CCDC CBC-TR-1689.pdf

CCDC CBC-TR-1689

(U) Remote Chemical Sensor Development – CB10674: Concepts and

Technology Assessment for Leave-in-Place Chemical Sensors

Jason Guicheteau Alan Samuels Patrick Riley Brian Hauck

Charles Harden Vincent McHugh

Brian Ince Jennifer Soliz

Alex Miklos

RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE

September 2020

Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors;

critical technology; export controlled; September 2020. Other requests for this document shall be referred to Defense Threat Reduction Agency, ATTN: SCR, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6201.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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(U) This document contains technical data whose export is restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22, U.S.C., Sec. 2751 et seq.) or the Export Administration Act of 1979 (Title 50, U.S.C., App. 2401 et seq.) as amended. Violations of these export laws are subject to severe criminal penalties. Disseminate in accordance with provisions of DoD Directive 5230.25.

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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)

XX-09-2020

2. REPORT TYPE

Final

3. DATES COVERED (From - To) Jun 2019–Apr 2020

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

(U) Remote Chemical Sensor Development – CB10674: Concepts and Technology Assessment for Leave-in-Place Chemical Sensors

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)

Guicheteau, Jason; Samuels, Alan; Riley, Patrick; Hauck, Brian; Harden, Charles; McHugh, Vincent; Ince, Brian; Soliz, Jennifer; and Milklos, Alex

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

FY19 CBA CB2ST CB10674 - Perimeter Defense 5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Director, CCDC CBC, ATTN: FCDD-CBR-IS, APG, MD 21010-5424

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

CCDC CBC-TR-1689

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Defense Threat Reduction Agency; 8725 John J. Kingman Road, MSC 6201, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6201

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

DTRA

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors; critical technology; export controlled;

September 2020. Other requests for this document shall be referred to Defense Threat Reduction Agency, ATTN: SCR, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6201.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT: LIMIT 200 WORDS

(U) This report provides performance characteristics and user feedback on conceptual leave-in-place chemical sensors, identifies commercial off-the-shelf technologies that are sufficiently mature to address the envisioned operational applications, and highlights relevant emerging science and technology.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

(U) Leave-in-place chemical sensor (LIPCS) (U) Persistent chemicals (U) Remote sensing

(U) Vapor chemical hazards (U) Chemical detection

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:

17. LIMITATION

OF ABSTRACT

SAR

18. NUMBER OF

PAGES

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Renu B. Rastogi

a. REPORT

U//FOUO

b. ABSTRACT U

c. THIS PAGE U

19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)

(410) 436-7545

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18 ii

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(U) PREFACE

(U) The work described in this report was authorized under project no. FY19 CBA CB2ST CB10674 - Perimeter Defense. The work was started in June 2019 and completed in April 2020.

(U) The use of either trade or manufacturers’ names in this report does not constitute an official endorsement of any commercial products. This report may not be cited for purposes of advertisement.

(U) This report has not been approved for public release.

(U) Acknowledgments

(U) The authors acknowledge the following individuals for their hard work and assistance with the execution of this technical program and technical writing input:

(U) Optical spectroscopy discussions and information were provided by representatives from the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Chemical Biological Center (CCDC CBC; Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD) Spectroscopy Branch; specifically, Erik Emmons.

(U) Colorimetric discussions and information were provided by representatives from the CCDC CBC Sensors, Signatures, and Aerosol Technologies Branch, Biochemistry Branch, and Chemical Analysis and Physical Properties Branch; specifically, Angela Ziegler.

(U) Fiber sensing discussions and information were provided by representatives from the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Soldier Center (Natick, MA) and Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory (Lexington, MA); specifically, Richard Osgood, Michael Wiederoder, Rod Kunz, Richard Kingsborough, and Todd Thorensen.

(U) Algorithm discussions and information were provided by representatives from the CCDC CBC Sensors, Signatures, and Aerosol Technologies Branch; specifically, Charlie Davidson.

(U) Communications and connectivity discussion and information were provided by representatives from the CCDC CBC NBC Battlefield Integration Branch; specifically, Maxwell Bottiger.

(U) Assistance with formatting and editing of documentation was provided by Booz Allen Hamilton (Belcamp, MD); specifically, Rebecca Braun and Heather Rollyson.

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(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) This report provides performance characteristics and user feedback on conceptual leave-in-place chemical sensors (LIPCS), identifies commerical off-the-shelf technologies that are sufficiently mature to address the envisioned operational applications, and highlights relevant emerging science and technology. As designed, an LIPCS is a small, inexpensive, “disposable” sensor that is deployable by various means and in different situations, to indicate the presence of chemical vapor hazards without increasing a Warfighter’s physical and cognitive burden.

Conceptual development of deployment was investigated through interviews with operational users from the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and other interested stakeholders, over a six-month period. The authors of this report also attended the 2019 Chemical Biological Operational Analysis event (held at Camp Dawson, WV) and presented in the Concept Feedback Tent. Over a three-day period, more than 70 users, operators, and attendees were interviewed to acquire real-time feedback from daily field exercises. The principal question was how an LIPCS-type device could have been employed to mitigate chemical hazards during the exercise.

