EXHIBIT H - Security Classification Guides.pdf
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This document outlines a federal contract opportunity for fleet management services. The Army Materiel Command Contracting Command at Redstone Arsenal is soliciting proposals for services and resources required to plan, analyze, establish, operate and sustain wholesale forward supply activities located at Fort Bliss, Texas and Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The scope of work includes full spectrum material management tasks associated with managing, operating and overseeing these forward wholesale depot activities. The solicitation is set aside for Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Businesses and will cover an initial one-year base requirement for CONUS operations plus a deployment option, as well as four one-year options and a six-month bridge extension. Responses are due in early January 2021 as specified in the solicitation, which will follow the AMCOM Best Value contracting process as outlined in Sections B, F, H, L and M.
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (BMD) RADARS
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE (SCG)
July 22, 2013
Change 1, April 25, 2017
Distribution statement D applies. Distribution authorized to the Department of Defense and U.S. DoD contractors for administrative and operational use. Distribution limits are effective immediately. Other requests for this document shall be referred to Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Research, Development and Acquisition Security Division.
This document contains information that may be exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE – This document contains Controlled Unclassified Information and must be destroyed In Accordance With (IAW) requirements in paragraph 13.f.(2).
Local Reproduction of this document is authorized only in its entirety.
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Radars
Security Classification Guide (SCG)
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
INTERIM CHANGE NOTICE ROSTER
Identification of Correction or Change Date of Change Date of Entry Entered By Approved By
Change 1 April 25, 2017 April 25, 2017 MDA/EIR VADM J. D. Syring
BMDS RADARS SCG, TO INCLUDE CHANGE 1, CONSISTS OF 135 PAGES.
NOTE: A dark vertical line shown in the border indicates the topic area affected by changes. Renumbering topics due to additional classification are considered administrative and will not be reflected as a change.
FOREWORD
i
1. DESCRIPTION. The Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Sensors (SN) Directorate
(MDA/SN) mission is to develop, test, acquire, deploy, and sustain BMD radars for detection, tracking, and discrimination of ballistic missile threats. Key components of SN include: Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs), COBRA DANE (CD) Radar, Army/Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance and Control Series 2 (AN/TPY-2) Forward Based Mode (FBM) or Terminal Mode
(TM), Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR), and the Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX). Aboard the SBX, the missile defense radar is called the X-Band Radar (XBR). The SN Program Director manages this effort. (Ch 1)
The Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs) and COBRA DANE (CD) Radar are existing sensors that have been modified to perform the BMD mission in addition to their current legacy missions. In addition to this guide, the CD is jointly covered by the COBRA DANE Security Classification and Declassification Guide (SCDG). Similarly, the UEWR is also covered by the Air Force Space Command Ground-Based Radar Missile Warning Systems (GBRMWS) SCG. In the event of a conflict between these two documents, the existing COBRA DANE or UEWR Security Classification Guide takes precedence unless the topic is unique to Ballistic Missile Defense. If the topic is unique to Ballistic Missile Defense, this guide takes precedence with regard to the topic.
The classified aspects of the BMDS Sensors mission are identified in this guide as required by Enclosure 4, Paragraph 8, of
DoDM 5200.01 “DoD Information Security Program.” Security Classification Guides (SCGs) are required for all systems, plans, programs, and projects in which classified information is involved. This guide prescribes levels of classification and appropriate declassification instructions for specific information and activities associated with the BMDS Sensors Directorate, and any future
BMDS sensor technologies and components. This SCG provides additional guidance concerning the protection of related sensitive information as prescribed by United States Statutes, Presidential Executive Orders, Department of Defense (DoD) Directives and
Instructions, and Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Publications and Policies. Users should become familiar with information and guidance provided or referenced in this guide. Applied properly, this guide will help personnel understand and apply good security practices, preclude inadvertent compromise of critical defense capabilities, reduce unnecessary acquisition costs, and potentially save lives when Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems are employed.
