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Army Planning and Orders Production

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HEADQUARTERS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

JANUARY 2005

FM 5-0

(FM 101-5)

This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online www.us.army.mil

*FM 5-0

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*This publication supersedes the planning portion of FM 101-5, 31 May 1997.

i

Field Manual Headquarters No. 5-0 Department of the Army Washington, DC, 20 January 2005

Army Planning and Orders Production

Contents Page

PREFACE ................................................................................................................. v INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................... vii Chapter 1 FUNDAMENTALS OF PLANNING ........................................................................1-1

The Nature of Planning ..........................................................................................1-1 Key Planning Concepts........................................................................................1-15 Digital Enhancements to Planning .......................................................................1-27 Effective Planning ................................................................................................1-28

Chapter 2 ARMY PROBLEM SOLVING .................................................................................2-1 Problem Solving and Decision Making ..................................................................2-1 Solving Problems in a Group Setting .....................................................................2-4 Structure of Problems ............................................................................................2-5 Solving Problems ...................................................................................................2-5

Chapter 3 THE MILITARY DECISION MAKING PROCESS ..................................................3-1 Background ............................................................................................................3-1 Performing the Military Decision Making Process................................................3-11 Planning in a Time-Constrained Environment .....................................................3-57

Chapter 4 TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES .......................................................................4-1 Troop Leading Procedures and the Military Decision Making Process .................4-1 Performing Troop Leading Procedures..................................................................4-4

Appendix A STAFF STUDIES AND DECISION PAPERS ....................................................... A-1 Staff Studies...........................................................................................................A-1 Decision Papers .....................................................................................................A-7

FM 5-0 ___________________________________________________________________________________ ii

Appendix B MILITARY BRIEFINGS..........................................................................................B-1 Types of Briefings ..................................................................................................B-1 Briefing Steps ........................................................................................................B-4

Appendix C STAFF GUIDELINES FOR MISSION ANALYSIS .................................................C-1

Appendix D COMMANDER’S GUIDANCE GUIDELINES ........................................................D-1

Appendix E ESTIMATES ..........................................................................................................E-1

Appendix F TASK ORGANIZATION ......................................................................................... F-1 Fundamental Considerations................................................................................. F-1 Command and Support Relationships................................................................... F-3 Task Organization Formats ................................................................................... F-7

Appendix G PLANS AND ORDERS ..........................................................................................G-1 Characteristics .......................................................................................................G-1 Types of Plans .......................................................................................................G-3 Types of Orders .....................................................................................................G-4 Techniques for Issuing Orders ..............................................................................G-7 Administrative Instructions for Preparing Plans and Orders..................................G-8 Attachments (Annexes, Appendixes, Tabs, and Enclosures) .............................G-12 Standing Operating Procedures ..........................................................................G-13 Matrices and Templates ......................................................................................G-14 Examples and Procedures for Completing Plans, Orders, and Annexes............G-16 List of Figures ......................................................................................................G-17

Appendix H INTEGRATING TARGETING INTO THE OPERATIONS PROCESS...................H-1 Targeting Process and Targeting Team................................................................H-1 Decide....................................................................................................................H-2 Detect ....................................................................................................................H-6 Deliver....................................................................................................................H-7 Assess ...................................................................................................................H-7

Appendix I JOINT PLANNING .................................................................................................. I-1 Joint Planning Overview ......................................................................................... I-1 Joint Planning Concepts......................................................................................... I-2 Joint Operation Plan Format................................................................................... I-4

_________________________________________________________________________________ Contents iii

GLOSSARY ...............................................................................................Glossary-1 BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................Bibliography-1 INDEX ............................................................................................................. Index-1 iv

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v

Preface Doctrine provides a military organization with unity of effort and a common philosophy, language, and purpose. FM 5-0 is the Army’s keystone manual for planning operations. It is the Army’s doctrinal source for problem solving, the military decision making process (MDMP), troop leading procedures (TLP), and formats for Army plans and orders.

PURPOSE

FM 5-0 promotes a common understanding of the fundamentals of planning and provides the foundation for developing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for planning in all Army publications. It provides a doctrinal approach to decision making that helps commanders and their staffs examine a situation, reach logical conclusions, and make informed decisions. FM 5-0 is the common reference for planning within the Army education system.

SCOPE

FM 5-0 includes MDMP and formats for plans, orders, and briefings formerly found in FM 101-5. Staff responsibilities, staff officer duties during preparation for and execution of operations, rehearsals, information management, and liaison duties formerly addressed in FM 101-5, are now covered in FM 6-0.