(U) Conceptual LIPCS devices were described to the users as being intended for chemical hazard monitoring or reconnaissance, disposable (no larger than a single round of ammunition, up to a cartridge size), and deployable during missions by way of carrying, tossing, depositing, or launching, such as along routes of advance or egress. The sensors would be small enough to allow for multiple LIPCSs to be carried by a single individual, and they would be monitored remotely, so that a user would not have to physically interact with the LIPCS device.

(U) Combining this LIPCS description with input from the various user discussions, five main operational scenarios and applications of interest were determined in which LIPCSs would enhance situational awareness of the threat environment:

(U//FOUO) unattended perimeter-monitor chemical sensor deployment in choke points and for route surveillance, as well as clearance, reconnaissance, egress, and ingress points;

(U//FOUO) subterranean, room, and hallway reconnaissance to provide the ability to deploy the sensor without physically breaching the area of interest;

(U//FOUO) deployment of LIPCSs around named areas of interest and target areas of interest for surveillance and reconnaissance (“outside the wire” placement), to include deployment by air-dropping the devices using unmanned aerial systems;

(U//FOUO) deployment of sensors around airfields, logistics support areas, and ports to continuously monitor for vapor hazards and surface contamination; and

(U//FOUO) deployment to establish safe areas around structurally unstable or collapsed infrastructure.

(U//FOUO) These five scenarios identify a desire for small-size, low-weight, and low-power sensors that can be deployed in areas of interest to remotely monitor chemical vapor threats, vi

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which is a technology that does not exist. A list of LIPCS performance metrics were identified that would be beneficial to fulfill these operational scenarios:

(U//FOUO) LIPCS devices should be ~1 lb or less (optimally, less than 1/3 lb).

(U//FOUO) Sensor distance to operator should be sufficient to enable detect to warn (masking up).

(U//FOUO) Different modes of alarm operation should be used, such as silent

(transmits to listening or observational post), audible, or visible (to be read by an external device).

(U//FOUO) LIPCSs should be easily deployed and operated by either chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) specialists or general-purpose forces.

(U//FOUO) Battery life should be 8–12 h with a goal of 24 h or greater.

(U//FOUO) Anomaly hazard detection should be a threshold requirement;

threat classification should be an objective.

(U//FOUO) LIPCSs should be able to connect to existing or developing tactical information systems.

(U) During discussions about the potential desired functionalities of LIPCS, users stated, “It is less important to identify the threat than to classify the presence of a threat.” In general, the LIPCS is expected to be a less specific, potentially less sensitive sensing and alerting capability than the standard Joint Chemical Agent Detector. When deployed as a detect-to-warn based functionality, the LIPCS should indicate anomalous circumstances that are consistent with a threat scenario and perhaps broadly classify the situation as a possible chemical attack.

(U) Following concept development of the use cases for LIPCSs, a survey of current technologies was performed to identify developing and advanced sensor solutions that could be assessed or matured through science and technology strategies. Four technological areas were identified and are discussed in greater detail in Section 4:

(U//FOUO) impedance techniques (graphene, metal–organic frameworks, molecular imprinted polymers, and functionalized carbon nanotubes);

(U//FOUO) colorimetric sensing (including enzymatic and electronic readers);

(U//FOUO) spectroscopic techniques (integrated photonics); and (U//FOUO) spectrometric techniques (ion mobility spectrometry remains the most mature technology, but a lower false-alarm rate is desired for improved confidence).

(U) This is not an exhaustive list of all potential technologies; however, these technologies have achieved sufficient maturity and have demonstrated performance such that they are deemed the most probable solutions to address LIPCS operational uses. Based on the outcome of the survey, in the near-term, technological solutions that are most capable of outperforming the LIPCS while remaining within the size, weight, power, and unit cost constraints are impedance-based sensors and enzyme-catalyzed colorimetric chemistries. These technologies should be investigated in terms of vapor sensitivity and response time and for detection of persistent or low-volatility agents on surfaces.

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(U) CONTENTS

(U) PREFACE .............................................................................................................. iii

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....................................................................................v

1. (U) INTRODUCTION

2. (U) SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT

2.1 (U) Service Discussions

2.1.1 (U) U.S. Army

2.1.2 (U) U.S. Marine Corps

2.1.3 (U) U.S. Navy

2.1.4 (U) U.S. Air Force

2.1.5 (U) U.S. Special Operations Command

2.2 (U) Chemical Biological Operational Analysis

3. (U) LIPCS CONCEPT, SCENARIO, AND REQUIREMENTS

3.1 (U) Conceptual Scenarios for LIPCSs

3.2 (U) Proposed Requirements for LIPCSs

4. (U) TECHNOLOGIES UNDER CONSIDERATION

4.1 (U) Electrical Impedance

4.2 (U) Spectrometric Techniques (IMS)

4.3 (U) Colorimetric Detection

4.4 (U) Spectroscopic Techniques (Vibrational Spectroscopy)

4.5 (U) Additional Miniature Sensing Concepts

5. (U) SUMMARY

6. (U) CONCLUSION AND PATH FORWARD

(U) LITERATURE CITED

(U) ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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(U) FIGURES