2. AUTHORITY. The Director, MDA, holds delegated authority from the Secretary of Defense to exercise TOP SECRET (TS)
Original Classification Authority (OCA) and to establish security classification policy and guidance over all MDA funded technology, development, and acquisition programs. The Director, MDA, is responsible for BMD programmatic policy, requirements, priorities, systems, resources, and programs, and is further responsible and accountable for research, development, and transition of BMD systems to the Military Departments and combatant command operations. This SCG is issued pursuant to E.O. 13526, DoD Directive
5134.09, DoDM 5200.01, MDA Instruction 5530.01-INS and MDA 5230.02-INS. (Ch 1)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
iii
INTERIM CHANGE NOTICE REGISTER .......................................................................................................................................... i
FOREWORD.............................................................................................................................................................................................. i
1. DESCRIPTION............................................................................................................................................................................. i
2. AUTHORITY ............................................................................................................................................................................... i
3. INTERIM CHANGES ................................................................................................................................................................. ii
4. SUPERSESSIONS ....................................................................................................................................................................... ii
5. EFFECTIVE DATE ..................................................................................................................................................................... ii
6. CHANGE 1 EFFECTIVE DATE ................................................................................................................................................ ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................................................................................ iii
SECTION I - GENERAL
1. PURPOSE
2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
3. OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY
4. CLASSIFICATION POLICY
5. OPERATIONS SECURITY
6. PUBLIC RELEASE
7. UNCLASSIFIED TECHNICAL DATA
8. FOREIGN DISCLOSURE
9. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY MARKINGS
10. USING SECTION II - TOPICS OF CLASSIFICATION
11. SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
12. REPRODUCTION AND DISSEMINATION
13. SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
iv
SECTION II - TOPICS OF CLASSIFICATION
100 Program Management
200 Systems Information
300 System Engineering and Requirements
400 Deployment
500 Software
600 Product Improvement
700 Sensors
800 Operations
900 Simulations (Including Hardware-In-The-Loop [HWIL])
1000 Test and Evaluation
1050 Factory Test
1100 System Exercises, Training, and Training Support Material/Devices
1200 Facilities (Operations and Design Features)
1300 Logistics, Product Assurance, and Safety
1400 Countermeasures
1500 System Survivability
1600 COMSEC
TABLE OF CONTENTS
v
1700 Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
SECTION III - ATTACHMENTS ...................................................................................................................................................... A-1
ATTACHMENT A - ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................................................. A-1
ATTACHMENT B - DEFINITIONS ................................................................................................................................................B-1
ATTACHMENT C - REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................................C-1
ATTACHMENT D - CLASSIFICATION DIAGRAM ................................................................................................................... D-1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
vi
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SECTION I - GENERAL
1. PURPOSE
To provide uniform security classification guidance for the management and protection of BMD Radar information.
2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
This guide should be cited as the basis for derivative classification, re-grading, or declassification of information and material associated with BMD Radars. It provides classification guidance and sets the minimum classification levels and durations to be used.
It is to be used in conjunction with related BMDS, Element, and Component classification guides and guidance documents. It complies with Executive Orders, United States Statutes and related DoD guidance. Related reference documents are listed in Section
III at Attachment C.
3. OFFICE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY
This guide is issued by the MDA. The Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) providing the technical expertise to develop this security classification guide is the MDA BMDS Sensors Directorate (SN). The MDA Technical Intelligence Directorates (DE/I)
Program Protection Division (EIR) staff coordinates proposed security classification policy for consistency and uniformity across all
BMDS Elements and Components. All inquiries concerning content, interpretations, and clarifications of this SCG shall be forwarded to the MDA Security and Program Protection Division (EIR), Assistant Director for Information Safeguards for subsequent staffing to
MDA/SN as appropriate. Classification challenges shall be forwarded to MDA Information Safeguards at the address below for staffing within the MDA and a subsequent decision by the OCA, if needed.
Missile Defense Agency Telephone (Commercial): (256) 313-9287
ATTN: MDA/Information Safeguards DSN: 897-2457
Bldg 5222, Martin Road
Redstone Arsenal, AL 35898
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4. CLASSIFICATION POLICY
a. In recent years, MDA has made significant progress extending the technological base for BMD. The accelerated development of the BMDS has been accomplished using a strategy of open cooperation with the scientific community, both domestic and international, when possible. The sharing of fundamental research information has provided numerous success stories for the public and private sectors as well as for BMD.
b. While MDA is committed to keeping fundamental research unclassified and available to a broad community where possible, it must also protect certain information within the research, development, testing, and evaluation process related to military operational capabilities, performance of planned or developing systems, and unique technologies critical to the BMDS. These protective actions are necessary to deny adversaries information regarding U.S. capabilities and intentions, which would permit them to modify their military systems and plans in ways that lessen the effectiveness of U.S. defense systems and undermine U.S.
investments in the acquisition of these systems.
c. Classification Challenges: Any authorized holder of national security information who has substantial reason to believe that certain information is improperly or unnecessarily classified is encouraged to challenge that classification and bring about corrective action [See Enclosure 2, section 3 of MDA Instruction 5200.02-INS, Information Security Program]. The challenge may be initiated either informally or formally. Informal questioning of a classification is encouraged before resorting to a formal challenge.
Regardless of form, all challenges will be considered as good faith attempts to improve our processes and no retribution will be tolerated against any Government or contractor employee who comes forward with such a request. Questions regarding the challenge process should be referred to MDA Information Safeguards.
d. Classification Duration: At the time of original classification, the original classification authority will establish a specific date or event for declassification based upon the duration of the national security sensitivity of the information. Upon reaching the date or event, the information shall be automatically declassified. If the original classification authority cannot determine an earlier specific date or event for declassification, information shall be marked for declassification 10 years from the date of the original decision. Unless otherwise noted in the “DECLASS” column, all classified items will remain classified for twenty-five (25) years from the date of the creation of the new document.
