CBRN Canteen Cap Award

JUSTIFICATION FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

FOR THE Chemical Biological Radioactive Nuclear (CBRN) Canteen Cap

UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF 41 U.S.C. 1903

1. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Troop Support, Clothing and Textiles Supply Chain, is the

contracting activity.

2. The action being approved is the ability to solicit for DLA requirements on another than

full and open competition basis.

3. Following are the quantities and estimated price to meet requirements for the :

National Stock Number (NSN), Quantity, and Estimated Unit Price:

8465‐01‐529‐9800 33,000 each $

Estimated dollar value of the proposed award: $ each

4. The statutory authority permitting other than full and open competition for this action is

41 United States Code (U.S.C.) 1903 special emergency procurement authority as

implemented by FAR 13.5. The CBRN Canteen Cap is deemed to be available only from

the original source for this follow‐on contract for the production of this highly

specialized component and it is likely that award to any other source would result in (A)

Substantial duplication of cost to the Government that is not expected to be recovered

through competition; or (B) Unacceptable delays in fulfilling the agency’s requirements.

5. A sole‐source fixed quantity contract to Avon Protection Systems, Inc. (APS) is necessary

to procure the CBRN Canteen Cap. The Canteen Cap was developed with the M50,

M51, M53, and M53A1 masks as systems to provide protection against exposure to

CBRN agents. At the subsystem level, each of the required components such as the

CBRN Canteen Cap provide a critical function to the mask system. If a single component

does not meet the required capabilities, a mask system failure could occur and lead to

serious injury or death.

APS is the sole producer of the M50, M51, M53, and M53A1 chemical biological mask

systems and a majority of the system components, to include the CBRN Canteen Cap.

These masks provide CBRN protection and only masks produced by APS meet the

Government’s requirements. These masks are separate items from the CBRN suits and

or other equipment. The Government only has limited data rights to the contractor

drawings. APS has not shown interest in selling the full detailed Technical Data Package

(TDP) for each mask system to the Government. On 27 November 2019, the Contract

Specialist emailed APS requesting to purchase the M50, M51, M53, and M53A1 detailed

TDPs. APS replied they are not interested in selling the TDP in an email dated 16

December 2019.

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The Government currently only has limited top level drawings, system performance

specifications, Quality Assurance Provisions (QAPs), and Special Packing Instructions

(SPl) that may be used to procure these mask systems and components; however, this

collection of documents are insufficient for competition because they lack the necessary

technical details. These missing technical details include interface dimensions, material

requirements, and component level verification requirements. Without these missing

technical details, the Government cannot guarantee the systems will function as

required by the Warfighter.

In 2000, the Government competed the M50, M51, and M53 systems for a development

contract. The Government selected the APS's prototype as having the best potential to

meet the Government's performance requirements. Extensive testing was conducted at

the system level to determine the masks’ protection capability. This testing included the

following: chemical agent testing, protection factor testing, field operational testing,

and testing of interoperability with other systems.

The Government’s effort to develop a competitive TDP for the JSGPM mask systems and

spare components would result in significant duplication of cost, approximately $, which

will not be recovered through competition by the Government. Table 2 below outlines

the cost to reverse engineer the items:

Table 1 ‐ Estimated Cost

Any effort to procure the components and systems on this contract competitively while

ensuring the parts meet critical requirements, would require either the purchase of the detailed

TDP from APS or conducting a reverse engineering effort.

Since APS is not willing to sell the rights to their TDP, reverse engineering these components

and systems would require the following steps:

Step 1 – Reverse Engineering/Design. During this stage, it is required to conduct research and

development efforts such as identify materials, design prototype molds, produce prototype

materials, perform internal conformance testing, and conduct an analysis of alternatives. Upon

reaching the appropriate technology readiness level the Government would need to invest in

production molds, verify production process repeatability, and prepare for component testing

and evaluation in accordance with the performance specifications identified in Step 1. This step

results in costs of approximately $.

Step Cost ($M)

1. Reverse Engineering/Design $

2. Government Technical Data Update $

3. Component Test and Evaluation $

4. System Test and Evaluation $

TOTAL $

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Step 2 – Government Technical Data Update. The current Government technical data is not

adequate for a competitive procurement. Each component and system level performance

specification will need to be updated to include the appropriate performance requirements

necessary to support competitive procurement and ensure Warfighter safety. This step also

includes identifying lessons learned from previous failure mechanisms. The effort to update

Government technical data will cost approximately $.

