Amendment 0002_2019 Combined Electrical Distribution System Test Report.pdf

Project Test Report April 1 – December 20, 2019

Triennial Electrical System Testing ProjectTriennial Electrical System Testing Project

CoverCover

Veterans Affairs Medical Center Spokane, Washington

Contract No. 36C26019Q0086

CoverCover in cooperation with

Slocum & Associates

16901 Blakeway Place

Mosely, Virginia 23120

P - (512)484-5594

845 Long Branch Circle

Sugar Hill, Georgia 30518

P - (678)546-9393, F – (678)828-5903

Electrical Testing & Maintenance Project Contract No. 36C26019Q0086

Mann-Grandstaff Veterans Affairs Medical Center

Spokane, Washington April 1 – December 20, 2019

Section 1 Executive Summary

Section 2 Publications/Exhibits

Section 3 Electrical Test Records

Section 4 Thermographic Test Records

Table of Contents

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Electrical Testing & Maintenance Report Summary

General

Slocum & Associates in cooperation with SDV Services Inc. provided electrical testing and maintenance services at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Spokane, Washington on April 1 – December 20, 2019. All services were conducted in accordance with contract specifications, industry standards, NFPA 70B and manufacturer’s recommendations. This report consists of the following:

Section 1 Electrical Testing and Maintenance Report Summary

Section 2 Publications/Exhibits

Section 3 Electrical Test Records

Section 4 Thermographic Test Records

The types of equipment inspected during this session included:

Medium Voltage Circuit Breakers and Protective Relays

Medium Voltage Sectionalizing Switches

Medium Voltage Oil-Type Transformers

Low Voltage Main & Distribution Switchboards w/ Circuit Breakers

Automatic Transfer Switches

Bus Risers and Disconnects

Motor Control Centers

Low Voltage Dry-Type Transformers

Thermographic Inspection (Infrared)

In addition to regular testing procedures, infrared scan procedures were used to determine serviceability and reliability of the equipment inspected. The infrared services were conducted using a FLIR T440 thermal imaging camera.

While infrared technology can be an invaluable tool in predictive maintenance, it is not without limitations. Reflectivity, background, material emissivity and ambient temperature are among many factors that can influence thermal readings. As a result, reported temperature readings outlined in this report should not be viewed or used in terms of absolute temperature readings.

Slocum & Associates in cooperation with

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Instead, the readings should be viewed in terms of trends and relationships with other equipment components or like materials.

Supplemental tests were performed wherever possible and on an as-needed basis. These tests consisted of recording circuit loads and conducting Voltage Drop Tests. Circuit loads were monitored to assist in identifying potential phase imbalances or overload conditions. Voltage Drop tests were conducted to determine potential contact resistance issues. Both tests are extremely valuable in helping to determine potential sources of temperature variances.

The last section of this report contains the Individual Thermographic Report section. This section provides a report on each piece of equipment with a deficiency to include among other things:

Thermal image

Visual image

Thermal readings

Location

Condition and cause

Priority level

Recommended action

Repair Priority Levels

It is important to note the “temperature rise” documented on each page of the report is stated for example, “At least 17°C over reference.” This is stated this way as we know for certain the temperature is at least that value. What we don’t know is the true temperature at the point of the problem as other pieces of equipment or hardware shield us and the camera from that view.

We also know at some point in time the equipment item will fail based on the reported condition but cannot with any certainty predict when that will happen. Therefore, every documented issue is important and should be carefully considered.

Many factors or questions need to be addressed when attempting to establish a repair priority level to resolve documented issues. In random order, some general guidelines or questions you might consider in assigning a repair priority level are:

1. How critical is the piece of equipment?

2. What are the ramifications if it fails? What areas will be affected?

3. Is there a personnel hazard or danger?

4. Can the issue lead to collateral damage of related equipment either upstream, downstream or within the same area?

5. What is the cost of resolving the issue using a controlled, scheduled shutdown versus an emergency repair/replacement of the equipment item should the equipment fail unexpectedly?

6. Are resources (personnel, contractors, money, etc.) available to make the repairs?

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The thermographer cannot readily address such issues or make such determinations. As a result, repair priority levels need to be determined by the VA personnel with the ability to address such questions or those pertinent to their facilities. Note – answers to questions 1-5 should help to overcome or support obstacles encountered with question 6.

Findings & Recommendations

Outlined below are findings and recommendations for each issue noted during this testing session.

1. Electrical System Condition

Issue

There have been several recent electrical system upgrades in this facility designed to provide a safer environment for the buildings and their occupants. However, the main switchboard equipment in the CLC (Building 12) has never been upgraded and is in fair condition. The air circuit breakers serving as the main and alternate main need to have the original trip units retro-fitted with newer solid-state trip devices to provide safe and proper protection to the building.

This equipment has far exceeded its useful industry service life 25 years of age and the 15 year service life outlined in the VA Electrical Design Manual reference below.

VA Electrical Design Manual Reference

1.15.4 AGE AND PHYSICAL CONDITION

(b) The equipment should be capable of remaining in use for a minimum of 15 years of additional life or having 60 percent of remaining life, if not the equipment shall be replaced.

