J ARedacted.pdf

Control No.: PEO STRI 13-022

JUSTIFICATION AND APPROVAL

FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

1. Contracting Activity: Program Executive Office Simulation, Training and Instrumentation

(PEO STRI) Acquisition Center.

2. Description of Action: The U.S. Army, Assistant Project Manager for Project Manager for

Training Devices (PM TRADE), PEO STRI has a requirement to increase the ceiling of the Live

Training Transformation Consolidated Product Line Management (LT2 CPM – hereafter referred to as CPM) Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract number W900KK-10-D-

0001, competitively awarded to General Dynamics C4 Systems (GDC4S) on 25 November 2009.

This contract modification will increase the contract ceiling by $48M from $200M to $248M with no extension to the existing period of performance which ends 28 February 2015. This modification is a one-time ceiling increase. The modification would use Research and

Development (R&D), Other Procurement, Army (OPA), and Operations and Maintenance, Army

(OMA) funding as legally appropriate for the individual delivery order requirements. It is expected that FY 13 through FY 15 funds would be utilized to fund the various delivery orders given the ordering period for the CPM contract. Other than the increase in ceiling, the contract scope and contract terms will not be altered by this modification. The intent of this contract modification is to provide PM TRADE with a viable contract vehicle to ensure PM TRADE meets its LT2 program requirements until the CPM Next contract vehicle is awarded.

a potential protest period to the CPM

Next acquisition could push the CPM Next award into the following fiscal quarter of the current

PALT. Delivery orders may be firm fixed price or cost plus fixed fee depending on each individual requirement. Time and material CLINs may be used on each delivery order whether the delivery order is fixed price or cost plus fixed fee.

3. Description of Supplies/Services: The objective of this contract modification is to increase the contract ceiling to allow the continuation of the PM TRADE’s LT2 product line until CPM

Next is awarded. The current scope of the CPM contract enables PM TRADE and other Services to support the various acquisition programs within the LT2 product line across their total life cycle. It includes the maintenance, management, and evolution of the LT2 core assets such as the Common Training Instrumentation Architecture (CTIA), the Future Army System of

Integrated Targets (FASIT), the One Tactical Engagement Simulation System (OneTESS), LT2

Products (i.e., National Training Center (NTC), Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Home

Station Instrumentation Training System (HITS), Digital Range Training Systems (DRTS), etc., the LT2 Construct, LT2 Common Components, LT2 Standards, the LT2 Portal, and the LT2

Integrated Development Environment (IDE).

The CPM contract meets the requirement for a consolidated streamlined product line approach which provides the participating Project Managers/Product Managers (PM/PdMs) for Combat

Training Instrumentation Systems (CTIS), Digitized Training (DT), Live Training Systems

(LTS), and the United States Marine Corps (USMC) an efficient, effective, and agile method to accomplish the management, maintenance and evolution of the LT2 product line core assets.

a. Total life cycle system management product line support of systems/products within the

LT2 product line family of training systems.

b. Product line support of systems/products that leverage LT2 product line assets.

c. Support of external interoperability initiatives (i.e., Live, Virtual, Constructive-

Integrating Architecture (LVC-IA), Joint, Foreign Military Sales.

d. Synchronization with Warfighter Focus (WFF).The CPM contract currently supports twelve active delivery orders performing various product line activities, to include: LT2 product line management, architectural development, product development, standards development, post deployment software support (PDSS) for PM TRADE, Program Manager Training Systems

(Marine Corps), and Project Manager Constructive Simulation (LVC-IA program). The $48M ceiling increase will be utilized to continue support of active delivery orders and the establishment of new delivery orders to support efforts until the competitive CPM Next contract is awarded. The table below further supports the $48M increase.

4. Authority Cited: 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1), as implemented by FAR 6.302-1, Only One

Responsible Source and No Other Supplies or Services Will Satisfy Agency Requirements.

Furthermore, supplies may be deemed to be available only from the original source in the case of a follow-on contract for the production of highly specialized equipment when it is likely that award to any other source would result in (a) Substantial duplication of cost to the Government that is not expected to be recovered through competition and (b) Unacceptable delays in fulfilling the agency’s requirements.

http://uscode.house.gov/uscode-cgi/fastweb.exe?getdoc+uscview+t09t12+37+408++%2810%29%20%252

5. Reason For Authority Cited:

a. Background: The CPM single award IDIQ contract was competitively awarded to

GDC4S on 25 November 2009. The CPM IDIQ contract has a one year base period and four one-year options. Option year four is through 28 February 2015. The contract ceiling estimated in the acquisition plan was set to $200M for the base contract. Currently, there is approximately

$687K left of the original $200M ceiling. The reason for the CPM contract reaching its ceiling early within the contract ordering period is threefold:

(1) Unanticipated requirements and higher than estimated funding levels in FY 13 for

LT2 products. Examples of this includes programs such as Exportable Training Capability –

Instrumentation System (ETC-IS). This program used an unanticipated $30M plus for development and fielding of the ETC-IS to United States Army Pacific (USARPAC). Additional examples are the DRTS and Integrated Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)

Training System (IMTS) programs. These programs received approximately $25M in reallocated funds from the Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) and

Congressional adds.