Step 3 – Component Test and Evaluation. Upon completing research and development efforts

the Government would be required to validate the design using the previously established

product and process configuration baseline. Production representative samples of the

components would be subjected to the testing described in the component level performance

specifications such as material properties, deterioration, and mean time between failure,

reliability, environmental, battlefield contaminants, and long term storage. This effort will cost

approximately $.

Step 4 – System Test and Evaluation. After successfully meeting all of the component level

performance requirements, the Government would be required to test the design solution in

the JSGPM mask systems. These tests would be defined by the system level performance

specifications and include environmental (salt fog, transportation, drop, vibration,

electromagnetic interference etc.), protection factor, Simulant Agent Resistance Test Manikin

(SMARTMAN), and long term storage testing. Agent testing alone would cost approximately.

As described in Table 1 above, awarding a competitive contract for the components and

systems would result in the duplication of costs of approximately $ that is not expected to be

recovered through competition.

Additionally, qualifying a new source would result in unacceptable delays in fulfilling the

Government’s requirements. Table 2 below outlines the timeframe to qualify an additional

source.

Table 2 ‐ Estimated Schedule

Step 1 – Reverse Engineering/Design. The reverse engineering/design phase for components

manufactured using soft rubbers requires multiple stages, including the development of

Step Schedule (Months)

1. Reverse Engineering/Design 48 – 60

2. Government Technical Data Update 18

3. Component Test and Evaluation 18

4. System Test and Evaluation 24

TOTAL 108 – 120

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material formulations, mold design and fabrication, and process design. Based on these factors

a single component would take approximately 12 – 18 months for a contractor with expertise in

soft rubber design and manufacture. It is reasonable to assume that not all of the components

of a mask system can be designed simultaneously. Therefore, these systems would require a

combination of sequential, iterative, and parallel design processes to realize a complete system

design. Based on the number of unique parts and multi‐system compatibility requirements, it is

estimated that this initial design phase could take approximately 36 – 48 months. Maturation of

the assembly process necessary to produce these items is estimated to take an additional 12

months; this is especially important as mask leakage points are often the result of improper

assembly of components and result in system failures. For comparison, there have been

multiple 24 – 36 months Operating and Supply Cost Reduction (OSCR) efforts to reverse

engineer components contained in these mask systems that were unsuccessful. In summary,

the total duration for reverse engineering/design is estimated to take 48 – 60 months.

Step 2 – Government Technical Data Update. Current quality assurance provisions are based

solely on Avon‐owned drawings. Assuming every component is completely reverse engineered,

it is estimated that creating detailed drawings suitable for production and updating quality

assurance requirements to appropriately test and accept the new designs, would take

approximately 18 months. An alternative approach would be for the Government to convert

the current sole source requirements into competitive, performance‐based specifications. It is

estimated that this approach would take an equivalent amount of time as previously defined

for creating detailed drawings. It is important to note that all quality assurance requirements

must ensure backward compatibility with current mask systems.

Step 3 – Component Test and Evaluation. After successful component design, each component

must be evaluated in accordance with Government requirements using certified test

equipment. A typical First Article Test (FAT) of an individual component takes approximately 6 –

12 months, assuming no design changes are necessary. Agent testing must be completed at

certified Government laboratories. It is not unusual for the wait time for agent testing to be

several months and upwards of a year due to limited capacity. Considering the number of

components associated with these systems it is reasonable to expect a minimum of 18 months

for component testing.

Step 4 – System Test and Evaluation. FAT for similar systems has taken approximately 12 – 24

months, assuming no changes to the design. To reiterate, agent testing must be completed at

certified Government laboratories with limited capacity. System agent testing uses specific test

equipment known as SMARTMAN; there are only two Government laboratories approved for

SMARTMAN testing and the lead time is typically 9 – 12 months. Similar system FATs have been

historically difficult to pass. For example, the M52 Joint Service Chemical Environment

Survivability Mask (JSCESM) took approximately 5 years to meet system FAT requirements.

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Assuming all testing is successful, a conservative estimate to complete FAT on the Joint Service

General Purpose Mask (JSGPM) systems is expected to take at least 24 months.

As described in Table 2 above, qualifying a new vendor would result in an unacceptable delay of

108 – 120 months. The delay would be caused by lengthy testing and approval from the

services and DLA of the new item. The urgent need for this item is due to back orders building

with purchases requisitions of over 33,000 units as of January 2020. In addition, this item

should have a safety level of six (6) months of stock. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that a

new source could produce items that meet the Government's requirements.

6. There is no plan to obtain competition for this contractual action on the prime contractor

level for the reasons stated above in section 5. Notices required by FAR 5.201 shall be

published, and any proposals received shall be considered.

