19GE5026Q0151 Sole Source Justification.pdf

JUSTIFICATION FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

SECTION 1: IDENTIFICATION OF THE AGENCY AND THE CONTRACTING

ACTIVITY

Department of State Contracting Activity

☒ Acquisition Management

Requiring Activity

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), INL Amman Office, Jaber Counternarcotics Capability Project (JCCP)

SECTION 2: NATURE AND/OR DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION BEING

APPROVED

Approval is requested to award a new contract on a sole source basis to CRDF Global of Arlington, VA for the supplies and/or services described in Section 3 on behalf of the Requiring Activity.

The contract will be a FFP type contract.

SECTION 3: DESCRIPTION OF SUPPLIES/SERVICES REQUIRED TO MEET THE

AGENCY’S NEEDS

INL requires specialized counternarcotics training, equipment, and operational support services at the Jaber border crossing between Jordan and Syria through the "Jaber Counternarcotics Capability Project (JCCP)."

Background:

Jordan faces significant challenges countering cross-border drug smuggling at its Jaber border crossing with Syria, where the movement of illicit narcotics generates revenues for transnational criminal organizations and Iran-aligned groups. Since Syria’s December 2024 political transition, cargo and passenger traffic through Jaber has surged, and new land trade corridors have been established linking Jordan to Syria, Turkey, and other countries beyond. With this increased trade volume comes increased risk of illicit narcotics smuggling, as well as other illicit materials including explosives, weapons, and counterfeit goods.

This project directly supports U.S. efforts to counter Iranian malign influence in the region. Iran-backed groups and proxies have benefitted from illicit trade – including the drug trade – which generates revenue to fund destabilizing activities throughout the Middle East and threaten U.S.

interests and allies. By enhancing Jordan's counternarcotics capabilities at Jaber crossing, the

United States denies these adversarial actors a critical revenue stream while strengthening a key regional partner's capacity to resist Iranian influence operations.

Beneficiary:

The primary beneficiary is the Public Security Directorate's Anti-Narcotics Department (AND), specifically the 40 AND officers stationed at Jaber crossing who conduct labor-intensive secondary inspections of vehicles suspected of carrying illicit narcotics. AND has requested INL support to enhance its equipment, training, and standard operating procedures at Jaber crossing.

Project Goal:

Provide Jordanian counterdrug officers at Jaber border with advanced training and resources needed to effectively detect, interdict, and document illicit narcotics, while improving interagency coordination and operational efficiency. The project will enable Jordanian border authorities to disrupt drug-trafficking networks and deny revenues to transnational criminal organizations and Iran-aligned groups.

Jordan is a critical U.S. partner in an unstable region. This project strengthens Jordan's capacity to address shared security threats, reinforces bilateral cooperation, and demonstrates U.S.

commitment to supporting allies who advance American interests. Enhanced Jordanian border security capabilities contribute to regional stability, which serves U.S. national security objectives.

Required Services and Supplies:

Component 1: Specialized Counternarcotics Training The contractor shall deliver one-week training courses to AND officers and counterparts from other agencies, including Customs, Special Branch, and the General Intelligence Directorate, who work at Jaber crossing, with a maximum class size of 25 participants per course. Each course below will be offered twice so as to capture all 40 AND officers employed at Jaber crossing. Training shall be provided in both Arabic and English and include:

1. Emerging Threats and Smuggling Tactics - Understanding narcotics and narco-terrorism networks, Iranian proxy involvement in illicit drug trade, and Jordan's strategic position in regional smuggling routes. Identifying modified vehicles, false compartments, mixed cargo shipments, and evolving concealment techniques.

2. Technology in Smuggling and Counter-Smuggling, Know Your Customer (KYC), and Know Your Cargo (KYCARGO) - Understanding how traffickers exploit technology and learning AI-enabled detection tools and U.S.-aligned technologies. Cross-referencing travel patterns, cargo manifests, and risk indicators to flag high-risk entries.

3. Behavioral Analysis, Targeted Questioning, and Integrity Management - Detecting deception, recognizing behavioral anomalies, conducting effective interviews, and mitigating insider threats.

