JA_-_15-C070_-_W56KGY-15-C-0025_-_FBO.pdf

Control Number: 15-C070

JUSTIFICATION REVIEW DOCUMENT

FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

Program/Equipment: Depot-Level Sustainment Services for specified portions of Guardrail Common Sensors (GRCS) Receiving Set, Radio AN/ARW-88(V) and Auxiliary Ground Equipment (AGE) Van [Test Set, Flight Line AN/ARM-163(V) series]

Authority: 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(2) and FAR 6.302-2, “Unusual and Compelling Urgency.”

Amount:

Prepared By:

DSN:

Logistics Management Specialist Date Reviewed: 09/25/2015 Email:

Procuring Contracting Officer:

Michael Peduto DSN: 848-5362 Email: michael.p.peduto2.civ@mail.mil Date Reviewed: 09/25/2015

Technical Representative:

DSN:

Chief, EW Branch Date Reviewed: 09/28/2015 Email:

Requirements Representative:

DSN:

Logistics Management Specialist Date Reviewed: 09/25/2015 Email:

Reviews: I have reviewed this justification and find it adequate to support other than full and open competition.

Director, Intelligence Electronic Warfare and Sensors Logistics and Readiness Center

Email:

Signature:

Legal Counsel:

Signature:

JUSTIFICATION AND APPROVAL

FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

1. Contracting Activity:

Army Contracting Command - Aberdeen Proving Ground (ACC-APG) Attn: CCAP-CCC 6001 Combat Drive Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005

2. Description of Action: The proposed contract action is to issue letter contract W56KGY-15- C-0025 for twelve (12) months of depot-level repair, on-call technical assistance services, and reset for the Guardrail/Common Sensor (GRCS) Receiving Set, Radio AN/ARW-88(V) and Auxiliary Ground Equipment (AGE) Van to satisfy an urgent need to prevent a break in outside the continental United States (OCONUS) intelligence gathering missions. The contract value is estimated at . This estimate is based on the rough order of magnitude submitted by Blackhawk Management Corporation (BMC) on September 22, 2015. This contract will utilize Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 and 2016 Operations Maintenance, Army and Army Working Capital Funds. The period of performance is September 30, 2015 through September 29, 2016.

3. Description of Supplies/Services: The GRCS Receiving Set, Radio AN/ARW-88(V) Weapon System provides commanders with Army airborne

, direction finding and signals emitter location capabilities. A total of twenty (20) GRCS Receiving Set, Radio AN/ARW-88(V) Weapon Systems are fielded world-wide. GRCS Receiving Set, Radio AN/ARW-88(V) provide

. Due to the advanced age of several subsystems, which were first fielded in the 1980s, the GRCS Receiving Set, Radio AN/ARW-88(V) Weapon System and subsystems have experienced significant parts obsolescence. The Government is in the process of developing a replacement system for the Advance Quick Look (AQL) which provides the critical to GRCS; however, fielding of the replacement system is not expected Until that time, GRCS, and the AQL must continue to be supported, as only GRCS can meet current needs. The AGE Van is the preflight testing system and data link check for the GRCS Receiving Set, Radio AN/ARW-88(V) Weapon System and includes the vehicle chassis and drivetrain.

4. Authority Cited: The statutory authority permitting other than full and open competition is 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(2) and FAR 6.302-2, “Unusual and Compelling Urgency.”

5. Reason for Authority Cited: The proposed source is Blackhawk Management Corporation (BMC), CAGE Code: 0NLE0, 1335 Regents Park Drive, Suite 130, Houston, TX 77058-2541.