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5. OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC)
a. OPSEC will be applied to all MDA activities supporting the development, testing, deployment, transition, and operation of the BMDS.
b. OPSEC is a process that identifies and mitigates adversarial risk to our operations by looking at our operations through the eyes of our adversaries. The application of the OPSEC methodology includes identifying critical information, analyzing threats and vulnerabilities, analyzing and assessing adversarial risk, and implementing OPSEC measures that reduce this risk.
c. The MDA OPSEC Program foundation was built based on policies and directives found in National Security Decision
Directive Number 298, “The National OPSEC Program” and in DoD Directive 5205-2, “The DoD OPSEC Program,” and is promulgated by the MDA OPSEC Support Staff via the MDA OPSEC Program Instruction, MDA-5205.02-INS, which describes in detail MDA OPSEC policies, roles, responsibilities, and resources.
d. The MDA OPSEC Support Staff is dedicated to improving the overall MDA OPSEC posture by providing Agency-wide
OPSEC guidance, assistance, training, and awareness. Additionally, the MDA OPSEC Support Staff maintains OPSEC awareness and training resources available on the MDA OPSEC Homepage located on the MDA Enterprise Web Portal. For OPSEC guidance and assistance, you may contact either your appointed MDA Program/Element OPSEC Coordinator (719) 721-0732, the MDA
OPSEC Support Staff HSV/NCR (256) 313-9544, or COS (719) 721-7907.
6. PUBLIC RELEASE
a. The fact that this guide shows certain details of information to be unclassified does not allow automatic public release of the information. In addition to the defense classification system, there are other reasons why information may not be releasable. The
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) authorizes certain protections and is covered below in Paragraph 11 of this Section. Certain public laws, including the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, and the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended, also restrict release of certain types of unclassified technical data.
b. All information pertaining to the Sensors Program that is proposed for public release must undergo a formal security classification and policy review process and obtain official public release authorization before the information is released into the public domain. The recommendation to release BMDS information to the public falls within the purview of MDA officials having
SECTION I - GENERAL
cognizance for the subject matter at issue. DoD Directive 5230.09, “Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release,” governs the security classification and policy review process for obtaining official public release approval. The cognizant DoD Public Affairs office will make the final public release determination and approval. The public release review process will be initiated through respective public affairs offices as follows:
(1) Civilian and military employees assigned to the MDA will initiate the public release security and policy review process with the staff of the MDA Public Affairs Directorate (MDA/PA), (571) 231-8211.
(2) MDA civilian and military employees assigned to geographically separated organizations will initiate the public release security and policy review process through the DoD Component Public Affairs office supporting their activities. The supporting
Public Affairs (PA) office must forward information proposed for public release to MDA/PA for additional processing and coordination.
(3) MDA contractor personnel should enter the public release process according to the provisions of the applicable contract governing public release processing (normally through the Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) to MDA/PA).
(4) All other requests for courtesy public release security and policy review of MDA equities will be forwarded to the
Washington Headquarters Services Office for Freedom of Information and Security Review (571) 372-0462.
c. MDA/PA will assure appropriate coordination with the cognizant official public release authority prior to the release of any information belonging to other DoD Components that is proposed for public release by MDA civilian, military, or DoD contractor authors.
d. Information submitted for public release requires 10 business days minimum for review once submitted to PA. Reviews may take 30 or more business days depending on amount of information, reviewers needed, and priority work. Accelerated reviews can only be performed for MDA senior leadership and may be dependent on concurrent review workload, as well as priority work.
Transmittal letters must also identify the contract number, type of materials, proposed use, and valid suspense date, if applicable.
Internal distribution of the material must be limited and strictly controlled until the review process is complete. The term
“information” includes, but is not limited to, news articles, contract announcements, advertisements, brochures, photographs, motion picture films, scripts, technical papers, speeches, displays, briefings, etc., on any aspect of the MDA, BMDS, or BMDS Sensors
Program. Contractor personnel will refer to the public release clause in section H in their contract(s) for further guidance. All material
SECTION I - GENERAL
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
reviewed and cleared for public release shall be marked with the Distribution Statement A and the MDA review identification. Review identification will be provided in the public release authorization.
e. Prior coordination with MDA/PA is required for replies to queries and/or proposed visits by news media representatives to contractor or operating facilities when the subject of interest involves the BMDS or equities for which MDA has cognizance.
f. Amendments to, additions of new material to, or an entire revision of information previously cleared for public release constitutes “new” information that must again be submitted for official public release review and approval as outlined above prior to being released into the public domain. Further, the issue of compilation must be considered whenever two previously approved documents, or major portions thereof, are combined. In all cases where potential sensitivity arises from the newly combined information, the material must be re-submitted for official public release review and approval.
g. (FOUO) The accuracy of information that appears in the public media without having been officially released by the
Department of Defense or other U.S. Government activity must be neither confirmed nor denied until it has been cleared for official public release through the process outlined above.
h. (FOUO) Information that is either derivatively classified or identified as requiring protection in accordance with these instructions cannot be considered for release into the public domain until:
(1) The information has been evaluated and approved for declassification by cognizant authority, if applicable; and
(2) The information has been reviewed and cognizant authority has determined that the information is no longer exempt from mandatory disclosure to the public.