Chapter 1 describes the Army’s approach to planning and discusses the nature of plans and planning activities. Chapter 2 discusses Army problem solving in general terms and prescribes the steps of the Army problem solving process.

Chapter 3 explains the MDMP. Chapter 4 discusses TLP. The appendixes are planning tools to assist commanders and staffs in planning, decision making, orders production, and military briefings.

APPLICABILITY

FM 5-0 applies to all Army leaders. Chapters 1 and 2 contain doctrine and TTP that apply to planning and solving problems at all echelons throughout the institutional and field Army. The primary audience for Chapter 3 is battalion-through corps-level commanders, leaders, and staffs. Chapter 4 applies to leaders and Soldiers at company-level and below. The appendices support Chapters 2 through 4.

Doctrine in FM 5-0 applies across the spectrum of conflict (peacetime military engagement, smaller-scale contingencies, and major theater war), and the range of operations (offense, defense, stability, and support). FM 5-0 does not detail tactical missions or the use of forces during operations. The examples provided are guides only, showing general application procedures.

Army headquarters serving as the headquarters of a joint force land component or joint task force should refer to JP 5-0 and other joint planning publications.

Additionally, Army service component commands, and headquarters serving as

__________________________________________________________________________________ Preface vi

ARFOR headquarters, should also refer to FM 100-7 for Army-specific, operational-level planning considerations.

ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

Terms that have joint or Army definitions are identified in both the glossary and the text. The glossary lists most terms used in FM 5-0 that have joint or Army definitions. Terms for which FM 5-0 is the proponent manual (the authority) are indicated with an asterisk in the glossary. Definitions for which FM 5-0 is the proponent manual are printed in boldface in the text. These terms and their definitions will be incorporated into the next revision of FM 1-02. For other definitions in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent manual follows the definition.

The glossary contains referents of acronyms and definitions of terms not defined in JP 1-02 and FM 1-02. Some common abbreviations and acronyms—for example, the abbreviations for military ranks and publications—are not spelled out; refer to the glossary. Additionally, since ARFOR is a defined term as well as an acronym, it is not spelled out.

All references to annexes refer to annexes to operation plans (OPLANs) or operation orders (OPORDs) unless stated otherwise.

Unless stated otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, is the proponent for this publication. The preparing agency is the Army Doctrine Proponency Division, US Army Combined Arms Center. Send written comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-CD (FM 5-0), 1 Reynolds Road (Building 111), Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352. Send comments and recommendations by e-mail to web-cadd@leavenworth.army.mil. Follow the DA Form 2028 format or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

vii

Introduction Modern military staff procedures can be traced back to the formation of the Prussian general staff under General Helmuth von Moltke in the late nineteenth century. As warfare became more complex, doctrine on planning and decision making evolved in an effort to help commanders make decisions better and faster than their opponents. While the beginning of a modern staff system in the US Army emerged during the American Civil War (1861-1865), doctrine regarding staff procedures, decision making, and planning was limited until World War I.

Not until the 1924 publication of Field Service Regulations did Army doctrine show formatted orders with annexes, maps, and tables. Even then, doctrine only alluded to the requirement for leaders to make an “estimate of the situation” and follow a deliberate process that culminated in a decision.

In 1932, the first manual for staff officers was published under authority of General (later General of the Army) Douglas MacArthur. The 1932 Staff Officer’s Field Manual provided the US Army’s first comprehensive command and staff doctrine on which today’s staff procedures are based. The 1932 manual described staff functions, explained a five-step commander’s estimate process, and provided detailed formats for operation orders.

In August 1940, the first FM 101-5—Staff Officer’s Field Manual, The Staff and Combat Orders—was published. The doctrine established was broader in scope and depth than that of the 1932 manual. It defined terms and standardized graphics, and discussed commander and staff responsibilities more precisely. It guided Army commanders and staffs throughout World War II and for almost five years thereafter.

FM 101-5 was revised five times between 1940 and 1984. In May 1997, 13 years after its last revision, FM 101-5, then titled Staff Organization and Operations, was republished. It focused on command and staff relationships, staff organizations, staff officer responsibilities, the military decision making process, and the mechanics of producing orders. Additionally, it added doctrine on information management and two central concepts of Army command and control (C2) doctrine: the commander’s intent and commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR).

FM 5-0 marks the sixth revision of FM 101-5 since it was first published.