Replacement parts for this equipment are becoming increasingly more difficult to obtain due to age and technical obsolescence. Equipment of this age and condition raises the question of reliability in regards to the ability of the equipment to properly and safely protect the facility.

Careful consideration should be given to upgrading the older equipment throughout this facility.

As electrical equipment ages, the associated risk of a failure increases significantly. Such failures usually occur without prior warning and can be potentially catastrophic. Repairing or replacing aged equipment is another issue due to obsolescence or non-availability of parts. In the event of a failure, there is a great possibility parts will not be available or will have significant lead times. As an example, SDV found a defective main switch in a federal building that took 6 months to acquire a replacement part due to technical obsolescence. This can lead to very costly repairs and extended down time for equipment and related circuits.

Included in section 2 to this report is an article presented by three professional engineers (PEs) specializing in electrical distribution systems – “Renovating Electrical Distribution Systems” by Syed M. Peeran, PhD, PE; Mario Vecchiarello, PE; and Jeff Romeo, PE. The first page of this article references the hazards of aging electrical systems and the unpredictability of equipment exceeding its useful service life. Equipment identified in this report has far

4 | P a g e exceeded this service life without upgrade and has this element of unpredictability regardless of past performance or testing.

Recommendation

Due to the age and obsolescence of the above-referenced main switchboard in the CLC, a project should be initiated to replace or upgrade this switchboard.

2. Adverse Conditions

Buildings 4,5,6,6A MDP Panel – This switchboard is located outdoors. Even though the enclosure is rated for outdoor usage, the equipment continues to be penetrated by dirt/debris and exposed to lower than normal ambient operating temperatures. Such conditions can impact the physical ability of the breaker to respond to a fault while low ambient temperatures can lead to hardening of grease used to lubricate the internal operating mechanisms. Either condition may result in the circuit breakers and switches either operating slowly or not at all in the event of a fault. A delayed response in opening (seconds versus cycles) can lead to a sustained arc while failing to open can lead to a fire. Both have the potential for a catastrophic failure if left uncorrected.

Medium Voltage Sectionalizing Switches & Transformers

Some of the medium voltage outdoor switchgear was found with condensation on the inside of the enclosure as pictured to the right. Moisture is one of the contributing factors in the development of corona damage with the potential for a catastrophic failure.

None of the outdoor equipment has heater strips installed to minimize the potential for moisture accumulation.

Additionally, ice removal solvents in winter months are prematurely aging the outdoor medium voltage transformers and switches as represented by the pictured to the right. These solvents are corrosive and the exterior of the enclosures are corroding after only being placed in service within the past couple of years.

This can lead to a reduced service life and possible mechanical failure of the enclosure.

Additionally, the bases of the switches and transformers are not sealed to prevent water, dirt, etc. from penetrating the enclosure.

Enclosed in section 2 to this report is a Square D publication concerning placing electrical equipment in corrosive or adverse environments. It provides guidelines for protecting such electrical equipment.

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Recommendation

The MDP panel for buildings 4,5,6,6A needs to be either relocated indoors or a protective shell with conditioned air placed over the panel. This will help to minimize the potential for dirt/debris to penetrate the equipment. Additionally, conditioned air would serve to reduce the equipment operating temperatures. Both measures would serve to extend the useful service lives of this equipment. If left uncorrected, the potential exists of a catastrophic failure and possible fire.

Heater strips need to be installed in all outdoor switchgear.

All outdoor equipment needs to have their bases sealed with a silicone caulk or similar form of protection from water penetration.

The ice removal solvents need to be prevented from being applied to the outdoor medium voltage equipment to ensure they can reach their expected useful service life.

3. Adverse Conditions

Buildings 4,5,6,6A MDP Panel – This switchboard is located outdoors. Even though the enclosure is rated for outdoor usage, the equipment continues to be penetrated by dirt/debris and exposed to lower than normal ambient operating temperatures. Such conditions can impact the physical ability of the breaker to respond to a fault while low ambient temperatures can lead to hardening of grease used to lubricate the internal operating mechanisms. Either condition may result in the circuit breakers and switches either operating slowly or not at all in the event of a fault. A delayed response in opening (seconds versus cycles) can lead to a sustained arc while failing to open can lead to a fire. Both have the potential for a catastrophic failure if left uncorrected.

Medium Voltage Sectionalizing Switches & Transformers

Some of the medium voltage outdoor switchgear was found with condensation on the inside of the enclosure as pictured to the right. Moisture is one of the contributing factors in the development of corona damage with the potential for a catastrophic failure.

None of the outdoor equipment has heater strips installed to minimize the potential for moisture accumulation.

Additionally, ice removal solvents in winter months are prematurely aging the outdoor medium voltage transformers and switches as represented by the pictured to the right. These solvents are corrosive and the exterior of the enclosures are corroding after only being placed in service within the past couple of years.

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This can lead to a reduced service life and possible mechanical failure of the enclosure.

Enclosed in section 2 to this report is a Square D publication concerning placing electrical equipment in corrosive or adverse environments. It provides guidelines for protecting such electrical equipment.

Recommendation

The MDP panel for buildings 4,5,6,6A needs to be either relocated indoors or a protective shell with conditioned air placed over the panel. This will help to minimize the potential for dirt/debris to penetrate the equipment. Additionally, conditioned air would serve to reduce the equipment operating temperatures. Both measures would serve to extend the useful service lives of this equipment. If left uncorrected, the potential exists of a catastrophic failure and possible fire.