7. UNCLASSIFIED TECHNICAL DATA
a. The Secretary of Defense has statutory authority (10 U.S.C. 130) to either disseminate to the public or withhold unclassified technical data with military or space applications. In general, under applicable statutes and regulations, unclassified technical data may be withheld from public disclosure when all of the following criteria are met: 1) it is in the possession of or under the control of the Department of Defense; 2) it has military or space application; 3) it may not be exported lawfully without an approval, authorization or license under U.S. export control laws; and 4) it discloses critical technology.
b. DoD Directive 5230.25, “Withholding of Unclassified Technical Data from Public Disclosure,” contains procedures for reviewing unclassified U.S. DoD scientific and technical information proposed for public disclosure. DoD Instruction 5230.24, “Distribution Statements on Technical Documents,” contains procedures for applying distribution statements and export control warning notices which limit dissemination on appropriate materials. The state of U.S. foreign relations may have since changed, but the continuing threat of economic and military espionage to national security makes vigilant application of these procedures just as important today as when the directive was written.
c. The BMDS Sensors Program is deeply involved in advanced technology, much of which is critically important to future defense systems, even though it may be unclassified. The directives cited in paragraph 9.b. above establish requirements for protecting such technology from uncontrolled public disclosure. At the same time, they provide mechanisms for supplying the data to qualified U.S. contractors or institutions for such legitimate purposes as performing on contracts, bidding on contracts, or conducting scientific research. Persons working with BMDS information and technical documents must be familiar with safeguarding procedures and restrictions in DoDD 5230.25 and DoDI 5230.24.
8. FOREIGN DISCLOSURE
a. Foreign disclosure (oral and/or visual disclosure and documentary release) is the conveying of Classified Military
Information (CMI) or Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), in any manner, to an authorized representative of a foreign government or international organization. DoD Directive 5230.11, “Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign
Governments and International Organizations,” June 16, 1992, provides guidance on all aspects of foreign disclosure. Furthermore, MDA Instruction 5230.02-INS, “International Security”, establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) review and disclosure of U.S. classified military information (CMI) and controlled unclassified information (CUI) to foreign governments and international organizations, for foreign visits and assignments to MDA, for technology transfer, and for munitions export/import licensing.
b. The Director, MDA, reports directly to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) [USD
(AT&L)]. As the Acquisition Executive for the BMDS, the Director, MDA, has total management responsibility, to include original classification and foreign disclosure authority for all MDA funded programs as specified in DoD Directive 5134.09, “Missile Defense
Agency (MDA).” In accordance to the Delegation of Disclosure Authority Letter (DDL) for the Director, International Affairs, (MDA/DI), dated 9 March 2012, the Director, MDA, delegates foreign disclosure authority to the Director, International Affairs as the
SECTION I - GENERAL
MDA Designated Disclosure Authority (MDA DDA). This delegation is for MDA-originated CUI, and MDA-originated CMI up to the SECRET level, for all programs and activities of the developmental Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). This authority includes all programs and activities transferred to MDA, and all other MDA-funded activities. The Director, MDA, is the single authority for the oral and visual disclosure, and documentary release of MDA-originated TOP SECRET CMI. Finally, a DoD component possessing delegated disclosure authority from MDA may disclose MDA information in compliance with the authorities and limitations of the specific DDL.
c. Planners must consider and determine the extent to which CMI and CUI may need to be shared with other nations, international organizations, or foreign entities/corporations. Prior to any anticipated international participation (i.e., cooperative research, development, or testing; co-production; or sale), an appropriate Program Security Instruction, Technology
Assessment/Control Plan (TA/CP), and Delegation of Disclosure Authority Letter shall be developed in accordance with DoDD
5530.3, International Agreements, and in coordination with MDA/DIS and MDA Research, Development and Acquisition Security
Division.
d. BMDS Classified Military Information (CMI) or CUI will only be disclosed or released to foreign nationals after being specifically authorized in writing by the MDA principal disclosure authority (PDA); their designated disclosure authority (DDA)
/foreign disclosure officer; or to those holding a delegation of disclosure authority letter (DDL) granted by the MDA DDA.
e. Any military activity receiving a request for MDA/SN information from a foreign government or international organization, or its representatives, will forward the request to its respective Foreign Disclosure Office. All such requests will be expeditiously forwarded to MDA/DIS, Bldg 5222, Martin Road, Redstone Arsenal, AL 35898, for initial foreign disclosure review and approval processing. Similarly, requests for MDA/SN information received by a defense contractor from a foreign government or international organization, or its representatives, should be referred through the respective Contracting Officer Representative (COR) to MDA/DIS.
