BAA is an open request for white paper submittals at any time until the expiration of the BAA or until the Topic is removed. White papers and proposals will be assessed according to the instructions and criteria contained in the BAA. Offerors are invited to submit brief descriptive white papers relevant to a Topic or Topics described within the BAA. Each Topic identifies a Technical POC to whom questions relating to a particular Topic must be directed.

AVIATION RESEARCH AIRPORT PAVEMENTS (ARAP)

Topic Number: ARAP0001:

Develop Measurements, Specifications, and Guidance for Multiple Bump Events of Airport Pavement Roughness to Supplement the Existing Pavement Surface Boeing Bump Index (BBI)

Technical POCs: Richard Ji; Richard.Ji@FAA.gov Matthew Brynick; Matthew.T.Brynick@FAA.gov Copy: 9-ACT-AAQ-600-BAA@FAA.gov

Background:

Pavement smoothness is an important consideration for airport pavement. It provides the comfort and safety of aircraft ground operations. Therefore, when pavements are put into service, the FAA recommends that airports periodically check in service roughness because the surface characteristics of a pavement affect aircraft operation cost and the riding quality.

It is because of these considerations, that technical procedures and evaluation for pavement roughness is provided in Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5380-9 Guidelines and procedures for measuring airfield pavement roughness, which references the Boeing Bump Index (BBI) for evaluation. The BBI was developed solely to identify and quantify single event in-service runway pavement roughness from acceptable, excessive to unacceptable conditions.

However the BBI does not show roughness issues caused by continuous events, which reflects the interaction between the pavement and the aircraft. Without considering it, the single bump cannot reflect the real ride quality felt by the user when the aircraft, such as when it is passing by multiple bumps caused by surface distresses, the frost heave, and runway wavelengths. The consideration of a coupled system with the runway and the aircraft in a multiple vertical bump events can reflect the real responses of the aircraft and make the airport operators correctly protect the aircraft safety and aircraft structural fatigue.

The outcome from this research effort will provide airport operators with multiple bump event surface evaluation procedures for in-service pavement roughness, as well as technical specifications to consistently conduct safe, reliable, and effective airport surface roughness inspections.

Purpose:

Develop methodologies and procedures for conducting multiple bump event based airport pavement surface roughness inspections, as well as technical criteria for acceptable, excessive, and unacceptable pavement roughness.

Requirements:

The FAA would like proposals to address the specific areas listed below; however, proposals are not limited to these requirements.

mailto:Richard.Ji@FAA.gov mailto:Matthew.T.Brynick@FAA.gov mailto:9-ACT-AAQ-600-BAA@FAA.gov

Determine if an alternative method or index for the calculation of the roughness of in-service airport pavement is possible or necessary considering both single and multiple event bumps.

• Develop processes and procedures for analyzing multiple event bumps and develop recommended technical specifications (i.e. acceptable, excessive, and unacceptable surface roughness criteria).

• Develop a software package that considers multiple event bumps and make it available for public use.

Period of Performance/ Rough Order of Magnitude: The Period of Performance (PoP)/Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) will be determined based on the projects proposed.

There are currently no set parameters for these elements.

Topic Number: ARAP0002:

Machine Learning Solutions for Airport Rigid Pavement Design

Technical POC: Dr. David Brill; David.Brill@FAA.gov

The current FAA rigid pavement thickness design procedure in computer program FAARFIELD computes only the critical tensile stress at the bottom of a single concrete slab.

This eliminates the possibility of considering top-down cracking as an explicit design failure mode. In the field, contributing factors to top-down cracks are temperature gradients (causing curling), in combination with complex aircraft gear loads that may span multiple slabs.

Current FAA standards attempt to limit top-down cracks through joint spacing limitations based on experience and rules-of-thumb. As climatic conditions vary widely throughout the U.S., this empirical approach may be ineffective in some cases and result in unnecessary costs in others.

The mechanism of top-down cracking can be modeled directly using three-dimensional (3D) finite element (FE) methods, but these models are typically far more time-consuming than would be realistic for design. Rather, the most promising approach to incorporating multiple rigid failure modes in FAARFIELD involves using artificial neural networks (ANNs).

Implementing ANN-based stress models in FAARFIELD would accomplish two objectives:

• Speed up the design process compared to direct three-dimensional finite element (3D-FE) computation at design time; and

• Allow more reliable estimates of rigid pavement design life in cases where rigid pavements are at high risk for failure due to top-down cracking (generally, higher-stiffness subbases and/or longer joint spacing).

Previous FAA studies using multiple-slab 3D-FE models established critical combinations of gear positions and slab curling for top-down cracking, for many large aircraft types. An FAA-sponsored project at Iowa State University investigated the use of machine learning methods, specifically training ANNs to return the design stresses for top-down cracking design. These studies established the feasibility of using ANNs to find critical stresses for top-down cracking, even when the critical gear locations are not known a priori. ANN results are available in a fraction of the time required for direct computation, making them suitable for design applications.