Heater strips need to be installed in all outdoor switchgear.

The ice removal solvents need to be prevented from being applied to the outdoor medium voltage equipment to ensure they can reach their expected useful service life.

4. Trip Hazard

The facility landscaping scheme has included placing rocks around the medium voltage sectionalizing switches and transformers as represented by the picture to the right. These rocks create a highly uneven surface presenting a ”trip or fall” hazard for personnel working in these areas. This is extremely important when personnel are performing “switching operations” in this equipment creating the potential for an individual to fall into the energized components. National Electric Code section 110.26 outlined below provides guidance for protecting personnel from such hazards.

NEC Reference

110.26 Spaces About Electrical Equipment.

Sufficient access and working space shall be provided and maintained about all electrical equipment to permit ready and safe operation and maintenance of such equipment.

Key to understanding 110.26 is the division of requirements for spaces about electrical equipment in two separate and distinct categories: working space and dedicated equipment space. The term working space generally applies to the protection of the worker, and dedicated equipment space applies to the space reserved for future access to electrical equipment and to protection of the equipment from intrusion by nonelectrical equipment. The performance requirements for all spaces about electrical equipment are set forth in this section. Storage of material that blocks access or prevents safe work practices must be avoided at all times.

(A) Working Space. Working space for equipment operating at 600 volts, nominal, or less to ground and likely to require examination, adjustment, servicing, or maintenance while energized shall comply with the dimensions of 110.26(A)(1), (A)(2), and (A)(3) or as required or permitted elsewhere in this Code.

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The rocks around this equipment need to be replaced with a material providing a stable surface to enable personnel to operate equipment in a safe and proper manner.

5. Overhead Sprinklers

Much of the electrical equipment located throughout this facility has sprinkler heads and related water pipes directly over or within the spray pattern of the electrical equipment as represented by the picture to the right. No protective covers have been installed to prevent water from getting into the electrical equipment nor are physical protective devices installed to protect the actual sprinkler heads from physical damage. Both are required by National Electric Code section 110.26(F)(1)(a) through (F)(1)(d) as outlined below.

110.26(F)(1)(a) through 110.26(F)(1)(d)

(F) Dedicated Equipment Space. All switchboards, panelboards, distribution boards, and motor control centers shall be located in dedicated spaces and protected from damage.

Exception: Control equipment that by its very nature or because of other rules of the Code must be adjacent to or within sight of its operating machinery shall be permitted in those locations.

(1) Indoor. Indoor installations shall comply with 110.26(F)(1)(a) through (F)(1)(d).

(a) Dedicated Electrical Space. The space equal to the width and depth of the equipment and extending from the floor to a height of 1.8 m (6 ft) above the equipment or to the structural ceiling, whichever is lower, shall be dedicated to the electrical installation. No piping, ducts, leak protection apparatus, or other equipment foreign to the electrical installation shall be located in this zone.

Exception: Suspended ceilings with removable panels shall be permitted within the 1.8-m (6-ft) zone.

(b) Foreign Systems. The area above the dedicated space required by 110.26(F)(1)(a) shall be permitted to contain foreign systems, provided protection is installed to avoid damage to the electrical equipment from condensation, leaks, or breaks in such foreign systems.

(c) Sprinkler Protection. Sprinkler protection shall be permitted for the dedicated space where the piping complies with this section.

(d) Suspended Ceilings. A dropped, suspended, or similar ceiling that does not add strength to the building structure shall not be considered a structural ceiling.

The dedicated electrical space includes the space defined by extending the footprint of the switchboard or panelboard from the floor to a height of 6 ft above the height of the equipment or to the structural ceiling, whichever is lower. This reserved space permits busways, conduits, raceways, and cables to enter the equipment. The dedicated electrical space must be clear of piping, ducts, leak protection apparatus, or equipment foreign to the electrical installation. Plumbing, heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning piping, ducts, and equipment must be installed outside the width and depth zone.

Foreign systems installed directly above the dedicated space reserved for electrical equipment must include protective equipment that ensures that occurrences such as leaks, condensation, and even breaks do not damage the electrical equipment located below.

Sprinkler protection is permitted for the dedicated spaces as long as the sprinkler or other suppression system piping complies with 110.26(F)(1)(c). A dropped, suspended, or similar ceiling is permitted to be located directly in the dedicated space, as are building structural members.

The electrical equipment also must be protected from physical damage. Damage can be caused by activities performed near the equipment, such as material handling by personnel or the operation of a forklift or other mobile equipment. See 110.27(B) for other provisions relating to the protection of electrical equipment.

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Exhibits 110.21, 110.22, and 110.23 illustrate the two distinct indoor installation spaces required by 110.26(A) and 110.26(F), that is, the working space and the dedicated electrical space.