1. (U) LIPCS concept of use for deployment along AAs for persistent chemical presence monitoring

2. (U//FOUO) USMCS concept depicting LIPCS devices (orange circles) deployed near an LP/OP to augment early warning of threat agent vapors and at a distant NAI to monitor for adversary deployment of a persistent surface-contaminating threat agent

3. (U//FOUO) LIPCS devices deployed in tandem with JCADs to increase spatial coverage of hazard warning zone

4. (U//FOUO) The USMC Nibbler drone is a 3D-printed capability controlled by the Marine Corp handheld computer, shown here with an LIPCS implementation payload

5. (U//FOUO) SEAL teams deploying an LIPCS array to protect amphibious landing operations

6. (U) LIPCS sensors (orange circles) deployed along with unattended perimeter monitor chemical sensors (yellow triangles) to monitor airfield for contamination

7. (U//FOUO) Scenario 1: LIPCSs on the NAIs

8. (U//FOUO) Scenario 2: LIPCSs on the AA

9. (U) Top: dielectric material (light blue) sandwiched between electrode plates.

Bottom: film of the dielectric material deposited on finger region of IDEs

10. (U) Impedance-based chemical sensor showing small SWaP

11. (U) Form factor of the Design West Technologies CNT microsensors:

(A) handheld or badge module; (B) throwable puck module

12. (U) Vaporsens CNT array technology

13. (U) Left: two methods to integrate CNT chemiresistors into commercial

RFID tags. Right: the equivalent circuit diagrams

14. (U) Polestar Technologies MIP-functionalized graphene sensor

RFID assembly

15. (U) Responses of MIP-functionalized graphene sensor RFID tags upon exposure to 0.2 and 2 ppb levels of soman (top) and tabun (bottom)

16. (U) Seacoast Science SC-210 modular chemical detection system

17. (U) An assortment of uniquely functionalized polymer–graphene nanoplatelets

(left) coat each of the 24 sensor elements on an array construct (right) in a prototype electronic nose sensor concept developed at CCDC Soldier Center

18. (U//FOUO) Left: CDM compared to the JCAD. Center and right: CDM integrated onto the T-Hawk avionics pod (Honeywell; Charlotte, NC)

19. (U) Conceptual drawings of eCDM

20. (U) Conceptual drawing showing the potential use of 3D-printed components for a disposable IMS-based chemical vapor detector

21. (U) Clockwise from top-left: a colorimetric array designed to detect TIC/TIM gases; a dendrogram showing the separation of those gases at PEL concentration after 5 min exposures; and an example of before, after, and difference images of an exposed array ix

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22. (U) (A) Colorimetric dyes developed by Clear Scientific, Inc

23. (U) MOSA, developed by Intelligent Optical Systems, Inc

24. (U) Fiber-based sensor concept consisting of colorimetric dyes that are read by fiber arrays in an early-concept exploration project at MIT-LL

25. (U) Prototype CARD system developed for Raman-based vapor detection

26. (U) (A) Waveguide schematic shows sorbent material for capturing target vapor threat. (B) Schematic diagram of setup used to perform WERS measurements with compact Raman spectrometers. (C) Technology integration goal for optical-based vapor sensing into compact Raman spectrometer

27. (U) Chip-scale distributed-feedback quantum cascade laser sensor developed by Pendar Technologies and integrated by Mulberry Sensors

28. (U) Microsensor prototype consisting of bioluminescent bacteria embedded in a microchip construct (left) and housed in a miniature sensor sphere (right) in an early concept exploration project at MIT-LL

29. (U) Surveyed technologies for LIPCS solutions

(U) TABLES

1. (U) LIPCS Variants and Performance Characteristics

2. (U) Condensed Summary of Responses from CBOA Questionnaire

3. (U) LIPCS Recommendation for Assessment x

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(U) REMOTE CHEMICAL SENSOR DEVELOPMENT – CB10674:

CONCEPTS AND TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

FOR LEAVE-IN-PLACE CHEMICAL SENSORS

1. (U) INTRODUCTION

(U//FOUO) In accordance with the National Defense Strategy, the Joint Forces must preserve Warfighter lethality in contested environments through agile and adaptable modernization efforts.1 Under the Chemical and Biological Defense Program’s vision, the Joint Forces achieve this end in a chemical and biological (CB) contested environment through coordinated and integrated efforts that neutralize any CB threats that our adversaries may employ to gain an advantage in competition and standoff.2 To preserve freedom of movement and action in the execution of small- and large-scale operations, the ground and littoral expeditionary forces can develop situational understanding to avoid CB threat agents by placing low size, weight, and power (SWaP); readily deployable; non-recoverable CB sensing capabilities in strategically important areas in the maneuver space. Such leave-in-place chemical sensor (LIPCS) devices, defined as miniature early-warning sensors for chemical hazards, should be deployable without drastically increasing Warfighters’ physical and cognitive burden while leveraging existing capabilities where possible, (e.g., unattended ground sensors [UGS] employed by intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR] systems). Two LIPCS variants would be needed to address two distinct chemical threat circumstances: (1) early warning of the presence of non-persistent vapor-phase hazards, and (2) indication of the presence of persistent condensed-phase contamination on surfaces. The applicability of the LIPCS devices in these two circumstances is summarized in Table 1, along with appropriate performance characteristics as established by extant requirements.