(2) The second reason that surfaced in FY 13 is that numerous life cycle programs that had traditionally utilized the Warfighter FOCUS (WFF) contract were turned away from the

WFF contract. The WFF contract provides worldwide integrated Live, Virtual, and Constructive training operations, maintenance, sustainment, instruction and other services for training devices, simulators, simulations on a global basis. As such, these programs had to rely on the CPM contract to complete the whole life cycle technology refresh efforts. Normally the software work would have been completed on the CPM contract and the majority of the hardware acquisition, integration, and fielding would have been completed on WFF.

(3) Thirdly, is the overall success of the LT2 product line, which has grown significantly in the past few years. Product participation has grown from four products in FY 09 to 14 in FY

13. Most notably the United States Marine Corps (USMC) has increased its participation from

$250K per year to over $15M on the CPM contract, fully utilizing LT2 and the CPM contract for their live training needs. This level of USMC ceiling usage was not anticipated in the original ceiling calculations. In all, approximately $70M in unanticipated requirements drove the CPM contract to its $200M ceiling prematurely and unexpectedly. The intent of this ceiling modification is to provide PM TRADE with a viable contract vehicle to ensure PM TRADE meets its LT2 program requirements until the competitive CPM Next contract vehicle is awarded.

(4) The ceiling increase of $48M through a contract modification will support continuity of the programs until the competitive solicitation is awarded.

b. Alternatives:

(1) PM TRADE is developing a replacement contract for CPM. CPM Next is a full and open competitive acquisition, and the current CPM contract requirements will be assumed by the

CPM Next contract once awarded and after a sufficient transition period to ensure the Army’s investment into the LT2 product line is protected. It is currently estimated that an award for this plus a potential contractor transition period creates a two year FY 14 and FY 15 execution gap for PM TRADE’s LT2 product requirements.

(2) The Government has also considered a competitive acquisition for the required ceiling modification request based on PM TRADE’s FY 14 and FY 15 requirements. This alternative is not viable due to the following reasons:

(a) Given an average PALT estimate of 331 days for a competitive award of this sort and the estimated four months for the PM to prepare the requirement, this would conservatively allow for an award in 1 st Qtr FY 15 based on starting the process October 2013. This timeline would not support the current PM TRADE requirements and would significantly impact multiple programs and the LT2 product line performance as documented in paragraph 5.d Impacts.

(b) This alternative would also compete with the ongoing CPM Next acquisition as the same Government personnel would be required to support both acquisitions.

(c) The acquisition of a separate competitive contract would result in substantial duplication in cost.

(d) The Government labor for the acquisition of the contract would be duplicative with the CPM Next acquisition, resulting in a substantial cost to the Government without any return value to the Government. The estimated duplicative acquisition cost is $1.2M. (See supporting cost data in Attachment 1). Note: this figure only accounts for the cost of the core team; it does not account for all Government labor hours that would be expended executing the acquisition processes such as Solicitation Review Board, Contracts Review Board, Small Business

Assessment, etc.

(e) There would be substantial duplication in the contractor’s management overhead with two duplicative CPM contracts executing at the same time. Each contractor team would require a program management/business area management (BAM) for the efforts resulting in an estimated additional cost to the Government for the $48M separate effort; based on industry standard BAM costs. BAM costs are for the company’s management and oversight structure. This includes functions such as program management, contracts, quality assurance, security, logistics, administrative support, data management, engineering, etc. Each of these functional areas has a hierarchy of supervisors and management. The costs for these positions are charged to the Government proportionally to their organizational management responsibilities and duties as required by the Government contract. (See supporting cost data in

Attachment 1).

(f) Additional Government resources needed to manage the separate but duplicative contract effort for two years would cost the Government an estimated . (See supporting cost data in Attachment 1).

(g) Having two separate contractors performing core CPM functions independently would substantially put at risk the current CPM product line PDSS yearly cost avoidance of

$18M. It is estimated that the cost avoidance would be reduced by a factor of 50% based on the work distribution of key product line PDSS efforts and the complexities of synchronizing two separate contractor teams within the LT2 product line framework. (See supporting PDSS cost avoidance data in Attachment 2).

(h) The LT2 product line utilizes governance and tools to manage the product line core assets to ensure that the Government product line investment is protected and the product line continues to provide needed live training capabilities in a cost efficient and effective manner.

The Government would have to provide significant oversight to a new contractor team and pay for contractor transition activities that would delay fielding capabilities significantly, put at risk

Government product line investment, put at risk product line return-on-invest (ROI) and cost avoidance. To avoid these substantial risks, the Government would have to conduct a minimum of a 3 month transition period for each of the 14 efforts. Additionally, this same transition effort would have to be duplicated with the award of CPM Next following a few months later.

c. Justification:

The justification for this modification to the CPM contract is the timing of program schedules and the unacceptable impacts to the programs if these requirements are not met within their timelines. It has been demonstrated in paragraph 5.b Alternatives, the Government cannot have a competition, award the contract, and complete transition activities, all within the schedule constraints. The secondary justification is the duplication of cost and resources, which would be incurred if a secondary competitive acquisition, were to be undertaken as a possible solution, even though it is not a feasible option due to schedule constraints. The duplication in cost to the

Government would be significant, conservatively estimated at $3.8M (sum total of figures stated in b. Alternatives (2)(d), (e), and (f)), with no resulting benefit to the Government. Additionally, the award of a duplicate contract tasked with LT2 product line management running in parallel with the existing CPM contract, also tasked with LT2 product line management, would significantly put at risk the Governments LT2 product line investment, cost avoidance, and efficiencies across the LT2 programs participating programs.

