JA- Relocatable Building - Laughlin AFB - (Approved)_Redacted.pdf
PDF 989 KB Posted
- Attached to
- Sole Source Justification and Approval - Temporary Modular Office Facility (Laughlin AFB)
- Solicitation number
- W569QE-26-P-A005
- Issued by
-
Department of the Army
About this file
This is a Justification Review Document for a FAR Part 6 non-competitive sole-source procurement. The requiring activity is the 315th Engineer Battalion, Task Force Guardian (AO East), Joint Task Force-Southern Border at Laughlin Air Force Base, Texas. The contracting activity is the 922nd Contracting Battalion, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, with contracting oversight from the 410th Contracting Support Brigade, Fort Sam Houston, Texas.
The procurement seeks approval to award a $932,000 firm-fixed-price contract to Integrated Modular Solutions, LLC (CAGE: 69VG8, located in Bonham, Texas) for furnish and installation of one temporary modular office facility at Laughlin AFB in support of Joint Task Force-Southern Border operations. The contract includes a base period of performance from June 1, 2026 through May 31, 2027 ($150K) and four one-year options (Options 1-4 at $150K each) plus an FAR 52.217-8 period through December 30, 2031 ($75K), totaling $857K over the base and option periods. The government estimates total contract value at $932K and will fund this entirely through FY26 Operations and Maintenance Army (OMA) appropriations.
The justification for sole-source procurement centers on national security and operational continuity. The modular office trailer houses a classified Tactical Operations Center (TOC) with permanently integrated classified communications infrastructure, including SIPR/NIPR hardline drops, a Small Network Node operating on Starlink transport, crypto devices, and classified radios. The facility contains buried secure cables, utilities, and network pathways fully integrated into Laughlin AFB's base infrastructure. The contracting officer asserts that any vendor other than the incumbent would require complete dismantling and reconstruction of the facility, which would expose classified communications pathways and secure cabling, result in a minimum 20-day loss of secure command-and-control capability, and create unacceptable national security risks. The document notes that no technical data package or engineering documentation exists to allow alternative vendors safe access to the classified infrastructure, and no alternate SIPR-capable facility exists on Laughlin AFB or within the Del Rio sector. Market research identified 12 interested sources through a Sources Sought Notice posted April 9-15, 2026, however, the government determined no vendor can perform the requirement without operational disruption and classified infrastructure compromise. The incumbent contractor is a Woman-Owned Small Business (WOSB) and Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business (SDVOSB), though the requirement remains assigned to the 8(a) program. The contracting officer certified fair and reasonable pricing based on the previous contract pricing for the same requirement, same facility configuration, and same classified infrastructure support requirements.
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Text version
CUI//SP-PROCURE//FEDCON
Control Number:
CUI//SP-PROCURE//FEDCON
JUNE 2025
The facility is a controlled restricted area with buried secure cables, utilities, and network pathways. The proposed contractor is the only responsible source capable of providing continued support without dismantling or exposing classified systems. Any vendor other than the incumbent would be required to perform a full teardown and reconstruction of the RLB compound, which would directly expose classified communications pathways, secure cabling, and sensitive utility trenches. No technical data package or engineering documentation exists that would allow another vendor to safely access or modify the classified infrastructure without interrupting secure operations.
The RLB’s critical infrastructure is permanently integrated into Laughlin AFB’s base systems. The facility’s utilities, including water, electrical power, and sewer are fully tied into the installation’s infrastructure through buried conduits and secure utility trenches.
These connections were engineered specifically to support the battalion’s classified communications architecture and cannot be disconnected, rerouted, or reconstructed without exposing secure pathways and disrupting mission-critical systems. Because these utilities are physically integrated into the base and directly support SIPR/NIPR
, the facility cannot be dismantled or replaced without prolonged loss of secure command-and-control capability.
Market research confirms that no known vendors maintain cleared personnel capable of working inside an active classified environment without shutting down SIPR services. Relocation or reconstruction of the TOC would result in a minimum 20-day loss of secure command-and-control capability, which is an unacceptable delay in fulfilling the agency’s requirement risk under FAR 6.103-1(
There have been no significant changes since the previous procurement that would allow for full and open competition. The classified nature of the facility and the integrated secure infrastructure remain unchanged.
b. Alternatives:
1. Competitive Acquisition: A competitive action would require a new vendor to dismantle the existing modular trailer, expose classified cabling, and reconstruct the facility. This would shut down SIPR/NIPR services, expose secure pathways, and create unacceptable national-security risks. No alternative vendor possesses the required clearances or access to work within the classified environment without service interruption.
2. Use of In-House Government Resources: The Government does not possess the engineering, construction, or secure-facility technical capability to maintain or reconstruct the modular trailer without exposing classified systems. No organic unit within the 315th Engineer Battalion, 130th MEB, or JTF-SB has the required expertise or authority to modify classified infrastructure.
3. Suspension of Contract Support: Suspending support would immediately degrade the battalion’s ability to conduct secure mission command. The modular trailer is the
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CUI//SP-PROCURE//FEDCON
Control Number:
CUI//SP-PROCURE//FEDCON
JUNE 2025
only SIPR-capable facility available in the Del Rio sector. Loss of the TOC would eliminate the battalion’s ability to execute secure operations.
4. Relocation to Another Facility: No alternate SIPR-capable facility exists on Laughlin AFB or within the Del Rio sector. Establishing a new secure facility would require months of construction, new utility trenches, and installation of classified communications infrastructure, none of which can occur without exposing secure systems.
5. Extension of the Current Contract: An extension is not viable because the requirement is for continued uninterrupted use of the existing RLB under a new period of performance. The current contract expires on 31 MAY 2026. The incumbent remains the only responsible source capable of providing this support without compromising classified systems.
c. Impact if not approved: If this justification is not approved, the Government will be required to pursue competitive action that would necessitate dismantling the existing RLB TOC. Doing so would expose SIPR and NIPR cabling and secure communication pathways, shut down all classified communications for a minimum of twenty days, and eliminate the battalion’s only secure mission-command node. This disruption would significantly increase the risk of spillage or compromise of classified systems and would expose the secure network architecture to uncleared vendor personnel. The resulting loss of secure command-and-control capability would cause substantial operational degradation to JTF-SB and the 315th Engineer Battalion and could lead to mission failure. These consequences represent unacceptable national-security risks and unacceptable delays in fulfilling the agency’s requirements under FAR 6.103-1( and would directly jeopardize ongoing operations. Therefore, failure to approve this justification would result in mission degradation, increased security vulnerabilities, and operational delays that cannot be mitigated.
7. Efforts to Obtain Competition: The Contracting Officer will publish the notices required by FAR 5.101 and any responses received shall be considered.
Responses were received from vendors in response to the Sources Sought Notice posted on SAM.gov from 10-15 Apr 2026 ; however, effective competition is not expected among these respondents. Although required notices will be posted in accordance with FAR 5.101, the classified and fully integrated nature of the existing facility prevents any vendor other than the incumbent from performing the required work without dismantling or exposing classified systems. Such actions would result in the loss of security control capability and create unacceptable national security risks.
Any transition to a new vendor would require dismantling and reconstructing the RLB TOC, resulting in a minimum 20-day interruption of SIPR/NIPR services. This delay would jeopardize ongoing operations and degrade the battalion’s ability to maintain secure mission-command functions. Therefore, while market research identified interested vendors, no vendor can perform the requirement without causing operational disruption and compromising classified infrastructure.
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