Such requests received by subcontractors will be routed through the respective prime or associate contractor and the COR to
MDA/DIS. All MDA requests for FD of CMI and CUI must be submitted to the MDA International Security Division (DIS) with no less than 10 business days allotted for internal MDA review and no less than 20 business days for requests requiring external agency review, and must include a clearly-defined benefit to U.S. policy objectives.
f. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) establishes guidelines for restricting the proliferation of missiles, unmanned air vehicles, and related technology for those systems capable of carrying a 500 kilogram payload 300 kilometers or more, as well as systems intended for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Items subject to control include complete rocket systems and subsystems (ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles and sounding rockets) and unmanned air vehicle systems and
SECTION I - GENERAL
subsystems (cruise missiles and drones). Questions concerning application or interpretation of the MTCR should be referred to the
General Counsel (MDA/GC).
g. Requests for release of classified or unclassified MDA BMDS oral, visual, and/or documentary information at meetings where attendance by foreign nationals is planned/anticipated shall be submitted to MDA/DIS for appropriate foreign disclosure coordination and approval processing. Meetings include working meetings, symposia, seminars, conferences, etc. One final copy of the material proposed for disclosure must be submitted to MDA/DIS with no less than 20 business days allotted for internal MDA review and no less than 30 business days for requests requiring external agency review, prior to the proposed presentation date.
h. Foreign participation in or observation of tests, exercises, war games, and modeling/simulations activities bring additional foreign disclosure coordination and international security issues that require adequate preparation time to prepare tailored Delegated
Disclosure Lists (DDL), Foreign Disclosure Guidelines (FDG), and appropriate security plans at each affected site.
i. Requests from MDA government sponsors to DIS to provide one-time or case-by-case International Traffic in Arms
Regulation (ITAR) exemption coverage to contractors performing work on behalf of MDA require 20 business days for review, coordination, and approval, once submitted. More time may be required if the disclosure review is not yet completed. DIS will consider ITAR exemption requests for longer periods: up to 90 days for the first 6 months of any government requirement or direction.
After this time, further ITAR exemptions may be approved only if the contractor has a licensing application on file with the U.S.
Department of State.
9. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) AND FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO) MARKINGS
a. The Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) provides access to government data and records by virtually any person or organization, foreign or domestic. The opportunity for Americans to understand how their government operates and what data it maintains is an important right. While the FOIA recognizes the requirement for “openness” in our society, it also provides nine exemptions that are used to justify withholding information from mandatory disclosure to the public. The nine FOIA exemption categories are:
(1) Records currently and properly classified in the interest of national security;
(2) Records related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of the DoD or any of the DoD Components.
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(3) Records protected by another law or statute that specifically exempts the information from public release;
(4) Trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a private source which would cause substantial competitive harm to the source if disclosed;
(5) Internal records that are deliberative in nature and are part of the decision making process that contain opinions and recommendations;
(6) Records which if released would result in a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) Investigatory records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes;
(8) Records for the use of any agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; and
(9) Records containing geological and geophysical information (including maps) concerning wells.
b. FOIA requests will be processed in FOIA channels as prescribed in: DoD Directive 5400.7, “DoD Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) Program” and MDA Instruction 5400.02-INS, “Freedom of Information Act” (as revised or changed, respectively).
Exempted information shall be marked “For Official Use Only” (FOUO) at the time of creation and safeguarded in accordance with
DoDM 5200.01 Volume 4. The DoDM 5200.01 provides marking rules for classified and unclassified records containing information that is considered FOUO.
c. Any person who creates, uses, or handles government information must understand what information is legally considered sensitive and authorized to be withheld. This information is designated “Controlled Unclassified Information” in Volume 4 of DoDM
5200.01. For Official Use Only (FOUO) information is the standard DoD category for Controlled Unclassified Information. Other categories used by other U.S. government agencies are listed and explained in Volume 4 of DoDM 5200.01. Failure to adequately safeguard exempted unclassified information can violate export laws and compromise individual privacy and proprietary information agreements. Personnel are subject to administrative, civil and criminal sanctions for failing to safeguard exempted information.
Failure to understand and accurately apply protective efforts for this information can have serious consequences by not protecting against public confusion that might result from disclosure of reasons and rationales that were not in fact ultimately the grounds for an agency's action, degrading program protection and operations security efforts; and necessitating costly expenditures to mitigate adversary threat systems.
d. Each government, military, and contractor employee has a critical role in helping identify and protect FOUO information.
Each individual must be familiar with the relevant FOIA exemptions, so they can accurately identify when the FOUO marking must be applied. Proper FOUO markings help personnel understand what specific information is exempt under FOIA and help protect this material if it is requested under the FOIA, even after declassification.