The contractor proposed to perform this work is GDC4S in Orlando, Florida. GDC4S was awarded the CPM contract competitively in November 2009, and has been under contract with

PM TRADE to perform the CPM work since February 2010. They have assembled a diverse team, both within their own company, and through 20 subcontractors to accomplish the CPM work which involves 14 separate LT2 training products. This is the only company with unique capabilities to perform the identified efforts within the LT2 product line framework paradigm within the time constraints identified, without significant risk to the Government. The attributes that make GDC4S the only company with unique capabilities to perform this work include the following:

(1) Currently GDC4S occupies and supports TRADE’s operations at the IDE facility. All of the Government-owned software is housed on computer equipment inside this facility. The IDE facility is beyond full capacity for personnel. GDC4S has established infrastructure connections from this facility to their corporate work areas (also in Research Park) to allow other engineers working on efforts to access the tools and software on the Government equipment. The IDE cannot house all of the needed personnel to perform all the necessary CPM work, so having this interconnection is critical to accomplishing the work. No other contractor has this capability established.

(2) GDC4S maintains all of the infrastructure and systems required in the day-to-day operations of the LT2 systems. These function include the LT2 portal, multiple program help desks, CTIA development environment (to include: HITS, Combat Training Centers (CTCs) and

DRTS), Model Based System Engineering (MBSE) tools, software repositories, software licenses, etc. There would be a significant time and cost to transfer all of these responsibilities to a new contractor. Time and cost includes several months of training, transition, and learning curve to utilize all the tools and processes within the LT2 Construct.

(3) Part of the function of the CPM contractor is to ensure that all of the programs and their teams follow the LT2 processes for development, integration and test, configuration management, deployment and governance. GDC4S was the contractor that developed most of these processes and has been charged with ensuring the LT2 governance is followed. No other contractor currently possesses the highly complex governance process knowledge to ensure the product line continues to be developed and managed appropriately. Training a new contractor to manage the LT2 product line would take approximately three to four months. Thus, there would be a significant impact to the cost and schedule of developing and fielding LT2 systems to the

Warfighter. Furthermore, the learning curve for new contractors would introduce new risks to programs, to include reduced product quality which impacts training effectiveness.

(4) GDC4S was instrumental in working with the Government team in procuring a

MBSE tool suite and in creating the LT2 framework architecture in support of our system-of-systems analysis and impact assessments, as well as Department of Defense Architecture

Framework (DoDAF) development work with TCM Live. Currently, they are the only organization that understands how these tools operate within the live training domain, and they manage the equipment that these tools reside on. No other organization would be able to step in and assume these functions in a timely fashion to support our ongoing Joint Capabilities

Integration Development System and DoDAF work. There are also a multitude of other tools and software packages that GDC4S has purview over in support of the LT2 product line. Again, no other contractor has the unique capability to perform these tasks within a timely manner that would not impact LT2 product quality, cost, and schedule.

(5) GDC4S has a well-established contractual relationship with the WFF contractor (the contractor is one of their subcontractors on the CPM contract). This relationship has streamlined issue/problem tracking at numerous military installations where LT2 components are utilized.

No other contractor currently has this working partnership with WFF in support of our products.

(6) Under the technology insertion initiatives for CTIA and LT2, the Government team determined that the current architecture was no longer supportable and has begun a migration to a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) approach. GDC4S has completed several weeks of SOA training and is well into the development of the new approach. Further, GDC4S has expertise and facilitated many of the workshops that have driven the technology insertion roadmap for

CTIA and the LT2 product line. Currently, no other contractor could continue this work without a long transition period and without significant training in SOA, virtualization, and software product line concepts.

(7) The sum of the above would put at risk the significant cost avoidance realized by the

CPM effort as currently managed by GDC4S. There are other contractors who can assume these overarching LT2 functions, but not without a significant stand-up period and transitional effort.

(8) Since the CPM effort under GDC4S would continue, a new contract/contractor would create a significant duplication of effort, resulting in management complexities. Additionally this would place significant risk to the Government in that CPM investments could be lost.

d. Impact: See Attachment 3 for detailed schedules for each program listed below.

(1) ETC-IS Impacts: (DO-0008)

Failure to receive the CPM ceiling increase in FY 14 and FY 15 will significantly impact the following for the ETC-IS that will support the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness

Capability:

(a) Halt required Information Assurance (IA) accreditation, bi-annual IA updates, and annual Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) reviews, resulting in system shut down, and a Denial Authority To Operate (DATO) issued by Army G6.

(b) Stop all PDSS, including resolution of problem ticket reports to maintain system availability.