Purpose:

The purpose of this Topic is to develop machine learning solutions to substitute for the direct, 3D-FE based computation of concrete stresses due to aircraft loads in airport pavement design, and return rigid pavement design stresses for top-down and bottom-up cracking rigid pavement failure modes. This Topic assumes that a separate model will be needed for each distinct aircraft type. Additional research will determine to what extent multiple variants of an aircraft type (e.g., the B737 series) can be covered by a single model, and how much deviation from default aircraft characteristics can be tolerated.

mailto:David.Brill@FAA.gov

The FAA will entertain proposals for the production of machine learning solutions for airport rigid pavement design. The solutions may be ANNs or other models, but must be capable of returning design stresses for top-down cracking quickly and accurately. Given the wide range of aircraft gear characteristics that may be used in a typical airport pavement design (gear geometry, number of wheels, wheel load, etc.), the proposals should consider how many independent models are needed to give adequate representation to the existing aircraft library.

Proposals should consider how solutions can be expanded to include future and growth aircraft gear types.

The proposals must meet the following requirements:

• Models must consider a realistic range of slab sizes, concrete thickness, temperature gradients (causing slab curling), load transfer coefficients, and other factors to determine critical tensile stresses leading to both top-down and bottom-up cracking failure.

• Models must be trained using stresses computed by the FAA-developed 3D-FE program FAA Structural Response – 3D (FAASR3D), which will be provided by the

FAA.

• Final models must be portable. That is, they must be deliverable to the FAA in a form that can be redistributed as part of standard design software, preferably as a software library that links to FAARFIELD. The final models cannot depend on software subject to copyright, commercial licenses or other encumbrances, but must be freely distributable.

The results of the research will be used by FAA to develop/modify pavement design standards (Advisory Circulars) and standard design software, include the software program

FAARFIELD.

All proposed efforts should be properly documented in the detailed project plan.

Period of Performance/Rough Order of Magnitude:

Efforts lasting up to three years will be considered. Continued efforts at the completion of each milestone or deliverable are at the discretion of the FAA, based on performance and results. These efforts are anticipated to be funded annually, subject to availability of funds.

ROM for this research is expected not to exceed $200,000.00 per project, per fiscal year for any awards made under this announcement.

Topic Number: ARAP0003: This topic has been deleted.

Topic Number: ARAP0004: This topic has been deleted.

Topic Number: ARAP0005: This topic has been deleted.

Topic Number: ARAP0006: This topic has been deleted.

AVIATION RESEARCH AIRPORT SAFETY (ARAS)

Topic Number: ARAS0001: This topic has been deleted.

Topic Number: ARAS0002:

Aqueous Film-Forming Foams (AFFF) Replacement

Technical POCs: Keith Bagot; Keith.Bagot@FAA.gov Jonathan Torres; Jonathan.Torres@FAA.gov

Title 14 CFR Part 139 (Part 139) provides regulations to airports that have scheduled operations with aircraft of 9 to 31 seats or scheduled and unscheduled operations with air carrier aircraft holding more than 30 seats. Per Part 139, certificated airports must have a certain amount of extinguishing agents on hand dependent on the aircraft activity at the airport. The main agent that Part 139 calls for airport to have is aqueous film-forming foams (AFFF). Guidance for the types of foams used at airports can be found in Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5210-6D, “Aircraft Fire Extinguishing Agents”.

Over the years, there has been a growing concern about the potential health and environmental impacts of AFFF used by Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) Departments at airports and surrounding communities. Perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances, commonly referred to as PFAS, are a toxic group of chemicals that are found in AFFF concentrates used at airports.

Specifically of concern are perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS) and perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA). Both PFOS and PFOA are considered persistent, bio-accumulative and toxic by United States (US) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards. Though foam manufactures have worked diligently to reduce presence of PFAS in their AFFF concentrates, the environmental concerns still linger. There are also several other PFAS compounds in the current AFFF formulas whose environmental and health hazards are not yet known. Recently new AFFF formulas known as Fluorine-Free Foams (FFFs) have shown potential to replace current AFFFs however; they have not been shown to have equivalent fire extinguishing capabilities.

Additionally, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 enacted in October 12, 2018 stated:

Not later than 3 years after the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator, using the latest version of National Fire Protection Association 403, ‘‘Standard for Aircraft Rescue and Fire-Fighting Services at Airports’’, and in coordination with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, aircraft manufacturers and airports, shall not require the use of fluorinated chemicals to meet the performance standards referenced in chapter 6 of AC No: 150/5210–6D and acceptable under 139.319(l) of title 14, Code of Federal Regulations.

For these reasons, the FAA’s Airport Technology Research and Development Branch (ATRD) was tasked by the FAA Office of Airport Safety and Standards with evaluating FFFs and aide in determining performance standards for FFFs to be used at airport. The FAA Technical Center mailto:Jonathan.Torres@FAA.gov broke ground on a new research facility in November 2018 with the primary focus on AFFF alternatives research testing and other ARFF technologies. Construction of this facility was completed in October 2019. One of the primary function of this facility is to find alternative firefighting agents that are environmentally friendly, while providing the same level of safety currently offered by MIL-PRF-24385 AFFF.