Table 1. (U) LIPCS Variants and Performance Characteristics

LIPCS Vapor LIPCS Solid/Liquid

Function Give early warning of airborne hazards

Indicate the presence of persistent chemical hazards

How Deployed In and around troop positions or friendly positions

In key terrain, named areas of interest, or along avenues of approach

Sensitivity Immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) Operationally hazardous aerial concentration levels Size/Weight/Mission Duration

(including batteries) <1 in.3, ~1/3 lb, >8 h

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(U//FOUO) This report identifies several candidate concepts of employment (CONEMPS) for LIPCS devices. This understanding is critical to identify current technologies with potential for near-term assessment or advanced development, define relevant LIPCS performance parameters, and identify relevant near- and mid-term science and technology (S&T) concepts in this technology space. We engaged end users to identify conceptual use cases for this category of technologies, defined performance characteristics accordingly, and surveyed the technology space for suitable government and commercial off-the-shelf (GOTS and COTS, respectively) systems. In addition, we surveyed emerging technologies reported in the recent technical literature that show promise for addressing the performance characteristics of LIPCSs for unattended monitoring of chemical threats.

2. (U) SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT

(U//FOUO) The initial focus of this project was to develop a conceptual understanding of the operational space and scenarios for the deployment of LIPCSs. To accomplish this, we conducted interviews with users from the U.S. Army (USA), U.S. Navy (USN), U.S. Air Force (USAF), and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), as well as other interested stakeholders over a six-month period. Through these discussions, the LIPCS concept and scope were defined.

Individual Service input is presented first and is followed by a Joint Services summary that focuses on common themes that emerged during the discussions.

2.1 (U) Service Discussions

2.1.1 (U) U.S. Army

(U//FOUO) The USA combat developers appreciated the LIPCS concept and emphasized the application of the sensors for persistent monitoring of named areas of interest (NAIs) and avenues of approach (AAs; Figure 1). The value of the LIPCS to the USA in the execution of maneuver missions derives from the ubiquity of the sensors. Reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) teams would emplace the sensors into NAIs prior to maneuver operations, and the sensors would be interrogated during the main, supporting, and reserve element movements. The USA combat developers suggested that a communications mode involving infrared (IR) diodes in lieu of radiofrequency (RF) transceivers could provide remote query and connectivity for the sensors.

This would enable them to report their status to the approaching forces while alleviating the concerns surrounding the challenges of RF transmission from the LIPCSs. There was also interest in an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) or unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) that could remotely deploy the LIPCSs and later revisit their location and connect with them via the IR diode link to query their status (clean vs dirty), thus providing a georeferenced report on the presence of contamination along a route or in an NAI. As conceived, the LIPCS technology would provide satisfactory performance by developing a binary “threat/no threat” chemical hazard response (threshold) or class-based (objective) threat presumptive identification (blood, blister, or nerve). Ideally, the LIPCS sensors would respond to operationally relevant levels of persistent contamination on surfaces (as defined by current programs of record, including the Proximal Chemical Agent Detector and the Nuclear Biological Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle Sensor Suite Upgrade [NBCRV SSU] for chemical surface detection). The same or

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(U//FOUO)

complementary LIPCS devices should respond to airborne vapor- or gas-phase threat agents at or above immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH) levels, augmenting the sensing function that is currently in the field and expanding the area covered to enhance early warning of an airborne threat regardless of changes in wind direction. The USA combat developers identified the notional LIPCS as a durable, expendable sensing capability with a series production price point of less than FY28 $200 per item. The specific desired performance and SWaP characteristics included the capability to:

(U//FOUO) detect a threat agent delivery event on key terrain;

(U//FOUO) store a detection event in volatile memory until interrogated by a manned or unmanned (ground or air) vehicle;

(U//FOUO) be employed by physical impingement into soft soil or sand via

UAS, UGV, drop-off, munition delivery, or hand emplacement;

(U//FOUO) be employed by airdrop from 500 ft above ground level;

(U//FOUO) defeat radio direction-finding, jamming, and beaconing by use of a non-RF or no traditional RF-based telemetry solution;

(U//FOUO) select mission duration;

(U//FOUO) self-destruct at the end of the mission; and (U//FOUO) self-destruct post-employment, in the event of tampering.

Figure 1. (U) LIPCS concept of use for deployment along AAs for persistent chemical presence monitoring.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(U//FOUO) USA user representatives expressed interest in the ability to camouflage the LIPCS so that they will not be readily discovered after emplacement. They were also interested in the ability to incorporate a self-destruct mechanism into the LIPCS that would engage upon evidence of tampering or by a remote command, which could be issued by manned and unmanned systems that approach the sensors to within sufficient range to establish communications with the devices. USA combat developers expressed a desire to integrate the LIPCS technology with existing non-CBRN UGS systems such as acoustic, passive IR motion detection, magnetic and seismic sensor arrays, and electro-optical imaging surveillance cameras.