(c) Prohibit required CPM contractor subject matter expert (SME) support for June 2014

First Unit Assessment (FUA). This will impact a successful FUA with the new operations group utilizing the ETC-IS. Rotational units will not receive a high quality instrumented training experience with feedback through after action reviews (AARs) intended to facilitate improvement of critical combat skills.

(d) Restrict required integration, testing, and installation of continuous tech refresh hardware replacement essential to maintain system availability.

(e) Prohibit required CPM contractor SME support for FY 14 & FY 15 USARPAC rotational exercises. This will impact Soldier readiness for rotational units preparing to deploy, thereby not providing a high quality instrumented training experience with feedback through

AARs intended to facilitate improvement of critical combat skills.

(f) Restrict enhancement of the training and exercise capability for the entire Pacific Area of Responsibility (AOR).

(g) Delays implementation of USARPACs ability to provide Joint and multinational forces in the AOR a realistic, instrumented exercise for rotational units providing critical feedback to hone skills needed to fight and win in the current and future operational environment.

(h) Delays implementation of USARPACs ability to work together on a complex battlefield in the Pacific and facilitate seamless combined operations with U.S. partners in the region.

(i) Impacts the Pacific Command (PACOM) commander's training strategy to enhance theater engagement with U.S. partners, and keeps assigned forces in the region training in the environment where they will be expected to fight.

(2) HITS Impacts: (DO-0014)

Without the additional required ceiling, the HITS program will not meet requirements and milestones. Because the HITS program is integral to the Integrated Training Environment (ITE), lack of ceiling/funding will place the Army’s ITE at critical risk. Some 8 th

Army and Forces

Command (FORSCOM) units will be denied the ITE culminating training event, placing the

Army Force Generation model at risk:

(a) HITS will not develop and integrate software and associated hardware required for interoperability with LVC-IA Increment 3. This will result in HITS not meeting LVC-IA performance and schedule requirements.

(b) HITS will not conduct semi-annual Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert

(IAVA) software patch application in sustainment of the Authority to Operate (ATO). This will place all fielded HITS at risk, and could result in inoperable systems. Without IA certification, training sites are subject to a DATO.

(c) HITS will not respond to obsolescence and address performance enhancement requirements through continuous technology refreshment.

(3) CTC PDSS Impacts: (DO-0002)

(a) The following are Windows XP systems that fall under the mandate for migration to

Windows 7 in 3 rd

Qtr FY 14: AVID video editing system (critical for creating AARs); digital tactical monitoring (provides email, chat and Command, Control, Communication, Computer

Information Surveillance and Reconnaissance messages needed to provide AAR feedback);

voice tactical monitoring (provides tactical communication audio clips for the AAR). Without the additional required ceiling, the migration to Windows 7 will not occur. The AVID Original

Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) no longer supports the Window XP software or IAVA patches and are at risk of failure which will severely impact the training and AARs at the JRTC and

NTC.

(b) The PDSS delivery order under CPM procures the software licenses at both

JRTC/NTC for the following systems: Oracle (database), VMWare (user workstations), AVID

(video), Adobe Creative Suite (AAR products), Sysmatic Ghost/Juniper SBR (IA protection) and the Radiant Mercury Cross Domain Solution. Without the additional required ceiling, the PDSS delivery order will not procure the licenses. Instrumentation, Areas Weapons Effects, AARs, Command/Control and Soldier safety monitoring will cease. Training at the NTC and JRTC will stop in FY 14.

(c) Without the additional required ceiling, PDSS cannot support the migration to CTIA

4.0. Migration to CTIA 4.0 is required to support the CTC-Range Communication System

(RCS) deployment of Observer Controller Trainer (OCT) tablets and instrumentation of the participants. This will delay CTC-RCS deployment, which will then impact the upgrade of the live fire network to a cellular network. The current live fire radios are obsolete, unavailable and quickly being consumed. PM TRADE will be forced to invest several million dollars in reengineering the current live fire radios if CTC-RCS is delayed.

(4) IMTS Impacts: (DO-0004)

(a) The IDE performs all PDSS efforts for the IMTS program. This includes maintaining the IMTS system software configuration baseline and the associated IA certification for each site. The lab IA efforts include evaluation, incorporation and testing of Security Technical

Implementation Guides into PDSS controlled IMTS software and regression testing to assure continued software functionality. PDSS also includes distribution of IA updated software to 17 certified Combined Arms Collective Training Facilities (CACTF) sites, 20 certified shoot houses, six urban assault course (UAC) sites fielded under Lockheed Martin and software modifications to 30 existing UAC sites that do not comply with DoDI 8500.2. Without this contract, all IMTS PDSS efforts will end.

(b) IA certification is required for all Department of Defense (DoD) systems which utilize computers. Without a certification, all training sites are subject to a DATO. The IMTS CACTF and shoot house sites were utilized for training over 186,000 Soldiers in FY 12 and over 158,000 in the first ten months of FY 13. A DATO would degrade training and adversely impact Soldier readiness at over 20 active Army and Reserve training sites.

(c) The remote access effort enables the IDE to update software remotely without requiring travel to 17 CACTF and 20 shoot house sites. This capability reduces the expected travel budget from FY 14 onward and enables the lab to maintain additional sites without increasing the manpower necessary to operate the lab. Without this contract, remote software updates will not be completed.