4. Evidence Handling and Documentation - Proper evidence collection, chain of custody procedures, and coordination with forensic laboratories

Component 2: Provision of Portable Detection Equipment The contractor shall procure and deliver up to two handheld equipment kits (primary and backup) for AND's use during secondary inspections. Equipment shall be deconflicted with other U.S.

assistance and will prioritize U.S.-manufactured technologies to support American industry and ensure interoperability with U.S. systems. Equipment may include: chemical identification analyzers or mass spectrometers (up to 2); contraband detection kits (up to 2); borescope inspection kit; handheld backscatter X-ray imagers; handheld density meters; vehicle disassembly/reassembly tools; and spare parts and licenses. The contractor shall provide hands-on training on proper use, maintenance, and calibration of all equipment, integrated into the training courses.

Component 3: Operational Support and Standard Operating Procedures The contractor shall work with AND leadership and INL Amman to revise and develop comprehensive SOPs for counternarcotics inspections, evidence handling, and interagency coordination. SOPs shall address secondary inspection procedures, evidence collection and chain of custody, coordination protocols between AND and other border security agencies, equipment maintenance schedules, reporting requirements, and information sharing. The contractor shall conduct workshops to introduce SOPs and provide follow-up mentorship to support implementation.

The contract shall have a 24-month period of performance, with the final award to be made no later than October 1, 2026, and the period of performance scheduled to end no later than September 31, 2028.

The estimated value for the entire period of performance is $800,000.

SECTION 4: IDENTIFICATION OF THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY PERMITTING

OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

This statutory authority permitting other than full and open competition is 41 U.S. Code 1901 as implemented by FAR 12.000; see also FAR 12.102(b).

SECTION 5: DEMONSTRATION THAT THE PROPOSED CONTRACTOR’S

UNIQUE QUALIFICATIONS OR THE NATURE OF THE ACQUISITION REQUIRES

USE OF THE AUTHORITY CITED

CRDF is uniquely qualified to provide these services based upon an exceptional operational capability, established relationships in Jordan, and program efficiencies that cannot be replicated by any other organization. Additionally, CRDF has demonstrated this expertise through successful collaborations with U.S. agencies and offices including the Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) and other partners.

CRDF has already completed comprehensive POE assessments (Al-Karameh, Al-Omari, and ongoing at Jaber), established trusted operational relationships with Jordanian law enforcement and security agencies, and maintains Jordanian government-vetted SMEs and an in-country office enabling immediate program continuation. The proposed INL programming at Jaber POE directly builds upon CRDF's existing CT programming, ensuring seamless technical continuity that a new contractor could not replicate without 6-12 months of delay and resource waste.

Estimated Cost of Duplication if Competed The Government has analyzed the cost elements that depend on institutional knowledge, relationships, and the groundwork CRDF has already established through its concurrent CT-funded Jordan Border Screening Program. A new vendor lacking this foundation would require materially more resources and time to deliver the same scope.

Operational Support and SOP Development (Objective 3): CRDF is expected to allocate only 30 SME labor-days ($845/day = $25,350) to develop and implement standardized SOPs across four separate Jordanian agencies (AND, Customs, GID, and JAF-adjacent coordination). This compressed timeline is achievable only because CRDF has already completed comparable SOP development at Al-Karameh and Al-Omari POEs under its CT program and maintains established working relationships with all four agencies. A vendor without this foundation would reasonably require significantly more SME days to independently build the interagency trust and access necessary to complete equivalent SOP work; the Government conservatively estimates this would add $25,000–$50,000 in additional labor costs alone (assuming 1–2x the current SME day allocation), before accounting for the additional calendar time such relationship-building would require.

Training Delivery Efficiency (Objective 1): CRDF's Lead Instructor and Instructor are subject matter experts who are already JAF Military Intelligence-vetted for Jordanian POE access and who possess existing DEA/narcotics interdiction backgrounds specific to the Captagon illicit drug trade and Jaber crossing conditions. A new vendor's SMEs would require security vetting before deployment; a process that, absent pre-existing clearance, introduces schedule risk to the 24-month period of performance, as obtaining clearances can take six months or more.