Together, FM 5-0 and FM 6-0, replace FM 101-5. FM 5-0 now addresses only planning. FM 6-0 addresses C2, staff organization and operations, the duties of and relationship between the commander and staff, information management, rehearsals, and liaison. This organization mirrors a similar distinction made in joint doctrine.

The doctrine FM 5-0 prescribes is built on two central precepts: (1) commanders are responsible for planning and (2) effective planning incorporates the concept of mission command.

Commanders are responsible for planning. Their knowledge, experience, and personality—along with how they interact with their staff and units—drives the

_______________________________________________________________________________ Introduction viii planning process. While staffs complete much of the detailed analysis and preparations of plans and orders, commanders play a central role in planning through their commander’s intent, CCIR, and planning guidance. These guide the activities of the staff and subordinate commanders. Staffs assist commanders with the coordination and detailed analysis necessary to convert the commander’s intent, CCIR, and planning guidance into a plan or order.

Effective planning incorporates the concept of mission command. Mission command, the Army’s preferred C2 concept, concentrates on the objective of an operation and not on every detail of how to achieve that objective (see FM 6-0).

Successful mission command results in subordinate leaders at all echelons exercising disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent. Staffs support mission command when they produce mission orders. Mission orders is a technique for completing combat orders. This allows subordinates maximum freedom of planning and action to accomplish missions and leaves the “how” of mission accomplishment to the subordinates (FM 6-0). FM 5-0 applies this technique to planning and describes how to produce mission orders.

To understand FM 5-0, readers must understand the fundamentals of full spectrum operations described in FM 3-0 and the art of tactics described in FM 3-

90. They must discern how the activities described in FM 3-07 carry over and affect offensive and defensive operations. They must recognize the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) described in FM 6-0, and understand how mission command, commander’s visualization, and exercising C2 influence planning. FM 5-0 also refers to joint publications. Reviewing these joint publications stimulates understanding of how Army planning supports and complements joint planning.

Many of the examples provided are based on offensive and defensive operations.

Tactical planning for stability operations and support operations is performed in a similar manner to offensive and defensive operations. However, applying combat power in offensive and defensive operations is different than in stability operations and support operations. Planning horizons may be longer and the emphasis on civil considerations greater. FM 3-07 provides planning considerations for stability and support operations.

FM 5-0 expands Army planning doctrine. To plan effectively, planners and commanders must appreciate the nature of planning and plans. Planners must understand the purpose, environment, and characteristics of the planning process. Knowledge of FM 5-0 forms the basis for this understanding.

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CONTENTS

Nature of Planning..................................... 1-1 Science and Art of Planning................. 1-3 Planning as Part of Command and Control...................... 1-4 Planning and Decision Making............. 1-6 Operational-Level and Tactical-Level Planning.............................................. 1-7 Fundamentals of Planning.................... 1-8 Functions of Planning and Plans....... 1-12 Key Planning Concepts.......................... 1-15 Nested Concepts ................................. 1-15 Sequencing Operations ...................... 1-16

Control Measures ............................... 1-18 Risk Reduction.................................... 1-18 Hasty and Deliberate Operations ..... 1-19 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance ............................. 1-20 Planning Horizons ............................... 1-21 Parallel and Collaborative Planning... 1-22 Forward and Reverse Planning.......... 1-23 One-Third/Two-Thirds Rule ................ 1-24 Planning Pitfalls ................................... 1-25 Digital Enhancements to Planning ........ 1-27 Effective Planning.................................... 1-28

Chapter 1

Fundamentals of Planning Successful generals make plans to fit circumstances, but do not try to create circumstances to fit plans.

General George S. Patton Jr.

This chapter provides an overview of the nature of planning. It describes how planning is part of the broader field of command and control (C2) and an essential activity of the operations process. It emphasizes mission command as the preferred C2 concept for planning operations in uncertain and fluid environments. It describes how planning supports decision making and includes the fundamentals of planning. This chapter also provides key planning concepts, to include how time, uncertainty, and risk influence planning. It describes effective planning and discusses the pitfalls that commonly impede it. Finally, this chapter addresses how modern information systems enhance planning.

NATURE OF PLANNING

1-1. Military operations are uncertain and unpredictable. They are complex endeavors—struggles between opposing human wills. Commanders face thinking and adaptive enemies. They can never predict with certainty how enemies will act and react, or how events will develop. Even friendly actions are difficult to predict because of friction, such as human mistakes and the effects of stress on individuals. Leaders who understand the dynamic relationship that time and uncertainty have on enemy and friendly forces are better equipped to develop effective plans. Given the nature of operations, the object of planning is not to eliminate uncertainty but to develop a framework for action in the midst of it.

