Atch1_-_Total_Survivability_2005.pdf
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- Aircraft and Aircrew Protection Phase 2 (A&AP-2)
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- W911W6-17-R-0006
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Atch 1 - Total Survivability report
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| Atch3_-_TIA_Template_-_Expenditure_Based_29_March_2017.doc | DOC document | |
| Atch2_-_IACP_AS_Journal_Paper.pdf |
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David Friedmann
AATD
(757) 878-2159 dfriedmann@aatd.eustis.army.mil
Total Survivability
Vulnerability Reduction and Operational
Availability
Vulnerability
Reduction
Susceptibility
Reduction Operational
Availability
Aircraft Type Number shot down/crashed
Soldiers killed
H-60 8 43
AH-64 1 0
OH-58 4 7
CH-47 1 16
CH-46 2 21
UH-1 1 3
AH-1
H-53
Unknown 2 1
Total 21 94
Aircraft Type Number shot down/crashed
Soldiers killed
MH-60 1 4
MH-53 1 5
HH-60 1 6
Total 3 15
2003 – 2004 Helicopter Losses
Engagement Survivability: PS = 1 – PK = 1 – PH*PK|H
Total Survivability = (1 – Susceptibility * Vulnerability)
+ Operational Availability to fight another day
Total Survivability
Don’t get hit, but if you do - don’t die, and then get repaired quickly.
Avoid Detection
Avoid Engagement
Avoid Damage
Avoid Destruction Vulnerability Reduction
Signature Reduction
Active Countermeasures
Situational Awareness
Survivability Chain
Traditional Aircraft and Aircrew Survivability Approach:
Air Force Model - High-Altitude, High-Speed Aircraft
One-on-One Engagement Survivability
Paradigm
One-on-One Engagement Survivability
Paradigm – Problems with Past Approach
• Everything done piecemeal, no systems approach
• Parasitic protection solutions are too heavy
• Limited effort on non-ballistic threats – chem/bio, laser, DEW
• Little protection for subsystems – controls, electronics, hydraulics
• No developed optimization methods for platform design – limited modeling capability – excess weight and cost
• Ballistic / crashworthiness protection designed for point solutions – reduced effectiveness for off-point conditions
• Damaged aircraft = attrition kill
• No state awareness - pilots unaware of extent / effect of damage until it is too late
Avoid Destruction
Avoid / Absorb Damage
Return to Service
Joint Network
Survivability
Total Survivability Paradigm
Signature Reduction
Situational
Awareness
M/UMT
Active CM
TTPs, Training / Incident
Investigation, Reporting
Crashworthiness
NDI &
Repair
Durability &
Damage Tolerance
System
Hardening
Agility /
Maneuverability
Avoid Destruction
Avoid / Absorb Damage
Return to Service
Joint Network
Survivability
Total Survivability Paradigm
Signature Reduction
Situational
Awareness
M/UMT
Active CM
TTPs, Training / Incident
Investigation, Reporting
Crashworthiness
NDI &
Repair
Durability &
Damage Tolerance
System
Hardening
System Optimization in Design - Interdependence
Agility /
Maneuverability
Level of Integration
E ff e c ti v e n e s s Effectiveness of Integrated Survivability Features
Survivability Imperatives Survivability Enhancers
TTPs
Training
Single Platform with partial survivability
Single Platform with fully integrated survivability
Single Platform with complete survivability teamed with survivable unmanned platform
Network
-centric
MUMTs
Single Platform with no survivability
Survivability Sustainment
Manned-Unmanned Teaming
Network-centric Systems
Agility / Maneuverability
Incident Investigation and
Reporting
Platform Vulnerability Reduction
Damage Tolerant
Damage Resistant
Crashworthy
Repairable
System Redundancy / Separation
Aircraft State Awareness
Platform Susceptibility Reduction
Signature Control
Threat misdirection / interception
External Situational Awareness
BDAR
Logistics
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