In Exhibit 110.21, the dedicated electrical space required by 110.26(F) is the space outlined by the width and the depth of the equipment (the footprint) and extending from the floor to 6 ft above the equipment or to the structural ceiling (whichever is lower). The dedicated electrical space is reserved for the installation of electrical equipment and for the installation of conduits, cable trays, and so on, entering or exiting that equipment. The outlined area in front of the electrical equipment in Exhibit 110.21 is the working space required by 110.26(A). Note that sprinkler protection is afforded the entire dedicated electrical space and working space without actually entering either space. Also note that the exhaust duct is not located in or directly above the dedicated electrical space. Although not specifically required to be located here, this duct location may be a cost-effective solution that avoids the substantial physical protection requirements of 110.26(F)(1)(b).

Exhibit 110.21 The two distinct indoor installation spaces required by 110.26(A) and 110.26(F): the working space and the dedicated electrical space.

A facility-wide survey of all electrical rooms/closets should be conducted to identify electrical components not properly protected or shielded from the sprinkler systems spray patterns or with overhead water lines. Additionally, the survey needs to identify sprinkler heads without physical protective covers.

Shields need to be installed in all areas where electrical components are within the spray pattern or have overhead water lines to prevent damage to prevent overhead water sources (sprinklers and water lines) from penetrating the enclosures. Such penetration could lead to a potentially catastrophic failure. Protective covers or cages need to be installed on unprotected sprinkler heads to prevent accidental activation with the same potential for catastrophic failure as mentioned above.

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6. Improper Working Clearance

Switchboards ESB and MSB in building 40 have been placed directly against the wall represented by the picture to the right. National Electric Code section 110.26(A)(1) requires a minimum 30” working clearance outlined below.

110.26(A)(1)(a) Dead-Front Assemblies

(a) Dead-Front Assemblies. Working space shall not be required in the back or sides of assemblies, such as dead-front switchboards or motor control centers, where all connections and all renewable or adjustable parts, such as fuses or switches, are accessible from locations other than the back or sides. Where rear access is required to work on nonelectrical parts on the back of enclosed equipment, a minimum horizontal working space of 762 mm (30 in.) shall be provided.

Exhibit 110.9

Distances measured from the live parts if the live parts are exposed or from the enclosure front if the live parts are enclosed. If any assemblies, such as switchboards or motor-control centers, are accessible from the back and expose live parts, the working clearance dimensions would be required at the rear of the equipment, as illustrated. Note that for Condition 3, where there is an enclosure on opposite sides of the working space, the clearance for only one working space is required.

In the case of this new switchboard installation, there are bus connections located in the rear of the enclosure that cannot be serviced from the front as they are blocked by other installed equipment (circuit breakers, support structures, secondary conductors, etc.). Any attempts to service these connections as well as clean the rear portion of the enclosure from the front would require extensive disassembly of circuit breakers and secondary conductors that clearly is not the intent of the manufacturer or the NEC.

There appears to be confusion and misapplication related to installation guidelines of similar “dead-front switchboards” throughout the country based on our findings. The National Electric Code (NEC) defines “dead front” as “without live parts exposed to a person on the operating side of the equipment.” The recently-installed main low voltage switchboard located in the basement of the building is a “dead-front switchboard” based on this NEC definition. Operating personnel are protected from the energized components when covers are in place. However, this definition makes no reference to working space requirements.

NEC section 110.26(A)(1)(a), Dead-Front Assemblies (outlined below) uses this definition and applies other qualifying factors or elements in determining working spaces around such assemblies. Those factors or elements are:

1) Connections,

2) Renewable or adjustable parts, such as fuses or switches, and

3) Accessibility from locations other than the back or sides.

Additional clarification regarding work space requirements is provided in Exhibit 110.9 further down in NEC Section 110.26(A)(1)(a). It states, “If any assemblies, such as switchboards or motor-control centers, are accessible from the back and expose live parts, the working clearance dimensions would be required at the rear of the equipment.” The switchboards in

10 | P a g e question do have covers providing rear access that expose the switchboard bus components.

This installation clearly meets these conditions requiring a minimum 30” working space.

The ESB and MSB switchboards need to be relocated to provide the minimum 30” working distance as required by NEC Section 110.26(A)(1)(a). This is necessary to facilitate proper maintenance and servicing of the bus and other components of the switchboard to include cleaning. Additionally, future installations need to ensure proper working clearances are followed.

7. Transient Voltage Surge Suppression

It does not appear the majority of the main and distribution switchboards as well as the automatic transfer switches in this facility have transient voltage surge suppression systems (TVSSs) installed to protect the enclosed or downstream sensitive electronic boards from being damaged due to, among other things, voltage and current surges generated during power shifts to and from emergency power. This can lead to premature failure of these boards and greatly increase maintenance costs.

Additionally, all other systems within these facilities containing sensitive electronic circuits (i.e., security and fire alarm systems, data centers, etc.) should be checked for similar protection issues to avoid such costly failures.

Two related magazine articles concerning the need for surge protection are located in the Publications section located in tab 2 to this report.

Recommendation

At a minimum, TVSS systems should be installed on all switchboards and automatic transfer switches to protect sensitive electronic components from damage due to surges.

Consideration should be given to installing this on other systems such as fire alarm, security.

8. Defective Transient Voltage Surge Suppression Module

The TVSS module in panel MDP for building 41 appears to have a defective “A” phase module to prevent surges from potentially damaging downstream circuits or equipment.

Recommendation

The TVSS module in this panel needs to be replaced to provide proper protection of the downstream equipment.