1-2

Any plan is a framework from which to adapt, not a script to be followed to the letter.

FM 3-0

1-2. Planning is the means by which the commander envisions a desired outcome, lays out effective ways of achieving it, and communicates to his subordinates his vision, intent, and decisions, focusing on the results he expects to achieve (FM 3-0). The outcome of planning is a plan or an order that—

• Fosters mission command by clearly conveying the commander’s intent.

• Assigns tasks and purposes to subordinates.

• Contains the minimum coordinating measures necessary to synchronize the operation.

• Allocates or reallocates resources.

• Directs preparation activities and establishes times or conditions for execution.

1-3. A plan is a continuous, evolving framework of anticipated actions that maxi-mize opportunities and guide subordinates through each phase of the operation. A plan may be a formal, articulated document or an informal scheme. Since planning is an ongoing process, a plan is an interim product of planning based on information and understanding at the moment that is subject to revision. The measure of a good plan is not whether execution transpires as planned but whether the plan facilitates effective action in the face of unforeseen events.

1-4. Full spectrum operations demand a flexible approach to planning that adapts planning methods to each situation. An effective planning process structures the thinking of commanders and staffs while supporting their insight, creativity, and initiative. The Army uses three different, but related processes to guide planning activities:

• Army problem solving.

• The military decision making process (MDMP).

• Troop leading procedures (TLP).

1-5. Army problem solving provides a standard, systematic approach to define and analyze a problem, develop and analyze possible solutions, choose the best solution, and implement a plan of action that solves the problem (see Chapter 2). Problem solving applies to all Army activities and provides the base logic for the Army’s two tactical planning processes: MDMP and TLP.

The MDMP is more appropriate for headquarters with staffs. It provides a logical sequence of decisions and interactions between the commander and staff for developing estimates and effective plans and orders (see Chapter 3).

At lower tactical echelons, commanders do not have staffs. Leaders at company level and below use TLP to plan and prepare for an operation (see Chapter 4).

__________________________________________________________________ Fundamentals of Planning

1-3

StabilityOffense

Defense

• Initiative

• Agility

• Depth

• Synchronization

• Versatility

Tenets:

Operational Framework

Principles of War

Support

Figure 1-1. Fundamentals of Full Spectrum Operations

SCIENCE AND ART OF PLANNING

1-6. Planning is both science and art. For example, many aspects of military operations are quantifiable such as, movement rates, fuel consumption, and weapons effects. They are part of the science of planning. Other aspects belong to the art of planning. The combination of forces, choice of tactics, and arrangement of activities, for example, belong to the art of planning.

Knowledge of the science of planning is often gained through institutional training and study. Understanding the art of planning is primarily gained through operational training and experience. Effective planners understand and master both the science and the art of planning.

Science of Planning 1-7. The science of planning encompasses aspects of operations—capabilities, techniques, and procedures—that can be measured and analyzed. These include the physical capabilities of friendly and enemy organizations and systems. It includes a realistic appreciation for time-distance factors and an understanding of how long it takes to initiate certain actions. The science of planning includes the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) used to accomplish planning tasks and the operational terms and graphics that compose the language of tactics. While not easy, the science of planning is straightforward.

1-8. Planners master the science aspect of military operations to understand the physical and procedural constraints under which units operate. Because mili-tary operations are an intensely human activ-ity, planning cannot be reduced to a formula.

This fact necessitates understanding the art of planning.

Art of Planning 1-9. The art of planning requires understanding how the dynamic relationships between friendly forces, adver-saries, and the environ-ment create complexity within operations. This understanding helps planners develop simple

1-4 and flexible plans for a variety of circumstances. The art of planning includes knowing the effects of operations on soldiers. It involves the commander’s willingness to take calculated risks.

1-10. Planning requires creative application of doctrine, TTP, units, and resources. It requires a thorough knowledge and application of the fundamentals of full spectrum operations (see Figure 1-1 and FM 3-0) and the art of tactics (see FM 3-90). The art of planning involves developing plans within the commander’s intent and planning guidance by choosing from interrelated options, including—

• Types and forms of operations, forms of maneuver, and tactical mission tasks.

• Task organization of available forces.

• Arrangement of activities in time, space, and purpose.

• Resource allocation.

• Choice and arrangement of control measures.

• Tempo.

• Risk the commander is willing to take.

1-11. These options define a starting point from which planners create distinct solutions to particular tactical problems. Each solution involves a range of options. Each balances competing demands and requires judgment.

The factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC) always combine to form a different set of circumstances. There are no checklists that adequately apply to every situation.

PLANNING AS PART OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

1-12. Planning is part of the extended field of command and control. FM 6-0 describes two C2 concepts, detailed command and mission command. While the Army’s preferred C2 concept is mission command, commanders do not rely on purely detailed or purely mission command techniques. The degree to which planners incorporate detailed command techniques into plans and orders depends primarily on the nature of the action or task, qualities of the staff and subordinates commanders, and the capabilities of the enemy.

Detailed Command 1-13. Detailed command centralizes information and decision making authority. Orders and plans are detailed and explicit. Successful execution depends on strict compliance to the plan with minimal decision making and initiative by subordinates. Detailed command emphasizes vertical, linear information flow; information flows up the chain of command and orders flow down. It stems from the belief that imposing order and certainty on the battlefield brings successful results. In detailed command, commanders command by personal direction or detailed directive.

1-14. In detailed command, commanders impose discipline and coordination from above to ensure compliance with all aspects of the plan. Detailed orders may achieve a high degree of coordination in planning, however, after the operation has commenced, it leaves little room for adjustment by

1-5 subordinates without reference to higher headquarters. Detailed command is not suited for taking advantage of a rapidly changing situation. It does not work well when the chain of command and information flow is disrupted.

Detailed command is less effective in fluid military operations requiring judgment, creativity, and initiative. Because of these disadvantages, mission command is the Army’s approved technique.

Mission Command 1-15. Mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission orders for effective mission accomplishment. Successful mission command results from subordinate leaders at all echelons exercising disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to accomplish missions. It requires an environment of trust and mutual understanding (FM 6-0). Mission command is the preferred C2 concept for planning. It emphasizes timely decision making, subordinates understanding of the commander’s intent, and the clear responsibility of subordinates to exercise initiative within that intent.

1-16. Mission command accepts the uncertainty of operations by reducing the amount of certainty needed to act. In such a philosophy, commanders hold a “loose rein,” allowing subordinates freedom of action and requiring initiative on their part. Commanders make fewer decisions, allowing them to focus decision making on the most important ones. Mission command tends to be decentralized, informal, and flexible. Orders and plans are as brief and simple as possible. Commanders rely on subordinates’ coordination ability and the human capacity to understand with minimum verbal information exchange. The elements of mission command are—

• The commander’s intent.

• Subordinates’ initiative.

• Mission orders.

• Resource allocation.

1-17. Effective planning supports mission command by stressing the importance of mission orders—a technique for completing combat orders that allows subordinates maximum freedom of planning and action in accomplishing missions and leaves the “how” of mission accomplishment to subordinates (FM 6-0). Mission orders state the task organization, commander’s intent and concept of operations, unit mission, subordinates’ missions, and the essential coordinating instructions. Missions assigned to subordinates include all normal elements (who, what, when, where, and why). However, they place particular emphasis on the purpose (why) in order to guide, along with the commander’s intent, subordinates’ initiative.

1-18. Mission command requires plans with the proper level of detail; not so detailed that they stifle initiative or so general that they provide insufficient direction. The proper level depends on each situation and is not easy to determine. Some operations require tighter control over subordinate elements than others. An air assault or a river crossing operation, for example, requires precise synchronization. In these examples, plans or portions of the plan are more thorough. As a rule, plans should only contain specific information required to provide the guidance necessary to

1-6 synchronize combat power at the decisive time and place while allowing subordinates as much freedom of action as possible.

PLANNING AND DECISION MAKING

1-19. Decision making is selecting a course of action as the one most favorable to accomplish the mission (FM 6-0). Planning is a form of decision making. However, not all decisions require the same level of planning.

Commanders make hundreds of decisions during operations in an environment of great uncertainty, unpredictability, and constant change.

Some decisions are deliberate, using the MDMP and a complete staff to create a fully developed and written order. The commander makes other decisions very quickly. This results in a fragmentary order (FRAGO). When developing plans, commanders normally choose between analytic or intuitive means of decision making.

Analytic Decision Making 1-20. Analytic decision making approaches a problem systematically.

Leaders analyze a problem, generate several possible solutions, analyze and compare them to a set of criteria, and select the best solution. The analytic approach aims to produce the optimal solution to a problem from among those solutions identified. This approach is methodical, and it serves well for decision making in complex or unfamiliar situations by allowing the breakdown of tasks into recognizable elements. It ensures that the commander and staff consider, analyze, and evaluate all relevant factors. It may help inexperienced leaders by giving them a methodology to compensate for their lack of experience. The Army’s analytical approach to decision making is Army problem solving (see Chapter 2) and the MDMP (see Chapter 3).

