PSDS2 JA-26-C-0212_Extension_W56KGY-25-F-0048_Redacted.pdf

CUI

Control Number:

JA-26-C-0212

FAR Part 6 Justification for Other than Full and Open Competition

1. Requiring Activity: Product Lead (PL) Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Sensing & Effects

(PL RISE)

2. Contracting Activity: Army Contracting Command – Aberdeen Proving Ground (ACC- APG), Division C, CCAP-DDC, 6580 Surveillance Loop, building 6006, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland 21005

3. Description of Action: PL RISE is requesting approval to award the FAR 52.217-8 Extension of Services to Raytheon Company, Cage Code: 04071, located at 22260 Pacific Blvd, Dulles, VA 20166-6916, under current Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) Contract Number SPRBL1-15-D-0017. The proposed action would add Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) - Term and Cost Reimbursable (CR) CLINs to the current task order to extend services for 118 days, from 30 May 2026 – 25 September 2026 in the amount of and will cover operations and sustainment services for the Persistent Surveillance and Dissemination System of Systems (PSDS2), encompassing all related systems, subsystems, and hardware/software. Currently, these services are set to expire on 29 May 2026. As a customer-funded requirement, the obligation of Fiscal Year (FY) 26, Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds is anticipated. Raytheon Technologies is the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) for PSDS2, justifying this sole-source approach.

4. Description of Supplies/Services: The Persistent Surveillance and Dissemination System of Systems (PSDS2) is a critical Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) that has been providing Full Motion Video (FMV) capabilities since 2005. PSDS2 functions as a comprehensive system and architecture, receiving video feeds from various sensors and consolidating them in a central location for persistent surveillance, video analysis, dissemination, and long-term archiving.

This request covers Operations and Sustainment (O&S), logistics, and lifecycle support for PSDS2 systems deployed both within the Contiguous United States (CONUS) and Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS) through 2029. This includes personnel for system operation and maintenance in CONUS and OCONUS locations, as well as Field Service Representatives (FSRs) and Operators/Imagery Analysts. The requirement also necessitates the ability to rapidly deliver all necessary items, including digital assets, to designated locations on demand. This support applies to the entire PSDS2 network, encompassing its subsystems, hardware, and software components. The vendor supporting the PSDS2 software must maintain the Secure Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) Authority to Operate (ATO).

a) Hardware, Software, and Firmware Support: Maintenance, updates, and configuration management for the specialized system components.

b) Field Service Representatives (FSRs): Personnel for system installation, deployment, operation, and on-site maintenance in both domestic (CONUS) and international (OCONUS) locations.

2. The Government’s position is validated by past procurement history and recent market research. A previous competitive acquisition for these services revealed that the only way for other vendors to meet the minimum technical requirements was to partner with Raytheon as a subcontractor. Recent market research confirms this environment is unchanged. A competitive process would invariably lead back to Raytheon, rendering the competition a costly and time-consuming administrative exercise without a different outcome.

3. The Government does not possess a viable Technical Data Package (TDP) required to compete this requirement. A TDP purchased in 2018 is now obsolete due to numerous software updates and modifications, and the Government has neither the funding nor the resources to maintain it. Without a current TDP, there is no technical baseline from which another vendor could even begin to develop a compatible solution, making a competitive acquisition much higher risk.

b. Analysis of Alternatives: A thorough analysis confirms that no other course of action is viable without introducing unacceptable cost, schedule, and operational risk.

A competitive effort to replace PSDS2 entirely would trigger massive, unrecoverable costs. Without a viable TDP, a new vendor would have to start from zero, effectively replicating over 15 years of system development and integration knowledge. This would entail:

New Software Development: Designing, writing, and testing a completely new video management system to replicate the functionality of .

Hardware and Software Integration: A complex effort to integrate the new system with the PSS-T Family of Systems (FoS) and a multitude of government-furnished sensors.

Full-Scale Testing Regimen: Conducting a complete series of Developmental Testing (DT) and Operational Testing (OT) events to validate system performance and safety.

Logistics and Training Overhaul: Creating an entirely new set of training materials and logistics support plans.