To identify potential fluorine-free firefighting agent candidates that could replace current AFFF used at airports.

The FAA would like white papers to address the specific areas listed below; however, Offerors

• Foams should meet standards found in MIL-PFR-24385

• Foams must have no trace of PFOS, PFOA, or any other Fluorine content

• Foams must not contain any chemicals found in the EPA’s List of Emergent

Contaminants

The FAA’s fire test facility can be used to evaluate the fire extinguishment capabilities of the foams and can be part of the proposal.

All proposed efforts should be properly documented in a detailed project plan.

The PoP/ROM will be determined based on the projects proposed. There are currently no set parameters for these elements.

Topic Number: ARAS0003: This topic has been deleted.

Topic Number: ARAS0004: This topic has been deleted.

Topic Number: ARAS0005: This topic has been deleted.

Topic Number: ARAS0006:

Sensors for Verifying Accuracy of Continuous Friction Measuring Equipment (CFME)

Technical POC: Murphy Flynn; Murphy.Flynn@FAA.gov

Historically the consistency of runway friction measurement (Mu) across CFME equipment has been inadequate. FAA Approved CFME’s and Friction Level Classifications for the CFME’s are included in Advisory Circular 150/5320-12 (latest version). Use of CFME’s has been reduced to monitoring “trending” values in contaminated conditions and different trigger values, based on vendor, for maintenance. CFME’s generally utilize load cells to record the vertical and horizontal forces at the friction tires for computing friction (Mu) values.

Prescribed wheel slip is generally achieved with a mechanical speed reducing mechanism connecting the vehicle driving tire with the friction tire. As we strive for performance standards, past data from Friction Workshops indicate that the slip measurements prove inaccurate due to excessive tire deformations during slip calibration tests. With the advent of wireless sensors, the FAA wants to determine the feasibility of quantifying these deformations to account for performance errors.

Assess the feasibility of mounting sensors on the CFME friction tires (e.g. “Smart Tire” Concept) to verify CFME readings. Assess how the use of wireless sensors could potentially test the accuracy of CFMEs for computing friction and maintaining prescribed wheel slip. The CFME could potentially be instrumented (inside the tire, if possible) with wireless sensors.

Assess whether data captured by the sensors (with the CFME in use) and utilizing the properties of the tire, can accurately determine friction (Mu) and tire slippage. The proposed research is to investigate the feasibility of obtaining the following:

• Determine feasibility of using data collected with tire properties and CFME operating conditions to calculate a Mu and tire slippage.

• Determine method for comparing the accuracy of CFME readings with those obtained from friction tire sensors.

• Determine method for verifying that data acquisition rates and data collected from sensors are reasonable.

Requirements:

mailto:Technical%20POC:%20Murphy%20Flynn;%20Murphy.Flynn@FAA.gov

• Identify wireless sensors suitable for use on CFME friction tires within the operating ranges and conditions of the various CFME tires (ASTM E670, E1551 or E1844). As all the friction tires contain tubes, investigate the feasibility of placing sensors between the tube and the inside the tire behind the tread as well as on or behind the sidewall. Potential use of piezoelectric sensors should be considered for recording pressure, temperature and strain. Methods for isolating the mechanical load in the tires from any thermal induced loads should be assessed.

• Identify a method for static calibration of the sensors and CFME load cells to include both vertical and horizontal forces.

• Assess the feasibility of developing a finite element model which can accurately relate friction and wheel slippage measurements generated by CFME with friction tire mounted sensors.

The PoP/ROM will be determined based on the projects proposed. There are currently no set

Topic Number: ARAS0007:

Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) for Pavement Inspection

Technical POC: Mike DiPilato; Michael.DiPilato@FAA.gov

The FAA’s Airport Technology Research and Development Branch (ATR) is currently conducting research on how to enable to the safe, reliable, and effective integration of small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS)/mounted sensor technologies into the airport environment to supplement airport Pavement Management Program (PMP) inspections, specified in Advisory Circular 150/5380-7 (latest version), ‘Airport Pavement Management Program (PMP)’. Airfield pavement inspections assists airports with finding optimum strategies for maintaining pavement in a safe serviceable condition over a given period for the least cost. This is especially important due to approximately 70% of Airport Improvement Program grants allocated each year are invested in airfield pavements.

There have been several attempts in recent years of companies and airport operators using sUAS to conduct various types of pavement imaging and inspections at airports. These activities have included proof-of-concept demonstrations involving the use of various types of sUAS platforms, sensors, and procedures. To build off these promising activities, ATR plans to conduct research in cooperation with industry partners to develop procedures and technical specifications for sUAS platform(s) and sensor(s) used to supplement sUAS airport PMP inspections.

The outcome from this research effort will provide airport operators with standard processes and procedures, as well as technical specifications for various types of sUAS and sUAS mounted sensor technologies to consistently conduct safe, reliable, and effective sUAS airport PMP inspections.

Develop recommended processes and procedures for using sUAS to supplement airport PMP inspections, as well as technical specifications for various types of sUAS and sUAS mounted sensor technology(s).