1-21. The analytic approach to decision making serves well when time is available to analyze all facets affecting the problem and its solution.

However, analytic decision making consumes time and does not work well in all situations—especially during execution, where circumstances often require immediate decisions.

Intuitive Decision Making 1-22. Intuitive decision making is the act of reaching a conclusion that emphasizes pattern recognition based on knowledge, judgment, experience, education, intelligence, boldness, perception, and character. This approach focuses on assessment of the situation vice comparison of multiple options (FM 6-0). It is used when time is short or speed of decision is important.

Intuitive decision making is faster than analytic decision making in that it involves making decisions based on an assessment of the situation rather than a comparison of multiple courses of action (COAs). It relies on the experienced leader’s ability to recognize the key elements and implications of a particular problem or situation, reject the impractical, and select an adequate (rather than the optimal) COA.

1-23. Intuitive decision making is especially appropriate in time-constrained conditions. It significantly speeds up decision making. Intuitive decision

1-7 making, however, does not work well when the situation includes inexperienced leaders, complex or unfamiliar situations, or competing COAs.

Additionally, substituting assessment for detailed analysis means that some implications may be overlooked. Commanders use intuitive decision making when time is short and problems straightforward. It is usually appropriate during execution (see FM 6-0).

Combining Analytic and Intuitive Decision Making 1-24. The two approaches to decision making are rarely mutually exclusive.

Commanders often base an intuitive decision during execution on the situational understanding and products generated as part of a preceding MDMP. The staff may use part of the MDMP, such as wargaming, to verify or refine a commander’s intuitive decision if time permits. When commanders direct the MDMP in a time-constrained environment, many of the techniques, such as choosing only one COA, depend on intuitive decisions. Even in the most rigorous analytic decision making, intuitive decision making helps set boundaries for the analysis and fills in the gaps that remain.

1-25. Each method of decision making has strengths and weaknesses.

Selecting one over the other depends primarily on the experience of the commander and staff, and how much time and information are available. The analytic approach is more appropriate when enough time and information are available to choose among different COAs, or when the staff is inexperienced. The majority of tactical decisions made during execution, when time is short and information is lacking or doubtful, are intuitive.

OPERATIONAL-LEVEL AND TACTICAL-LEVEL PLANNING

1-26. It is important to understand planning within the context of the levels of war. The levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions (see FM 3-0). The three levels are strategic, operational, and tactical, although there are no distinct limits or boundaries between them. The strategic and operational levels provide the context for tactical operations.

1-27. Operational- and tactical-level planning complements each other but have different aims. Operational-level planning focuses on developing plans for campaigns and major operations. Planners at the operational level focus on operational art—the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, or organization, integration, and conduct of theater strategies, campaigns and major operations. Operational-level plans link the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives.

1-28. Tactical-level planning revolves around battles and engagements conducted to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units (see FM 3-90). Activities at this level focus on tactics. Tactics is the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain, and the enemy to translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements (FM 3-0), Tactical-level planning emphasizes flexibility and options. Planning horizons (see paragraphs 1-85–1-89) for tactical actions are relatively short. At the tactical

1-8 level, comprehensive planning may be feasible only for the first engagement or phase of a battle; succeeding actions could depend on enemy responses and circumstances. A key to effective tactical planning lies in anticipating and developing sound branches and sequels.

1-29. Operational-level planning involves broader dimensions of time and space than tactical-level planning. It is often more complex and less defined.

Operational-level planners are often required to define an area of operations (AO), estimate forces required, and evaluate the requirements for the operation. In contrast, tactical-level planning proceeds from an existing operational design. Normally AOs are prescribed, objectives and available forces identified, and sequences of activities specified for tactical-level commanders. Operational- and tactical-level planning, however, are not limited to particular echelons. Major Army Command (MACOM) headquarters may engage in tactical planning, and echelons normally associated with tactical missions increasingly find themselves undertaking operational-level design.

1-30. The joint operation planning process (deliberate, crisis action, and campaign) is beyond the scope of this manual. However, Army forces operate in a joint environment, and Army leaders must understand joint operation planning. Army service component commands (ASCCs) routinely participate in joint operation planning including planning for the joint force land component. Corps and divisions perform or participate in joint operation planning when serving as joint task force (JTF) or ARFOR headquarters.

