FAR Part 6 Justification and Approval for Other than Full and Open Competition

1. Requiring Activity: JPdD BDS, JPM CBRN Sensors - 2800 Scully Road

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010-5424

2. Contracting Activity: U.S. Army Contracting Command - Aberdeen Proving Ground (ACC-APG), Edgewood Contracting Division (ECD), 8456 Brigade Street, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010-5401

3. Description of Action: ACC-APG-ECD intends to award a single award Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract to Chemring Sensors and Electronic Systems (CSES), 4205 Westinghouse Commons Drive, Charlotte, NC 28273 (CAGE 6KWZ6), for FRP of the JBTDS. This action represents the logical follow-on to contract W911QY-15-C-0035, under which CSES executed the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) and is currently performing the JBTDS Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) phase. The competitively awarded EMD/LRIP contract, issued in April 2015, delivered the technical baseline, qualification testing, and LRIP hardware now supporting Multi-Service Operational Test and Evaluation (MOT&E). The FRP contract is required to ensure uninterrupted transition from LRIP to sustained production and fielding, in alignment with the approved Single Acquisition Management Plan (SAMP) and the Major Capability Acquisition (MCA) pathway of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework (AAF).

The FRP contract will be established as an Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract with a single thirty-six (36) month ordering period. The contract is planned for award in FY26 and will utilize FY26, FY27, and FY28 Defense-Wide Procurement appropriations, subject to the availability of funds. All orders will be placed within the established ordering period; no options are anticipated for the base IDIQ contract vehicle. The IDIQ structure provides the flexibility to issue delivery orders as requirements are identified, and funds become available throughout the ordering period.

4. Description of Supplies/Services: The JBTDS provides the Joint Forces with a mission-critical capability for sustained operations in a CBRN environment as well as force protection in peacetime and contingency operations. JBTDS is the only militarized, tactical, lightweight biological surveillance system designed specifically for rapid detection, collection, identification and warning of Biological Warfare agents. The system fills a validated Joint Requirement for tactical-level biological detection interoperable across Services, highly mobile and sustainable under the constraints of modern force structure. The JBTDS system is a lightweight, man-portable, battery-operable system of record designed to provide detection, collection and identification of airborne biological warfare agents. The system’s modular architecture Detector/ Collector (D/C), Identifier and Data Station (DS) enable flexible, task-organized deployment across multiple mission sets. The approved performance specification defines stringent thresholds for probability of detection, false alarm rates and environmental survivability. The FRP scope encompasses production, quality assurance, testing, configuration management, logistics support and delivery of the production-representative Technical Data Package (TDP).

The JBTDS program is an Acquisition Category (ACAT) II effort with Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) oversight. The Army Acquisition Executive delegated Milestone Decision Authority to the Capability Program Executive for CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) Defense. A FRP Decision is projected in March 2026, with First Unit Equipped (FUE) projected for FY27, Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in FY29, and Full Operational Capability (FOC) in FY35. The system’s key components are:

a. Detector/ Collector (D/C). This component houses the detection subsystem and aerosol collector. The detection subsystem continuously samples ambient air and uses laser‑induced fluorescence to detect suspicious particulate matter. Upon detection of an anomaly, it automatically initiates the collection of an aerosol sample. The device incorporates meteorological sensors and Global Positioning System to geo‑reference detections and communicates via an integrated radio to the Data Station. It is capable of stand‑alone operation or networked array operation and must withstand transportation and long‑term storage

b. Identifier and Data Station (DS). The DS provides remote command, control and communications for a D/C array. It consolidates and displays alarms; initiates resets or sample commands and interfaces with Joint Warning and Reporting Network and the CBRN Sensor Command and Control (CSC2) systems. The DS software can reside on Government‑furnished command‑and‑control hardware or a dedicated ruggedized laptop. When used with an internet protocol‑based radio, the DS enables long‑range communication with multiple D/C units and is the operator’s primary interface with higher‑echelon C2 systems.

c. Consumable Sets. Single‑use components—filters, reagents, identification strips and sample vials are required for each collection and identification cycle. The consumable set supports both the detection and identification functions and is sized to support one mission cycle per kit. Consumables must meet stringent shelf‑life, packaging and storage requirements and are replenished through the supply system.

Program Support. In addition to production hardware and consumables, the FRP contract includes program management, systems engineering, software support, integrated logistics support, obsolescence management and the delivery of technical data. Specific deliverables include Manufacturing Plan (DI‑MGMT‑81889), Quality Assurance Program Plan, Configuration Management Plan, Failure Modes and Criticality Analyses, operator and maintenance technical manuals, training materials, packaging instructions, Bills of Materials and the production‑representative TDP and Software Data Package with Government Purpose Rights.

The system is modular and can be fielded as a stand-alone unit or in a networked array enabling units to tailor configurations to mission needs.