Requirements:

The FAA would like submittals to address the specific areas listed below; however, white papers are not limited to these requirements:

• Develop standard and repeatable processes and procedures for collecting, analyzing, maintaining, and reporting airport pavement data collected by sUAS mounted sensors;

• Develop recommended technical specifications (i.e. performance criteria) for various types of sUAS platforms and mounted sensors that would be utilized to supplement airport PMP inspections mailto:Michael.DiPilato@FAA.gov

Period of Performance/Rough Order of Magnitude:

The DRAFT final deliverable for this research project must be submitted to the FAA no later than 12 months after award. The FINAL deliverable must be submitted to the FAA no later than 30 calendar days following the receipt of FAA comments to the DRAFT final deliverable. All FAA comments/edits must be addressed/incorporated in the FINAL deliverable.

The ROM will be determined based on the projects proposed. There are currently no set parameters for the ROM. All white papers will be considered.

Topic Number: ARAS0008:

sUAS Based Foreign Object Debris (FOD) Detection on Airport Surfaces

Technical POC: Mike DiPilato; Michael.DiPilato@FAA.gov Copy: 9-ACT-AAQ-600-BAA@FAA.gov

Background:

The FAA’s Airport Technology Research and Development Branch (ATR) is currently conducting research on how to integrate small-unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) into the airport environment for various applications. These applications include: obstruction analysis, airfield pavement inspections, wildlife hazard management, perimeter security, and aircraft rescue and firefighting.

ATR is currently in the process of expanding their research portfolio to include additional applications that will improve airport safety. One application of interest to the FAA and industry is the use of sUAS for ‘real-time’ foreign object debris (FOD) detection, on airport surfaces.

Purpose:

Conduct research on sUAS based FOD detection on airport surfaces.

Requirements:

The FAA would like white papers to address the specific areas listed below; however, submittals are not limited to these requirements:

• Conduct research, testing, and evaluations to determine the feasibility of using sUAS platforms and sUAS sensors to detect FOD (in ‘real-time’) on airport surfaces.

o Determine whether sUAS based FOD sensors meet all, some, or none of the requirements in Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5220-24, Airport Foreign Object Debris (FOD) Detection Equipment.

• Develop standard and repeatable processes and procedures for using sUAS platforms and sUAS sensors to conduct ‘real-time’ FOD detection/inspections on airport surfaces.

• Conduct research, testing, and evaluations on new and innovative UAS based airport FOD detection sensors (systems) that are not discussed in AC 150/5220-24.

The Period of Performance (PoP) for projects under this topic is anticipated not to exceed 18 months however, project of longer duration will be considered. The Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) will be determined based on the projects proposed. There are currently no set parameters for the ROM.

mailto:Michael.DiPilato@FAA.gov

Topic Number: ARAS0009:

Airport Unmanned Aircraft System(s) (UAS) Detection and Mitigation Research Program

Technical POC: Jim Patterson; Jim.Patterson@FAA.gov

Consistent with Section 383 of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Reauthorization Act of 2018 (Public Law 115-254, Oct. 5, 2018), Airport safety and airspace hazard mitigation and enforcement, the FAA is launching an effort to test and evaluate technologies and systems that detect and/or mitigate potential aviation safety risks posed by unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)1 operations in the airport environment.

Section 383(a) of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 created a new § 44810 in Title 49 U.S.C.

Section 44810(a) requires the FAA Administrator to work with the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, and the heads of other relevant federal departments and agencies to ensure that technologies or systems that are developed, tested, or deployed by federal departments and agencies to detect and mitigate potential risks posed by errant or hostile UAS operations do not adversely impact or interfere with safe airport operations, navigation, air traffic services, or the safe and efficient operation of the National Airspace System (NAS).

In addition, § 44810(b) requires the FAA to develop a plan for the certification, permitting, authorizing or allowing of UAS detection and mitigation systems in the NAS. Section 44810(b) requires the FAA to take certain actions as part of or potentially informing the plan, including convening an Aviation Rulemaking Committee. Further, § 44810(c) requires the FAA to test and evaluate technologies/systems that detect and/or mitigate risks posed by UAS at five airports and § 44810(d) directs the FAA to use detection and mitigation systems to detect and mitigate the unauthorized operation of an unmanned aircraft that poses a risk to aviation safety in the course of the required testing and evaluation.2

As part of this program, the FAA has issued Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) Topic Number ARAS0009 to solicit interest from manufacturers, vendors, and integrators of UAS detection and/or mitigation technologies/systems.

Purpose:

The purpose of this Topic is to identify eligible manufacturers, vendors, and integrators of UAS detection and/or mitigation technologies and/or systems in support of the FAA’s Airport UAS Detection and Mitigation Research Program, which is being carried out pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 44810(c)-(d). For purposes of this research program:

1 See 49 U.S.C. § 44801(12) for definition of UAS.

2 The FAA was expressly exempted from various federal laws that would otherwise present legal implications associated with UAS detection and mitigation activities. See 49 U.S.C. § 44810(g). The authority conferred in § 44810(g) is limited to the testing and evaluation of UAS detection and/or mitigation technologies/systems by the FAA at five airports. This authority cannot be delegated.