Appendix I summarizes joint operations planning and provides a joint formatted order as a quick reference for Army planners. JP 5-0 covers joint operation planning in detail. Additionally, FM 100-7 outlines Army operational- level planning considerations.

FUNDAMENTALS OF PLANNING

1-31. Combat consists of the interplay between two or more opposing commanders—each commander seek-ing to accomplish their missions while preventing the other from doing the same. Every commander needs a high degree of creativity and clarity of thought to outwit a willing and able opponent. Commanders and staffs consider certain planning fundamentals to assist them in developing effective plans. These fundamentals lend rigor and focus to the purely creative aspect of planning and provide a crucial link between concept and application. The degree of their application varies with the situation.

Commanders Focus Planning 1-32. The commander is the most important participant in effective planning. Commanders discipline the planning process to meet the requirements of time, planning horizons, simplicity, and level of detail.

Commanders ensure that all operation plans and orders are compliant with domestic and international law. They also confirm the product to ensure it is

Fundamentals of Planning

• Commanders focus planning.

• Planning is continuous.

• Planning is time sensitive.

• Keep plans simple.

• Build flexible plans.

• Design bold plans.

1-9 relevant and suitable for subordinates. Generally, the more involved commanders are in planning, the faster staffs can plan. Through personal involvement, commanders ensure their commander’s intent is reflected in the plan.

1-33. Commanders, assisted by their staff, use the activities of visualizing the battlespace, describing the visualization to subordinates, directing action in terms of the battlefield operating systems (BOS) to achieve results, and leading the unit to mission accomplishment (see FM 3-0 and FM 6-0).

1-34. Commander’s visualization is the mental process of achieving a clear understanding of the force’s current state with relation to the enemy and environment (situational understanding), and developing a desired end state that represents mission accomplishment and the key tasks that move the force from its current state to the end state (commander’s intent) (FM 6-0).

Commander’s visualization (see Figure 1-2) is a way of mentally viewing the dynamic relationship among Army forces, enemy forces, and the environment at the present while conducting operations against an opposing force over time.

1-35. Commander’s visualization commences in planning and continues throughout the operations process until the force accomplishes its mission.

Commanders describe their visualization, in the form of their commander’s intent, planning guidance, and commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR). Chapter 3 provides a detailed discussion of the commander’s role in planning, including the commander’s intent, planning guidance, and CCIR.

Figure 1-2. Commander’s Visualization

Planning Is Continuous 1-36. Planning does not stop with the production of an order. It is a continuous and adaptive process. Since situations (or the information available about them) continuously change, plans are revised as time allows.

Key Tasks

1-10

Accurately predicting an operation’s outcome is difficult. Anticipating the many possible contingencies, especially those far in the future is more difficult. As planners develop a solution to a problem, the problem changes.

Continuous planning enables organizations to adjust from an existing concept of operations based on a common understanding of the situation and the expected result.

1-37. Because plans concern future operations that help the commander and staff make assumptions about the nature of the situation at the time of execution, plans cannot remain static. As the commander and staff adjust their estimates, they also change their plans. A plan, even if not executed as designed, provides the point of departure for later unplanned actions.

1-38. Planning occurs throughout the operations process (see Figure 1-3).

During preparation, plans are revised based on new information. Feedback from unit backbriefs and rehearsals may also initiate changes to the plan.

During execution, plans are revised based on the assessed progress of the operation and new information. Anticipated branches and sequels, initially formulated during the planning stage, are assessed and updated for possible execution. Anytime during the operations process, unanticipated threats or opportunities may significantly change the situation, requiring the planning process to restart and a new plan developed. Continuous assessment, reflected in staff running estimates, is key to ensuring plans are revised and remain relevant to the situation. (Appendix E discusses staff estimates.)

Figure 1-3. Distributions of Operations Process Activities

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Planning Is Time Sensitive 1-39. Time is a critical factor in planning. Whether done deliberately or rapidly, all planning requires accurate situational understanding and skillful use of time. Time is a precious commodity during operations that both sides (friendly and enemy) attempt to exploit. The result is a constant pressure to decide and act quicker than the enemy. Understanding the effects that time has on conducting operations, helps commanders determine how fast and how far ahead to plan. Taking more time to plan often results in greater synchronization; however, it also means less time for subordinates to plan and prepare, and more time for the enemy to prepare and act.

1-40. When allocating planning time, commanders consider subordinates’ planning requirements. Commanders ensure that plans are sent to subordin-ates in enough time to allow them to adequately plan and prepare their own actions. When time is short, commanders do not demand perfect products.