10. USING SECTION II - TOPICS OF CLASSIFICATION
a. Section II provides specific original classification determinations regarding MDA BMDS information and assigns the required level of protection for each Topic of Classification, plus related declassification and other protective marking instructions and explanatory remarks. By following the guidance and instructions provided in Section II, personnel can have confidence that they will be appropriately protecting and marking documents under derivative classification review.
b. The “CLASS” (classification) entry identifies the highest classification level assigned to information set forth in the
“TOPIC” column. Authorized abbreviated classification markings for classified MDA information include: TS = TOP SECRET; S =
SECRET; C = CONFIDENTIAL; AND U = UNCLASSIFIED. Additional protective markings and information are indicated in the
“REMARKS” column, and may include special notices such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Restricted Data (RD), Formerly Restricted Data (FRD), Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information (CNWDI), DoD Unclassified Controlled Nuclear
Information (DoD UCNI), Cryptographic Information (CRYPTO), Department of Energy (DOE) UCNI, For Official Use Only
(FOUO), and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).
c. The Reason for Classification column explains why the topic is classified. The following acceptable reasons for classifying information are specified at Section 1.4 of Executive Order 13526. They are:
(1) 1.4 (a): Military plans, weapons system, or operations;
(2) 1.4 (b): Foreign government information;
(3) 1.4 (c): Intelligence activities (including covert action), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology;
(4) 1.4 (d): Foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources;
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(5) 1.4 (e): Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security;
(6) 1.4 (f): United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
(7) 1.4 (g): Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans or protection services relating to the national security, or
(8) 1.4 (h): The development, production, or use of weapons of mass destruction.
d. The level of damage (“damage,” “serious damage,” or “exceptionally grave damage”) to the national security expected in the event of an unauthorized disclosure of information determines the level of classification. If “damage” to the national security can be expected, then information should be classified CONFIDENTIAL. If “serious damage” to the national security can be expected, then information should be classified SECRET. If “exceptionally grave damage” to the national security can be expected, then information should be classified TOP SECRET. The classification decision flow chart at Attachment D illustrates the process used by an original classification authority to determine the proper level of classification. This process may also be used to establish a minimum level of protection for information believed to be classified until an appropriate derivative or original classification determination can be made.
e. Determining the appropriate classification of information or material, in any form, is based on an evaluation that considers all applicable items in this SCG. Classified information will be protected at the highest level consistent with Executive Order 13526, and this SCG. Individual items of information may warrant a lower classification level than when the information is combined with other information elements. Even individual items of unclassified information may become classified when compiled with other elements of information. Security classification in each specific case must be determined by consideration of all applicable elements.
Any changes from classification levels assigned in this SCG will require written approval from the MDA OCA.
f. The “DECLASS” (declassification instructions) entry specifies how long the classification shall remain in effect. Unless otherwise noted in the “DECLASS” column, all classified items will remain classified for twenty-five (25) years from the date of the creation of the new document.
g. Information classified according to this guide is considered derivatively classified. When individuals incorporate, paraphrase, restate, or generate classified information in a new form, they must use diligence in identifying and documenting the exact classification of that information. Personnel should determine whether their paraphrasing, restating, or summarizing of classified
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information has removed all or part of the basis for classification and mark the information according to information security guidelines in DoDM 5200.01-V2. Personnel who apply derivative classifications must:
(1) Observe and respect original classification decisions;
(2) Verify the information's current level of classification as far as practical before applying the markings; and
(3) Carry forward to any newly created documents the pertinent classification markings, the assigned dates or events for declassification, and a listing of the source document on, or attached to, the official file or record copy.
h. Decisions to declassify or downgrade MDA information must be coordinated with MDA Information Safeguards. Unless delegated in writing by the OCA, only the cognizant OCA may exercise declassification/downgrading authority. The decision to declassify or downgrade must not occur until coordination with all cognizant organizations (i.e. those who may be adversely affected by such a decision) is completed. The information, once declassified or downgraded, must not jeopardize U.S. national security interests and must not provide a potential U.S. adversary a military or economic advantage, which could counter U.S. national security concerns.
i. Information that derives its classification from this SCG or other classified documents will be marked in accordance with
DoDM 5200.01-V2.
11. SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
a. Government patent applications will be handled by standard practices. DoD contractors under contract with the BMDS
Sensors Program will submit all patent applications through the Contracting Officer for determination of the appropriate classification level and coordination/approval by MDA.
b. Classified transmissions shall be addressed to commanders or officials in charge of specific activities or facilities.
Furthermore, classified mailing to contractor facilities require written verification of facility clearances and storage capabilities with the Defense Security Service, Central Verification Activity, 600 10th Street, Fort Meade, MD 20755 (Phone: 888-282-7682; Fax:
301-833-3912). Classified mail procedures should be in accordance with DoDM 5200.01-V3.