CRDF’s operational presence in Jordan provides critical advantages that would be costly and time consuming to duplicate. Their Amman-based team enables daily coordination with Jordanian government partners and immediate response to program needs that organizations without in-country presence cannot provide. The alignment between CRDF's CT and counternarcotics programs creates significant efficiencies: shared experts reduce costs, integrated training eliminates duplication, and unified procedures prevent conflicting methods that would confuse personnel working across multiple agencies at border crossings. Awarding this contract to a different organization would split U.S. border security assistance across multiple implementers, creating coordination problems, duplicate administrative costs, and incompatible procedures that would reduce program effectiveness and waste taxpayer resources. The estimated $800,000 investment achieves multiple strategic objectives— disrupting narco-terrorist revenue streams, countering Iranian influence, and strengthening a key ally—at a fraction of the cost that would be required through separate, uncoordinated programs. Both fiscal responsibility and the urgent need to address trafficking threats support this sole source award.

SECTION 6. DESCRIPTION OF EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT OFFERS WERE

SOLICITED FROM AS MANY POTENTIAL SOURCES AS IS PRACTICABLE,

INCLUDING WHETHER A NOTICE WAS OR WILL BE PUBLICIZED AS

REQUIRED BY FAR SUBPART 5.1 AND, IF NOT, WHICH EXCEPTION UNDER

FAR 5.101(B) APPLIES

(i) The proposed contract was synopsized on Sept 10, 2026, and no other potential sources expressed an interest in this requirement. In an effort to identify competitive interest, the Department of State, as part of their market research, provides entities, on an annual basis, a listing of items for which it is seeking competitive sources, as well as instructions for obtaining source approval information. Additionally, the availability of the listing is periodically publicized, and feedback is requested regarding market capabilities. To date, no other companies have expressed interest in becoming qualified to compete for the items to be acquired under the proposed contract.

SECTION 7. DETERMINATION BY THE CONTRACTING OFFICER THAT THE

ANTICIPATED COST TO THE GOVERNMENT IS FAIR AND REASONABLE

The Contracting Office has determined that the anticipated price(s) will be fair and reasonable based on comparison to substantially similar item(s).. By signing the justification, the Contracting Officer makes a determination that the $800,000 to the Government is expected to be fair and reasonable.

SECTION 8. DESCRIPTION OF THE MARKET RESEARCH CONDUCTED (SEE

PART 10) AND THE RESULTS OR A STATEMENT OF THE REASON A MARKET

RESEARCH WAS NOT CONDUCTED

INL Amman conducted comprehensive market research between December 2025 and February 2026 to identify potential implementers capable of providing counternarcotics training, equipment procurement, and operational support services at Jaber border crossing in Jordan.

Interagency Consultations:

INL Amman coordinated extensively with multiple U.S. government agencies to assess organizational capabilities and identify potential implementers with relevant expertise and operational presence in Jordan. Consultations were conducted with:

• Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) - to identify organizations within border security and inspection training capabilities

• Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) - to assess current border security implementers and their capacity to support counternarcotics objectives

• Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) – to assess equipment vendors and border security implementers

• Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - to identify organizations within JAF, customs and border protection expertise operating in Jordan

• Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) - to identify organizations with narcotics interdiction expertise and established relationships with Jordanian counternarcotics authorities

These consultations confirmed that CRDF is currently the most trusted organization with an operational presence at Jordanian ports of entry, having been selected by the Bureau of Counterterrorism to implement the Jordan Border Screening Program. Through this ongoing CT program, CRDF has:

• Conducted comprehensive POE assessments at Al-Karameh and Al-Omari border crossings (September 2025)

• Scheduled theConducting an ongoing Jaber border assessment for March 2026(geospatial assessment completed July 2026)

• Established working relationships with the Public Security Directorate’s, Anti-Narcotics Department, Jordanian Armed Forces, General Intelligence Directorate, and Customs Authority

• Developed baseline data and training methodologies for secondary inspection capabilities

Assessment of Alternative Sources:

During the market research process, INL Amman identified and assessed several organizations that have implemented border security, law enforcement training, or counternarcotics programs in the Middle East region. However, none of these organizations possess the critical combination of:

1. Current operational presence at Jordanian border crossings with established government relationships

2. Pre-vetted subject matter experts with DEA/narcotics interdiction backgrounds already approved by JAF Military Intelligence for work at ports of entry

3. Ongoing complementary programming that enables immediate implementation without duplicating assessments or baseline studies

4. Institutional knowledge of Jordanian border operations, training requirements, and interagency coordination mechanisms

Review of Existing Implementers:

INL Amman reviewed organizations currently implementing or recently completed programs in Jordan.