On September 22, 2015, the Director for Communications Electronics Command (CECOM) Logistics and Readiness Center requested ACC-APG to take immediate action to prevent a break in services for depot-level repair, on-call technical assistance services, and reset for the GRCS Receiving Set, Radio AN/ARW-88(V) and AGE Van. The GRCS Receiving Set, Radio AN/ARW-88(V) Weapon System is a low-density system with highly complex interactions of many different technologies that provides extremely critical intelligence that are vital to national security. The GRCS Receiving Set, Radio AN/ARW- 88(V) Weapon System is an enduring capability at the

. As GRCS planes are currently deployed and flying daily missions both on the failure to maintain the GRCS Receiving Set, Radio AN/ARW-88(V) Weapon System capability on the GRCS planes will jeopardize the . The GRCS Receiving Set, Radio AN/ARW-

88(V) Weapon System is currently being utilized heavily in OCONUS missions and the loss in

The GRCS system is highly classified at a Top Secret Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS SCI) level. All contractors who will be given access require TS SCI security clearance for the company and all personnel working on the system.

The classification requirements for this program are due to the sensitive nature of the capability for data collection within the GRCS and heightened by the data collected by these systems. Currently, there are over one-hundred and six

(106) items that need to repaired/reset. Failure to take action on these items jeopardizes the aircraft’s operational level as additional repairs and resets are expected to be required by the LRC over the next twelve (12) months. With the current items needing repair/reset and the projected additional repairs/resets required over this twelve (12) month period, failure to take immediate action will endanger the entire fleet from being fully mission capable. Losing the will result in the Government not receiving critical intelligence it uses in making decisions related to national security and military intelligence.

BMC has previously provided sustainment and repair efforts on the of the GRCS Receiving Set, Radio AN/ARW-88(V) Weapon System. Part of these requirements were addressing parts obsolescence issues. Previous efforts were accomplished beginning in the late 1990s on task orders under multiple contract vehicles, after the original developer of the went out of business. The government did not acquire the necessary technical data under these contract vehicles, nor does the government have a reasonable means to acquire the data under these expired contracts. As a result of these early efforts, several obsolescence solutions were developed by BMC for the entire system. BMC has identified an obsolescence solution and delivered that solution to roughly 30% of the fleet and the remaining systems will need these modifications/repairs over the life of this contract vehicle. Due to the Government’s lack of technical data, no other contractor could perform the reset/repairs, and address any potential obsolescence issues required to be resolved during repair/reset without significant non-recurring engineering costs and time. Even if the Government were able to obtain technical data sufficient to support a competition, a different source would require a significant and unacceptable, eighteen (18) month learning curve to gain proficiency in subsystem and component repair and establish a repair depot for this thirty (30) year old system. This coupled with the time to acquire new clearances would result in an unacceptable delays to this urgent requirement.

As the provider of sustainment services for the and through the previous sustainment vehicles, BMC has gained the necessary security clearances for its employees.

Use of another contractor would result in additional potential delays, not only for the proficiency lead time discussed above, but also delays in performance associated with obtaining necessary clearances. The time needed to obtain clearances for five (5) people could be in excess of a capability of all contractor support people.

Failure to acquire the proposed services will result in inoperable GRCS Receiving Set, Radio AN/ARW-88(V) Weapon Systems, which will degrade mission readiness, and may result in serious injury or loss of life to the Warfighter.

The AGE Van is the preflight testing system and data link check for the GRCS Receiving Set, Radio AN/ARW-88(V) Weapon System and includes the vehicle chassis and drivetrain. BMC’s possession of the technical knowledge, the complete and detailed technical data, as well as their role as the AQL integrator and sustainer, makes them the only vendor that can effectively sustain this equipment. Additionally, the AGE Van vehicle chassis and drivetrain maintenance must be conducted in a secure facility due to the sensitive nature of the equipment in the AGE Van. The AGE Van equipment cannot be removed from the system in order to allow unsecure maintenance to the chassis or drivetrain. Maintenance and support of the AGE Van is critical to ensure the repairs/resets are performed correctly and that there are no operational issues with GRCS Receiving Set, Radio AN/ARW-88(V) Weapon. Failure to maintain the AGE Van would result in the Government having to test the reset/repairs during a mission which increases risk to the ability to achieve the schedule mission. This increased risk jeopardizes the Government’s ability to gather its intelligence and achieve its mission.