1) UAS detection system refers to a system or device capable of lawfully and safely detecting, identifying, monitoring, or tracking an unmanned aircraft or unmanned aircraft system. UAS detection systems may be integrated into or be linked to counter-UAS3 systems, but, themselves, do not provide the capability to disable, disrupt, seize control, or otherwise directly interfere with UAS operations.

2) Mitigation refers to actions taken to deter, prevent, respond to, and minimize the immediate consequences of safety and security threats posed by certain UAS operations.

Mitigation may be conducted using counter-UAS and UAS detection systems, or by using other means, including efforts not reliant on these technical systems.

The FAA has a requirement to test and evaluate technologies/systems that have the ability to detect and/or mitigate UAS in the airport environment. It is important to note that the FAA will not be comparing or ranking vendors, nor is it developing a list of approved vendors as part of this research program. The FAA will be collecting data on UAS detection and mitigation capabilities and the associated impacts of these systems/technologies on the safe and efficient operation of the NAS in order to inform the additional activities required under 49 U.S.C.

§ 44810.

The FAA is seeking the submission of white papers to address the specific areas listed below;

however, submittals are not limited to these requirements:

1) UAS Detection Testing - Conduct testing and evaluation of technologies/systems to protect the air operations area (AOA)4 of an airport and as much surrounding area as possible with a general goal of reaching approximately 5 miles out from the center point of the AOA.

2) UAS Mitigation Testing - Conduct testing and evaluation of technologies/systems that offer mitigation capabilities, either as a stand-alone system or in conjunction with a detection capability, to protect the AOA of an airport.

The FAA reserves the right to pre-test mitigation technologies/systems in a controlled setting before introducing any system/technology into any airport environment for operational testing.

The selection of any offered system/technology for FAA’s research program may be denied, and testing of any selected mitigation systems/technologies may be discontinued at any stage, due to the identification of unacceptable adverse impacts or interference caused by the system/technology to safe airport operations, navigation, air traffic services, or the safe and efficient operation of the NAS.

Period of Performance (PoP)/ Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM):

The PoP/ ROM will be determined based on the projects proposed. There are currently no set

3 See 49 U.S.C. § 44801(5) for definition of counter-UAS.

4 See 14 C.F.R. § 153.3 for definition of air operations area.

Topic Number: ARAS0010:

Small-Scale Outwash and Downwash Testing for Vertiports for Advanced Air Mobility

Technical POC: Jonathan Torres; Jonathan.Torres@FAA.gov

Given the advent of vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft, there is a need to define the requirements for the planning, design and establishment of the landing area or structure intended to service these aircraft, together with associated buildings and facilities. These aircraft include, but are not limited to, standard category aircraft (<7000lbs and <9 passengers), optionally piloted aircraft and unmanned aircraft. The landing area or structure may be used to provide commercial services in support of the operations of VTOL aircraft, including, but not limited to: occupant and cargo transport, flight instruction, aerial work, aircraft rental, and maintenance services. A minimally developed vertiport facility may be defined for the boarding and discharging of passengers and cargo by VTOL aircraft.

A major component that can affect the design parameters of a vertiport’s landing area is the downwash and outwash created by VTOL aircraft while taking off or landing. Unlike traditional helicopter design, VTOL aircraft have multiple rotors appearing in a variety of different configurations. The effect of downwash and outwash in these novel aircraft configurations can impact the size requirements of the safety area surrounding a vertiport’s touchdown and lift off area.

Purpose:

The purpose of this Topic is to study and develop a small-scale test methodology to study downwash and outwash from VTOL aircraft and determine how they will affect vertiport design parameters. These aircraft include, but are not limited to, standard category aircraft (<7000lbs and <9 passengers), optionally piloted aircraft and unmanned aircraft.

Requirements:

The FAA would like submissions to propose a small-scale test methodology that can be used to measure downwash and outwash of several composite aircraft configurations that represent current VTOL aircraft design.

FAA will aide in the coordination, when possible, of obtaining information regarding current VTOL aircraft designs for this research.

The results of the research will be used to facilitate the development of minimum standards and guidance for the design and operation of VTOL facilities that support civil VTOL aircraft.

Period of Performance/Rough Order of Magnitude:

Efforts lasting up to two years will be considered. There are currently no set parameters for the

ROM.

AVIATION RESEARCH SOFTWARE & SYSTEMS

(ARSS)

Topic Number: ARSS0001:

Complex Digital Systems

Technical POC: Srini Mandalapu, Srini.Mandalapu@FAA.gov Copy: 9-ACT-AAQ-600-BAA@FAA.gov

Background:

Aircraft manufactures and modifiers are developing highly integrated and distributed system architectures with multiple aircraft functions. In addition, new methodologies, tools, and Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning (AI/ML) applications are planned to be used in airborne systems. Aircraft system element development continue to evolve due to technology innovations and the desire to reduce system element development cost and time to market. Safe use of these methodologies, tools, and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components may not have been demonstrated in embedded aircraft equipment; which may introduce a safety risk for undetected errors with failure manifestation at the aircraft level; and may only be suitable to meet safety regulations when new, revised or additional assurance activities are also included. For example, industry is proposing to use Artificial Intelligence (AI) where little is known about the validation and verification of AI in a safety critical environment. In addition, use of autonomous (non-piloted) aircraft are also being proposed under conditions where, currently, regulations and guidance do not exist. These methodologies, individually or in combination, could introduce unknown risk if not properly addressed early in the development process.

