24-SIMACQ-PD-1410-0098_A5_SOW FARO Trackers_DKedits20240712 (002).docx

Statement of Work (SOW) Procurement of FARO Vantage E6 Laser Trackers for the Naval Foundry and Propeller Center

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.0.1 The Naval Surface Warfare Center Philadelphia Division (NSWCPD) is a Department of Defense entity responsible for research and development, test and evaluation, engineering and fleet support organization for the Navy’s ships, submarines, military watercraft, and unmanned vehicles. This requirement is for Naval Foundry and Propeller Center (NFPC) who is responsible for the design, manufacture, and repair propellers for the US Navy.

1.1 BACKGROUND

The Naval Foundry and Propeller Center (NFPC) a detachment of the Norfolk Naval Shipyard, primary mission is responsible for the design, manufacture, and repair of propellers for the US Navy. NFPC’s stringent quality assurance methods to measure both in-process manufacturing and completed parts, utilizing specialized equipment from brand FARO. NFPC currently owns fifteen (15) Faro Laser Trackers, one (1) Laser Tracker Probe, two (2) Arms and two (2) Arm Scanners produced by Faro. The Navy’s MetCal will no longer accept FARO’s cal/cert/B89 process for Vantage Trackers with the V0100 designation, so these trackers are obsolete and need replacement.

1.2 SCOPE OF WORK

This scope of work comprises of the vendor to provide NFPC with the FARO Laser Trackers and related components. The vendor is responsible for providing the components and quantities listed in section 3.0 and delivered as listed in section 6.0 with no deviations under a Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP).

2.0 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS

Not Applicable.

3.0. REQUIREMENTS

3. 1 The vendor shall provide and deliver the below FARO equipment in accordance with the noted item part number, description and quantities listed in the respective CLIN Structure.

3.2 The vendor shall deliver the components as specified in the above table to the address list in Section 6.0.

4.0 DATA REQUIREMENTS

Not Applicable

5.0 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

5.1 OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC)

The Contractor shall protect critical information associated with this contract to prevent unauthorized disclosure. NFPC’s Critical Information List, (CIL) will be provided on site, if warranted. Performance under this contract requires the contractor to adhere to OPSEC requirements. The Contractor may not impose OPSEC requirements on its subcontractors unless NFPC approves the OPSEC requirements. During the period of this contract, the Contractor may be exposed to, use, or produce, NFPC Critical Information (CI) and/or observables and indicators which may lead to discovery of CI. NFPC CI will not be distributed to unauthorized third parties, including foreign governments, or companies under Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence (FOCI) unless such FOCI has been appropriately mitigated through measures approved by the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency.

CUI correspondence transmitted internally on the contractor's unclassified networks or information systems, and externally, shall be protected per NIST SP-800-171, Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) in Non-federal Systems and Organizations.

Assembled large components/systems being transported to and from testing areas, other production or government facilities (whether or not on public roadways) shall be in an enclosed van trailer or covered flatbed trailer. Component/System outside storage, staging, and test areas shall be shielded/obscured from public view wherever physically possible.

NFPC’s CI shall not be publicized in corporate wide newsletters, trade magazines, displays, intranet pages or public facing websites. Media requests related to this project shall be directed to the PCO, and the COR who will forward the required to the NFPC Public Release Authority for review.

Any attempt by unauthorized third parties to solicit, obtain, photograph, or record, or; incidents of loss/compromise of government Classified or CI, Business Sensitive, Company Proprietary information related to this or other program must be immediately reported to the contractor's Facility Security Officer and Cognizant Security Office and/or the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the NFPC Security Division (Code 1123). Questions concerning these requirements shall be directed to the PCO, and the COR who will forward the request to the NFPC Security Division (Code 1123).

5.2 RECEIPT, STORAGE, AND GENERATION OF CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION (CUI)

All Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) associated with this contract must follow the minimum marking requirements of DoDI 5200.48, Section 3, paragraph 3.4.a, and include the acronym "CUI" in the banner and footer of the document. In accordance with DoDI 5200.48, CUI must be safeguarded to prevent Unauthorized Disclosure (UD). CUI export controlled technical information or other scientific, technical, and engineering information must be marked with an export control warning as directed in DoDI 5230.24, DoDD 5230.25, and Part 250 of Title 32, CFR. Nonfederal information systems storing and processing CUI shall be protected per NIST SP-800-171, or subsequent revisions. All transmissions to personal email accounts (AOL, Yahoo, Hotmail, Comcast, etc.) and posting on social media websites (Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, LinkedIn, etc.) are prohibited. Destroy CUI associated with this contract by any of the following approved methods: A cross-cut shredder; a certified commercial destruction vendor; a central destruction facility; incineration; chemical decomposition; pulverizing, disintegration; or methods approved for classified destruction.

6.0 PLACE OF DELIVERY

6.1 Vendor shall deliver the components to the following location:

Naval Foundry & Propeller Center ATTN: Eric Boyer 2003 Constitution Ave.

BLDG 1081

Philadelphia, PA 19112 M-F (7:30am-3:00pm) Shipping and Receiving 215-897-6680

7. COUNTERFEIT MATERIAL PREVENTION

7.1 All components for (FARO Technologies) electronic assemblies and subassemblies are purchased from Original Manufacturer (OM), authorized suppliers, or franchised distributors; At a minimum, the contractor shall ensure that procurement practices and processes to purchase and install components from OM, authorized suppliers, or franchised distributors are flowed down to subcontractors and suppliers at all tiers

7.2 The Contractor shall maximize the use of authentic, originally designed and/or qualified parts

7.3 The contractor shall assess potential suppliers to minimize the risk of receiving counterfeit parts or materials

7.4 The contractor shall have purchasing procedures which confirm whether a selected supplier is authorized (as defined in SAE AS5553) for each purchase

7.5 The contractor shall define minimum inspection and test requirements for parts being procured and shall ensure that in-house, third-party, and/or supplier inspection and test procedures and facilities comply with the requirements of this section. These minimum inspection and test requirements shall specify appropriate test methods to detect potential counterfeit parts and materials

7.6 The contractor shall use government or industry services such as GIDEP and other commercially available services to identify part or supplier quality or authenticity problems. The Contractor shall notify NFPC of the occurrence of a confirmed counterfeit part or material and the actions taken to identify, contain, and impound all product from the lot, within 7 working days of confirmation of the counterfeit status. The Contractor shall flow down a requirement for similar notification from Subcontractors or suppliers at any tier to the Contractor. The contractor shall initiate and submit an ALERT to the Government- Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) within 60 days of knowledge of the counterfeit part or material. Counterfeit parts are defined in SAE Aerospace Standard 5553. Counterfeit parts may be electronic or mechanical in nature. Counterfeit electronic parts may typically be used parts which have been refurbished and represented as new. Commonly counterfeited electronic parts include parts such as microcontrollers or specially screened devices, or common parts, which have several pin-compatible versions from multiple manufacturers, such as memory devices and operational amplifiers. Counterfeit mechanical parts are typically improperly made, marked, or treated products. Examples are improper anodization or heat treatments (or falsified data), mismarked parts sold as higher grade steel, or used/fake parts such as valves or circuit breakers.

7.7 Seller warrants the goods delivered pursuant to this Contract, unless specifically stated otherwise in this Contract, shall (i) be new (ii) be free from defects in workmanship, materials, and design and (iii) be in accordance with all the requirements of this Contract. Seller further warrants that the performance of work and services shall conform with the requirements of this Contract and to high professional standards. All warranties in this Contract shall survive inspection, test, final acceptance and payment of goods and services.