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9. Defective Circuit Breakers

Issues

The circuit breakers below were found to be defective. Each is listed by location along with a description of the deficiency.

Location Circuit ID Issue

Building 1, Swbd A Elevator 3 Breaker Failed to open mechanically.

Building 4,5,6 PDP Building 6 Feeder Premature trip during overcurrent testing.

Building 40 MSB Main Premature trip during overcurrent testing.

Additionally, panels 1EQ1 (building 1, Pharmacy) and BEQ9 (building 1, rm. A007A) were found with “clip-on” style circuit breakers such as those used in house panels. This style breaker contains clips that can lose tension over time leading to overheating without any means of adjustment. As such, these circuit breakers should not be allowed in this facility.

Location Circuit ID Issue

Building 1, Swbd A Elevator 3 Breaker Replaced with Spare. Repair old breaker.

Building 4,5,6 PDP Building 6 Feeder Replace if nuisance trips develop.

Building 40 MSB Main Replace if nuisance trips develop.

10. Lockout Feature

Except for the main breakers, the Eaton Magnum DS circuit breakers in switchboards EDSS and NDSS (Building 1 ATS room) do not have lockout features allowing them to be readily locked out for safety purposes as outlined in NFPA 70E, Electrical Safety in the Workplace and OSHA

1910.147. The picture to the left below shows the loop used to lockout the main circuit breakers in these switchboards. The picture to the right below shows the configuration of the remaining Magnum breakers in these switchboards lacking this lockout feature.

An Eaton representative should be contacted to determine if this feature can be added to the non-conforming breakers in these switchboards. If not available, another form of lockout

12 | P a g e protection needs to be obtained to enable these circuit breakers to be properly and safely locked out while personnel perform work on downstream circuits.

11. Transformer Oil Test Results

Oil samples were taken of all medium-voltage oil-type transformers. Each sample was tested using dissolved gas analysis (DGA) and found to be normal with the exception of transformers T15 (MRI) and T17 (building 12). Outlined below is an overview of the findings for these two

(2) transformers:

▪ T15 (New MRI Transformer) – oil showed abnormal to high levels of thermal gases

(methane, ethane and ethylene), abnormal acetylene levels and abnormal TDCG (Total Dissolved Combustible Gas) levels.

▪ T17 (building 12) – has high water content.

The results for T15 (new MRI Transformer) is of great concern due to the potential for a transformer failure.

Laboratory test results have been incorporated into the test records for the medium-voltage transformers located in tab 3 to this report. A recap and analysis of the fault gases or water content for transformers T15 and T17 are as follows:

Transformer Oil Fault Gas Analysis

Location:

Bldg. 27

MRI

Transformer ID: T15

Fault Gas Test Result Test Limit Differential

Ethane (C2H6) 286 65 -221

Ethylene (C2H4) 265 50 -215

Acetylene (C2H2) 437 35 -402

TDCG 1209 720 -489

Water 183 200 17

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Transformer Oil Fault Gas Analysis

Location: Bldg. 12

Transformer ID: T17

Fault Gas Test Result Test Limit Differential

Ethane (C2H6) 5 75 70

Ethylene (C2H4) 9 75 66

Acetylene (C2H2) <1 3 >2

TDCG 188 1000 812

Water 44 35 -9

Fault Gas Interpretations

▪ Ethane and ethylene are high thermal gases used to identify overheating of the oil leading to deterioration of the oil and cellulose insulation. Overheating can be the result of poor contact, loose connections or circulating currents in the transformer core.

▪ Acetylene is measured to identify insulation breakdown in the windings or loose connections. This indicator is of great concern due to the potential for transformer failure. It should be noted acetylene can be related to a one-time fault or be an active arcing issue typically determined by additional oil sampling and trend analysis.

▪ TDCG is a composite value of all the key gases tested in an oil sample. This value provides a general indicator of oil condition. IEEE C-57.104-2008 provides a classification system for TDCG results.

▪ Water content is used to identify potential problems with the insulating or dielectric strength of the transformer oil.

Transformer Condition

Transformer T15 appears to have a loose internal connection leading to arcing based on the abnormal levels of ethane, ethylene and acetylene. This is the first time testing this transformer due to its relatively recent installation.

Transformer T17 in 2015 had 18 parts per million (ppm) and well below the maximum threshold for water content. Test results for this testing session were measured at 44 ppm and above the maximum limit for this test parameter. High water content can lead to deterioration of the transformer insulation and a subsequent failure.

The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) developed IEEE C-57.104-2008, “IEEE Guide for the Interpretation of Gases Generated in Oil-Immersed Transformers,” to assist in the evaluation of transformer condition. Below are excerpts from this publication

14 | P a g e containing the four-level criteria for classifying transformer risks followed by Table 1, Dissolved Gas Concentrations.

IEEE Reference

6.5 Evaluation of transformer condition using individual and TDCG concentrations

It can be difficult to determine whether a transformer is behaving normally if it has no previous dissolved gas history. Also, considerable differences of opinion exist for what is considered a “normal transformer” with acceptable concentrations of gases.

A four-level criterion has been developed to classify risks to transformers, when there is no previous dissolved gas history, for continued operation at various combustible gas levels. The criterion uses both concentrations for separate gases and the total concentration of all combustible gases. See Table 1.