(5) Unmanned Aerial System - Tactical Engagement Simulation System (UAS-TESS)

Impacts: (New Work)

Executing the UAS-TESS prototype and integration efforts under the CPM contract results in successfully interoperating with established LT2 standards and interfaces at the NTC. This effort establishes the basis for the first Gray Eagle Live ITE at the NTC. Follow-on implementations will reuse these standards to reduce integration and sustainment costs at other

CTCs. This training environment provides collective training to support the development of manned-unmanned tactics, training, and procedures. Additionally, the CPM delivery order provides the schedule efficiencies required to implement UAS-TESS data collection in time to support Gray Eagle follow on test and evaluation not later than April 2015. Not using CPM risks the development and fielding of a stovepipe, costly, proprietary solution that does not conform to

LT2 standards. This risk could affect the Gray Eagle UAS’ ability to meet its critical test schedule and its participation in CTC rotations and mission rehearsals critical to pre-deployment readiness.

(6) CTC Live Fire Impacts (JRTC): (New Work)

If the CPM contract cannot be used, then significant delays for fielding targets and range effects devices would occur. A significant delay means that the following would continue to occur:

(a) Targetry failing due to use and age, and are no longer maintainable due to obsolescence (no longer by OEM). A significant number of failed targets at JRTC would result in cancelling a rotation which would seriously degrade unit live fire training. This would, in turn, degrade combat readiness for future deployable units.

(b) Failing targetry devices become a safety concern/hazard for participating dismounted and mounted Soldiers, which would adversely affect training events.

(c) Range effects devices become a safety concern/hazard which means that unsafe pyrotechnics and accompanying targets are littered throughout the simulated battlefield presenting potential safety hazards to training Soldiers.

No CPM contract effort means that another contract vehicle would have to be used which would result in a year delay to field targetry equipment. A year delay would significantly impact training per above points.

(7) CTC-IS RCS Impacts: (New Work)

The current CTIA architecture does not support a mobile architecture, and performance limitations will reduce capability planned to be fielded prior to Initial Operating Capability and

Full Operational Capability. Not performing the necessary architecture development and evolving to CTIA 4.0 will not support the planned infrastructure and application services to provide CTC Subsystem – Data capabilities such as enhanced Situational Awareness (SA), AAR development, production, presentation, and automated Instrumentation Issue and Recovery (IIR).

In addition, the current security architecture and Cross Domain Solution (CDS) limits the information and data collection between security domains. In order to provide the planned capabilities, the security architecture will need to be evolved to support services and application operating on the unclassified security domain and is planned for this effort. Not providing a mobile handheld capability that enhances SA, AAR development, production and presentation capabilities limits the ability of an OCT to identify and collect actionable feedback. This reduces the collaboration capability between an OCT and training analysis feedback facility analyst in development of AAR products. The centers will not be able to use a laptop as is currently proposed in the CTC-RCS contract.

Not providing an automated IIR capability would force the CTCs to provide a manual IIR process that is error prone, time consuming and labor intensive. Future training rotations will include instrumented participants in an order of magnitude that would not be supportable by the current manual process without a significant increase in manpower. The quantities of 11,000 participants instrumented at each CTC will increase the time to prepare for a rotation by a factor of five, and costs will not be economically affordable.

(8) Range Instrumentation System Control (RISCon) Impacts: (DO-0009)

(a) Advanced Video Attribute Terminal Assembler and Recreator (AVATAR) upgrades

(visualization): This effort provides enhancements to existing USMC’s AVATAR training systems that are necessary to support new mission requirements to support “pivoting to the

Pacific.” The AVATAR systems require enhancements to provide a realistic environment to move from the existing Middle Eastern theater to the Pacific Rim and the Horn of Africa.

USMC training capability is negatively impacted if the planned upgrade cannot be met on schedule. Realism and training effectiveness is lost if Middle Eastern AVATARs are used to train Marines deploying to the Pacific Rim and the Horn of Africa. Additional cost is incurred to provide role players to overcome current AVATAR shortfalls associated with not being able to reconfigure the AVATAR systems to correct region of interest (Pacific Rim or Horn of Africa).

(b) Tactical Video Capture System (TVCS) site software upgrades: This effort provides upgrades to the USMC TVCS to support enhanced AAR and address support issues. The fielded software is no longer sustainable. Under the currently funded effort, a Commercial off the Shelf

(COTS)-based software upgrade to KILO 2 at Camp Pendleton is being designed to replace the fielded proprietary software and to enhance AAR capabilities. This COTS software is currently being validated in the system integration & test site at Camp Pendleton. The plan is to deploy the KILO 2 COTS solution to the remaining six sites. If planned schedule is not met, USMC training will be impacted significantly. Performance will be impacted as the USMC will no longer have the capability to sustain or enhance the fielded proprietary solution. The effectiveness of the training will be negatively impacted as the production of AARs using the fielded system takes too long. The planned COTS solution resolves the AAR production issue and the sustainment issues. If the schedule is not met, the USMC loses training effectiveness due to poor AARs, and incurs the additional cost of operating a system that is no longer sustainable.