In addition, the traditional lines of identifying issues, gaps, and assurance process approaches for aircraft systems and system element implementation continue to blur. Issues may affect both aircraft systems and system element development such that identifying and mitigating them may need to be addressed in both areas, rather than individually.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) plans to conduct research to proactively address certification issues that may arise due to the introduction of new methodologies, tools, and techniques with a particular focus on Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning (AI/ML) applications and autonomy that can potentially cause new failure conditions posed by the rapid or new and novel development processes on highly integrated and distributed systems. The research results will be used in improving the assurance standards, guidance, and training material for certification engineers.

Purpose:

The purpose of this Topic is to address the use of new methodologies and techniques with a focus on AI/ML in safety critical airborne systems by identifying assurance concerns, validation and verification issues, and potential mitigation techniques to address risks early in the development process. Also, the FAA is studying new assurance processes that can address the safety risk that may have been introduced while implementing newer architectures, tool, and mailto:Srini.Mandalapu@FAA.gov technologies. The Topic also further explores the validity of the currently-recognized development assurance standards for highly integrated and distributed systems and determine if newer development assurance approaches are needed to demonstrate compliance with the regulations in light of the rapid advances in design and development of highly integrated and distributed aircraft systems.

The goal is to develop recommendations that assist in the certification and assurance of highly integrated, distributed, and complex digital aircraft systems, including systems development processes and architectures, requirements validation and integration; use of COTS devices, new and novel electronic hardware and software implementation techniques, tools, methods, and processes; continued operational safety; and streamlining approaches for safety assurance and aircraft certification.

Requirements:

The FAA would like white papers to address the specific areas listed below; however, submittals are not limited to these requirements. Innovative ideas are welcome and encouraged.

The research should consider aircraft and system safety and assurance issues in the following specific areas or combination of areas, but no be limited to:

• Implementation and verification Methodologies for Automation using Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in safety critical airborne systems

• Implementation of run-time assurance and the safety implications

• Pilot studies to evaluate the use of new assurance approaches, e.g., Overarching

Properties (OPs) as Alternative Means of Compliance

• Use of Formal Methods and Assurance Cases, and their use in aircraft certification

• Assurance Challenges with new and novel Avionics Architectures, Tools and

Technologies

For the research areas listed above, the FAA would like to:

• Assess alternative assurance approaches to currently recognized standards and their effectiveness in addressing safe implementation of new technologies such as AI/ML and addressing the safe implementation of autonomy.

• Identify the issues, challenges, and gaps in the current standards/guidance in assuring new complex airborne systems and components

• Develop criteria, mitigation approaches, recommendations, training material, or position papers.

The results of the research will be used by FAA to develop/modify standards, guidance, or training material to support the FAA’s certification workforce.

Period of Performance/Rough Order of Magnitude:

The Period of Performance (PoP)/Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) will be generally determined based on the projects proposed. However, the tasks lasting for more than 3 years will

NOT be considered.

Continued efforts at the completion of each milestone or deliverable are at the discretion of the FAA, based on performance and results. These efforts are anticipated to be funded annually, subject to availability of funds. ROM for this research is expected not to exceed $400,000.00 per project, per fiscal year for any awards made under this announcement.

Topic Number: ARSS0002:

Flight Controls and Mechanical Systems

Technical POC: Robert McGuire; Robert.J.McGuire@FAA.gov Copy: 9-ACT-AAQ-600-BAA@FAA.gov

Background:

The FAA’s Small Airplane Directorate has been working for a number of years to address General Aviation (GA) safety and to create a regulatory environment that uses advances in technology to enhance GA safety. In that time, the certification process study and Part 23 rewrite have indicated a need for the FAA to keep pace with technology and specifically apply it to prevent fatal GA accidents. Using a data driven approach, the FAA, along with the General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GA-JSC), have identified the top three causes of fatal GA accidents to be: loss of control (LOC), controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), and system or component failure - power plant. Advanced Flight Controls, including augmented flight path control can help address many of these root causes of fatal GA accidents.

Purpose:

The purpose of this Topic is to solicit white papers from the aviation community to develop proposed methods of compliance for certification of advanced flight control systems and address the root causes of fatal GA accidents. The white papers can focus on any one part of these causes, multiple parts of these causes, or all the causes. Offerors are welcome to submit multiple white papers if desired.

The FAA wants to identify barriers to certification and find ways to affordably certify systems and safety enhancements. Results will be used by the FAA and/or industry to capture best design practices, create industry standards, field new designs, and develop methods of compliance for certification of advanced flight control systems. Ultimately, the expected outcome will be a significant reduction of Loss of Control, CFIT, and power plant related GA accidents.