This review confirmed that while several organizations have relevant experience in border security or law enforcement training, none have the specific combination of current port of entry operations, pre-vetted expertise, and established access that CRDF possesses through their ongoing CT program and prior work for EXBS and DTRA.

Coordination with Jordanian Government Partners:

INL Amman met with CRDF multiple times to confirm their experience and interest in supporting this effort. CRDF noted the following advantages:

• CRDF's subject matter experts have already established trust and credibility with Jordanian border personnel

• Harmonized training methodologies across CT and counternarcotics programs would strengthen interagency coordination

• CRDF's familiarity with Jordanian operational procedures and cultural context would ensure training effectiveness

Conclusion:

Based on comprehensive interagency consultations, assessment of potential implementers, and coordination with Jordanian government partners, INL Amman determined that CRDF is the only organization capable of implementing this project without substantial duplication of costs and unacceptable delays. The unique circumstances created by CRDF's current CT border security programming make it impracticable for any other organization to provide the required services in a timely and cost-effective manner.

SECTION 9. ANY OTHER FACTS SUPPORTING THE USE OF OTHER

THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

Operational Continuity and Institutional Knowledge CRDF is currently implementing the Jordan Border Screening Program for the State Department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT), providing CRDF with unparalleled institutional knowledge of Jordanian border operations. Through this program, CRDF has conducted comprehensive Port of Entry assessments at Al-Karameh and Al-Omari crossings in September 2025 and is in the progress of completing a comprehensive Jaber border assessment scheduled (phase one completed July 2026) . CT has funded this assessment in the hope that it will inform other U.S. government programs at Jaber border. The proposed INL counternarcotics project represents a direct continuation of this CT work, focusing on the same secondary inspection capabilities, behavioral analysis, advanced screening, contraband detection, and SOP development tailored to AND's narcotics interdiction mission rather than counterterrorism screening. This continuity eliminates the need to duplicate assessments, re-establish baseline data, or redevelop training methodologies. CRDF has also previously worked as an implementer for the State Department’s Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program and for the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) in Jordan, who both praised CRDF’s unique institutional knowledge of Jordanian border crossings and its responsiveness to U.S. government programming requirements.

Established Presence and Trusted Relationships CRDF maintains an operational office and project team close to the U.S. Embassy in Amman, enabling daily coordination with Embassy and Jordanian authorities. Through their ongoing CT programming, CRDF has developed trusted working relationships with the Public Security Directorate’s Anti-Narcotics Department (PSD/AND), Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF), Customs Authority, and General Intelligence Directorate (GID) that provide immediate access to sensitive border facilities and operational environments. Most critically, CRDF's subject matter experts have already been vetted and approved by JAF Military Intelligence for work at ports of entry, a security clearance process that typically would require significant time (6 months or more) for a new implementer. This pre-existing approval enables immediate deployment of trainers to Jaber crossing without security processing delays.

Specialized Expertise in Counternarcotics Operations CRDF will deploy the same subject matter experts who conducted the comprehensive Jaber border assessment under the CT program. These experts possess Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and narcotics interdiction backgrounds, providing specialized knowledge of captagon trafficking patterns, concealment methods, and detection techniques specific to the Middle East region. Their familiarity with Jordan's operational, cultural, and training environment – combined with established working relationships with PSD/AND, Customs, and GID – ensures training is immediately relevant, culturally appropriate, and operationally effective. This eliminates the ramp-up time required for new trainers to understand Jordanian border operations, build rapport with beneficiaries, and tailor curriculum to local context. No other organization has subject matter experts with this combination of DEA expertise, Middle East regional knowledge, Jordanian operational experience, and pre-existing security clearances for border facility access.

Cost Sharing and Resource Optimization Working with CRDF enables cost sharing between INL Amman and CT programs, maximizing the efficiency of U.S. government resources. CRDF's concurrent implementation of both programs allows for shared deployment costs, consolidated administrative overhead, and joint utilization of in-country infrastructure and personnel. For instance, INL will not need to separately fund a baseline study since CT is already funding a relevant study. Training missions can be coordinated to reduce travel expenses, and subject matter experts can support both CT and INL objectives during single deployments to Jordan. This collaborative funding approach reduces duplication of effort, accelerates project timelines, and allows both bureaus to achieve their objectives more effectively within their respective budgets while maintaining programmatic flexibility and accountability.