(c) Infantry Immersion Trainer (IIT) enhancements: This effort provides IIT hardware/software integration enhancements to improve sub-system interoperability and address support issues. If the planned schedule is not met, the USMC loses training capability at its three

IIT sites. Under the current effort, the USMC has been developing a solution to address a critical design defect at all three sites. One of the subsystems has been unavailable to support training due to an overheating problem in Nema boxes that causes critical components to fail. A solution is being tested and will be deployed to correct the issue at all three sites. The plan is to integrate the RISCon into the Marine Corps Training Area Bellows and Camp Lejeune’s IITs to improve interoperability by integrating “stove piped” stand-alone systems into a single solution. AAR enhancements are also planned for all three IITs. Fixing the Nema box overheating problem restores a needed training capability and reduces the additional cost of role players. Adding the

RISCon exercise control and enhancing AAR capability to the IITs increases training effectiveness and performance. Without these additions, planned training capabilities are delayed and effectiveness is negatively impacted. RISCon integration eliminates the duplication of cost associated with the existing stove piped systems.

(9) Live Training Engagement Composition (LTEC) Impacts: (DO-0013)

FY 14 is a critical juncture for the LTEC and embedded training efforts. The primary focus of FY 14 is to finalize deliverable products for system platform PMs to be part of their annual software accreditation process. Without these final products, PM TRADE will be unable to meet the systems PMs’ timelines and performance expectations. Without completing these efforts there is significant risk that the windows of opportunity to embed these training devices will be delayed or derailed. Specifically the impacted efforts are addressed below:

(a) Impacts the ability of PM Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) to meet embedded training software key performance parameter 12-18 months. PM Live Training System’s (LTS) efforts to provide an LTEC Software solution to support testing and system integrations by 1 st

Qtr FY 15 will be delayed 6-12 months.

(b) Delays our support to GCV OEM and Net Warrior, including LTEC software updates and development/modification of hardware components. PM LTS will not be able to meet GCV and Net Warrior timelines for the development of interfaces, components and services for LTEC to support these efforts. PM LTS will not be able to meet the Net Warrior schedule to test new software in March 2014.

(c) Delays development of the LTEC solution to support testing and system integration activities for GCV and Net Warrior. Delays completion of the LTEC common core services.

(d) Delays the efforts to port LTEC to Android platforms and integration with NET

Warrior.

(e) Impacts the current Tactical Vehicle System (TVS) Engineering Change Proposal designed to embed, test, and validate LTEC software and component communication messages into the current TVS system prior to final hand off to GCV.

(f) Impacts efforts to support NET Warrior integration modifications, which include Non-

Recurring Engineering, software, testing and documentation.

(10) CTC MOUT IS Impacts: (DO-0004)

Failure to receive CPM ceiling space in FY 14 (for JRTC upgrade hardware and integration and for IA/PDSS/configuration management) for 3 CTCs and 35 CACTFs will significantly impact the following areas of the CTC MOUT IS program:

(a) Halt required IA accreditation, bi-annual IA updates, and annual FISMA reviews, resulting in three CTC system shutdowns and a DATO issued by Army G6.

(b) Stop all PDSS, including resolution of problem ticket reports to maintain system currency and availability.

(c) Critically delay the urgent replacement of aging/damaged hardware and software at the JRTC. Since JRTC is the only CTC using live fire MOUT rotations/exercises, they suffer significant and extensive damage to their facilities with each unit in rotation. JRTC is in urgent and dire need of this upgrade and would not be able to continue operation much longer. Without this needed help, the JRTC rotations will soon cease operation. As a result, units will not receive needed instrumented training experience with feedback through AARs that are intended to facilitate improvement of critical combat skill.

(d) Restrict required integration, testing, and installation of continuous tech refresh hardware replacement essential to maintain system availability.

(e) Loss of CTC MOUT IS rotational exercises due to inadequate facility readiness. This will affect FORSCOM Soldier readiness for rotational units preparing to deploy, thereby not providing a high quality instrumented training experience with feedback through AARs intended to facilitate improvement of critical combat skills.

(f) Restrict enhancement of the CTC MOUT software intended for all CTCs and

CACTFs. This will preclude training and exercise capability for 3 CTCs and 35 CACTFs.

(g) Delays implementation of 3 CTCs rotational units and 35 home station CACTF’s ability to provide joint and multinational forces a realistic, instrumented exercise for rotational units providing critical feedback to hone skills needed to fight and win in the current and future operational environment.

(h) Delays implementation of the Joint Maneuver Readiness Center’s ability to work together with allies on a complex battlefield with seamless combined operations with US partners in the region.

(i) Impacts the United States Army Europe commander's training strategy to enhance theater engagement with U.S. partners, and keep assigned forces in the region training in the environment where they will be expected to fight.

(11) LT2 Construct Impacts: (DO-0001)

The capabilities of the LT2 Construct would be limited which would negatively impact the

LT2 product line configuration management and the management, support, and evolution of existing LT2 core assets and LT2 products. Impacts to the LT2 Construct include product line configuration management, core asset development, LT2 portal maintenance and evolution.

PM TRADE has established the LT2 Construct that enables the LT2 product line to maximize the commonality, reuse, and interoperability of the LT2 products, while meeting training goals.