Such UGS arrays frequently include extended-life batteries augmented by solar panels for prolonged mission duration. Finally, the USA user representatives communicated a preference for the LIPCS sensor network to be integrated in such a manner that complementary remote sensing systems, including the Joint Services Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector or candidate refresh technologies, can be automatically cued to interrogate the airspace in the vicinity of an activated LIPCS and thereby alert to the presence of a suspected hazard and enhance early warning confidence and reliability.

2.1.2 (U) U.S. Marine Corps

(U//FOUO) The USMC combat developers envisioned dispersal of small, inexpensive, “disposable” sensors to detect chemical threat agents. For example, LIPCS could be strategically dispersed around rapidly configured listening or observational post (LP/OP) perimeters, to mitigate an inadequate number of Aerosol and Vapor Chemical Agent Detection (AVCAD) sensors. For this type of scenario (Figure 2), an audible alarm could be considered an alerting mechanism; however, there is concern about noise and light discipline under other mission sets.

In that regard, multiple alarm modes and indicators are generally desired. Another application of interest is to monitor a route and augment other sensors, including the Tactical Remote Sensor System (TRSS). The TRSS is a UGS array for ISR applications that consists of electro-optical infrared cameras, thermal sensors, and ground surveillance radar kits that detect personnel and vehicles. There are light, medium, and heavy variants that comprise the Ground-Based Operational Surveillance System capability sets for deployment at different echelons. All data are monitored by a wired or wireless link and a cross-domain solution to the operator station at the Combat Operations Center. Current implementations leverage the Minotaur and Maven appliance for sensor data aggregation. The LIPCS could augment the TRSS capability sets for chemical hazard detection. The USMC end users offered that to provide operational benefit to Marine missions, the LIPCS technology must be very low burden, easy to deploy, and should deliver a high level of alarm confidence in the presence of airborne threat agents. The LIPCS would be expected to presumptively detect airborne vapor-phase threat agents in a binary threat/no-threat state (threshold) or by class of threat (blood, blister, or nerve) (objective).

Figure 2. (U//FOUO) USMCS concept depicting LIPCS devices (orange circles) deployed near an LP/OP to augment early warning of threat agent vapors and at a distant NAI to monitor for adversary deployment of a persistent surface-contaminating threat agent.

(U//FOUO) For expeditionary air fields and forward operating base applications, the AVCAD is expected to be employed, but for expeditionary operations consisting of small teams with lighter equipment, toss-and-leave sensor products could be valuable. A CONEMPS that augments the capability delivered by and integrated with the Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD) was also deemed desirable. In this application, LIPCS would detect airborne vapor-phase threat agents in a binary (threat/no-threat) state at levels that compare with JCAD capabilities.

(U//FOUO) The concept is that small teams could have one JCAD for the whole team, but each operator could carry several smaller LIPCSs and deploy them in tandem with the JCAD to provide better spatial coverage and leverage the performance of netted sensor arrays and algorithms (Figure 3). Operational parameters requiring further investigation include the maximum distance between sensors that will provide continuity in protection; the distance outside the perimeter required to provide enough warning; and the potential for a “Tom Brady wristwatch” interface to alert users to the state of the remotely deployed sensor. Such a capability is readily embodied in the USMC handheld computer, which is an Android platform comparable to the USA’s Nett Warrior handheld end user device. Any sensor deployed in this fashion would be placed far enough out that the alert could be transmitted to an unprotected team, which would then send an element out in mission-oriented protective posture to investigate. Further development of an operational view that illustrates this concept should be performed, particularly to help users envision how these might work to generate beneficial feedback and to show a scalable concept of employment that varies by team size.

Figure 3. (U//FOUO) LIPCS devices deployed in tandem with JCADs to increase spatial coverage of hazard warning zone.

(U//FOUO) Another desired concept is an inexpensive “mini chem sensor” integrated on the USMC’s Nibbler UAS platform for the “quad for every squad” concept. The chemical detection module under investigation by CBRN Sensors Integrated on Robotic Platforms (C-SIRP) is an example. The Marine Corps Warfighter Laboratory is the lead for all concepts related to the Nibbler and develops Marine expeditionary force-level exercise opportunities for S&T insertion, providing opportunities to leverage S&T investments by multiple communities. The Marine Corps Intelligence Network and ISR capabilities like TRSS could serve as a hub for networked sensors under this concept (Figure 4).

Figure 4. (U//FOUO) The USMC Nibbler drone is a 3D-printed capability controlled by the Marine Common Handheld computer, shown here with an LIPCS implementation payload.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(U//FOUO) As mentioned, the conceptual LIPCS appears to map to TRSS and other CONEMPS as an NAI monitor, or target area of interest (TAI), in which the sensors are pre-placed or even projected (dropped) into the site. Larger area facilities, main supply routes (MSRs), and a response to an expectation from intelligence authorities of an adversary action involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could also be monitored or protected with the capability. Light armored reconnaissance battalions, which are up to 7 km ahead of the main body, could be considered. For example, an intelligence mission could be leveraged so that sensors relay information over a communications relay drone. Deployment of LIPCSs at choke points and other canalizing terrain features along a route of advance would provide early notification of adversary action involving chemical threats and would also fall under these CONEMPS. The conceptual LIPCS employed in this fashion would respond to operationally relevant levels of persistent contamination on surfaces (as defined by current programs of record including Proximal Chemical Agent Detection and NBCRV SSU chemical surface detection).