- Condition 1: TDCG below this level indicates the transformer is operating satisfactorily (see Figure 2). Any individual combustible gas exceeding specified levels should prompt additional investigation (see 6.6 and 6.7).

- Condition 2: TDCG within this range indicates greater than normal combustible gas level. Any individual combustible gas exceeding specified levels should prompt additional investigation. Proceed per Figure 2, Step 3. Action should be taken to establish a trend (Figure 2, Step 4). Fault(s) may be present. Proceed to 6.5.1 or 6.5.2.

- Condition 3: TDCG within this range indicates a high level of decomposition. Any individual combustible gas exceeding specified levels should prompt additional investigation. Proceed per Figure 2, Step 3. Immediate action should be taken to establish a trend (Figure 2, Step 4). Fault(s) are probably present. Proceed to 6.5.1 or 6.5.2.

- Condition 4: TDCG exceeding this value indicates excessive decomposition. Continued operation could result in failure of the transformer. Proceed immediately and with caution per Figure 2, Step 3, and 6.5.1 or 6.5.2.

Using these general guidelines, transformer T15 (MRI) falls between categories 2 and 4. while US-PA West falls into category 2 except for the Ethylene levels being at a category 4 level.

As there is no previous test data for transformer T15, consideration should be given to sampling and testing the oil as soon as possible to evaluate changes from the September 2019 sample. Any further action would be based on comparative results.

Square D or a qualified contractor regularly engaged in conducting transformer evaluations should be consulted regarding the results for transformer T17 to determine the best course of action to resolve this issue.

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It would appear the oil for transformer T17 needs to be reconditioned to reduce the water content to an acceptable level to prevent deterioration of the transformer insulation.

12. Missing Bus Curbs

The bus risers in building 1 do not have 4” curbs around the base of the bus risers to prevent liquids from penetrating the bus. Such requirements are outlined in National Electric Code section 368.10(c)(2) and NEMA Standard Publication BU 1.1-2005 outlined below (complete publication has been included in the Exhibit/Publications located in section 2 of this report).

368.10(c)(2) Installation Through Floors

(b) In other than industrial establishments, where a vertical riser penetrates two or more dry floors, a minimum 100-mm (4-in.) high curb shall be installed around all floor openings for riser busways to prevent liquids from entering the opening. The curb shall be installed within 300 mm (12 in.) of the floor opening. Electrical equipment shall be located so that it will not be damaged by liquids that are retained by the curb.

NEMA Reference

6.8.2.2 Floor Level Liquids.

6.8.2.2 Floor level liquids—Four-inch minimum curbs should be installed around all floor openings for riser busways to prevent floor level liquids from entering the opening.

Four-inch (4”) curbs need to be installed around each of the floor openings on the bus risers to prevent liquids from penetrating the bus duct. This is required by NEC and NEMA standards and serves to avoid a potentially catastrophic failure.

13. Circuit Labeling

With the facility being built over time with several additions, there now exist panelboards in different buildings or locations with the same circuit identification (i.e., Panel A). This can create confusion over which panel is being referenced at any point in time.

Recommendation

To avoid confusion, new circuit identifications should be created that incorporate the building number such as 1-A in this example.

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14. Grounding Study

An evaluation of the various grounding systems within this facility were evaluated as a part of this project. All findings and recommendation are fully reported on in Attachment B to this summary.

15. Thermographic Issues

Fifteen (15) thermal issues were noted during the infrared scan of this facility. The issues were primarily due to either high internal resistance or loose connections. Each issue and related recommendation is reported in the attached Individual Thermographic Test Records and is summarized in Attachment A to this summary.

High internal resistance is common in electrical panels where breakers don’t get exercised.

The breaker contacts begin to weld shut increasing resistance while drawing more current that can lead to overheating with the potential for nuisance trips.

Several loose connections were corrected by Slocum/SDV personnel. A condition called “micro-arcing” may be present in some of the issues identified as loose connections. This condition is created when conductor strands develop cracks that lead to arcing across the broken strands. “Micro-arcing” presents the same thermal pattern as a loose connection. As a result, many issues call for the conductor to be removed and inspected before attempting to tighten connections. Repairs may be necessary to remove damaged sections of the conductor.

Two (2) loose connection issues were noted in the medium voltage transformers. One instance is related to a loose connection in a load break elbow while the other appears to be related to a loose internal bushing.

Recommendation

The breakers identified with high internal resistance were exercised to wipe the contacts and loose connections were inspected and tightened on the spot.

Any remaining loose conductor connections should be tightened per manufacturer’s recommendations. However, stranded conductors should first be removed and inspected for cracked strands leading to “micro-arcing.” Damaged sections should be removed prior to reinstalling conductor and subsequent tightening.

The loose transformers connections should be corrected by a qualified contractor regularly engaged in such repairs.

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CD-ROM Version

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Attachment A. Thermographic Report Summary

Issues

▪ Bldg. 3, Switch P, EM Side - E-P7 compartment 3 ”B” phase load break elbow has a defective connection at the point where the cable terminates into the load break elbow.

▪ T-23, Secondary Side - Appears to be a loose connection on the X1 bushing.