Limiting capabilities to the LT2 Construct would force the 15 existing LT2 products to develop, configuration manage, and sustain product assets in a stove-piped environment, thus incurring unnecessary cost and schedule slips for each product, and negates the extreme cost avoidance achievements to date. This course of action would be contrary to the DoD's Better

Buying Power 2.0 strategy.

(12) CTIA Impacts: (DO-0001)

CTIA PDSS would not be able to release CTIA core software critical updates, IAVA patches, and hot fixes needed to support LT2 programs. This would include CTIA versions

3.0.1, 3.0.2, and 4.0.0. These LT2 programs would not receive the needed hot fix releases for fielded systems, which would negatively impact training: CTC-IS (versions 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6), DRTS.

2.6.1, HITS 3.0.0, RISCon 1.0.0 (USMC), and Targetry Range Automated Control and

Recording 1.3.2. CTIA tech insertion efforts would be limited, which would negatively impact future CTIA versions 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5, and the LT2 programs that use them.

6. Efforts to Obtain Competition:

a. Requirements for the ceiling increase were synopsized in a sources sought in a Notice of

Intent to Award-Sole Source Procurement on the FedBizOpps website via ASFI and the STRI

Business Opportunities Portal (STRI BOP) on 6 September 2013. Only one company, GDC4S, the incumbent LT2 CPM contractor, responded to the announcement posted 6 September 2013.

GDC4S has demonstrated that it is capable of completing the Government’s requirements, has adequate financial and organizational resources, and past performance on technical and delivery schedules for all LT2 CPM delivery orders have been satisfactory or better, as indicated by LT2

CPM CPARS reports to date.

b. PM TRADE is developing a replacement contract for CPM. CPM Next is a full and open competitive acquisition, and the current CPM contract requirements will be assumed by the CPM

Next contract once awarded and after a sufficient transition period to insure the Army’s investment into the LT2 product line is protected. The acquisition process for CPM Next started in this plus a potential 100-day protest period, and a potential contractor transition period creates a two-year FY 14 and FY 15 execution gap for PM TRADE’s LT2 product requirements.

The intent of this ceiling modification is to provide PM TRADE with a viable contract vehicle to ensure PM TRADE meets its LT2 program requirements until the competitive CPM Next contract vehicle is awarded.

c. Based on information in paragraph 5 above, competition for this contract modification was not feasible. Market research has been performed for the follow-on requirement to identify all potential sources.

7. Actions to Increase Competition: The Government is currently in the process of competing the whole CPM requirement under the ongoing CPM Next acquisition effort. PM TRADE’s objective for the LT2 product line is to maintain a competitive open source environment. As part of the product line, all technical data and standards are readily available to industry via the LT2 portal. The intent of the LT2 product line is to increase competition across the product line utilizing an open system architecture approach for the system development, production, and sustainment by leveraging Government owned product line core, process, tools, facilities, and standards.

8. Market Research: The action for the ceiling increase was synopsized in the Federal

Business Opportunities (FBO) website via ASFI and on the STRI BOP on 6 September 2013.

See paragraph 9 for results.

The following captures the results of the market research that was conducted as part of the

CPM Next on-going acquisition. It demonstrates that there will be significant competition for the CPM Next acquisition. However, due to factors demonstrated in paragraph 5 above, CPM

Next cannot be awarded and transitioned in time to accomplish PM TRADE’s near term requirements in FY 14 and FY 15. The below information provides an objective summary of industry’s capabilities relative to the CPM Next acquisition effort, and demonstrates that sufficient competition will exist for the on-going CPM Next acquisition.

CPM Next market research was conducted in several forms, to include:

a. A Request for Information (RFI) issued on 22 February 2013, with an opportunity for industry to respond to illustrate capabilities to do the CPM Next efforts in two forms; written information papers limited to eight pages, and one-on-one sessions in a length up to two hours.

b. A Sources Sought issued on 5 June 2013, with an opportunity for industry to respond to illustrate capabilities to do the CPM Next efforts in two forms; written information papers limited to 10 pages, and one-on-one sessions in a length up to 45 minutes.

c. A CPM Next Industry Day on 24 June 2013 attended by 80 participants.

d. As a note, market research was also conducted in 2009 for the CPM acquisition effort that is currently on contract. The two efforts mirror each other in concept and basic premises of execution.

Table 1 summarizes the assessments of industry capabilities based on discussions and their respective responses to the CPM Next RFI and Sources Sought to perform this work.

9. Interested Sources: PM TRADE conducted market research to determine if other sources could meet the LT2 CPM requirements within the programs’ schedule constraints. The action for the ceiling increase to the LT2 CPM contract was synopsized in the Federal Business

Opportunities (FBO) website via ASFI and on the STRI BOP on 6 September 2013. This action will be accomplished on a sole source basis in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1), as implemented by FAR 6.302-1(a)(2)(ii)(A) and (B). Any other acquisition approach to meeting near term requirements will cause unacceptable delays in meeting the agency’s live training mission. The synopsis stated that all responsible sources may submit a capability statement, and responses shall provide a description of the sources’ ability to meet the requirements which shall be considered by the agency. A notice was provided to verify that no other source other than

GDC4S can meet this requirement due to the delivery schedule.