The same or complementary LIPCSs would respond to airborne vapor- or gas-phase threat agents at or above IDLH levels.

2.1.3 (U) U.S. Navy

(U//FOUO) In discussions with USN combat developers, the most logical mapping of the LIPCS would be in support of specialty teams whose missions involve entering unknown environments with potentially hazardous atmospheres, to include visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS); explosive ordinance disposal (EOD); and sea, air, and land (SEAL) teams. The USN opted for components of the Dismounted Reconnaissance Sets, Kits, and Outfits acquisition program that include low-oxygen-environment sensors and low-exposure-level toxic industrial chemical or toxic industrial material (TIC/TIM) detection. The most likely conceptual use case of the LIPCSs by VBSS, EOD, SEAL teams, and Seabees would be in sensitive site exploitation missions, investigating potentially hazardous situations on an adversary’s detained vessel, and on unmanned ground and air platforms. The LIPCSs might also be suitable for screening choke points ahead of a task force movement or at entry-control points in ports. One operational group discussed littoral operations as one of the most dangerous circumstances for potential adversary deployment of chemical hazards, and they suggested distributing LIPCSs on buoys or similar floating platforms around the beachhead and shoreline (Figure 5). To be effective in this application, the LIPCS should provide sensitivity and specificity sufficient to detect airborne vapor-phase threat agents in a binary (threat/no-threat) state at levels that compare with JCAD capabilities.

Figure 5. (U//FOUO) SEAL teams deploying an LIPCS array to protect amphibious landing operations.

2.1.4 (U) U.S. Air Force

(U//FOUO) In discussions with USAF representatives and stakeholders, the LIPCSs could be components of an airfield protection and assessment CONEMPS, with the possibility of a line-powered configuration (Figure 6). The USAF notes that the sensors would be emplaced in locations where they are vulnerable to damage or loss by kinetic events on the airfield, so it is important that they be low-cost and supported by a logistics chain of replacement items. The USAF would be interested in an LIPCS to streamline or automate current airfield protection, for vapor sensing and liquid contamination sensing. Teams of airmen must physically visit each position on the airfield to inspect the sensors and papers for the presence of vapor or persistent surface contamination. The USAF also desires that LIPCSs additionally respond to aerosols, low-volatility agents, mid-spectrum agents, and pharmaceutical-based agents. An electronic interface that conveys the state of the LIPCS for both vapor hazards and surface contamination would reduce or eliminate the need for airmen to physically inspect protected areas. A USAF initiative called Rapid Airfield Damage Assessment System (RADAS) comprises a host of technology packages for inspection of airfield surfaces and facilities after a kinetic event, to support rapid quantification of any residual damage that could affect airfield serviceability for launching and landing sorties. The LIPCSs could augment the RADAS to enable sensing of chemical contamination. To satisfy USAF expectations in such applications, LIPCSs would respond to operationally relevant levels of persistent contamination on surfaces (as defined by current programs of record, including Proximal Chemical Agent Detection and NBCRV SSU chemical surface detection). The same or complementary LIPCSs would also respond to airborne vapor- or gas-phase threat agents at or above IDLH levels.

Figure 6. (U) LIPCS sensors (orange circles) deployed along with unattended perimeter monitor chemical sensors (yellow triangles) to monitor airfield for contamination.

2.1.5 (U) U.S. Special Operations Command

(U//FOUO) USSOCOM concept developers assessed that the LIPCS would have utility when deployed along MSRs or AAs. LIPCSs would also be valuable when deployed forward of the forward line of troops; for example, by a reconnaissance force emplaced in support of the maneuver plan (AA or direction of travel). Unattended sensors may also have value when deployed along phase lines, sector boundaries, or coordination points. They could be emplaced to rear or lateral troop locations to support off-target attacks when the wind direction is not from the front of the formation. Another concept of interest to U.S. special operators would be a layered defense array that fuses information to provide a “standoff integrated early warning”. Special operators would support intra-theater mobility assets by providing area monitoring and alert-in-depth via unattended LIPCS devices deployed by manned rotary-wing aircraft and UASs, mortar tubes, grenade launchers, or artillery. To satisfy USSOCOM performance expectations in such applications, the LIPCSs would respond to operationally relevant levels of persistent contamination on surfaces (as defined by current programs of record including Proximal Chemical Agent Detection and NBCRV SSU chemical surface detection). The same or complementary LIPCSs would respond to airborne vapor- or gas-phase threat agents at or above IDLH levels.