The support required by the Government for this system requires extensive knowledge of the weapon system’s design and operation. When BMC became involved in providing sustainment and obsolescence management in the 1990s they augmented their technical capabilities by hiring individuals who had been involved in the system development and integration. This gave them unique knowledge and information in order to ensure all modifications and repairs made to equipment supporting the would function within the system. While the technical assistance is incidental, failure to maintain this assistance will result in unacceptable delays to achieving programmatic objectives that could jeopardize the success of Project Manager Sensors – Aerial Intelligence (PM SAI) and LRC. Failing to successfully meet its programmatic objectives will adversely impact how quickly PM SAI and LRC can provide solutions to the Warfighter. This will result in delays in providing materiel solutions and better capabilities to the Warfighter that can help them perform their missions more effectively and efficiently.

Until the replacement system is competitively procured, the current and AGE Van must be maintained. On August 13, 2015, the Government approved a follow-on sole source five-year requirements contract for depot-level repair, on-call technical assistance services, and Reset for portions of the Guardrail Common Sensors (GRCS) Receiving Set, Radio AN/ARW-88(V), and the AGE Van support to BMC, Cage Code: 1B7X9, 1322 Space Park Drive, Suite A-220, Houston, TX 77058, Phone: (832) 536-3712. Justification and Approval Control Number 15-C043 approved award to BMC as the only responsible source for such a requirements contract. However, recently

Any change in strategy would require most of the pre-award documents to be reworked. A milestone chart for the follow-on contract is depicted below:

Milestone Forecasted Date

Failure to select the right contract type could jeopardize the Government’s ability to field the AQL technology replacement, thus jeopardizing national security, and cost the taxpayer millions of dollars.

The proposed action will provide repair/refurbish/reset unserviceable parts, procure technical support, continue obsolescence management and execute any redesign associated with end of life/obsolete parts until the sole source follow-on contract action will be awarded.

6. Efforts to Obtain Competition: Due to the urgent and compelling urgency associated with this effort, no other source is capable of providing this support immediately. Based on the information contained in paragraph 5, no other source could perform these services during the period of performance without any operational impact to the OCONUS

. The Government has previously conducted market research, the details of which are contained in the Market Research section of this document. Efforts to alert other industry sources, who could potentially meet government requirements, have not yielded any further interest.

7. Actions to Increase Competition: The government did not acquire the necessary detailed technical documentation that describes all of the form, fit, and functional characteristics of the components in any previous contract, nor does the government have a reasonable means to acquire the data under these expired contracts. The Government only possesses system specification information and Level 2 drawings for Guardrail subsystem components pertinent to this effort, not a TDP that would enable another source to provide the required services.

Breaking out subsystems or components is not feasible for GRCS without providing the technical data because of the highly complex interactions of many different technologies in GRCS as identified in paragraph 5. The AQL technology is anticipated to be replaced The replacement requirement has been identified and funding has been programed by PM SAI and it is anticipated that procurement of the replacement system will be competitive. In the event of the redesign effort being required and approved, the Government will pursue the associated technical data /rights.

8. Market Research: Market research did not yield any additional viable sources. MARKET- SURVEY-5782-1 was posted successfully on 10 February 2015. Three contractors responded to the market survey, BMC, . , responded by email indicating did not have interest in performing the repair services in this solicitation. responded by email indicating that could build some of the cables, however, had no interest or ability to complete repair services of mission equipment, which is the requirement for this effort. BMC was the only contractor expressing an interest in the complete effort. In addition to the market research, the Sustainment Engineer supporting the CECOM LRC notified of the posting to Federal Business Opportunities on 10 February 2015. On 12 February 2015, the LRC spoke with on the phone. expressed that they did not feel that this effort was worthwhile for them. He said that did offer to serve as a pass through to BMC, but he opined that such would likely increase costs to the Government.

was the only other contractor that expressed interest in satisfying the Government’s requirements for this action, but via a subcontract to BMC.