Requirements:

The FAA would like to address the specific areas listed below, however, white papers are not limited to these requirements. Innovative ideas are welcome and encouraged.

• Aviation Safety Research focusing on new and innovative Cockpit Displays, Heads-up Displays, and/or Inceptors for General Aviation, VTOL, VSTOL, or Hybrid aircraft.

• Aviation Safety Research focusing on new and innovative Autopilot technologies, Flight Path Control Systems, Automation, and/or Collision Avoidance Systems for General Aviation, VTOL, VSTOL, or Hybrid aircraft.

• Aviation Safety Research focusing on developing Mission Task Elements, Means of Compliance/Methods of Compliance, or other research to assist in the certification of General Aviation, VTOL, VSTOL, or Hybrid aircraft.

mailto:Robert.J.McGuire@FAA.gov

• Aviation Safety Research focusing on how sensors, avionics, processors, actuators, etc.

could be used to enhance GA safety by safely retrofit into existing General Aviation aircraft.

• Aviation Safety Research focusing on automation in the context of safe flight path augmentation, automation for safety risk controls, aiding pilot decision making, reducing pilot workload, performing dynamic consistency checks, and providing run time assurance for complex systems.

• Aviation Safety Research focusing on ways to enhance the safety of commercial Urban Air Mobility.

• Aviation Safety Research focusing on ways to reduce the General Aviation accident rate.

• Aviation Safety Research to address design best-practices, architectures, and methods of compliance to affordably implement basic envelope protection, augmented flight path control systems, and energy management concepts.

• Aviation Safety Research to propose ways to address pilot distraction, confusion or pilot errors that have resulted in GA accidents and incidents.

• Aviation Safety Research to propose design best-practices, architectures, and methods of compliance to certify “refuse to crash” hazard avoidance systems. These systems have awareness of threats such as terrain, obstacles, weather, and other aircraft.

The Period of Performance (PoP)/Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) will be generally determined based on the projects proposed. However, tasks lasting for more than 3 years will NOT be considered.

Continued efforts at the completion of each milestone or deliverable are at the discretion of the FAA, based on performance and results. These efforts are anticipated to be funded annually, subject to availability of funds. There are currently no set parameters for the ROM.

AVIATION RESEARCH STRUCTURES AND

PROPULSION (ARSP)

Topic Number: ARSP0001: This topic has been deleted.

Topic Number: ARSP0002;

Aircraft Large Rechargeable Electric Energy Storage System (LREESS) Safety

Technical POCs: Thomas Maloney; Thomas.Maloney@FAA.gov Edward Dolan; Edward.T.Dolan@FAA.gov

In the United States and abroad, experimental prototypes of all electric propulsion vehicles are pushing the envelope of electrical energy storage systems to new limits. This technology has enabled new areas such as, eVTOL, unmanned aerial vehicles, rotocraft, airplanes, and large transport airplanes. These aircrafts are adopting electric energy storage systems with increase in power consumption and electrical capacity, in the Megawatt and MW-hr range, respectively.

To improve aircraft Large Rechargeable Electric Energy Storage System (LREESS) safety, efficiency, reliability and maintainability, the aerospace world has found that progressive electrification of on-board services reduces or removes the need of traditional energy storage systems. This has led to a new understanding of electrical energy storage and a need for new industry standards and regulations.

LREESS will incorporate the use of many new materials and chemistries to increase the energy storage to weight ratios. This will create a greater risk to multiple nearby systems with an unintended energy release. To prevent the risk of an inadvertent energy release the energy storage management systems will become very complex, with increased focus on recharging, monitoring and maintenance of the LREESS.

LREESS can consist of a single battery pack, several battery packs, a single fuel cell, or multiple fuel cells, along with all the supporting equipment electronics, balance of plant, and safety systems to integrate into the aircraft.

In this Topic, a modularized electrical storage system, or modularized battery system refers to a system composed of several smaller module(s) or sub-pack(s). A module or sub-pack will contain an assembly of cells connected and enclosed in an overall single enclosure. A pack will contain an assembly of modules (sub-packs) and electronics that are connected and enclosed by an overall single enclosure. More than one pack can be used in the LREESS for aircraft. This modularity places a greater criticality and stress on the aircraft electrical system. Safe design, validation and maintenance of the LREESS will be a challenge.

mailto:Thomas.Maloney@FAA.gov mailto:Edward.T.Dolan@FAA.gov

LREESS are new and novel designs that present many issues to evaluating the safety, and demonstrating the capabilities of the safety conditions during normal and abnormal conditions.

The resulting change in aircraft large electrical systems will have far reaching implications for the electrical system, crashworthiness, generation, protection, distribution, shock protection schemes, and energy storage. To support these new technologies, changes to the entire electrical distribution systems will be necessary.

Purpose:

The purpose of this Topic is to conduct research that will address regulations and guidance associated with the electrical system architecture to ensure safety of LREESS. It will also examine the existing safety regulations and standards including 14 CFR 25.1709, 1309, 1351 and 1353 for any gaps in LREESS safety and evaluate the modularization of these systems.