(U//FOUO) USSOCOM also illustrated several special operations forces applications for the LIPCSs, including the following:

(U//FOUO) overt, covert, clandestine, and low-visibility emplacement of LIPCSs at or on the objective area to support reconnaissance, characterization, and post-attack damage assessments;

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(U//FOUO) LIPCSs emplaced on selected weapons at WMD sites or CBRN hazards to monitor and support contamination avoidance, force protection, increased situational awareness, and post-event hazard mitigation and control;

(U//FOUO) LIPCSs or unattended sensors employed over an extended operating range, such as roughly 100 m or more (versus the 10–20 m baseline achievable using a JCAD or other organic sensor) and supported through UAS- or ground-emplaced retransmission stations; and

(U//FOUO) LIPCSs or unattended sensors embedded into form factors designed to blend into multiple operating environments (i.e., urban, woodland, desert, facility, etc.) with a low observable form factor (e.g., a native rock, brick, building vent, light fixture, etc.).

2.2 (U) Chemical Biological Operational Analysis

(U//FOUO) In addition to our discussions with individual Services, we presented the LIPCS concept to end user participants at the Chemical Biological Operational Analysis (CBOA-2019;

held at Camp Dawson, WV) as part of the “concept tent” to gather feedback on the technical concept before launching any significant S&T efforts to develop the technology. At CBOA-2019, we had discussions with members from all Services and other DoD agencies, usually after operators returned from the daily field trails and exercises in which CBRN scenarios were carried out. This allowed us to directly obtain feedback on how LIPCSs could have been employed in that day’s exercise to mitigate unforeseen gaps or needs. The LIPCSs were described to the participants as small, inexpensive, “disposable” sensors that could be scattered around to indicate the presence of chemical threats. We stressed that the intent of the LIPCSs was that Warfighters could carry several of them and toss them into place during missions or in critical nodes like NAIs (Figure 7), or they could drop them like breadcrumbs along a route of advance during an early entry or the route reconnaissance phase of the operation (Figure 8).

Figure 7. (U//FOUO) Scenario 1: LIPCSs on the NAIs. Sensors are deployed by reconnaissance element or projected into NAIs. Sensors are periodically interrogated (e.g., by a small UAS that pairs with the sensors to read out their detection status and indicate threats). These could also be synchronized with other ISR systems emplaced in the NAIs.

Figure 8. (U//FOUO) Scenario 2: LIPCSs on the AA. Sensors are deployed along an AA by reconnaissance teams or are projected ahead of a maneuver mission. On approach, sensors could be interrogated by a handheld device that pairs with the sensors to read out their sensing outcome. These could also be synchronized with other ISR systems emplaced on the battlefield.

(U//FOUO) We confined discussions on LIPCSs to chemical detection while noting that there is a parallel program concept being explored for biodetection. For example, a BioACER (Biological Automated Collector/Detector for Expeditionary Reconnaissance) prototype was also on display in the concept tent. This system offers a compact, deployable capability that implements loop-mediated, isothermal amplification, polymerase chain reaction assays in a form factor that is compatible with air-dropped arrays. LIPCS discussions were focused on the need to develop technologies that lower operator burden while supporting operation for extended periods of time and providing personal immediate warning of a conventional chemical agent or emerging threat agent. The technology would also benefit from implementation of critical infrastructure-protection systems in which the sensors could operate on shore power for indefinite periods of time. Sensors that are deployed “outside the wire” should blend in or be camouflaged to look like indigenous rocks or other natural objects, and they should possibly self-destruct when tampered with or when nearing the end of their mission life.

(U//FOUO) The LIPCS concept resonated with small unit operations because it affords the capability to drop sensors from a payload on a small UAS or to carry and toss the sensors when concerns exist about possible chemical agent use by an adversary. Key functionality should include operation under various terrain-specific circumstances at sufficient distance from the operative teams to provide a detect-to-warn capability. The specific distances depend on mission, environment, troops, terrain, and time. The systems would be most useful if integrated with existing user interfaces, such as the Nett Warrior end user device (EUD) or the USMC handheld computer (both are Android-based computational environments), in lieu of adding another controller or interface.

(U//FOUO) The LIPCS concept could provide benefits for Title 10 and Title 32 Defense Support to Civil Authorities missions, such as reconnaissance of various confined spaces or pockets that can trap hazardous vapors and aerosol threat agents after an incident. It would also

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(U//FOUO)

be valuable for inspecting confined spaces and interrogating areas where secondary explosion hazards may be present. The sensors should be droppable into confined spaces, be able to establish communications with a controller hub, and capable of functioning on battery power for at least 8 h.

(U//FOUO) Several operators commented that the LIPCSs should be simple and lightweight.

We interpreted that to mean that the sensor package should be small enough that three to five individual sensors complete with all electronics for communications and remote LIPCS operation can easily fit into the space of a single rifle magazine or cargo pocket. The sensors should have the capacity to alert Warfighters either audibly or visually in force protection applications, or silently via remote telemetry to a handheld computer or Nett Warrior EUD, in R&S missions in which noise and light discipline is paramount. As in previous discussions with individual Services at CBOA-2019, operators wanted to drop the devices well in advance of a maneuver operation for route reconnaissance and in NAIs, perhaps interrogating them via UAS or along the approach route by the forward elements of the maneuver force.