Quantities and delivery timelines are aligned to a FRP Decision no later than 2nd quarter FY26, FUE in FY27, IOC in FY29 and FOC in FY35. These milestones are tracked in the program’s Acquisition Program Baseline and remain under DOT&E oversight. Executing FRP within this window is critical to avoid delays to IOC/ FOC, prevent breaches of cost/schedule/performance thresholds and ensure timely JBTDS fielding to meet validated Joint Service operational requirements.

5. Authority Cited: This action is being pursued under the authority of 10 U.S.C. § 3204(a)(1), as implemented in FAR 6.302-1 “Only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements.” Authority, 6.302-1(a)(2)(ii)(A), ”Supplies may be deemed to be available only from the original source in the case of a follow-on contract for the continued development or production of a major system or highly specialized equipment, including major components thereof, when it is likely that award to any other source would result in-(A) Substantial duplication of cost to the Government that is not expected to be recovered through competition.”

6. Reason for Authority Cited: FAR 6.302-1(a)(2)(ii)(A) provides for award of follow-on production contracts without full and open competition when the requirement is a logical continuation of prior development or limited production efforts, and when award to another source would result in a substantial duplication of cost that is not expected to be recovered through competition.

a. Reverse engineering at scale. Decomposing hardware, materials and processes to production fidelity; deriving equivalency data; validating performance in qualification testing and re-establishing quality baselines. This is multi-year, high-risk and costly-particularly for bio-detection assays and unique collection/identifier components where tacit know-how is decisive.

b. Licensing and specially negotiated licenses (SNLs). Negotiate expanded licenses from CSES and multiple lower-tier IP holders. Because several contributors assert rights, the Government would face serial or parallel negotiations to assemble a legally clean production stack, often at premium pricing and with ongoing use restrictions.

c. Parallel development. Funding a clean-room alternative design to avoid encumbered IP. That means new integration, new qualifications, and new sustainment pipelines. Additionally, there is a risk that performance equivalence cannot be proven without access to restricted test methods or data.

Each path adds cost, defers fielding, and introduces legal exposure if any restricted data or software is inadvertently used. None of these paths delivers near-term production capacity more efficiently than continuing with the rights-holding OEM or negotiating targeted rights expansions where they matter most.

DoD’s current policy framework DoDI 5000.85 MCA and DoDI 5010.44 IP Acquisition and Licensing emphasize two complementary imperatives: Secure the data and rights necessary to execute program and capability sustainment and avoid paying for rights providing no clear value to mission or sustainment outcomes. For JBTDS, forcing an FRP competition without the production-level TDP and associated rights would run counter to these principles. It would obligate the Government to spend heavily on reverse engineering, licensing mosaics or re-development simply to recreate what already exists-without demonstrable mission benefit and with real risk to schedule and readiness. In short, competing FRP under the current IP posture would spend more to achieve less, and would undercut the policy goal of smart, use-case-driven rights acquisition.

Recommended course of action (to protect cost, schedule and readiness). While the Government cannot lawfully authorize a third-party manufacture today, there are pragmatic options to increase flexibility over time without wasteful spending:

• Targeted rights expansion where it matters. Negotiate SNLs for specific use cases (e.g., depot repair of defined Line Replaceable Units, cyber assurance of critical software modules, or competition for designated spares).

• Modular Open Systems Approaches (MOSA) informed segmentation going forward. For upgrades or follow-on increments, anchor the design in MOSA with well-defined Modular System Interfaces and Form-Fit-Function artifacts. This limits vendor lock to true black boxes and creates future competitive seams without demanding unnecessary DMPD today.

• Assay (lab test or analytical procedure) and process-knowledge access. Where sustainment risk is concentrated in assays and consumables, prioritize data packages and rights documenting performance envelopes, verification methods and quality attributes the minimum to qualify alternates rather than attempting to purchase full trade-secret processes.

• Supply assurance via OEM backed subcontracts. To mitigate near-term fragility, use OEM-managed second sources (under the OEM’s licenses) for chokepoint parts while negotiations for Government use-case rights proceed.

This approach preserves readiness, avoids litigation risk and channels resources into rights delivering measurable sustainment or competition value fully consistent with DoD policy. Given the current rights posture that provides Limited Rights for critical subsystems, Restricted Rights for software and only partial GPR on select assay processes, the Government cannot lawfully authorize another vendor to manufacture JBTDS. Attempting to compete FRP now would entail costly reverse engineering, complex licensing across multiple IP holders or parallel development all high-risk and low value compared to negotiating targeted rights expansions and shaping future increments with MOSA.

c. Impact if not approved: Three-Part Analysis of Duplication of Cost

Step 1 – Estimate of Duplication of Costs

Awarding FRP to any source other than CSES would force the Government to replicate nearly all development and qualification work already completed. These costs include:

• Costs to transition DEVCOM CBC technology, adapt the design, establish and verify a production line and build test hardware

• Costs to conduct First Article and Software Acceptance Testing

• Costs for tooling, fixturing, test stands and software test benches

• Costs to independently test and evaluate the JBTDS system, including MIL-STD, live agent, interferent, reliability and false alarm testing

• Costs for requalification and verification testing

• Costs for TDP reconstruction and intellectual property workarounds

• Costs for program management and systems engineering re-baselining

These expenditures represent nearly one-third of the FRP ceiling and would add no new capability, merely recreating work already performed.