7. There are no plans to increase competition for the CBRN Canteen Cap due to the

aforementioned unique nature of this sole source requirement. The Government does not own

or have rights to technical data adequate for competition.

The Government previously undertook OSCR efforts to reverse engineer the various

components, and create a competitive Technical Data Package (TDP). Attempts to reverse

engineer the items were not successful due to critical features that were difficult to define.

These critical features ensure proper system interface and function. The Government

suspended further efforts to reverse engineer the components due to the high risk of

manufacturing parts that fail to meet system requirements. The criticality of the items’

dimensions, material properties, and interface requirements cannot be overstated – if a single

component on this list does not meet the required capabilities, then a mask system failure

could occur and lead to serious injury or death.

8. A Sources Sought Notice was posted on Fed Biz Opps on March 18, 2020 for the fixed

quantity of the CBRN Canteen Cap identified within this document. The posting closed April 17,

2020; APS was the only contractor to respond.

In addition the Engineering Support Activity, CCDC Chemical Biological Center along with ACCDTA

conducted market research on August 2019 in accordance with FAR 10.002(b)(2) in

relation to the M50, M51, M53, and M53A1 mask systems regarding capabilities to meet

customer requirements. The market research included contacting knowledgeable individuals in

Government, DoD database searches in Product Data Management System (PDMS)/IHS

Haystack/Joint Acquisition Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Knowledge Systems

(JACKS), and reviewing online product literature of similar manufacturers. Results of the market

research indicates that other sources may have the capability to produce similar items,

however, the Government does not have sufficient technical data to ensure Government

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requirements are met. Without accurate Government owned detailed technical data, validation

and acceptance of any parts would require extensive testing and verification, causing a serious

schedule delay and duplication of costs. A competitive procurement is not possible with the

current technical data.

9. The ESA has reported that to date, no other sources have written to express an interest.

10. In accordance with FAR 5.102(a)(6) when an acquisition contains brand name

specifications, the contracting officer shall include with the solicitation the justification or

documentation required by 6.302‐1(c), 13.106‐1(b), or 13.501, redacted as necessary in

accordance with FAR 6.305.

10. In accordance with DGPA 13.003‐P (2), Special Emergency Procurement Authority (SEPA)

the Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT) for purchases made within the United States is

$750,000.00 to facilitate the defense against or recovery from nuclear, biological, chemical or

radiological attack. An e‐mail dated January 28, 2020 from from DLA Troop Support Policy

Office confirms this increased SAT for a CBRN item. In accordance with FAR 13.501(a)(2)(i) and

the Contract Quality Management Plan (CQMP) dated August 2019, review and approvals for

Justification & Approvals below the SAT is at the Procurement Contracting Officer level.

11. As the Contracting Officer, I hereby certify that the justification is accurate and complete to

the best of my knowledge and belief will serve as approval. I hereby determine the anticipated

cost to the Government will be fair and reasonable base on price analysis, including favorable

comparison to previous award price and published commercial price list from APS.

___4‐20‐20_______ _____________________________

Date Jennifer Scarpello

Contracting Officer

Individual Equipment

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13.501 Special documentation requirements.

(a) Sole source (including brand name) acquisitions. (1) Acquisitions conducted under

simplified acquisition procedures are exempt from the requirements in part 6. However,

contracting officers must—

(i) Conduct sole source acquisitions, as defined in 2.101, (including brand name) under this

subpart only if the need to do so is justified in writing and approved at the levels specified in

paragraph (a)(2) of this section;

(ii) Prepare sole source (including brand name) justifications using the format at 6.303‐2,

modified to reflect that the procedures in FAR subpart 13.5 were used in accordance with 41

U.S.C. 1901 or the authority of 41 U.S.C. 1903;

(iii) Make publicly available the justifications (excluding brand name) required by 6.305(a)

within 14 days after contract award or in the case of unusual and compelling urgency within

30 days after contract award, in accordance with 6.305 procedures at paragraphs (b), (d), (e),

and (f); and

(iv) Make publicly available brand name justifications with the solicitation, in accordance with

5.102(a)(6).

(2) Justifications and approvals are required under this subpart for sole‐source (including

brand‐name) acquisitions or portions of an acquisition requiring a brand‐name. If the

justification is to cover only the portion of the acquisition which is brand‐name, then it should

so state; the approval level requirements will then only apply to that portion.

(i) For a proposed contract exceeding $150,000, but not exceeding $700,000, the contracting

officer's certification that the justification is accurate and complete to the best of the

contracting officer's knowledge and belief will serve as approval, unless a higher approval

level is established in accordance with agency procedures.

Awarded contract SPE1C120P0432 to unknown vendor for unknown amount on 2020-05-05.