(U//FOUO) As part of the CBOA-2019 event, we submitted a questionnaire that participants were asked to fill out following our discussions on LIPCSs. Over the three-day event, we interviewed and interacted with more than 70 users from across all of the Services, as well as other DoD-related stakeholders. The instantaneous feedback we received was invaluable and is included herein. However, less than 15% of the participants we spoke with completed and submitted the questionnaire. From the returned questionnaires, we obtained feedback from infantry and CBRN specialists, comprising enlisted personnel and officers from the USA and USMC, with a range of experience from 1 to 26 years. The feedback from the questionnaires was overwhelmingly positive toward the LIPCS concept. Experienced Warfighters (with 3+ years of service) highlighted that this technology could close capability gaps in their respective mission sets. Table 2 summarizes the responses.

Table 2. (U) Condensed Summary of Responses from CBOA Questionnaire

Question/Area of Interest Response Do remote chemical sensors fill mission shortfalls?

Yes: enhanced detection and situational awareness What is the probable mission impact? Reconnaissance/detect to warn

Is the logistical burden acceptable? Yes: additional trainings and use case understanding needed

What additional functions are desired? Detection of other threats, aquatic use

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

3. (U) LIPCS CONCEPT, SCENARIO, AND REQUIREMENTS

(U//FOUO) Through the individual Service discussions and CBOA-2019 event, several scenario-based concepts of use for LIPCS emerged, as well as a standard request for needed requirements.

3.1 (U) Conceptual Scenarios for LIPCSs

(U//FOUO) A clearly portrayed concept is key for operational understanding and CONEMPS building for the users of LIPCS. A common functionality use scenario mentioned in each of the Service discussions (Section 2.1) was for LIPCS sensors to be used for R&S purposes, albeit in different situations. The following list is not a comprehensive, but it captures the general use case scenarios:

(U//FOUO) deployment of sensors around NAIs and TAIs for R&S (outside-the-wire placement);

(U//FOUO) deployment of sensors around airfields, logistics support areas, and ports to continuously monitor for vapor hazards and surface contamination;

(U//FOUO) deployment in choke points for route surveillance, clearance, and reconnaissance and in egress and ingress points (to ensure exit point is contaminant free);

(U//FOUO) deployment of sensors for subterranean room and hallway reconnaissance (ability to roll or lob a sensor into an area without physically breaching the area of interest); and

(U//FOUO) deployment of sensor configuration to establish a safe area around structurally unstable or collapsed infrastructure.

3.2 (U) Proposed Requirements for LIPCSs

(U//FOUO) During discussions about the potential requirements of LIPCSs, users stated, “It is less important to identify the threat than to classify the presence of a threat.” In general, the LIPCS is expected to be a less specific and potentially less sensitive sensing and alerting capability than the standard JCAD. It must indicate anomalous circumstances consistent with a threat scenario and perhaps broadly classify the situation as a possible chemical attack. That said, the systems should still be deployed as a detect-to-warn-based functionality.

(U//FOUO) The network part of the technology is considered critical. There are logistics, calibration requirements, and other concerns. Particularly in the case of the LIPCS, the logistical and maintenance burdens should be kept to a minimum:

(U//FOUO) Sensors should be approximately 1 lb or less, and optimally, ~1/3 lb (single round ammunition up to cartridge size).

(U//FOUO) Sensor distance to operator should suffice for detect-to-warn (mask-up) capability.

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(U//FOUO) Different modes of alarm operation are needed (silent, transmits to LP/OP), audible, or visible (read by external source).

(U//FOUO) Different modules should be operable by specialists and generalists.

(U//FOUO) Battery life must be 8–12 h (threshold); 24 h or more (objective) is desired.

(U//FOUO) Anomaly detection (threshold) and classification of threat (objective) capabilities are needed.

(U//FOUO) Connectivity should be technology agnostic: connectivity to Nett Warrior, Marine Corps handheld, and other systems should be possible.

4. (U) TECHNOLOGIES UNDER CONSIDERATION

(U//FOUO) Following discussions with users to define initial scenario and technical requirements for LIPCS, we reviewed current commercial and non-commercial technologies, as well as known S&T programs that could address LIPCS development. The goal was to identify near-term system design concepts or areas of research and identify technological development opportunities. As stated earlier, the main hazard state that is being targeted by this study is vapor chemical threats. The secondary focus is persistent liquid and solid threats deposited onto surfaces.

(U) Multiple internal meetings were held at the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Chemical Biological Center (CCDC CBC; Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD). Scientists and engineers from across the center discussed the user feedback, the S&T efforts, as well as potential solutions that could address the LIPCS challenges. A broad list of technologies was discussed, including the following:

(U) electrical impedance-based techniques such as graphene, metal–organic frameworks (MOFs), molecular imprinted polymers (MIPs), and functionalized carbon nanotubes (CNTs);

(U) spectrometric techniques (ion mobility spectrometry [IMS]) and print-on-demand IMS (tailor sensor for mission);

(U) colorimetric sensing, including enzymatic and electronic readers; and

(U) spectroscopic techniques, such as integrated photonics.

(U) These technologies are discussed herein, and potential LIPCS capability solutions are addressed.

4.1 (U) Electrical Impedance

(U) For this report, the term impedance is used to capture a wide…