9. Interested Sources: Three contractors responded to the market survey, one indicating no interest in performing the repair services, and one only indicating an interest and ability to build some cables. Only one source, BMC identified above, responded indicating an interest and ability to complete the entire effort. In accordance with FAR 5.202(a)(2), this effort is exempt from the synopsis requirements of FAR 5.201 as the Government would be seriously injured if the agency complies with the time periods specified in FAR 5.203. A redacted copy of this Justification and Approval will be posted on the FedBizOpps website in accordance with FAR 6.305(b).

10. Other Facts:

Procurement History: The Government has previously procured Guardrail component maintenance services through BMC. These services have been competed in the past between 1999-2004 and awarded to BMC under contract DAAB07-00-D-G751. Four competitive Task Orders were awarded, 17 May 2001, 1 May 2002, 18 August 2004 and 14 December 2004. BMC was the only contractor to submit a proposal for three of the competitive actions. On the fourth action, the one other bidder was rated technically unacceptable. Additionally, two orders were awarded on a sole source basis to Blackhawk under Contract Number DAAB07-03-G-L609 on 3 November 2003, and 17 August 2004, with a third sole source order to Blackhawk approved 17 March 2005.

Contract No: Award Date: Dollar Value: Contractor: Extent Competed W15P7T-06-D- W405 5-year IDIQ

15 Jun 2006 $23,000,000.00

Blackhawk Management Corporation (BMC) Cage Code 0NLE0 Small Business

Sole Source, 10 U.S.C.

2304(c)(1), FAR 6.302-1 Only one responsible source No. of offers: 1

P00003 3-yr Extension 12 May 2010 $24,000,000.00

$47,000,000.00 P00013 1-yr Extension 11 June 2014 $ 0.00

$47,000,000.00

The intial Justification and Approval, control number 05-139 (approved on May 18, 2005) and its revalidation (approved on February 2, 2006) for base IDIQ contract stated that the Guardrail weapon systems will need to be supported until the Aerial Common Sesnor (ACS) system is fielded in 2017. The ACS effort was awarded to

The Government reviewed the requirements and intended to re-solicit the ACS effort and make the system operational by 2016. However, this strategy never materialized. Justification and Approval, control number 14-018, under W15P7T-06-D-W405 stated the Government would continue to conduct market research to asecertain if there are any changes in the marketplace that would enable future actions for competition, however, it is anticipated that follow-on acquisitions will need to be conducted on a sole source basis. Without the technical data and the continued statements by the Program Office to replace the system, the level of investment required to sucessfully compete for this requirement make it an unattractive business decision to compete for this effort.

11. Technical Certification: I certify that the supporting data under my cognizance, which are included in this justification, are accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Date: 09/28/2015

Chief, PRD Branch Signature:

12. Requirements Certification: I certify that the supporting data under my cognizance, which are included in this justification, are accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Date: 09/28/2015

ILS Manager Signature:

13. Fair and Reasonable Cost Determination: I hereby determine that the anticipated price to the Government for this contract action will be fair and reasonable based on the availability of historical pricing, price analysis, cost analysis, and comparison of the proposed prices with an Independent Government Estimate. Certified cost or pricing data will be obtained.

Michael Peduto Date: 09/28/2015

Procuring Contracting Officer Signature:

E-Signed by PEDUTO.MICHAEL.P.1388034935 VERIFY authenticity with eSign Desktop

14. Procuring Contracting Officer Certification:

I certify that this justification is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Michael Peduto Date: 09/28/2015

Procuring Contracting Officer Signature:

E-Signed by PEDUTO.MICHAEL.P.1388034935 VERIFY authenticity with eSign Desktop