▪ Bldg. 2, Laundry, Panel 1P - Compressor #2 circuit appears to have a loose ”B” phase secondary connection or presence of ”micro-arcing” exists.

▪ Bldg. 2, Boiler Plant, Panel 2L - Circuits 23 & 25 appear to have high internal resistance based on the thermal pattern.

5.2

22.7 °C

6.1

24.0 °C

23.6

55.5 °C

23.3

36.7 °C

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▪ Bldg. 4, Panel 4E - 2-pole Water Heater circuit breaker appears to have high internal resistance based on the thermal pattern.

▪ Bldg. 7, Rm. 126, Panel 7 EB - Circuit 24 appears to have high internal resistance based on the thermal pattern.

▪ Bldg. 27, Basement, Panel DP - Panel LL-L1 circuit appears to have a loose ”A” phase secondary connection or presence of ”micro-arcing” exists.

▪ Bldg. 27, Basement, Panel LL - 100 amp 3-pole and 50 amp 2-pole breakers on the right side appear to have high internal resistance based on the thermal pattern.

25.3

39.3 °C

43.1

65.9 °C

26.7

33.0 °C

26.8

50.1 °C

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▪ Specialty Care, 1st Floor, Panel 1N12 - Circuit 6 appears to have high internal resistance based on the thermal pattern.

▪ Specialty Care, Rm. E211, Panel 2EQ6 - Circuit 21 was found to have a loose secondary connection.

▪ Bldg. 1, Server Room - Circuit 3 appears to have high internal resistance based on the thermal pattern.

▪ Bldg. 1, 3rd Floor N Mechanical Room, MCC-1 - ”A” phase of 1AC-1 starter appears to have a loose line side connection.

19.8

30.5 °C

20.9

26.9 °C

14.7

22.5 °C

23.4

34.6 °C

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▪ Bldg. 1, 3rd Floor Roof, Panel 3EQ3 - The ”A” and ”B” phase line side connections appear to have loose connections or presence of ”micro-arcing” exists.

▪ Bldg. 1, 9th Floor, Panel 9EQ2 - Circuit 7 appears to have high internal resistance based on

▪ Bldg. 1, Elevator Penthouse, P1 Disconnect - ”C” phase line side connection appears to have a loose connection or presence of ”micro-arcing” exists.

Recommendations

▪ Bldg. 3, Switch P, EM Side - The switch needs to be de-energized. The ”B” phase load break elbow connection needs to be inspected for serviceability. Repair or replace defective components. Tighten all connections per manufacturer’s recommendations.

▪ T-23, Secondary Side - The transformer needs to be de-energized and the X1 bushing internal connection inspected for serviceability to include the internal connnection. Repair or replace damaged components. Tighten all connections per manufacturer’s recommendations.

▪ Bldg. 2, Laundry, Panel 1P - Compressor #2 ”B” phase secondary connection was inspected and corrected during the scheduled power outage by Slocum personnel. No further action

11.3

25.6 °C

22.2

33.5 °C

12.2

22.8 °C

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▪ Bldg. 2, Boiler Plant, Panel 2L - Circuit 23 & 25 breaker was exercised during the scheduled power outage. No further action required.

▪ Bldg. 4, Panel 4E - 2-pole Water Heater breaker was exercised during the scheduled power outage. No further action required.

▪ Bldg. 7, Rm. 126, Panel 7 EB - Circuit 24 appears to have high internal resistance based on

▪ Bldg. 27, Basement, Panel DP - Panel LL-L1 ”A” phase connection was inspected and corrected during the scheduled power outage by Slocum personnel. No further action

▪ Bldg. 27, Basement, Panel LL - 100 amp 3-pole and 50 amp 2-pole breakers were exercised during the scheduled power outage. No further action required.

▪ Specialty Care, 1st Floor, Panel 1N12 - Circuit 6 breaker was exercised during the scheduled power outage. No further action required.

▪ Specialty Care, Rm. E211, Panel 2EQ6 - Circuit 21 secondary connection was inspected and corrected during the scheduled power outage by Slocum personnel. No further action

▪ Bldg. 1, Server Room - Circuit 3 breaker was exercised during the scheduled power outage.

No further action required.

▪ Bldg. 1, 3rd Floor N Mechanical Room, MCC-1 - De-energize the MCC. The ”A” phase line side connection needs to be inspected for cracked strands causing overheating due to ”micro-arcing.” Re-terminate to remove damaged conductor strands. Reinstall conductor and tighten all connection per manufacturer’s recommendations.

▪ Bldg. 1, 3rd Floor Roof, Panel 3EQ3 - The panel needs to be de-energized. The ”A” and ”B” phase line side connections need to be inspected for cracked strands causing overheating due to ”micro-arcing.” Re-terminate to remove damaged conductor strands. Reinstall conductors and tighten all connection per manufacturer’s recommendations.

▪ Bldg. 1, 9th Floor, Panel 9EQ2 - Circuit 7 breaker was exercised during the scheduled power outage. No further action required.

▪ Bldg. 1, Elevator Penthouse, P1 Disconnect - ”C” phase line side connection was inspected and corrected during the scheduled power outage by Slocum personnel. No further action

Attachment B. Grounding Study Findings & Recommendations.