They accept the best possible products. In time-constrained environments, “best products” are those that contain just enough information to make a reasoned decision and give subordinates time to quickly assess the situation from their perspective and plan, prepare, and execute the necessary actions.

Commanders use parallel and collaborative planning techniques to give subordinate units maximum planning and preparation time (see paragraphs 1-90–1-95).

Keep Plans Simple 1-41. Simplicity is a principle of war; it is key to effective planning. Effective plans and orders are simple and direct. Staffs prepare clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. They use doctrinally correct operational terms and graphics, and eliminate opportunities to misunderstand the commander’s intent.

1-42. Simple plans require an easily understood concept of operations.

Planners prepare these plans by limiting the number of actions or tasks to the minimum the situation requires. They minimize details where possible, allowing subordinates to develop specifics with-in the commander’s intent.

For example, instead of assigning a direction of attack, planners can designate an axis of advance.

1-43. Simple plans are not simplistic plans. Simplistic refers to something made overly simple by ignoring the complexity of the situation. The factors of METT-TC determine the degree of simplicity possible. Good plans simplify complex situations; however, some situations require more complex plans than others. Commanders at all levels weigh the apparent benefits of a complex concept of operations against the risk that subordinates will not be able to understand or follow it. Simple plans are preferred because they are easier to understand and execute.

Build Flexible Plans 1-44. Flexible plans allow units to adapt quickly to a variety of circumstances. Commanders and planners build opportunities for initiative into plans by anticipating events that allow them to operate inside of the enemy’s decision making cycle during execution. Identifying decision points

1-12 and designing branches and sequels ahead of time—combined with a clear commander’s intent—aids in building flexible plans. Incorporating risk reduction measures into a plan also builds flexibility. For example, a commander may plan a large mobile reserve to compensate for the lack of information concerning an anticipated enemy attack.

1-45. Commanders stress the importance of mission orders as a way of building flexible plans. Mission orders focus on what to do and the purpose, without prescribing exactly how to do it. Control measures are established to aid cooperation among forces without imposing needless restrictions on freedom of action. This allows subordinates maximum freedom to make their own plans to accomplish the mission. Mission orders contribute to flexibility by allowing subordinates freedom to seize opportunities or react effectively to unforeseen enemy actions and capabilities.

Design Bold Plans 1-46. Commanders design bold, innovative plans that produce decisive results. Bold plans go beyond the usual limits of conventional thought or action to mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time. Bold plans are not rash plans—plans developed hastily without due consideration to the situation. Commanders must understand when and where to take calculated risks. (FM 3-90 and FM 6-0 discuss military risk and military gamble). Through their commander’s intent and planning guidance, commanders build offensive action into all plans. Commanders design bold plans that allow them to initiate combat on their own terms and seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

FUNCTIONS OF PLANNING AND PLANS

1-47. Planning and plans accomplish several key functions. When the problem is simple, detailed planning may not be necessary. When the problem is complicated, planning is essential. Planning, however, is not an end in itself. Using a prescribed planning process does not guarantee an organization will improve its situation. Mastering the procedural aspects of planning is important; however, creative thinking and applying sound judgment to solve tactical problems is the foundation of effective planning.

Planning takes on value when performed properly using methods appropriate to the conditions and activities being planned. Accomplished properly, planning greatly improves performance.

1-48. Planning and plans help the commander and staff—

• Think critically.

• Develop situational understanding.

• Anticipate decisions.

• Simplify complexity.

• Task-organize forces and allocate resources.

• Direct and coordinate actions.

• Guide preparation activities.

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Planning Helps Leaders Think Critically

1-49. The Army’s doctrinal planning processes (problem solving, MDMP, and TLP) are based on analytic decision making. They provide a common way to think about solving problems. When faced with a problem or tactical mission, Army leaders define the problem; gather information relevant to it; develop, analyze, and compare COAs; and select the optimal solution. The MDMP provides a standard organized framework for commanders and staffs to approach and solve tactical problems. Using common processes, understood Army-wide, helps commanders standardize planning techniques. Standard techniques facilitate effective planning between echelons and with cross-attached and adjacent units.

Planning Builds Situational Understanding 1-50. Planning that analyzes the factors of METT-TC helps commanders and staffs understand the current state of enemy and friendly forces in relation to the environment and each other. This analysis contributes to developing situational understanding and providing a common understanding of the nature of the problem among the commander, staff, and subordinates.