Step 2 – Estimate of Potential Price Savings from Competition

Although competition is normally pursued to reduce costs, in this case meaningful savings are not expected. CSES has already achieved economies of scale during LRIP.

The company has invested in improvements in manufacturability, long-term supplier agreements, and lifecycle cost reduction initiatives.

A new entrant would face steep start-up costs, fragmented licensing obligations and higher per-unit prices until a comparable scale was reached. Consequently, the Government has no reasonable expectation of achieving significant price savings through competition.

Step 3 – Comparison of Duplication of Costs Versus Potential Savings

The non-recoverable duplication of costs would vastly outweigh any hypothetical savings from competition. From both a financial perspective and in alignment with the AAF’s emphasis on efficiency, affordability and avoidance of duplication, a competitive FRP award would represent a net loss to the Government.

Schedule Delays and Operational Risks In addition to duplication of cost, qualifying for a new source would cause unacceptable delays. Based on historical timelines and program estimates, a second manufacturer would require 84 months before delivering FRP hardware. The projected schedule includes:

• Months 0–12: Transition DEVCOM CBC technology to a second source and harden the design to meet Government requirements

• Months 12–24: Order long lead items for EMD hardware

• Months 12–36: Set up production line and build EMD hardware for test

• Months 36–42: Complete initial testing to verify performance and qualify the production line

• Months 42–54: Order long lead items for LRIP hardware

• Months 54–60: Build LRIP hardware for test

• Months 60–66: Conduct First Article Testing

• Months 66–78: Order long lead items for FRP hardware

• Months 78–84: Build and begin delivery of FRP quantities

This delay fundamentally conflicts with the transformation strategy as directed in the Secretary of War, dated April 30, 2025, memorandum on Army Transformation and Acquisition Reform. The Secretary explicitly directed the Army to “accelerate delivery of war winning capabilities” and prioritize “defending our homeland”. The memorandum emphasizes building “a leaner, more lethal force” by ensuring Soldiers are “equipped with the best technology available” while eliminating delays that impede modernization.

An 84-month delay in delivering critical CBRN detection capability to the warfighter directly contradicts this directive to accelerate modernization and field capabilities that ensure force protection and operational effectiveness. The MCA pathway exists precisely to avoid such timeline disruptions and deliver enduring capabilities rapidly to those who depend on them for mission success and survivability.

Awarding FRP to CSES under FAR 6.302-1(a)(2)(ii)(A) is the legally, fiscally, and operationally sound decision. CSES is the only qualified source with proven ability to manufacture JBTDS. The Government does not hold sufficient rights to enable competition, as confirmed by Section K data rights assertions. Competing FRP would result (cause) in unrecoverable duplication of costs, delay deliveries by seven years, and introduce operational and sustainment risks.

Maintaining CSES as the sole source is consistent with the Major Capability Acquisition pathway under the Adaptive Acquisition Framework. The MCA pathway requires continuity, avoidance of duplication and efficient transition from development to

• Demonstrate good-faith efforts to achieve participation goals for Small, Small Disadvantaged, Women-Owned, HUBZone, and Service-Disabled Veteran- Owned Small Businesses.

• Provide narrative market research and outreach records (industry days attended, RFQs issued, new-supplier qualification attempts, and outcomes), including actions taken to onboard emerging small-business suppliers in the CBRN industrial base.

Government oversight of lower-tier competition. The Contracting Officer will review and approve the subcontracting plan in coordination with the ACC-APG Small Business Office and will monitor performance throughout execution. Oversight will include eSRS review, periodic verification of competitive sourcing for key elements and corrective action requests where the Prime’s sourcing practices do not reflect meaningful efforts to compete subcontracts or to meet category-specific small-business goals. This approach responds directly to prior Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance shortfalls under the legacy contract and is intended to broaden the industrial base and strengthen price discipline at the sub-tier.

Post-award transparency and future competition posture. Consistent with FAR 6.305 and FAR 5.301, the Government will synopsize the justification as required to promote transparency. In parallel, the program will continue to evaluate opportunities to reduce barriers to competition in future procurements (e.g., negotiating additional data rights where cost-effective, qualifying alternate sources for selected consumables, and encouraging second-source development for non-proprietary subassemblies). These efforts ensure, while the FRP prime award is executed as a logical follow-on, competition is nevertheless obtained to the maximum practicable extent across the supply chain and that conditions for greater future competition are actively pursued.