Introduction

The National Electrical Code is an overall governing document for this Scope of Work. NEC 250.4 states the purpose of the Electrical System Grounding is to limit the voltage imposed by lightning, line surges, or unintentional contact with higher-voltage lines. NEC 250.6 states the electrical system should be designed to prevent objectionable current. Stated differently, a properly designed and maintained electrical system meeting these objectives will help protect equipment and personnel from the harmful effects of stray currents and high voltages that can occur within electrical systems.

An important part of the Electrical System Grounding is to directly connect the electrical system’s neutral to earth using grounding electrodes such as ground rods, water pipes, foundation steel, building steel, etc. Articles 250.50 and 250.52 define electrodes permitted for serving this function. Part of this study is to evaluate the grounding electrodes in use and whether they are in serviceable condition.

Due to the nature of a grounding system, much of the grounding components are buried, in raceway, or concealed within the structure. This report is limited to site observations of what can be exposed without resorting to destructive means or having to take systems out of service. Grounding systems also tend to be a web of conductors, building steel, piping systems and other conductive material interconnected making it difficult to isolate specific parts of a system for an individual meter. Therefore, more often than not an ohm reading is one or more loop of conductors. Values less than one ohm are typically that of a conductive loop. Values greater than one ohm are more representative of a direct reading to ground or earth.

Executive Summary

Overall the Medical Center installation exhibits attention to maintaining installed equipment.

Maintenance of the facility’s grounding system is evident in that original installation work has not seen any significant deterioration, which indicates the maintenance personnel have paid attention to its upkeep.

There are several code violations that appear to be from the original installation. These need to be addressed and are identified throughout this report.

Various National Electrical Code references that are relevant to this study have been included in

Appendix A. These references have been paraphrased to simplify or add clarity to their intent.

Testing Procedures

Resistance and ampere readings were taken with a Megger DET14C Digital Earth Clamp-on Meter. This instrument induces a test current into the cable being measured and simultaneously measures the voltage’s reaction to the injected current. From the injected current and resultant voltage measurements, the measured circuit’s resistance can be calculated. Resistance as low as 0.01 ohms with a resolution of 1 milliohm can be measured to an upper limit of 1000 ohms.

Switchboards A and B

Switchboards A and B are in an outdoor walk-in fiberglass enclosure. The enclosure is nonconductive and therefore does not need to be grounded. The enclosures base and interior floor are structural steel and are required to be bonded. On the exterior of the structure, the steel base is bonded at two locations on opposite sides. These bonding jumpers are too short and hard against the steel frame preventing getting ohm meter reading using the clamp-on ground tester.

Switchboards A and B are bolted directly on the steel subfloor and with both Switchboards being grounded it is reasonable to expect the switchboard’s grounding carries through to the steel subfloor.

Both Switchboards serve as service entrance equipment thus requiring the incoming neutrals from the outdoor transformer to be bonded to the switchboards’ ground bus. The neutral and ground buses are properly bonded in both switchboards.

Switchboard A has to conductors that could be the required grounding electrodes. One wire measured

0.05 ohms and the other measured open. The 0.05-ohm reading is to low to expect it to be a direct reading of the grounding electrode but is more likely a connection to the enclosure’s frame or other bonding conductors forming a loop.

Switchboard A has a loose wire that is in contact with the neutral bus. This needs to be investigated to determine what action is necessary.

Picture 1 - Switchboard A – Loose wire in contact with the neutral bus.

Switchboard B is similar to Switchboard A in that the grounding conductors measured 0.02 ohms. One conductor is embedded in the concrete slab and appearances to be the grounding electrode conductor.

Underground conduits under the switchboards are not sealed to prevent moisture from getting into energized parts. Recommend sealing these conduits are required by the National Electrical Code.

NEC Reference Article 230.8 Raceway Seal

Service entrance raceways entering a building or structure from underground shall be sealed per Article 300.5(G). Spare or unused raceways are to be sealed too. Sealant shall not cause deterioration of conductor insulation, shields or other components.

The intent is to eliminate the possibility of water entry due to the condensation of water resulting from temperature differences.

Picture 2 - Switchboard B – Grounding conductors and underground conduits

Transformer T18

This transformer has a delta primary with a 208V secondary wye connected. Per codes, the transformer’s secondary neutral is required to be grounded. This grounding has been done via a factory-installed bonding strap from the neutral’s termination pad and the case of the transformer.

As required by codes the case of the transformer is required to be grounded. As witnessed the transformer’s case has been grounded.

Flexible jumpers are used to connect the transformer’s secondary terminations to the outgoing bus duct. There appears to be enough slack in these jumpers that during a high magnitude fault these jumpers could be pulled together due to the high magnetic flux generated during a fault. It is recommended either to confirm it is not possible for these jumpers to come in contact with each other

(requires a power outage) or install an insulating barrier between these jumpers.

Picture 3 - Transformer T18 – Flexible Jumpers

Building 12 Switchboard MSWB

Bare 4/0 AWG copper external grounding conductor measured 0.05 ohms.

Switchboard is a service entrance and has the neutral properly bonded to the ground bus.

Service entrance conduits are not bonded per code.

NEC Reference (Service Entrance Bonding) Article 230.92 Services

(A) Bonding of Equipment for Services. The normally non-current-carrying metal parts of…