SECTION I - GENERAL
c. Transmissions of CUI shall be handled as FOUO until official public release is approved in accordance with MDA
Instruction 5200.02-INS and DoD Directive 5230.09. FOUO documents and materials may be transmitted via first class mail, parcel post or in bulk shipments using fourth-class mail.
(1) (FOUO) Electronic transmission of CUI (voice, facsimile, and data) shall be only over secure communications circuits approved for transmission of such information. Only when secure communications circuits are not readily available to satisfy urgent mission requirements may CUI be transmitted using non-secure communications. Additional protection for FOUO information is contained in MDA Directive 5200.01, DoDM 5200.01-V4, and MDA Directive 8190.01.
(2) Use of public World Wide Web (WWW) sites to display information without restrictions constitutes public release. All of the procedures described in paragraph 8, Public Release, must be followed prior to posting official BMDS information on any publicly accessible web site. Use of the Web must include comprehensive risk management procedures to ensure mission benefits gained are carefully balanced against potential security risks created. DoD policy and requirements for use of the Web are contained in the Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, “Information Vulnerability and the World Wide Web,” dated September 24, 1998, and the DoD “Web Site Administration Policies and Procedures,” dated November 25, 1998.
d. Notification of Compromise. The compromise or possible compromise of classified information will be processed immediately in accordance with the following applicable directive: MDA Instruction 5200.02-INS.
e. Movement of Classified Material. The movement of classified MDA BMDS material will be accomplished in accordance with the following applicable directives DoDM 5200.01-V3 and MDA Instruction 5200.02-INS..
f. Destruction of Material. When material is no longer needed or requires destruction, the following guidelines apply:
(1) Classified material must be destroyed using procedures in Enclosure 3, Volume 3 of DoDM 5200.01.
(2) In accordance with Enclosure 3, Volume 3 of DoDM 5200.01 and DoD Instruction 5230.24, when no longer needed, FOUO/CUI shall be destroyed in a manner to reasonably assure destruction beyond recognition and reconstruction. The following destruction methods are authorized: burning; pulping; pulverizing; shredding; or tearing by hand.
12. REPRODUCTION AND DISSEMINATION
SECTION I - GENERAL
a. Local reproduction of this document is authorized only in its entirety for use by activities involved in the MDA BMDS.
When the document is locally reproduced, users must assure that proper front and back covers are appropriately applied.
b. Dissemination is limited to the Department of Defense, and U.S. DoD contractors and their subcontractors. Security classification guides are exempt from disclosure to the public under Exemption Three, Five and Seven of the Freedom of Information
Act (5 U.S.C. 552). This guide is marked For Official Use Only and must be safeguarded according to DoDM 5200.01-V4. This
SCG contains official CUI and must be destroyed as classified waste (see paragraph 13.f (2) above).
13. SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM (SAP)
a. In exceptional cases, even the strictest application of need-to-know will not provide adequate security, and Special Access controls must be applied. A special access program is a program of activity that employs enhanced security measures to:
(1) Prevent the loss of technology advances.
(2) Protect manufacturing breakthroughs and state-of-the-art technology.
(3) Gain military advantage and maintain our superiority of the future.
(4) Delay adversarial knowledge as long as possible.
b. The requirements for SAPs are set forth in E.O. 13526, DoDD 5205.07, DoDI 5205.11, and DoDM 5205.07-V1-V4. Per
E.O. 13526, such programs may be established only when it is clearly shown that:
(1) The vulnerability of, or threat to, specific information is exceptional;
(2) The normal criteria for determining eligibility for access applicable to information classified at the same level are not deemed sufficient to protect the information from unauthorized disclosure; or
(3) The program is required by statute.
SECTION I - GENERAL
c. Special Access Programs that are managed or funded by MDA require a review by the MDA Special Access Program
Executive Committee (SAPEC). The single point of contact within MDA for information concerning establishment of SAPs is
MDA/EIS, the Director of the Special Access Program Central Office (SAPCO). When the need for special access protection is perceived, early coordination with MDA/EIS is critical so that steps can be taken to obtain MDA and OSD approval and to develop the necessary classification guidance, security procedures, contractual vehicles and funding authority. Any instance in which a SAP has been established without proper authority shall be reported promptly to MDA/EIS, who will coordinate appropriate actions.
d. Special security classification levels for specific BMDS Sensors Program components have been reviewed for consistency in conjunction with overarching BMDS security classification guidance. Cooperative efforts may be sensitive and warrant protection.
See the BMDS SCG and related specific program or weapon system SCGs for additional guidance to facilitate horizontal protection of
BMDS information.
SECTION II – TOPICS OF CLASSIFICATION
Security classification levels for specific BMDS Sensors Program components have been reviewed for consistency in conjunction with overarching BMDS security classification guidance. Cooperative efforts may be sensitive and warrant protection. See the BMDS
SCG and related specific program or weapon system SCGs for additional guidance to facilitate horizontal protection of BMDS information.
The Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs) and COBRA DANE (CD) Radar are existing sensors that have been modified to perform the BMD mission in addition to their current legacy missions. In addition to this guide, the CD is jointly covered by the
COBRA DANE Security Classification and Declassification Guide (SCDG). Similarly the UEWR is also covered by the Air Force
Space Command Ground-Based Radar Missile Warning Systems (GBRMWS) SCG. In the event of a conflict, the existing COBRA
DANE or UEWR Security Classification Guide takes precedence unless the topic is unique to Ballistic Missile Defense. If the topic is unique to Ballistic Missile Defense, this guide takes precedence with regard to the topic.
All Unclassified information must be reviewed and officially approved for public release prior to its release outside the Department of
Defense. Unless otherwise noted in the “DECLASS” column, all classified items will remain classified for twenty-five (25) years from the date of the creation of the new document.
100 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CLASS REASON DECLASS REMARKS
101 Identified Research and Development
(R&D) BMD Radar program limitations
101.1 R&D activities tied to capability
shortfall
S
See
Remarks
1.4 (e),(g) 25 YR For vulnerabilities refer to Topic 201.
SECTION II – TOPICS OF CLASSIFICATION
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CLASS REASON DECLASS REMARKS
101.2 R&D activities not tied to BMDS
capability shortfall
U, S, TS
See
Remarks
(Ch 1)
1.4 (e),(g) 25 YR Classify information based on criteria throughout this directive. (Ch 1)
102 Critical Program Information (CPI) U, S
See
Remarks
1.4 (a), (c),(e),(g)
25 YR Short titles are UNCLASSIFIED.
SECRET when specific descriptions or justifications of CPI are revealed and/or if mission capabilities or system performance are revealed.
103 Sensor fielding
103.1 Exploratory or planning dates for
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for supporting BMDS
U
See
Remarks
1.4 (e),(g) Quarter and year.
103.2 Exploratory or planning dates for
Full Operational Capability (FOC) for
Supporting BMDS
U
See
Remarks
1.4 (e),(g) Quarter and year.
103.3 Definitive (Month, Day, Year)
planned IOC and FOC dates
S
See
Remarks
1.4 (g) 25 YR After declaration, the dates may be officially released and UNCLASSIFIED.
SECTION II – TOPICS OF CLASSIFICATION
NOTE 1. This section applies to all classification topics where potential vulnerabilities are possible. BMDS Element level vulnerability analysis will be performed at the TOP SECRET level. If determined that the component level vulnerability is also an element level vulnerability, then the component level vulnerability is TOP SECRET. (See Attachment B for Vulnerability definition).
NOTE 2. A vulnerability is considered mitigated if the mitigation is either:
a) Deployed for vulnerabilities that exist in a deployed capability.
b) Under configuration management for a vulnerability in a BMDS architecture, element, or component under development.
All Unclassified information must be reviewed and officially approved for public release prior to its release outside the Department of
Defense. Unless otherwise noted in the “DECLASS” column, all classified items will remain classified for twenty-five (25) years
The Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs) and COBRA DANE (CD) Radar are existing sensors that have been modified to perform the BMD mission in addition to their current legacy missions. In addition to this guide, the CD is jointly covered by the
COBRA DANE Security Classification and Declassification Guide (SCDG). Similarly the UEWR is also covered by the Air Force
Space Command Ground-Based Radar Missile Warning Systems (GBRMWS) SCG. In the event of a conflict, the existing COBRA
DANE or UEWR Security Classification Guide takes precedence unless the topic is unique to Ballistic Missile Defense. If the topic is
200 System Information
SYSTEMS INFORMATION CLASS REASON DECLASS REMARKS
201 BMD Radars Vulnerabilities See
Remarks
This section applies to all classification topics where potential vulnerabilities are possible.
For vulnerabilities refer to Note 1 and
Note 2.
SECTION II – TOPICS OF CLASSIFICATION
SYSTEMS INFORMATION CLASS REASON DECLASS REMARKS
201.1 Information that reveals system level
vulnerabilities for the BMDS mission
TS 1.4 (e),(g) 25 YR If vulnerability is identified, BMDS
Element level vulnerability analysis will be performed at the TOP SECRET level.
If determined that the component level vulnerability is also an element level vulnerability, then the component level vulnerability is TOP SECRET. (See
Attachment B for Vulnerability definition).
201.2 Information that reveals BMD sensor
limitations that do not qualify as system level vulnerabilities for the BMDS mission
S
See
Remarks
1.4 (e),(g) 25 YR This includes any data, analysis and/or compilation that shows a degradation or limitation of mission performance / capabilities.
See attachment B for limitation definition.
202 Capabilities to support the BMDS S
See
Remarks
1.4 (e),(g) 25 YR See attachment B for capabilities definition.
203 Sensor technology program…
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