The results of the analysis of responses to the Notice of Intent to Award – Sole Source

Procurement for LT2 CPM resulted in only one company, GDC4S, the incumbent LT2 CPM contractor, responding to the announcement posted 6 September 2013. GDC4S has demonstrated that they are capable of completing the Governments requirements; they have adequate financial and organizational resources; and their past performance on technical and delivery schedules for all LT2 CPM delivery orders has been satisfactory or better, as indicated by LT2 CPM CPARS reports to date. GDC4S is the only known source capable of providing support during this interim period until the CPM Next is awarded. To date, no other written responses have been received; however, all offers received will be evaluated.

10. Other Facts:

a. Procurement history: The existing CPM single award IDIQ contract, W900KK-10-D-

0001, was competitively awarded to GDC4S on 25 November 2009. The CPM IDIQ contract has a one year base period and four one-year options. Option year four is through 28 February

2015. There have been no previous approvals for other than full and open competition on this contract. This is a one-time request so that programs will continue throughout the full and open competition of CPM Next.

b. Acquisition data availability: The specifications and statements of work for all existing requirements are available. Future requirements will have a statement of work prepared prior to requesting a solicitation for any new delivery order on the existing contract. The follow-on CPM

Next has its own set of specifications and statements of work for the full and open competition.

c. Unusual and compelling urgency: Not applicable.

d. Subcontracting Competition: GDC4S has an existing comprehensive subcontracting plan in place.

Attachment 2: Supporting PDSS Cost Avoidance Data

LT2 PDSS Analysis/Data.

a. COA #1: Application (“Stovepipe”) Engineering of LT2 product line core assets.

The costs associated for sustaining LT2 Product Line core assets using Application

Engineering are highlighted in Table 1 – FY 13 PDSS Cost Avoidance Scorecard. In the row identified as “Stovepiped” describes the costs required to perform PDSS for each product instantiation within the Product Line (i.e. CTC, ETC, HITS, DRTS, etc.). The FY 13 cumulative cost for this would have been $27,304,746. This cost was based on the number of man hours that would have been required to sustain (manage, upgrade, fixes, etc.) the duplicative product software lines of code (SLOC) within the LT2 baseline. The labor rate was calculated conservatively at $150.00 per man hour (Appendix A).

b. COA #2: Second Generation Product Line Engineering (“Variation Management”) of LT2 product line core assets.

The costs associated with sustaining LT2 Product Line core assets using 2G PLE are also highlighted in Table 1. In the row identified as “Actual” describes the actual documented costs required to perform PDSS for each product instantiation. The FY 13 actual cumulative cost was $9,274,034. The cost was based on reported data by the CPM prime contractor.

The row identified as “PDSS Savings” describes the cost avoidance for each product.

For example:

CTC-IS PDSS Savings = Stovepiped – Actual

$635,634 = $3,063,075 – $2,427,441

The Actual Cumulative (AC) is a running total of Actual (An) that is defined by the following equation:

The Stovepipe Cumulative (SC) is a running total of Stovepiped (Sn) that is defined by the following equation:

Finally, the Cumulative Cost Avoidance (CA) is defined by the following equation:

$18,030,712 = $27,304,746 – $9,274,034

Therefore, based on the estimated cumulative stovepipe cost to sustain the SLOC of the LT2

Product Line and the cumulative actual cost that was officially reported to sustain the SLOC of the LT2 Product line, we can with great confidence determine that the cumulative cost avoidance for the U.S. Army is approximately $18,030,712.

Figure 5 graphically depicts the LT2 Product Line PDSS/PPSS cost avoidance for each product based on Table 1 above.

Figure 5. LT2 FY 13 PDSS/PPSS – Cost Avoidance

Figure 6 graphically depicts the LT2 Product Line cumulative cost avoidance since 2011 which is estimated to be $36 million. In addition, figure 6 projects the cost avoidance delta for annual Application Engineering (stovepipe) sustainment and CPM 2G PLE sustainment for FY 2014-17.

$3

$6

$11

$14

$17

$23

$26 $27

$27

$2 $3

$4

$6 $6

$8 $9

$9 $9

$0

$5

$10

$15

$20

$25

$30

M il li o n s

Actual

Stovepiped

Stovepiped Cumulative

Actual Cumulative

~$18M

LT2 Yearly PDSS Cost Avoidance

Figure 6. LT2 Software PDSS/PPSS – Cost Avoidance with Projections

2.0 Appendix A – Scorecard Spreadsheet Data

$0

$20

$40

$60

$80

$100

$120

$140

$160

$180

$200

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

M il li o n s

Application Engineering

“Stovepipe” cost to sustain each product independently

Annual sustainment increases due to obsolescence

$18M FY13 Cost Avoidance;

~$36M Cumulative Cost

Avoidance since FY11

CTIA 4 Development

Annual Sustainment reduction

• Consolidated Hardware

• Common Deployment

• Flexible / Composable

• Automated Testing

• Incremental Deployment

• Converge on common tools

CPM Sustainment using 2G PLE

Product Migration to SOA

(future)

Attachment 3: Program Schedules