Cost Efficiency and Fiscal Responsibility This approach reflects responsible stewardship of American taxpayer resources by maximizing operational impact while minimizing costs. The estimated $800,000 investment achieves multiple strategic objectives—disrupting drug trafficking, countering Iranian influence, and strengthening a key ally—at a fraction of the cost that would be required through separate, uncoordinated programs or through a new implementer requiring duplicative assessments, security clearances, and relationship building.

Procurement Efficiencies Through Program Integration The CT and INL programs require overlapping inspection equipment. Chemical analyzers, contraband detection kits, backscatter X-ray imagers, and vehicle disassembly tools. CRDF's concurrent implementation of both programs enables consolidated procurement and shipping, reducing per-unit costs to CT and INL through bulk purchasing and shared logistics.

Equipment can be standardized across Jordanian border security agencies (JAF, PSD/AND, Customs, GID), facilitating interagency coordination and reducing maintenance complexity.

INL staff can potentially assist CT – which does not maintain a full-time employee in Jordan – with processing the arrival of any procurements to Jordan’s airport, optimizing staffing resources. CRDF's established vendor relationships and supply chains accelerate delivery timelines, ensuring equipment reaches Jaber crossing months faster than a new implementer could achieve.

Harmonized SOPs and Interagency Coordination CRDF is currently supporting SOP enhancement and operational coordination at Jordanian land borders under the CT program. Continuing implementation through CRDF enables harmonized inspection methodologies and SOP frameworks that are consistent across agencies, ensuring that AND officers at Jaber crossing can coordinate seamlessly with Customs, GID, and JAF personnel using compatible procedures, terminology, and information-sharing protocols. A different implementer would develop separate SOPs that could conflict with or duplicate CRDF's CT work, creating confusion among border personnel who must coordinate across multiple agencies. CRDF's integrated approach strengthens interagency coordination and creates sustainable operational practices that build upon existing institutional knowledge rather than introducing competing methodologies.

Unique Combination of Capabilities No other organization possesses the unique combination of: current operational presence in Jordan with established government relationships; ongoing border security programming that directly complements INL objectives; pre-vetted subject matter experts with DEA/narcotics interdiction backgrounds and JAF security clearances; completed assessments and baseline data for Jaber crossing; ability to harmonize training, equipment, and SOPs across multiple agencies; and procurement efficiencies through program integration. This convergence of capabilities makes CRDF the only responsible source capable of implementing this project efficiently, effectively, and without substantial duplication of costs or unacceptable delays that would compromise U.S. national security interests.

SECTION 10. LISTING OF SOURCES, IF ANY, THAT EXPRESSED A WRITTEN

INTEREST IN THE ACQUISITION

To date, no other sources have written to express interest.

SECTION 11. STATEMENT OF THE ACTIONS, IF ANY, THE AGENCY MAY TAKE

TO REMOVE OR OVERCOME ANY BARRIERS TO COMPETITION BEFORE ANY

SUBSEQUENT ACQUISITION FOR THE SUPPLIES OR SERVICES REQUIRED

For the reasons set forth in Paragraph 5, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), INL Amman Office has no plans at this time to compete future contacts for the types of supplies/services covered by this document. If another potential source emerges, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), INL Amman Office will assess whether competition for future requirements is feasible.

SECTION 12. CERTIFICATIONS

REQUIREMENTS CERTIFICATION

I certify that the facts and representations under my cognizance which are included in this Justification and its supporting acquisition planning documents, except as noted herein, are complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

SIGNATURE:

<<SIGNED>>

Rajae Alnumani September 30, 2026 Financial Analyst/Program Assistant INL/Amman

CONTRACTING OFFICER CERTIFICATION (FAR 6.104-1(a)(12)) I certify that this submission is accurate to the best of my knowledge, and that it contains complete information necessary to enable other officials to make an informed recommendation for approval or disapproval.

SIGNATURE:

<<SIGNED>>

Travis Keon September 30, 2026 Contracting Officer RPSO Frankfurt, Bureau of Global Acquisitions