8. Actions to Increase Competition: This FRP award is a one-time requirement tied to the JBTDS production objective. No follow-on FRP buys of similar scope are anticipated. Nevertheless, the Government is taking concrete steps to remove barriers and increase competition where practicable in downstream needs (e.g., spares, repairs, consumables replenishment, modifications and technology refresh). Specifically, the contract will (1) require delivery and maintenance of releasable interface documentation (e.g., Initial Capabilities Documents, product specifications and logistics product data) with sufficient Government-purpose license rights to enable competitive qualification of non-proprietary subcomponents and consumables in future buys; (2) require an obsolescence/diminishing manufacturing sources (Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages) and parts management plan identifying candidates for second-source qualification and breakout when technically feasible; (3) enforce a Small Business Subcontracting Plan with eSRS reporting and variance analyses to drive competitive sourcing of lower-tier assemblies and commodities throughout the period of performance; (4) include value engineering change proposal incentives and encourage modular solutions lowering switching costs and facilitate future competition; (5) direct the contractor to document manufacturing readiness, special tooling/test equipment, Project No. 0919C CSES CRADA Technology transition of the TACBIO II from

DEVCOM-CBC

to CSES

13 September 2016 through 10 February 2020

Project No. 0919C General Dynamics –

ATP

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CSES)

CRADA Technology transition of the TACBIO from

DEVCOM-CBC

to General Dynamics-ATP

21 October 2009 through 02 April

The original contract (W911QY-15-C-0035) was competitively awarded on 02 April 2015 to CSES. Under EMD, CSES successfully integrated Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) components with proprietary Chemring technology to deliver a system tailored to Army requirements. Following EMD, the program transitioned into LRIP, (W911QY-15-C- 0035) initiated on 08 September 2023 after Milestone C approval. Under LRIP, CSES established and qualified its production line and delivered 60 D/Cs, 15 DSs and 1,800 sets of consumables. All items passed Government verification testing, and by March 2025 all LRIP deliverables were complete. These assets are now supporting MOT&E, logistics assessments, and sustainment planning.

b. Other Facts: The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) has independently verified the incumbent maintains an adequate and effective Quality Management System (QMS) and production system appropriate to JBTDS complexity. DCMA’s risk-based, multifunctional surveillance confirms the presence and consistent use of standardized work instructions; controlled manufacturing travelers and inspection points; receiving in-process and final acceptance inspections; lot/serial number traceability; calibration and control of inspection, measuring and test equipment;

configuration management of drawings, software loads and firmware and documented change control aligned to contract and specification requirements. DCMA further reports production planning and finite scheduling are in place and demonstrably used to manage capacity, long-lead material, and special processes; preventive maintenance and tooling/fixture verification are performed on a routine, planned basis; and supplier management includes documented purchase controls, flow-down of higher-level quality requirements, counterfeit risk mitigation and qualification/monitoring commensurate with the risk of the part or process. Workforce qualifications and certifications are maintained for critical operations (e.g., soldering/rework, conformal coating, bonding, Electrostatic Discharge controls), with supervisory oversight and periodic competency checks.

Objective evidence (inspection records, test data, nonconformance reports) is retained to support Government acceptance and product quality metrics are trended at the line and program levels with a defined Failure Reporting Analysis and Corrective Action System.

This independent Government oversight demonstrates production maturity and quality discipline at the incumbent, reduces execution risk at FRP and provides continuous

14. Fair and Reasonable Cost Determination: I determine the anticipated price for this contract will be fair and reasonable. This determination is based on a price analysis conducted in accordance with FAR 15.404-1(b), comparing the proposed fixed price to the IGE, recent historical pricing from LRIP, validated Life Cycle Cost Estimate and market research. The analysis will account for differences in quantity, configuration and economic conditions, as well as pricing trends and volume discounts from recent rough order of magnitude data. The Government team, including the Program Office, Contracting and DCMA collectively may analyze this information. Certified cost or pricing data as required by FAR 15.403-4 will be obtained to support this determination.

These combined analyses and supporting documentation form the basis for concluding the JBTDS FRP contract price is fair and reasonable.

15. Contracting Officer Certification: I certify this justification is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Approval

Based on the foregoing justification, I hereby approve the JBTDS FRP procurement over three (3) years (FY26–FY28) on an other than full and open competition basis pursuant to the authority of 10 United States Code 3204(a)(1) as implemented in FAR 6.302- 1(a)(2)(ii)(A), Only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements, subject to availability of funds, and provided the services and supplies herein described have otherwise been authorized for this acquisition.