A conservative estimate for this effort, as detailed previously, is It is fiscally irresponsible to invest such sums into a capability supporting the PSS-T, a system is planned to start divestment this fiscal year. This would be a deliberate investment in a dead-end capability, directly contradicting prudent fiscal stewardship.

The projected timeline to field a replacement system through a competitive process is estimated at 6.5 to 10+ years. This timeline includes the phases of procurement, system analysis, development, integration, a multi-tiered testing and validation process, and the lengthy, high-risk process of achieving a new Authority to Operate (ATO) through the full Risk Management Framework (RMF).

This multi-year delay would create a catastrophic capability gap. The current contract for O&S services expires in May 2026. Upon expiration, the fielded PSDS2 systems would degrade and fail without OEM support. This would leave deployed forces in high-threat environments, including without the real-time threat detection and situational awareness capabilities they rely on for force protection. This gap represents a direct and sustained threat to the lives of U.S. service members. It is not a matter of simple inconvenience; it is the removal of a critical tool used to prevent attacks and save lives. The operational risk created by this gap is, by itself, sufficient reason to reject this alternative.

In summary, a full and open competition would fail to produce a true competitive outcome, would incur substantial and fiscally imprudent costs for a divesting system, and would most critically, create a multi-year capability gap that would place American lives at direct risk. It is an untenable and operationally reckless course of action.

Other Government Contract Vehicles: While a new task order could be placed against the DLA IDIQ SPRBL125D0006, it would still require a sole-source award to Raytheon. Leveraging another agency’s contract reduces the Army's control over administration and efficiency. A direct, sole-source award provides the most timely and controlled path to securing the required services.

c. Impact if Not Approved: Failure to approve this Extension of Services will have severe and immediate consequences, directly increasing the risk of mission failure and loss of life for deployed U.S. forces. The impacts are as follows:

An immediate cessation of Operations and Sustainment (O&S) services would occur upon the current contract's expiration in May 2026. The PSDS2 systems supporting missions would degrade and fail. Warfighters would lose the ability to exploit mission-critical video feeds, blinding them to developing threats and eliminating a key tool for force protection. This creates a direct and unacceptable risk to soldiers' lives.

Without OEM support, the systems will suffer from software obsolescence, unresolved hardware failures, and critical cybersecurity vulnerabilities. The ATO, which only Raytheon can effectively support for its proprietary system, would lapse, rendering the systems unauthorized for network connection and use.

The Army's significant historical investment in the PSDS2 platform would be lost.

The operational downtime would eventually force an emergency re-procurement, likely at a much higher cost and on a compressed, high-risk schedule.

In conclusion, given Raytheon's exclusive ownership of the required proprietary software, the lack of a viable TDP, the unacceptable cost and schedule impacts of competition for a divesting system, and the catastrophic impact on the mission, awarding an Extension of Services for sole-source contract is the only logical and responsible course of action to ensure the continued protection of U.S. forces.

Encore II Base/Op 1

HC1028-08-D-

2024/0004

Raytheon 19 September 2009

– 18 September

Exception to Fair Opportunity- 16.505(b)(2)(B), Award under Multiple Award Task Order Contract.

S3, W15P7T-06-D- E404/0003

Computer Sciences Corporation, subcontracte d to Raytheon

8 September 2006 – 28 September 2011

Exception to Fair Opportunity- 16.505(b)(2)(B), Award under Multiple Award Task Order Contract.

ATSP3, H94003-04-

D-0006/0058 Raytheon 20 September 2007

– 31 October 2008

Exception to Fair Opportunity- 16.505(b)(2)(B), Award under Multiple Award Task Order Contract.

ATSP3, H94003-04-

D-0006 / 0011 Raytheon 22 September 2005

– 31 March 2006

Exception to Fair Opportunity- 16.505(b)(2)(B), Award under Multiple Award Task Order Contract.

Base/Opt. 2/3 (P4P), DAAB07-03-D-B013-

Technical and Management Services

29 December 2004

– 30 January 2007

Exception to Fair Opportunity- 16.505(b)(2)(B), Award under Multiple Award Task Order Contract.

b. Other facts: N/A