Additionally, this research will produce reports detailing the research results that can be used as the basis for developing FAA regulatory standards, associated guidance and policy material, and industry standards for aircraft electrical systems. The reports will also provide the aviation industry with public domain data that will address design decisions, tradeoffs and safety implications of higher voltage being implemented on new aircraft electrical systems, integration of traditionally non-electrically operated systems, and emergent electrical generation, electrical power distribution, energy storage systems and circuit protection. This will ensure the continued safe installation and operation of LREESS.

Requirements:

The FAA would like proposals to address the specific areas listed below; however, proposals

• Research on LREESS including but not limited to, generation, protection, distribution, shock protection, advance EMI/EMC protection, energy storage management systems, thermal management, recharging, monitoring and maintenance.

• Research and design validation of modularization of the LREESS.

• Research on Lithium-Ion Battery including but not limited to, safe installation and containment, thermal runaway (TR), TR initiation test methods, and calorimeter testing.

• Research and testing on crash worthiness of LREESS.

Efforts lasting up to 3 years will be considered. Continued efforts at the completion of each milestone or deliverable are at the discretion of the Government, based on performance and results. These efforts are anticipated to be funded annually, subject to availability of funds. ROM for this research is expected not to exceed $200,000.00 per project, per fiscal year for any awards made under this announcement.

AEROSPACE MEDICAL RESEARCH DIVISION

(AMRD)

Topic Number: AMRD0001;

Federal Aviation Administration Pilot Medical Certification Tele-Examination

Technical POC: Anthony P. Tvaryanas; Anthony.P.Tvaryanas@faa.gov Alternate POC: Stacey Zinke; Stacey.Zinke@faa.gov Copy: 9-ACT-AAQ-600-BAA@faa.gov

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires pilots to receive a medical certification exam with a designated FAA Aviation Medical Examiner (AME). Medical certification is needed to protect pilots and others, as the physical demands of flight can be imposing. Medical certification is time limited, the duration of which is risk-based given consideration of type of aerospace operations and pilot age and health status. During the public health emergency caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus, pilots were unable to schedule medical examinations with AMEs, necessitating the FAA to extend arbitrarily the duration of medical certification for several months. This situation was undesirable because it removed one of the safeguards for ensuring human reliability in aerospace operations.

A future public health emergency may prevent the accomplishment of the in-person AME medical certification exam visit for a sustained period, thereby potentially invalidating certification risk estimates made at the last medical certification exam. Assuming it is necessary to continue some degree of aviation operations, the FAA needs a contingency solution to accomplish the maximum number of elements comprising the medical certification exam as practical using telemedicine. This research problem aligns with DOT’s innovation goal by conducting research on technology to promote transportation safety and efficiency. It is also within scope of the aeromedical research program objectives described in the FAA’s 2021 Annual Modal Research Plan.

Purpose:

The purpose of this Topic is to leverage the general wave of innovation in telemedicine driven by the current public health emergency for application in support of aviation safety. The research question is, “What minimum set of existing telemedicine technologies and associated procedures provide the necessary data to address the maximum number of physical exam items on FAA Form 8500-8?5 The resulting solution is broadly scoped and can include, but is not limited to, video conferencing and data transmission capabilities; medical devices and measurement apps or technologies with data transmission and or storage capability; standardized procedures for conducting individual exam elements; integration of elemental procedures into an overall standardized exam workflow; and any required examinee training. It should be integrated into an equipment package that is mailed to the pilot (and AME if necessary) and jointly used by the AME and pilot through an internet connection. The solution should comply with general rules

5 https://www.aviationmedicine.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/FAA-Form-8500-8-GG-Edition-APPLICATION- FOR-AIRMAN-MEDICAL-CERTIFICATE.pdf mailto:Anthony.P.Tvaryanas@faa.gov mailto:9-ACT-AAQ-600-BAA@faa.gov https://www.aviationmedicine.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/FAA-Form-8500-8-GG-Edition-APPLICATION-FOR-AIRMAN-MEDICAL-CERTIFICATE.pdf https://www.aviationmedicine.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/FAA-Form-8500-8-GG-Edition-APPLICATION-FOR-AIRMAN-MEDICAL-CERTIFICATE.pdf for the practice of telemedicine.

Since the AME medical certification exam shares key elements with a general purpose physical exam, the resulting solution should be marketable to primary care providers such as family practice and internal medicine clinics. Additionally, this same problem exists across transportation modes where there is a requirement for vehicle operators to maintain medical certification. As aviation requires the most rigorous medical certification exam among the modes, the solution will be able to address the requirements of other modes (e.g., Commercial Driver Medical Exam, etc.).

https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/avs/offices/aam/ame/guide/

The FAA would like proposals to address the following:

• Expected Phase I Outcomes At the end of the 6-month Phase I period, the expected outcome is a final report documenting each of the FAA Form 8500-8 physical exam data elements and the associated telemedicine assessment/measurement solution, the associated level of evidence supporting its validity, and its cost.